

PHILIPPINE HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION

HISTORICAL BULLETIN

Volume XII



Numbers 1 - 4

January - December

1968

USAFIP, NL REPORT OF OPERATIONS
AND OTHER PAPERS

VOLUME I

PHILIPPINE HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION
Founded 1955

HONORARY OFFICERS:

President Ferdinand E. Marcos
Honorary President

Dr. Francisco Dalupan
Honorary Vice-President

Prof. Gabriel F. Fabella, Sr.
President Emeritus

BOARD OF CONSULTANTS:

Dr. Teodoro A. Agoncillo

Dr. Encarnacion Alzona

Prof. Esteban A. de Ocampo

Prof. Nicolas Zafra

Dr. Gregorio F. Zaide

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR:

Prof. Jorge L. Revilla



AMBETH R. OCAMPO



President Ferdinand E. Marcos and Dr. Jacobo C. Clave at Malacañang with some of the members of the Board of Governors of the PHILIPPINE HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION. From left to right: Mauro Garcia, the Editor, Dr. Pedro A. Gagelon'a, Dr. Gregorio, F. Zaide, President Emeritus Gabriel F. Fabella, Sr., and Professor Emeritus Nicolas Zafra.



The author, Col. Robert H. Arnold, crouching in front of a Japanese Tunnel at Tangadan, Abra after fall of the fortress to the 15th Infantry USAFIP, NL on April 17, 1945,



THE APPROVED PATCH FOR THE USAFIP, NORTH LUZON

Legend:

BLACK BASE represents the horrible days during the Japanese regime.

FLAME AT CENTER (Yellow) represents the symbolic light of liberty aglow in the hearts of those who remained with USAFIP, NL.

FIVE RAYS (Yellow) represent the five regiments which operated during the Japanese days and eventually aided in the liberation of North Luzon.

USAFIP, NL
REPORT OF OPERATIONS
AND OTHER PAPERS
VOLUME I

Edited

By

Celedonio A. Ancheta, M.A., LL.B., Litt.D.
Commanding Officer, 15th Infantry, USAFIP, NL, 1946
Fulbright Exchange Professor to Southern Illinois University
1967-1968

Copyright, 1976
by
PHILIPPINE HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form without permission in writing from the publisher, except by a reviewer who may quote brief passages in a review to be printed in a magazine or newspaper.

Library of Congress Catalog Card No. _____

Printed 1976

Published in the Philippines by
Philippine Historical Association
M a n i l a

DEDICATION

This volume is humbly dedicated to all the heroes
of the Battle of Bessang Pass, living and
dead, as a tribute to their
sacrifices and valor
for their country's
honor.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

The editor wishes to acknowledge his indebtedness to the U.P. Social Science Research Council for the two research grants and to the Southern Illinois University for two other research grants which enabled him in making researches from the military records of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and also in the National Archives of the United States in Washington, D.C. and in the Modern Military Records Division in Alexandria, Virginia, without which it would be impossible for this volume to come out.

This volume *USAFIP, NL REPORTS OF OPERATIONS AND OTHER PAPERS*, Volume I is the first of a series of ten volumes which will include the *Reports of Operations of Gen. J. M. Wainright*, *Reports of Operations of Filipino Generals*, and *Reports of Operations of the Japanese Imperial Army*.

It is the opinion of the editor that these volumes may serve the interest of scholars and researchers who plan to write on the history of World War II in the Philippines. Without these documentary sources, no historian can adequately present an accurate account of the Second World War in the Philippines.

The editor also wishes to acknowledge the assistance of the Philippine Historical Association for financing the publication of this volume and to all his friends who encouraged him in the preparation of this work.

If there are any mistakes found in this volume, the responsibility lies with the editor. For which he sincerely begs the indulgence of his reader.

The Editor

GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE

RESEARCHER IDENTIFICATION

The researcher named below has duly applied to use records in the National Archives.

NAME	CARD NO.
Prof. C.A. Ancheta	812-217
SIGNATURE	VALID THROUGH
<i>C. Ancheta</i>	Dec 1968

The use of records is governed by published regulations and is not implied in possession of this card.

BY *[Signature]* 12/18/67
(Signature) (Date)

NOT TRANSFERABLE

NAR FORM 318, JULY 1965

INTRODUCTION

The main part of this volume is a documentary record of the achievements of five guerrilla regiments: the 11th, 14th, 15th, 66th, and 121st of the United States Army Forces in the Philippines, North Luzon (USAFIP, NL). Three of these—the 11th, 15th, and 121st—were commanded by American officers, while the other two (14th and 66th) were by Filipino officers. The COs of the battalions and companies were all Filipino officers. The overall commander of the USAFIP, NL, who graduated from West Point, was Colonel Russell W. Volckmann who escaped from Bataan after its fall, and now a retired Brigadier General of the Army of the United States. His staff officers were mostly Filipinos, most of whom after the war occupied the highest assignments in the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Many of them were promoted to the rank of generals. Some were former graduates of the Philippine Military Academy at the City of Baguio. A considerable number of the officers of the five regiments were graduates from the different ROTCs of the colleges and universities in the Philippines, and a few from the United States. The enlisted men were mostly volunteers from the civilian sector. There were many Philippine Army soldiers and a few Philippine Scouts who survived the "Death March," or who escaped from Bataan after the surrender, and joined the guerrilla movement subsequently. The USAFIP, NL was a Filipino guerrilla outfit with about ten American officers and American civilians, who were miners in Northern Luzon at the outbreak of the War in the Pacific, and who had no alternative but joined the resistance movement unless they wanted to be concentrated in a concentration camp of the Japanese Imperial Forces.

Naming a few of the Filipino officers who were members of the USAFIP, NL and who had reached the pinnacle of their military careers, or civilian life in the Government of the Republic of the Philippines after the war are the following: Major Ferdinand E. Marcos, now the President of the Republic

of the Philippines; former Congressman and later Secretary of the Department of Public Works and Communications, and a delegate of the Philippine Constitutional Convention, Lt. Antonio V. Raquiza; Col. Simeon Valdez (ret.), former Congressman from the 2nd District of Ilocos Norte; and S/Sgt. Esteban B. Cabanos, who is now the President of the Philippine Veterans Bank. Among the military personnel, we have the following: Major General Calixto Duque (deceased), who became the chief of staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines after the war; and Lieutenant Generals Alfonso Arellano (deceased) and Segundo Velasco, both became chiefs of staff (AFP) after the war.

After-Battle Report is an official document on the operation reports of the five regiments. The original manuscript was in mimeographed form of 213 pages, prepared by the Historical Record Section, United States Army Forces in the Philippines, North Luzon. It is a rare document that chronicles the most significant campaigns and battles of the USA-FIP, NL culminating in the decisive battle of Bessang Pass on June 14, 1945 which led to the surrender of General Yamashita, the "Tiger of Malaya," who had taken over the command of the Japanese Imperial Forces in the Philippines.

The successful operations of the USAFIP, NL against the forces of General Yamashita prove once more to the whole world the love for freedom and democracy of the Filipino people, and their hatred against bigotry, intolerance, and fascistic dictatorship imposed upon them against their free will and democratic way of life. The importance of this document is to bridge the gap that separates the five regiments that operated in the different sectors in North Luzon. It merges and unifies into one tactical operation the guerrilla movement, thus giving to those interested on guerrilla warfare a better picture of the strategic and tactical operations against the forces of General Yamashita.

There are unit histories of the five regiments which were prepared by their respective headquarters, but unfortunately, the 15th Infantry Regiment only had a written and fairly accurate and complete history. It gives a true picture of the courageous and valiant stand of the Filipino soldier against the implacable forces of Japanese imperialism in the Philippines.

Contribution of the People of Abra to the Defense and Liberation of the Philippines was prepared by Colonel Robert H. Arnold, AUSR first commanding officer of the 15th Infantry Regiment. The significance of this paper is that it gives more accurate account on the guerrilla movement in the Ilocos provinces, and the early beginnings of the 15th Infantry Regiment in the province of Abra. Colonel Arnold was the man who had fathered the first guerrilla movement in Abra and Ilocos Sur. Regardless of other accounts that were written on the guerrillas in North Luzon, on who was who among the leaders of the guerrilla movement in the Ilocos region, Colonel Arnold's name, supported by reliable records and by interviews with people who were associated with the guerrilla movement, would come out towering over all other guerrilla leaders in the Ilocos region.

Colonel Arnold was then in Ilocos Norte heading a unit that was setting up signal installations at Cape Bojeador when the Pacific war broke out on December 8, 1941 (Manila time). He was unable to proceed to Bataan in accordance to WPO-3 due to the sudden landing of the Japanese Imperial Forces in the Ilocos region, that established blockades on all avenues of escape from the Ilocos in the north to Bataan in the south. He was entirely cut off and isolated by the enemy from the units of the USAFFE that had already retreated to the the Bataan peninsula. Without lossing time, Colonel Arnold, who was then only a First Lieutenant attached to a signal company of the U. S. Army's Philippine Department, started immediately recruiting and organizing men for his guerrilla group in the later part of December, 1941 at the town of Lagangilang, Abra. Colonel Arnold, no doubt, was the first guerrilla leader who organized a resistance unit in Northern Luzon. He left the Philippines for the United States as a full army colonel only after he had accomplished and performed well with honor a mission which he had assumed without regret, in September following the surrender of General Yamashita and his battered forces. Colonel Arnold never thought of the dangers and perils on his life by being a guerrilla leader in the mountains and regions of North Luzon which were infested with the Japanese Imperial Forces. His paramount concern was his sense of responsibility, honor, dignity and duty as officer of the army of the United States, and also of his service to his country

and to the people of Ilocos region, who later on after the war adopted him as a son.

Colonel Primitivo C. Milan, Chief of the Office of Military History, GHQ, AFP, commenting on the battle of Bessang Pass, which could be aptly applied here as a fitting comment on the significance of the **After-Battle Report**, in a nutshell, has this to say:

In this campaign, which lasted for more than three months during the liberation of the Philippines in 1945, Filipino soldiers and "green" guerrillas direct from civilian life proved to the world that they could be organized, trained, and equipped, and fight to victory against a well-trained enemy strongly defending a mountainous portion of Filipino land.

C.A.A.

Philippine Christian College, Manila
University of the Philippines System
Diliman, Quezon City

HEADQUARTERS
USAFIP NORTH LUZON
CAMP SPENCER

10 November 1945

Subject: AFTER-BATTLE REPORT
Thru : CG, Luzon Area Command
To : CG, AFWESPAC

1. The following after-battle report covers the major operations of the USAFIP, NL, in the provinces of Ilocos Norte, Abra, Ilocos Sur, La Union, Mountain Province, Cagayan, Isabela, and Nueva Vizcaya from 9 January 1945 to 15 August 1945.

2. From the commencement of hostilities on D-Day, the five infantry regiments of this organization were heavily engaged in carrying out the missions assigned to it initially under Sixth Army. Attached with I Corps as an independent divisional unit and then later on with the XIV Corps, the USAFIP, NL had covered its various assigned areas as a unified command consisting of over 20,000 troops in the combat and special service echelons. In spite of various handicaps, it accomplished its missions to the satisfaction of higher quarters. With three regiments and supporting units committed in conjunction with the 32d Division (US), and the 6th Division (US), the USAFIP, NL was in the process of effecting the final coup d'grace of General Yamashita's beleaguered Army at the Tuccucan area, Benguet, Mt. Province, when armistice was declared.

3. The achievement of the USAFIP, NL forces in another unmistakable proof of the faith, loyalty, and patriotism of the Filipinos in the cause for which the Allied Nations fought this war. At Bessang Pass and in the many other fields of action the ultimate honor, indeed, belongs to the immortal Fil-Americans who died the glorious death so that the Philippines might be redeemed; and to those heroic and valiant men who kept the flame of Bataan and Corregidor ever aglow, never for a moment bowing their heads to the enemy during those dark periods of enemy occupation, belongs the gratitude and acclaim of the liberated peoples the world over.

(Sgd.) R. W. VOLCKMANN
Colonel, Inf AUS
Commanding

P R E F A C E

At 1900, 9 January 1945, the following self-explanatory radio message No. 41, in three parts, was received by Headquarters, USAFIP, NL:

Effective at once you and all elements of your organization are placed under the command of the Commanding General Sixth Army paren Lieutenant General Walter Krueger United States Army paren to whom you will report by radio using same code but transmitting and receiving on frequency four one five four point five KCS Code name Aurora RPT Aurora paren one half field paren call sign Sixth Army station is Fox William seven five Pd.

For your information during initial phase of the Luzon operation and until otherwise directed the Sixth Army has assumed control of and will direct the operations of all of our interior forces north of the line Palawig Point paren fifteen degrees twenty five minutes north one one nine degrees five five minutes east paren San Miguel paren fifteen degrees twenty-five minutes north one twenty degrees thirty-five minutes east paren Santa Rosa paren fifteen degrees twenty-five north one twenty degrees fifty-five minutes east paren Saimag paren fifteen degrees twenty-five minutes north one twenty-one degrees ten minutes east paren deseada point paren fifteen degrees ten minutes north one twenty one degrees thirty minutes east paren PD acknowledge PD.

What transpired soon after receipt of this significant message from Lieutenant General Walter Krueger, US Army, is briefly narrated in this modest work. The sources of every factual event are the official reports, journals, field orders, operational and administrative files available in the Headquarters, USAFIP, NL, at Camp Spencer.

This work is far from being comprehensive and complete. Only such vitally important and significant events which transpired during the offensive to wrest North Luzon from the enemy have been included herein for the benefit of students and pundits of military history. To avoid confusing the reader,

the narrative terminates before commencing detailed discussions of other equally important operations which meanwhile were actually in progress. However, an attempt has been made to keep the reader abreast with the situation then taking place in other sectors of the USAFIP, NL and such an attempt should not confuse nor detract him in the preceding chapters.

Printing paraphernalia does not allow a more elaborate inclosure of detailed maps; only such fundamental and important situation maps are reproduced herein. To obtain a clearer and more exhaustive study, it is necessary to consult all the voluminous files of reports and journals of the USAFIP, NL.

Ambeth Ocampo

PHILIPPINE HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION
HISTORICAL BULLETIN



Volume XII

January-December 1968

Numbers 1-4

CONTENTS

	Pages
DEDICATION	i
ACKNOWLEDGMENT	iii
INTRODUCTION	v
PREFACE	xi
After-Battle Report Prepared by the Historical Records Section, G-3, USAFIP, NL	1
Contribution of the People of Abra to the Defense and Liberation of the Philippines	Robert H. Arnold 203
Simeon A. Ola	216
Gregorio Aglipay	Simeon Mandac 234
Chinese Guerrillas	251
Josefa Llanes Escoda and her Agents	267
Three Lectures	Celedonio A. Ancheta 275
Glossary	303
Presidents of PHA	316

ILLUSTRATIONS *7 diagrams*


President Ferdinand E. Marcos			
with the PHA Board of Governors			<i>Frontispiece</i>
Robert H. Arnold			"
Approved Patch for the USAFIP, NL			"
			<i>Facing page</i>
Simeon A. Ola	"	"	216
Simeon Mandac	"	"	216
Alberto S. Aranzaso	"	"	217
Chinese Guerrilla Monuments	"	"	217
Illuminada A. Ramos	"	"	266
Victoria Paguyo	"	"	266
Diploma of Honor			267

M A P S

Pages

Area Covered by USAFIP, NL	305
Tangadan Operations	306
General Situation, 121st Infantry	307
The Break Through	308
Battle for Bessang Pass, 1st Phase	309
Battle for Bessang Pass, 3rd Phase	310
Battle for Bessang Pass, 5th Phase	311
Lepanto-Mankayan Operations	312
Bauko-Sabangan Operations	313
Disposition of Japanese Forces	314
General Situation, 15th Infantry	315

AFTER BATTLE REPORT



Part I (PRE-D-DAY SITUATION)

Chapter I

THE MISSION OF THE USAFIP, NL ON D-DAY

The strong driving force behind the organization of the USAFIP, NL, was the strong desire to build and create a force that is strong and adequate to effectively deal a crushing blow to the Japanese. To that end, Colonel Russell W. Volckmann, by persistent selection of experienced ex-soldiers and capable healthy civilians, completed the T/O of his five infantry regiments, in order that his forces by D-Day would have their maximum fighting power in gear. The selection, therefore, was started immediately when he assumed command of the scattered guerilla units under determined American and Filipino leaders. That was in June 1943.

By October 1944, after Colonel Volckmann had practically knitted together all available fighting units in North Luzon area, and had supplied and equipped them with all available arms and ammunition, he was ready for the greater acceleration of recruitment and enlistment of men to complete his five regiments. By this time, also, indications had been forthcoming about the need of an all-out offensive in the North Luzon area or sector, to be undertaken simultaneously with projected American (U.S.) Army operations in the Luzon area.

Following orders from HQ, SWPA, regarding this projected all-out offensive, Volckmann's HQ finally fixed January 9, 1945 as D-Day for the USAFIP, NL. D-Day missions were drawn outlining for the five infantry regiments a series of activities designed to cripple, if not to permanently incapacitate, all enemy capabilities in North Luzon.

The most important objectives of the mission of the five regiments were:

1. Maximum demolition of bridges, culverts, and defiles, between Laoag and Tagudin, between Baguio and Bontoc, between Balete Pass and Bagabag, between Baguio and Bauang,

and on the Kennen Road, between Bontoc and Kiangnan, between Tagudin and Cervantes, and between Narvacan and Lagangilang;

2. Destruction of enemy wire communications;
3. Destruction of ammunition, fuel, and other supply dumps;
4. Destruction of planes concealed in dispersal areas;
5. Destruction of convoys and troop trains;
6. Encouragement of patriotic people under local leadership to "unleash maximum violence against the enemy"; and
7. Destruction upon proper order of railroad tracks and stations.

When D-Day came on January 9, 1945, all missions were practically accomplished despite enemy activities to nullify the devastating effect of what the USAFIP, NL had done to cripple their communications, installations, depots, dumps, convoys, bivouac areas, outposts, and garrisons.

Definitely, the following results were tallied on D-Day:

1. A majority of principal concrete and steel bridges and culverts on road sections specified in the D-Day Orders were destroyed and rendered unusable for vehicular traffic;
2. All road sections mentioned in the Orders were blocked and their use denied to enemy transportation;
3. All wire communications between principal enemy concentrations were cut and carried away, isolating troops from one garrison to another;
4. All located and known supply dumps were blasted;
5. All accessible planes in dispersal areas were either destroyed or put out of working order;
6. Trains and convoy trucks and wagons moving on the roads were ambushed and burned;
7. The people arose en masse either to join the USAFIP, NL forces to openly render aids to the guerrilleros, to desert areas where Japanese were concentrating, to help in the sabotage and destruction of enemy installations and supply dumps; or to hamper as much as they could the enemy movements. This contributed tremendously to the effective paralyzation and isolation of enemy troops garrisoned or concentrated in strategic towns and points.

In order that these various accomplishments of the USA-

FIP, NL could be maintained to render ineffective all enemy counter-moves, the five regiments moved out from their mountain CP's into strategic positions in towns and barrios previously liberated by them from Japanese control. This brought to the maximum the ability to deny to the enemy the use of the roads and highways of the remaining lines of communications, of landing fields, depots, and of centers of distribution and supplies.

The following troops disposition for D-Day, therefore, have in mind the primary concern of denying to the enemy any maneuver or counter-move (refer to figure):

15th Inf RCP	Nueva Era, Ilocos Norte
1st Bn CP	Vintar
2nd Bn CP	Batac
3rd Bn CP	Magsingal
121st Inf RCP	Bacnotan, La Union
1st Bn CP	San Juan
2nd Bn CP	Rosario
3rd Bn CP	Bauguen
66th Inf RCP	Camp Kilim
	Kapangan, Benguet
1st Bn CP	Camp Valhalla
2nd Bn CP	Itogon
3rd Bn CP	Atok
11th Inf RCP	Tuao, Cagayan
1st Bn CP	Burnay, Ifugao
2nd Bn CP	Rizal, Cagayan
3rd Bn CP	Tanudan, Kalinga
14th Inf RCP	La Torre, Nueva Vizcaya
1st Bn CP	Kabikalan, Isabela
2nd Bn CP	Pieza, Ifugao
3rd Bn CP	Binalian, Nueva Vizcaya

These five regiments, in the highest spirit of victory and in possession of all important strategic positions and cross-roads controlling the main arteries of commerce and transportation in the entire North Luzon area, were all alerted for D-Day on January 4, 1945.

They were now ready to deal the enemy the death-dealing

blow that will end a cruel and tyrannical occupation of northern Luzon. Armed with an array of captured Japanese and American firearms but possessed with only the elementary knowledge of the art and the science of military tactics, these brave and hardy North Luzon guerrilleros anxiously awaited the time when they could unleash furiously a coordinated simultaneous assault against all Japanese forces who were then concentrated in North Luzon, north of the general W-E line from Lingayen through San Jose to Baler on the Pacific. This attack was the culmination of a series of frequent and isolated sorties against the enemy for a period of three bloody and restless years (1942-1944), which set off the fuse of the big dynamite that blasted forever the ambitious dreams of the Japanese militarists.

Chapter II

LIAISON WITH SWPA AND SUBMARINE LANDINGS

One of the biggest handicaps responsible for the rather hazy and incoherent information about the the nature, scope, strength, and activities of the USAFIP, NL, was its miserable lack of radio communication. Before various guerrilla units were brought under one unified command, there were attempts to make contact with SWPA for the purpose of relaying enemy intelligence information. As the Japanese increased their activities and mopping-up operations, however, radio equipments became increasingly difficult to obtain, and communication had to be relayed through field agents and by special arrangements with guerrilla units operating in the South.

As early as 1943, when Colonels Moses and Noble were still in radio communication with GHQ, SWPA, it was evident that the guerrillas of Northern Luzon were ordered "not to engage in offensive operation against the enemy except where it was necessary for defense, and were assigned the primary mission of obtaining intelligence on enemy disposition and activities." These instructions were taken to mean that no large scale operations should be undertaken in the area covered by the USAFIP, NL until further orders from SWPA. Except for this policy which instructed unit commanders to "lay low" there is no existing or known record of other major policies enunciated by SWPA which had direct bearing on the guerrillas until the earlier part of 1944, when it became apparent that the Philippines was getting nearer in the time table or schedule of a United States Army invasion.

As a means to stop the "developing mental aversion to the enemy" of the units of the USAFIP, NL in mid-1944, limited attacks for "training purposes" and securing of arms were authorized and ordered—there were raids on puppet bureau of constabulary garrisons and Japanese-controlled outposts. All of these were undertaken for the purpose of securing arms and

lowering the morale of the Bureau of Constabulary; consequently the enemy disbanded these disillusioned "soldiers." Many of these operations against the enemy may never have reached the proper intelligence channels of SWPA because of the lack of radio communication then. To effect the transmission of intelligent data, it was necessary to contact other guerrilla units who were supposed to be in contact with GHQ, SWPA, especially those operating in the Visayan Islands and Mindanao. Field agents were sent to Manila and the Bicol regions with a view to appraise the Intelligence Section of SWPA of the activities of the North Luzon guerrillas; however, it was found that practically not one of the units in the South had facilities to relay regular and reliable intelligence reports. Other guerrilla units which were able to make contacts with SWPA were giving false and inaccurate report of operations occurring in the area of the USAFIP, NL. It is believed that many of the reports sent through field agents never reached their destination especially those that had to be radioed to Australia.

The USAFIP, NL HQ attempted to build a radio transmitter in order to establish its own communication link with GHQ, SWPA, and a wide search for every kind of radio part was made in North Luzon which proved fruitless, so that for a long time important and vital intelligence reports found a bottleneck in the Intelligence Section of the USAFIP, NL's mountain hideout. The initial radio contact was effected in August, 1944 when Lt. Carlos Ancheta and Sergeant Pete Luz reported to the Headquarters from Major Lapham's guerrilla units. It seemed that Major Anderson who was able to maintain radio contact with GHQ, SWPA, upon receipt of some of the intelligence reports made by our field agents, reported the existence of the USAFIP, NL to GHQ, SWPA. In response to the clamor for more intelligence reports, SWPA instructed Major Lapham to send these two radio technicians to Headquarters, USAFIP, NL. The two-man radio team went to work immediately, but their set lasted only for a week. Meanwhile, the services of two more radio technicians from Manila had been secured to improve on the pack power of the radio set of Ancheta and Luz. After a few days of tinkering and a generous amount of resourcefulness, a 75-watt transmitter was soon made which took its power from a waterfall near the mountain hideout of

GHQ, USAFIP, NL, and a constant interchange of messages was made possible--deemed satisfactory until better radio equipment was received via submarine. Later developments of the war were relayed and appropriate orders with direct bearing on the progress of operations was circulated to the area where the USAFIP NL was operating.*

Submarine Landings

On August 27, 1944, the US Submarine *Stingray* landed in Bangui, Ilocos Norte, carrying an intelligence party of fifteen Filipinos working under the Intelligence Section of GHQ, SWPA. In spite of the constant sea and land patrols by the Japanese garrisoned near Bangui, Ilocos Norte, the submarine was successful in its blind landing by forcing its way through coral reefs and eluding Japanese surface vessels that combed the area in search for the craft. This party, led by Lt. Jose V. Valera (Captain Joe) was able to unload several tons of arms, ammunitions, medicines, and radio supplies. In the face of innumerable odds against the enemy and natural elements, the party was able to evacuate its landed stuffs to the mountains. Within a period of one and one-half months, the party tried to contact guerrilla units in the North and also made reports to GHQ, SWPA about enemy situations in that area. In fact, it was through the aid of Valera's radio equipment that Gabu Airfield, then operated and controlled by the Japanese, was first raided on October 18, 1944 at 0630 hours by six waves of Allied planes which bombed and strafed the airfield. The enemy were taken by surprise and were not able to fly a single plane. Their eight 77-mm AA guns did not have a chance to fire and many of the Japanese planes were burned or wrecked.

Evidently, Valera's party was assigned the key mission to furnish SWPA with an accurate intelligence report of guerrilla activities and an up-to-date enemy information that could be obtained in North Luzon at that time. It is interesting to note that this landing party was in search of Governor Roque Ablan of Ilocos Norte (Governor-elect as of 1941) and his units who were believed to be still operating extensively somewhere in North Luzon. An attempt to trace the where-

* See Signal Annex.

abouts of Governor Ablan led the Valera party to contact the units of the 121st Inf at Dumalneg in the later part of October. After Lt. Valera had made sure from Lt. Col. John O'Day, (then a Captain) that the 121st Inf was one of the most extensive guerrilla outfit then operating in North Luzon, he offered to help the USAFIP, NL by securing the needed arms, ammunitions, and medicines from SWPA. Accompanied by elements of the 121st Infantry and Colonel O'Day, the landing party proceeded to Piddig and from there, were escorted to Camp V via the USAFFE Trail through Abra, Ilocos Sur, and La Union. On the 4th of December, 1944, a radiogram was received from General Courtney attaching the landing party to USAFIP, NL. Lt. Valera and members of his party were apportioned to the five Combat Regiments and Lt. Valera himself was designated Regimental S-2, 15th Inf, PA.

On December 20, 1944, a radiogram from General Douglas MacArthur was received commending Lt. Valera and party for "resolute devotion to duty that permitted you to get through and preserve your equipments. It was a splendid achievement. Sgd MacArthur."

In late October, 1944, word was received from SWPA that a submarine would put in at one of two designated points on the Ilocos coast during the early part of November. Darigayos, Luna, La Union, and San Esteban, Ilocos Sur were selected as the rendezvous points. In spite of the fact that all signals were correctly displayed, the submarine never appeared. (Because of later activities of the submarine, it is believed that it could not find the rendezvous point on this try.) Another rendezvous was arranged for late November. Darigayos became compromised on the day of the expected landing and the submarine, USS Gar, surfaced off San Esteban. When Lt. Col. Barnett paddled out to meet the submarine, the skipper asked Barnett if he was Volckmann. When Barnett stated who he was, the skipper asked where Volckmann was. Barnett replied that Volckmann was waiting down at Darigayos. The skipper said he thought he had surfaced at Darigayos! Luckily, he had made the mistake of surfacing at the alternate rendezvous point. The "Gar" unloaded 20 tons of supplies, four American officers (Capt. William Vaughn, Capt. William Farrell, Lt. Fred Behan, and Lt. Donald Jami-

son), two American enlisted men, and 10 Filipino radio operators and demolition men. In early December, the "Gar" returned and landed 25 tons of supplies at Darigayos. Another landing for a small amount of supplies was scheduled for late December but it was cancelled "due to operational conditions."

Chapter III

ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY IN NORTH LUZON

(As of 4 January 1945)

The invasion of Leyte in October, 1944 and the allied bombing attacks on Aparri, Gaba Airfield, and other strategic targets about the middle of that month produced various effects on enemy troop movements of the entire length and breadth of Luzon. Although an increased aerial activity was expected by the Japanese, the location and strength of their forces did not change considerably. A close table of enemy information was made by USAFIP, NL through its elaborate and efficient network of secret agents and grapevine runner communications. After subsequent supplies from SWPA had been received by submarine, radio installations were rigged up in various strategic places (See Signal Annex) to funnel G-2 reports to HQ, USAFIP, NL and thence to SWPA.

The Japanese high command expected that as an inevitable consequence of their naval defeat, the Americans would follow up their success in Leyte with a large-scale invasion of Luzon. As to where and when the blow would come, the Japanese were kept guessing. One thing was certain: that General Yamashita's 14th Army was frantically gearing up to make a determined stand in Luzon. In fact, Yamashita had the cheek to say that now (this was about January, 1945) "he had MacArthur right on his very lap" or words to that effect.

As of the latter part of December, 1944, a few days before D-Day, the big map of North Luzon was dotted with enemy concentrations as follows:

At La Union, a heavy concentration of the enemy was to be found in San Fernando and almost all of the towns bordering the coast-line along the axis of Hwy No. 3. Approximately, 22,500 Japanese—Army and Navy personnel—were in the province at this time and one-third of these were bivouacked in San Fernando and Poro Peninsula. In fact, the 19th Tora

Division and the QM Section, Western Division, 14th Area Army HQ had just landed in San Fernando from Korea, Japan, and a great bulk of their installations including food, ammo, and supply dumps were destroyed when the Allied fleet bombarded San Fernando late in December, the first week of January, to screen the landing in Lingayen.

Other Japanese concentrations in La Union as of December, were:

San Fernando, La Union

Poro	1,300 Inf, 200 Arty
Camansi	200 Inf
Carlatan	600 QMS
Santiago	500 Navy

Bauang, La Union

Bacuit	200 Inf
	6,120 Mixed Units
Vic. Naguillian and Burgos .	6,000 " "
Aringay	1,000 " "
Sta. Barbara	1,000 " "
Tubao	200 Inf
Damortis	2,000 Inf
Rosario Central and Vic ...	6,000 Inf & Arty.
Camp I (Cannon Rd.)	2,000 Mixed Units
Rabun	200 Inf
Sto. Tomas	1,000 Inf

Anti-aircraft and naval guns were installed at Poro Peninsula and San Fernando to indicate that the Japanese had intended to avail themselves the use of the port facilities thereat. Fuel dumps and a number of radio and radar stations were located at Poro, San Fernando, La Union, and nearby localities. The Baguio-Naguillian Road, Hwy No. 9, was used extensively and heavily guarded as it was the main avenue of vehicular traffic from the coastal regions to Baguio and vital Hwy No. 11 (Mountain Trail). The railroad line between San Fernando and Dagupan was put exclusively under military control and Hwy No. 3 and Kennon Road bustled with heavy troop movements.

In Ilocos Sur, the Japanese had only a negligible force from Vigan down to Tagudin. Small garrison detachments were

found at Sulvec, Sta. Maria, San Esteban, Bayogao, Bitalag, Candon, and Nagbunkel. They were transient and were easily vulnerable to harrassment by guerrilla unit. In fact, on D-Day, the Japanese had completely relinquished their hold on Hwy No. 3 from Bitalag to Narvacan. North of Vigan from Bantay to Cabugao, there were still remnants of the enemy especially around Currimao and Salomague which afforded port facilities to a certain extent. Those forces were whittled away and finally had to evacuate coastal towns into Abra, where the Japanese from Ilocos Norte were driven southward. The estimated strength of the enemy on December 20 was a little less than 450 Infantry. Only Suyo and Cervantes along Hwy No. 4 remained in Japanese hands until actual operations were brought to bear on them later on.

Ilocos Norte, approximately 500 Japanese were distributed along Hwy No. 3 from Badoc to Laoag and Gabu Airstrip. It appeared that as a result of the repeated bombing of allied planes of Gabu and the constant harrassment of raids by the USAFIP, NL forces from Bangui down to Laoag, the Japanese were prepared to consolidate and join their comrades at Abra.

It was soon definitely established that General Araki's Brigade had retired into Bangued and fortified the high grounds of Tangadan between Pidigan and Sulvec. His strength was enhanced as minor units rejoined him from the north and the south. For a time, it was thought not improbable that the Japanese were keeping the Bangued-Balbalasang Road open so that they could easily withdraw into Kalinga if Tangadan became indefensible. But as the operations progressed, they followed the Abra River Valley to Cervantes when their defenses crumbled at Tangadan.

In the Mountain Province, the densest concentration was at Baguio and its environs. All strategic localities along the Naguilian Road, Kennon Road, and the Mountain Trail from Baguio to Bontoc were infested with the retreating enemy. An idea of their distribution may be perceived from a section of the Intelligence summary of December 26 to January 1, 1945:

Mountain Province:

During the period, the following enemy disposition were reported:

Camp 3 Kennon Road	15 Inf
Camp 4 " "	25 Inf
Camp 6 " "	30 Inf
Camp 7 " "	35 Inf
Benguet Consolidated Mining Co. .	20 Inf
Eastern School, Guisad, Baguio ...	1,850 Inf
South Cottage Osmeña Residence, Baguio	681 Inf
Home Sweet Home, Baguio	500 Marines
Belgian Fathers' Convent	
City Store House, City	
Camp, Baguio	8 Inf
Heald Lumber Co., Baguio	2,500 Inf
Pacdal, Baguio	500 Inf
Teachers' Camp, Baguio	4,935 Sick
	75 Inf
Irisan Bridge, Baguio	19 Inf
BAL Station, Baguio	25 Inf
Quezon Hill, Baguio	50 AC
	8 Inf
Camp Holmes, Trinidad	500 Inf
Trinidad Stock Farm	150 Inf
Trinidad Girls Dormitory	500 Inf
KP 14, Acop's Place, Mt. Trail	200 MT.
KP 30, Mountain Trail	9 MT.
KP 52, " "	10 MT.
KP 67, " "	20 Inf
KP 72, " "	30 Inf
KP 90, " "	200 Inf
Bontoc " "	500 Inf
Sabangan " "	100 Inf
Banaue	500 MU
Ilocos Norte	
Laoag	1,600 Inf
San Nicolas	400 Inf
Ilocos Sur	
Cabuagao	330 Inf
Lapog	160 Navy
Cabanglutan	150 Inf
Solot-Solot	150 Inf
Malamin	1,000 MU

Santa Catalina	500 Inf
Solvec	135 Inf
San Antonio	300 Inf
Tagudin	100 Inf
Suyo	630 Inf

A b r a

Tangadan	190 Inf
Bangued	2,000 Inf

Isabela

Echague	7,000 Inf
Garit Airfield	5,000 Navy
Ilagan	4,000 Inf
Tumauini	2,200 Inf

In Cagayan, the Japanese were located in the following places with estimated strength as follows:

Camalaniugan Central	2,500 MU
Bantay, Camalaniugan	2,000 Inf
Baculod, "	2,400 Inf & Cav.
Gango, "	650 Inf & Cav.
Gattaran Central	4,300 Inf & Cav.
Guising, Gattaran	1,000 Inf
Nabaccayan, "	800 Inf
Capisayan, "	900 Inf
Cumao, "	1,000 Inf

The largest distribution of enemy troops in Nueva Vizcaya on December 26 was reported as follows:

Bayombong	3,670 Inf, Cav, SC
Bambang	3,000 Inf
Malasin and Dupax	300 Inf

All told, on D-Day minus 7, it may be safe to say that conservatively speaking, there were no less than 85 to 90 thousand Japanese troops in North Luzon at that time. This number may have been swelled up by the retreat of the Central Luzon forces of the enemy as offensive action accelerated after the fall of Balete Pass, San Fernando, and Baguio.

Enemy Capabilities

It was definitely established that the Japanese Navy which had stalked Philippine waters had disappeared. The indefa-

tigable Allied air force had erased enemy vestige of air power. In Luzon, the enemy's mechanized units were pitifully battered after its initial engagement with a far superior and highly mobile force at Pangasinan and Central Luzon. In the open terrain, the Japanese dared not raise a finger to challenge the mighty US mechanized units with the puny and feeble fire-power that the Japanese could effectively muster. Japanese artillery or what remained after the wreckage of naval and aerial bombardment was doubtless negligible and ineffectual. Aside from the fact that the enemy's guns were of light calibre and they had a miserably limited supply of them inadequate to make artillery concentrated fire count with a punch, they were also obsolete. Against a tough, highly fire-powered, armored, mobile and light force—an honest-to-goodness modern army—the outclassed Japs in North Luzon were desperately hopeless.

Yet, they still had an army, and the individual Jap soldier in all his fanatical, chauvinistic qualities remaining intact was ordered to heave up all his antiquated weapons, available armaments and supplies, and scamper and hide in the hills of the Cordillera Central.

Here, indeed, was his instinctive solution to his fast disintegrating forces in Luzon. Cognizant of the tough and merciless punishment he was suffering in the water, land, and air battles, and the scant and meager supply of all essential food, ammunition, war materials, and reinforcement as a result of his forced blockade, the mountains were his only means of escape.

North Luzon with its mountainous terrain could make him hold out and offer a protracted, tough war. Here, mechanized units could not move freely as in the open terrain. Roads available for operational purposes were only confined to the Ilocos coastal regions (Hwy #3) and along the west side of the Cagayan River extending north to south (Hwy #5). The middle axis of operation was the Mountain Trail (Hwy #11) extending from Baguio up north towards Bontoc. Hwy #4 traverses the rugged Ilocos and Cordillera Central ranges from west to east linking Hwys No. 3, No. 11, and No. 5. Except for these highways, there are a few other second-class roads but have little strategic value. To the Mountain Province,

therefore, the greater bulk of Yamashita's 14th Army were calculated to retreat with whatever light armaments they could carry along.

From the disposition of the enemy's troops on D-Day, his capabilities were mainly:

1. To defend Tangadan — an entrance to the Abra River Valley — so that his troops may withdraw from Ilocos Sur and Ilocos Norte to the east (Apayao and Kalinga).
2. To defend San Fernando, La Union; to defend the coast-line from Bangui to Damortis with special stress on organized localities like Tangaoan, Abra, Suyo, Ilocos Sur, San Fernando, La Union, and Bauang, La Union;
3. To defend Cagayan Valley from a landing on the north;
4. To defend Balet Pass;
5. To defend Rosario-Damortis line protecting the approaches to Baguio;
6. Defend Isabela and prevent landing of para-troopers thereat;
7. To execute delaying actions in successive positions by occupying and defending strategic mountain passes and possible avenues of approach to the Cordilleras and the Cagayan Valley.
8. To withdraw to the Cordilleras for a final stand.

All enemy movements during this period indicated that the enemy meant to go up to the mountainous sub-provinces of Benguet and Bontoc and make a final stand there in order to stick it out and prolong the war by possibly making the assaulting troops war-weary with increased casualties, deny friendly troops the use of mechanized units, and take advantage of topography and adverse weather conditions.

What the USAFIP, NL forces could do and actually did, considering the capabilities of the enemy with respect to fighting a war where the mountains and bad weather played a crucial and important role is a saga — narrated in the following chapters — that will never be forgotten. Mountain fighting is a forte to the guerrilla outfit composed of sturdy and courageous Ilocano and Igorot ex-servicemen, volunteers, and adventurers. With many of its officers trained and schooled in military science and tactics equipped with modern high-

powered military weapons far superior to the enemy's; the 20,000 guerrillas had everything on their side.

Finally, the following remark is quoted from an intelligence summary report prepared by G-2, USAFIP, NL in the second week of December, 1944, as follows:

The Japanese in Vigan were telling the people there and in Bantay that the Japs have been able to encircle the American forces in Leyte; that on account of this encirclement the Americans will die of starvation; that around 350 battleships of the Americans have been sunk by the Japs without any losses on their side. The civilians however, were informed of the truth by the radio news being circulated to different units by unit commanders of the USAFIP, NL.

The Japs in Candon suspected that arms were landed somewhere in the Ilocos Coast. They questioned civilian prisoners if they knew of any landing of arms.

The Japs were suspicious of all male civilians especially able-bodied ones. They suspected them to be bolomen and USAFIP guerrilleros. They also suspected young ladies to be WAS members. Anybody caught by the Japs was sure to be killed unless he had in his possession a pass issued by the Japs that he worked for them.

The Japs show decreasing morale as evidenced by the fact that they do all sorts of barbarisms—rape women and massacre civilians ruthlessly to avenge their decreasing integrity of imminent defeat. They also commandeer food supplies by force and without pay. It was also observed that units departing for other stations are jittery and nervous for fear they be sent to the hottest spot. Quoting the exact words of the Japs, "The Americans may come but they will find very few Filipinos" is a flat admission of the fact that they have knowledge of the coming of Allied forces to liberate the Philippines.

Part II (THE MAJOR OPERATIONS)

Chapter IV

SAN FERNANDO-BACSIŁ OPERATIONS 121st INFANTRY, USAFIP, NL

I. The Terrain

The San Fernando-Bacsil operations took place on a rolling country of low foot-hills branching off from the Cordillera Central, and running generally along the La Union sea coast in a north-south direction. From these hill ranges approximately 7 to 8 kms. southeast of San Fernando town, a spur runs to the northwest to the mouth of Oaig Creek (803.5-2012.8). Between this salient, on its south side and the China Sea, lies San Fernando (803.5-2010.8) guarding the gateway to the Ilocos provinces through which the National Road (Hwy No. 3) and the railroad pass to the north.

The series of almost parallel hill ranges, of which the Bacsil-Apaleng is the most prominent, offers a succession of corridors whose approaches open to the north and to the south. Where the spur breaks off from the Bacsil-Apaleng Range, the Oaig Creek spring to run in a west-northwest direction crossing the railroad track and emptying into the Carlatan Lagoon 2 1/2 km. north of the provincial capital.

The general formation of this river bed is a two-sided compartment opening to the north with lush bamboo thickets screening the valley. The hills to the east and south are heavily wooded with thick low tropical growths. There are a series of hills and hillocks on the south side of the stream, the more prominent of which being Insurrecto Hill (803.6-2010.3) and Mt. Dayaoen (805.5-2009.0), both overlooking San Fernando from the south-southeast direction. Between the river mouth before the railroad is crossed and the town, stands Reservoir Hill (803.7-2011.5) commanding the whole sweep of the river bed and directly bearing on the lower foot-hills across the valley.

Other streams rise from the Bacsil-Apaleng Ranges, one emptying into the sea at Lossoc (804.1-2003.9), 6 kms. south of San Fernando; and another to the south-southwest through Bauang to the sea at (803.8-200.9) at Baccuit, 10 kms. South of San Fernando on Hwy No. 3. The rest of the streams flow eastward then to the south to join the Naguilian River some 10 to 12 kms. to the southeast of San Fernando.

Hwy No. 3, passing through the town from the north to the south, branches to the east of Bauang (803.0-2000). On Hwy No. 9, through the town of Naguilian (812.3-2000.4) to Baguio. A short motor car road from Hwy No. 3 goes east at the San Fernando plaza, skirting the foot of the hills south of Oaig Creek and crossing the stream about 4 kms. (806.5-2010.5) away. The whole battle area from Carlatan Lagoon on the north to Bauang on the south, and from the sea on the west to the Naguilian River on the east, covers approximately 100 square kilometers of rough rolling country.

II. Enemy Situation

The defense of San Fernando Port was effected under the Hayashi Battalion, a conglomeration of all shipping units and marines, and other independent units that were then at San Fernando in January 1945. This unit had a strenght of some 3,000 front-line men, and were an independent unit from the 19th Division which landed at San Fernando on the 28th of December 1944, under the command of Lt. Gen. Osaki. At the beginning of the operations, all instal'ations of the 19th Division were landed at San Fernando and Carlatan areas. The ccomposition of the 19th Division were as follows:

The 73rd Inf, 75th Inf, 76th Inf, the 25th Mountain Artillery, 19th Engr Regt, 19th Transporting Regt, Investigation Co, Medical Co and 2 Field Hospitals.

The approximate strenght of this Division was 10,000 front-line troops. This Division, however, (except in one instance) did not actively participate in the defense of San Fernando.

In the earlier phase of the San Fernando operation, the overall command of the Japanese defenses was entrusted to a naval officer named Colonel Tatabe, who was later on relieved by Colonel Hayashi.

Aside from the 3,000 front-line units of this Hayashi unit;

there were possibly 2,000 rear area personnel who were unarmed. It appeared that after the 19th Division had landed in San Fernando, they were ordered to proceed to Baguio, leaving the Hayashi unit to defend the town, in view of the imminent landing of the Americans in Luzon.

As a consequence of the massive naval and air bombardments which screened the landing of American troops at Lingayen, Poro Peninsula, and San Fernando Japanese installations in these places were rendered impotent. As a consequence or an aftermath of this naval action, all the equipment, ammunition, and supplies landed in the vicinity of Carlatan, belonging to the 19th Division, were burned and destroyed.

At the start of operations, the Japanese occupied and fortified the prominent hills and ranges on both sides of the Oaig Creek at its crossing point with the San Fernando Camansi Road about 4 kms. to the East. Gun emplacements were also located on Reservoir Hill (803.7-2011.5) between the river mouth and San Fernando. All these emplacements and prepared lines of defense commanded the northern approaches of the river valley and the corridors running north to south. All the tactical and strategic advantages of these natural obstacles were actually exploited by the Japanese.

All the guns and firearms that they could muster, from the 150-mm, 105-mm, 75-mm to the smallest bore Japanese rifle available, all the ammunitions that they could afford to get from the bulk that was destined for their main army in the Mountain Province and the Cagayan Valley, were used in the defense of San Fernando. They garrisoned and armed to the teeth these perennial hills and valleys, giving emphasis in their defense on Reservoir Hills to the north-northeast and on Insurrecto Hills east-southeast and on Bacsil-Apaleng Ridge east of San Fernando.

Every hill and slope south of Oaig Creek carried an emplaced HMG, LMG, tunnels, foxholes, and pillboxes. Even the hills across the river at Dalangayan, Namtutan, and Bacsil were strongly fortified. They covered the northern approaches of the Oaig Creek compartment and the long corridors on both sides of Bacsil-Apaleng Ridge. They had food stored in their warehouses, cached in tunnels and foxholes, hidden in every conceivable hollow or dugout, gathered against the day and

time when they could no longer roam in safety to collect the forced tribute from civilians.

III. Our Troops

Fresh from training, the 1st Bn, 121st Inf, left Camp Casuga, Alibangsay, Bagulin, La Union, on January 4, 1945, for what was to become the bitter campaign to liberate San Fernando, the provincial capital of La Union. Baroro Bridge, spanning Baroro River, and linking the prosperous towns of San Juan and Bacnotan, was designated as one of the initial objectives of this Battalion commanded by Major Eduardo Borge, "A" Company, meanwhile, was to harass the enemy at the outskirts of San Fernando; and "C" Company, then stationed at Mamat-ing, Naguilian, had to continue ambushes along the Baguio-Naguilian Road where, at one time, an attempt to blast the Naguilian Bridge failed due to vigilance of the Japanese sentries.

In spite of supplies of arms, ammunition, and equipment, from secret landings made by American submarines at Dari-gayos, La Union, and Santiago, Ilocos Sur, the 121st Infantry units were still short of guns. Yet, this lack notwithstanding, the guerrilla forces commenced the general offensive to liberate La Union. At Baroro Bridge where the Japanese were well entrenched, "B" Company fought two days until January 6, when the bridge changed hands. On that same day, "D" Company occupied San Juan, after the enemy had fled to Carlatan, the northern guard-post of San Fernando.

IV. Our Operations

The capture of the Baroro Bridge by units of the 1st Battalion marked the beginning of a southward drive to gain enemy information as far south as the line Ago-Tubao-Pugo, and to gain contact with their 2nd Battalion which was already attached and operating with the 123rd Infantry (US), somewhere in the vicinity of Rosario, La Union, and San Fabian, Sison, and Pozorrubio, Pangasinan.

South of San Juan, towards San Fernando, "A" Company, connecting its right flank with "D" Company, formed a deployment along the railroad tracks between Mameltac and Bangcusay, and San Fernando to check enemy infiltration to the north. "D" Company from San Juan pushed southward along

the National Highway (#3) against slight enemy resistance, until Lingsat where the first signs of increased resistance made our men entrench themselves to consolidate their line extending from Bangcusay to the beach, along the Dalumpinas Road. "B" Company, recently arrived from a surprise attack at Bangar Japanese Garrison which they captured after killing fifteen and capturing twelve men, also formed its line at Lingsat on "A" Company's left flank.

At the beginning of operations to liberate San Fernando, the 1st Battalion had three companies deployed on a general E-W line north of San Fernando; "A" Company at the center of the line, "D" Company at its right flank, and "B" Company at its left, all determined to fight all opposition in their southward drive. "C" Company with HW Platoon attached was operating in the northern barrios of Naguillian, where 81-mm mortars fired and set aflame some enemy ammunition dumps in the vicinity of Naguillian.

After a period of fighting during which no appreciable gains were made by either side, the 3rd Battalion (without "I" and "L" Companies) was pulled away from the Suyo area to form a line on the Carlatan-Bangcusay sector. "K" Company deployed north of Carlatan Bridge at the extreme right of the line, and "M" Company to its left flank deployed in the vicinity of Mameltac. Left of the 3rd Battalion units were the 1st Battalion forces who were preparing to renew attacks against the main Bacsil Ridge which towered menacingly against our entrance through San Fernando's backdoor. "I" Company was detailed to guard the Luna Air Strip and the Amburayan River area, while "J" Company remained at the vicinity of Tagudin-Cervantes Road to hold and defend prominent grounds at the Butac area and harass the enemy at Cervantes and its vicinity.

It was in the early part of the second week of February when units of the 3rd Battalion were deployed on their new positions at the Carlatan-Bangcusay-Mameltac alignment. Late in the same month, a US Marine Air Support Party was attached to the regiment. Requests for daily air-strikes against enemy-held San Fernando were granted. Allied warplanes flew over and supported our troops who forged ahead through weakened Japanese defenses.

Despite all these advantages, the enemy practically held

their holes, their pill-boxes; and stood firm by their artilleries and MG's. Far to the west, 3rd Battalion units were being pinned down due to frequent enemy counter-attacks with plenty of hand grenades. "M" Company now deployed in the vicinity of Namtutan and Dalangayan, and "K" Company at its right flank bore all enemy assaults supported by artillery fired from Mt. Dayaoen, southeast of San Fernando. It can be said, however, that there was no ground gained that was ever lost to the desperate Japanese.

Before the close of February, all units of the 1st and 3rd Battalions were toeing the moving line. North of San Fernando, the 3rd Battalion advanced along a front from the sea coast to the east as far as Baraoas, occupying and securing areas in the vicinities of Carlatan and Pagdaraoan along the railroad track on Hwy No. 3 to the interior barrios and sitios of Biday, Mameltac, Dalangayan, Namputan, Abut, and Puspus to the east. The holding of this east-west line blocked all Japanese intentions and movements to push beyond the San Fernando enclosure. "M" Company on the left flank was face to face with the strong garrison at the Gabaldon building on the San Fernando-Camansi Road, with the 1st Battalion and Combat Company threatening the Japanese on a south-southeast line strung along the Bacsil-Apaleng Ridges. This was the set-up of the fight to the finish, each side bent on not giving nor asking quarters.

On February 28, the Regimental CP transferred from Salingcob, Bacnotan to San Juan, eight kms. north of San Fernando. The 2nd Battalion, at that time, was still with the 123rd Inf (US) operating in the south. "I" Company, recently released from previous assignments, was deployed on a line fronting the strongly fortified Reservoir Hill which hindered its advance by effective enemy fire from higher ground positions.

As the 1st and 3rd Battalions continued their attacks on Bacsil and Pagdaraoan vicinity, "C" Company at Naguilian intensified ambushes, particularly along the Baguio-Naguilian Road. On March 2nd, at about 2130, a "C" platoon ambushed three enemy trucks on Hwy No. 9, about 100 meters east of the Naguilian steel bridge, killing 7, including one officer, and capturing six US rifles, one garand, 11 Jap rifles, 15 TM

shells, 6 bayonets, dogtags, documents, over 4,000 pesos (war notes), and other articles.

On March 3, a platoon of "D" Company attacked an enemy MG nest at its left flank, killing six Japanese, and capturing the gun which had previously been rendered useless to the enemy. We suffered one killed and two wounded. "B" Company held its positions at Apaleng Ridge and made constant patrols to the left flank and rear of the Battalion. Simultaneously, on the 3rd Battalion front, an enemy group of an indeterminate number attacked the line of "K" Company east of Reservoir Hill. An engagement of one whole day ended with the repulsion of this enemy try on our lines. On the 4th of March, "K" Company renewed and intensified its attack after a mortar barrage, causing the enemy to withdraw towards the poblacion. A continuous fire from our boys followed by leap-frog advances gave "K" Company additional possession of about 100 yards of ground and brought the assaulting troops to the general vicinity of Katuguian, east of San Fernando proper, in a general line running East-West about 400 yards east of San Fernando-Camansi Road. "M" Company on the left flank also made advances moving abreast of "K" Company. Enemy counter-pushes with artillery and mortar support against our newly gained ground were harassing but ineffective.

The 1st and 3rd Battalions, meeting stubborn resistance all along their fronts plodded on bravely, needing badly additional reinforcements. Acting promptly on this felt need, the general command pulled back its 2nd Battalion from the operational area of the 123rd Inf (US), and loading them on boats, turned them up north to San Fernando.

Insurrecto Hill was the first objective. By passing the 3rd Battalion at the vicinity of Reservoir Hill, and overcoming slight opposition, the 2nd Battalion formed a general line facing south with "G" Company occupying the area north of the 1st ridge of Insurrecto Hill, "H" Company on the right flank of "F" Company further west on the second ridge to the right of "H" Company.

On the 14th of March, in a coordinated attack for the siege of the third and last ridge of Insurrecto Hill in an attempt by "F" and "H" Companies to complete occupation of this forbidden high ground, our troops were subjected to heavy

enemy fire from what possibly were 75-mm and 37-mm guns, three .50 Cal. MG's, and mortars from the general vicinity of Mt. Dayaoen. Forced back to avoid heavy casualties, "F" and "H" Companies occupied better positions, 100 yards north of the former line.

The next day, March 15, a flight of P-38's and medium bombers bombed and strafed the general area on the northern foot of Mt. Dayaoen, and the valley of Santiago and vicinity, hitting enemy concentration points most likely crippling a good number of the enemy's mountain guns that constituted a constant to our lines. After the general bombing and strafing, close support for the 2nd Battalion was called for, and in no time, the ground lost the day before was recovered and secured.

From here on, the fight became fierce, intense, aggressive, and unceasing. There was no let-up. Always along the line, a sector was charging ahead, or warding off a counterattack. The main force of the 2nd Battalion was directed to the Insurrecto Hill, providing meanwhile, supporting and harassing fires to the Reservoir Hill and the garrison south of the Gabaldon School. It was terrific and horrible, yet the Japanese took their punishment standing, and went out for more. At night under cover of darkness, they would leave their holes to prowl around their No-Man's land, staging desperate and futile sorties against the 121st forces who never went to sleep. Then they would crawl back to their holes—those that did not stop the bullets, the grenade fragments, or the shells—to live another hellish day watching the ever-closing lines of the 121st Infantry.

It was a more or less established fighting and only the planes above could break the deadlock. And these planes broke it beautifully by coordinating their air-strikes with the ground fires. By radio, by panels, by smoke shells, all the Japanese strongholds were being systematically pin-pointed and razed to ignominy and impotency. They circled over their prey and made dummy passes to be sure the Japanese were there before they unloaded the deadly gifts that Gen. Arnold had ordered especially packed for the little yellow brothers. The effect was, indeed, very gratifying. Such airstrikes invariably preceded the rush hour of the men of Col. Barnett. Weak from

loss of sleep and with only a little cold food to eat, they still plodded over the territory that always went up to a hiding Japanese who received their freight of death. The dead and the dying, like squatters, littered the field where the living, rushing madly against each other, did not even have time to think that they might also be reckoned among the fallen dead. Heroism was common sight, and these soldiers—heroes all—never faltered to reach the top of those hills to wreak well-deserved vengeance upon the enemy.

Units of the 1st Battalion, not a bit discouraged over many days of futile assaults, made a general attack on the main Bacsil Ridge on March 16. Already "B" Company had wrested control from a tough defending adversary, the highest outpost southeast of the principal ridge line at Bacsil and was itself not an inconsiderable threat to the enemy's right flank. Its combat patrols were sent out as far south as Bauang to probe enemy positions which were said to be steadily giving way to assaulting American troops from the south. "A" Company from the high ground overlooking Pias, persistently pounded against the left flank of the Japanese defenders of embattled Bacsil. Preceded by terrific bombing of American planes, a sensational scissor fire of brilliant continuity from a .50 Cal. MG at "B" Company's newly-acquired OP on the left and from a second HMG from "A" Company's deployment on the right, brought elements of "D" and combat companies to the immediate vicinity of Bacsil. First Battalion units had thus shortened their line into a solid arc which was continuously converging against the confused and bewildered Japanese troops. In short, the Fall of Bacsil had become a matter of time.

"C" Company on the 17th was recalled from harassing duty at the vicinity of Naguilian, and together with elements of "B" Company, commenced on March 18, what astonishingly turned out to be an unimpeded advance towards the foot of Mt. Dayaoen, southeast of San Fernando. There was terrific fighting all along the frontline of the regiment as units ventured to close in on San Fernando proper from all directions. Throughout the night of the 18th, enemy artillery desperately shelled the assaulting troops, while confused enemy units set important Japanese installations into flames that raged conspicuously out of the darkness. "I" Company, reinforced by one platoon each from "M" and "K" Companies, 121st Inf, and

one platoon "A" Company, MP Battalion, climbed over the last ridge of Reservoir Hill in the face of MG and AR fires from the enemy. In an intensified battling against the stubborn enemy, grenades, bazookas, and flame throwers were put into action. Briefly, the eve of the 19th was a nightmare to the Japanese because of the hardhitting 121st Infantry.

Furious troops of the 3rd Battalion had smashed their way into the last enemy defenses, and had gained complete control of Reservoir Hill on March 19. Simultaneously, 1st Battalion units had crashed against San Fernando's backdoor and had occupied the principal outpost at Bacsil.

Then came the 21st of March, and San Fernando fell with nothing but twisted ruins, blasted roads and plazas, and widespread misery. The liberation of this capital town enabled the regiment with its Battalions offering only a feeble and slight resistance. By March 23, a solid defensive line was strung west to east from Lossoc, north of Bauang to Gusing Sur. Hard-pressed now on the north by the 121st and on the south by the 6th Army units, the enemy must have slipped up to the Naguilian Road to join other Japanese forces in the mountain capital city of Baguio.

The prospect of several days' rest came as a pleasant surprise to the dog-tired elements of the 121st Infantry, when at daybreak of the 25th, they hiked to bivouac in the vicinity of San Juan, leaving the 2nd Battalion to patrol and hold a line facing south and extending all the way from Paringao near the seashore to Mamat-ing far to the east. Thus, the bloody first real engagement of the 121st Infantry operating as a single fighting unit ended.

V. Conclusion

The San Fernando-Bacsil operations may be said to have undergone three phases: the fight for position, the struggle for attrition, and the final drive. The first phase characterized by skirmishes and light engagements between patrols was mainly ground preparation by the 121st Infantry. The well-entrenched Japanese in the hills simply squatted and waited, except sending occasional burst of fire from their emplacements to give moral to their patrols.

The fight for attrition which lasted up to the middle of

March, was stabilized fighting. Definite firing positions and battle lines of both sides were established and their artillery pieces with LMG's, TM's, and RL's were the ones inflicting real damage. Short but fierce engagements generally accompanied such intercourse.

The final drive marked the furious and rapid advance of all units of the 121st, aided and supplemented effectively by the Allied Air Force. By March 24, 1945, the campaign was over; and when the 2nd Battalion turned over their patrol and security duties to the 129th Infantry of the U.S.A., they performed the last ceremony and wrote finis to the successful initial campaign of annihilation of all Japanese in North Luzon.

Chapter V

THE ILOCOS — TANGADAN OPERATIONS

Introduction

The Ilocos-Tangadan operations of the 15th Inf, under the command and direction of Lt. Col. Robert H. Arnold, covered the entire western half of North Luzon, from the Cordilleras to the China Sea on the west, and from Hwy #4 to the Babuyan Channel on the north. The provinces included in these operations are Abra, Ilocos Norte, and Ilocos Sur. The entire campaign, designed to annihilate the enemy wherever he was—garrisoned, entrenched, or on the march—took the greater part of five months from January to May, 1945.

This campaign by the 15th Inf was one of five scattered fronts over North Luzon. The 121st Inf was pre-occupied with the Japanese at the San Fernando-Bacsil operations; the 66th Inf was cleaning up Benguet, particularly the areas along the Mt. Trail, Trinidad, Baguio, and the Naguilian Road; the 11th Inf, in scattered positions, fought the enemy in Bontoc, Kiangnan, and Northern Cagayan Valley; and the 14th Inf was engaged in ambushes and destructions in the Isabela and Nueva Vizcaya sectors. The Sixth Army was pounding them on the general boundary lines of Pangasinan and Nueva Ecija toward the Mountain Province and the Cagayan Valley.

The Terrain

With the exception of the operations at Tangadan proper and in the southern portion of the Ilocos Sur-Abra boundary, the 15th Inf fought their battles in the plains and river valleys where the towns are located and also where the garrisons were established.

There are two big river valleys debauching into the Ilocos coastal plain—that of the Abra River and the Laoag (Pagsan) River. The Ilocos ranges running north to south rise above these valleys and separate them by spurs running eastward to the Cordillera Central. Numerous arroyos and gullies run

down the mountain slopes into the river beds below. Grass climb up the hill sides to the timber line where second growth timber grow in abundance to as high as the rocky crags on mountain tops.

Highway #3 traverses the two Ilocos provinces, and Hwy #6 enters Abra from Solvec, through Tangadan Pass. Trails and bypaths cover the whole territory, affording means of contact and communication to the scattered elements of the 15th Inf.

The sector in the Laoag-San Nicolas-Gabu area is flat country, running west along the broad, sandy Laoag River. Between Gabu and San Nicolas astride Hwy #3 to the east are rice fields, mangroves, and thick bamboo growths. A branch-road to the airfield runs between and parallel to the two rivers—Laoag on its north and Gabu on its south side. South of this level ground are low-lying hillocks, stretched in series; and behind them southward is the Paoay Lake surrounded by high ground which is studded with sparsely populated towns. Because of this kind of terrain, the Japanese did not offer any stiff opposition here.

The Sinait-Cabugao-Laoag sector is more of hills and mountains than low-level ground. Practically all the area is covered with rice, corn, and sugarcane fields. Between Cabugao and Salomague is a sprawling low ridge, with its tail extending out west to the sea at Salomague and its head pointing southeast to Hwy #3 between Cabugao and Lapog. Southeast of Cabugao town rises a solitary hill (Patac-Turod) with a spur rising south of Lapog, trending half of it west to the sea and the other half reaching east to the Ilocos ranges. Hwy #3 between Magsingal and Lapog cuts through this spur. South of it, through Magsingal to Bantay, the terrain is all flat, covered with thick tropical growths, except where there are cultivated fields of rice, corn, and tobacco. Only the ridge top at Sa'omague had big-gun installations, beside the east shoreline of Salomague port with its AA guns. Although the whole territory gave the Japanese good cover from surprise attacks, the open country surrounding them with its thick vegetation afforded the 15th Inf units sufficient safe approaches for attack.

The Bangued-Pidigan-Tangadan sector is entirely different

in lay out. Bangued and Pidigan lie on a straight line northeast from Tangadan which sits on the wooden southern tip of a north-northeast saddle which forms a link in a series of low-lying hills and ridges that connect the high Ilocos ranges on the west to the tall Cordilleras on the east across the Abra river bed.

Hwy #6 branching off from Hwy #3 at Sulvec north of Narvacan enters the Abra River valley through Tangadan hills on this Tangadan point which overlooks the low terrain north and south of the ridge. Observation from this position sweeps the whole surrounding country, as far south as Narvacan and its Cayapa River valley; and as far north as San Quintin and the sandy Abra River banks until the general area of Pidigan town.

The entire ridge guards passage to the rich Abra valley. Tangadan on this ridge astride Hwy #6 is the key point of this main defense line of the Japanese. It happens that it became also their last MLR of the entire Ilocos-Tangadan operations. As a part of their operations in northwest Luzon, the Japanese fortified the whole series of hills and ridges. With Tangadan and its tunnel on the highway as center, defensive installations were placed on Mt. Araniw north of Sulvec and southwest of Tangadan, commanding the RJ of Hwy #3 and #6. Directly to the south of Tangadan, and east of Mt. Araniw across Hwy #6, are the low hills of Camarao, Aquib, Lungog, Parparia, and Marozo—all on the northern fringe of the Cayapa River bed. These southern approaches to Tangadan had concrete pillboxes and trenches, with their field guns, howitzers, and AA guns pointed south and southwest to the main Hwy #3.

The whole hill ranges facing north were also strongly fortified with MG nests, trenches, pillboxes, and AA guns, particularly the hill in the vicinity of Baritbarit on the RJ of Hwy #6 and the branch-road to San Quintin, northwest of Tangadan. Other strongly defended points are Sal'acong on the north bank of the Abra River east of the Gap; and the hill at Cautit, overlooking the RJ of Hwy #6 and the branch-road to Pidigan.

To the west, the Ilocos ranges are all rocks or cogon with scattered patches of stunted trees. Between the Tangadan

ridge and the Abra River to the north are second-growth woodlands, excellent approaches for attacks from the north and the northeast. From Narvacan and the Cayapa River, the ground is open rice and sugar cane fields, allowing free enemy fire from their strong southern hill-defenses.

When Colonel Arnold began his offensive in January of that year, the main highways were already blasted to uselessness and vehicular traffic was at a standstill, although the Japanese tried hard frequently to restore them. Their garrisons established in various municipalities had become isolated forces which fell easy victims to the assaults of Colonel Arnold's soldiers. Only three sectors remained to withstand the concentrated assaults of the 15th Inf units.

The Enemy Situation

Even before Colonel Arnold went about the business of harassing and destruction as directed in FO #2, the enemy had been engaged in shifting its forces from one position to another, trying to outwit its adversary.

During the period from December 26, 1944 to January 1, 1945, the Japanese had in Ilocos Sur approximately 2,620 soldiers, with the greatest number (2,000) concentrated in Salomague, Cabugao. In Ilocos Norte, 1,995 soldiers were mainly located, 1,195 in Laoag proper, and 800 in the Gabu Airfield at the mouth of the Laoag River. Abra had a contingent of about one regiment, mostly garrisoned on the eastern side of Bangued as far as Casamata Hill.

The following week (January 2-6) witnessed another reshuffle of forces. Intelligence reports indicated the presence of 1,510 soldiers in Lapog and only 330 marines in Salomague—distributed as follows: Lapog proper, 160 Inf; Bo. Solot-solot, 150 Inf; Bo. Camindoroan, 50 Inf. Bo. Cabanglotan, 150 Inf; and Bo. Malamin, 1,000 Inf. The Laoag concentration remained in town, while Bangued reported no change in strength.

It was not definitely ascertained, but Intelligence located 18 AA guns in Salomague and one 37-mm gun in Kimposa, Suyu, on Hwy #4. Further reports coming in by January 15, indicated the presence of 2 AA guns, 2 MG's, and one TM, at the Banaoang Gap; one 155-mm gun at Kimposa, two .50 Cal.

and three .30 Cal. MG's in Sulvec, and six TM in Narvacan. In Ilocos Norte, there were one AA in Laoag; and one 20-mm AA, one 50-mm, three AA Cal. unknown, and seven FA guns in Gabu. Tangadan had one 75-mm gun, one AA, 2-3 TM, and several unknown caliber guns in Narvacan.

For the same period, from January 9-15, troop concentrations did not materially shift, with evident permanence in the following areas: Laoag-San Nicolas-Gabu Airfield for Ilocos Norte; Sinait-Cabugao-Lapog for Ilocos Sur; and Bangued-Pidigan-Tangadan for Abra. These places appeared to have been selected as last-stand positions, without favor to the Tangadan area as their last stronghold, although General Araki was hiding there. This belief was further strengthened because of the presence in Salomague of bigger field pieces and more AA guns than those installed in Tangadan.

The offensive tactics of Colonel Arnold's 15th Inf forces which began aggressive attacks and raids in Ilocos Norte toward the south, drove the desperate Japanese out of the province, followed them into Ilocos Sur, and then pursued them out through the Banaoang Gap to the only available haven of security that was nearest to their point of escape—Araki's garrison at Tangadan.

Our Troops

By January, 1945, Colonel Arnold had his RCP in a safe unknown hideout southeast of Batac, southwest of the Center of a rectangular area bounded on the north by the Dingras-San Nicolas road, the Banna-Dingras road on the east, the Pinili-Banna road on the south, and the Hwy#3 on the west. His first Battalion was comfortably hidden southwest of Mt. Masad-sadac, northeast of Vintar; the 2nd Battalion somewhere in the vicinity of Batac; and his 3rd Battalion somewhere in the general area east of Sinait-Cabugao-Lapog. He made surprise assaults on Japanese garrisons in towns or raid on predatory Japanese hankering for food in out-of-the-way places. The common characteristic of all these CP's was concealment from the general knowledge of the enemy who could never guess where an attack was to take place.

A quick appraisal of the enemy's resources disclosed their utter lack of nearly everything of their basic needs with which

to fight the Japanese. On top of this, the boys had no training to back them up except what they learned in the secret and hidden training camps, from past experiences in ambushes which were not so many, and from training directives issued occasionally by GHQ and RHQ. Nonetheless, they worked efficiently in the destruction of bridges, road blockades, and the capture of arms from Japanese convoys. Solitary enemy garrisons were an easy prey for them.

Our Operations

On January 4, 1945, GHQ, at Camp 16-3, the advance CP of the USAFIP, NL issued to the CO, 15th Inf, FO #2, defining among other things the principal missions of the regiment. This followed a previous radio message on the same subject—D-Day Missions—directing the accomplishment of the provisions of SO No. 129, GHQ, USAFIP, NL, dated December 4, 1944, within their assigned sector. Specifically, they were ordered to accomplish the following:

1. Maximum demolition of bridges, culverts, and defiles between Laoag and Vigan (later extended to Tagudin); between Narvacan and Lagangilang (Tagudin and Cervantes also);
2. Destruction of every wire communications;
3. Destruction of ammunition, fuel, and other supply dumps;
4. Destruction of planes concealed in dispersal areas;
5. Destruction of convoys and troop trains; and
6. Encouragement of patriotic people under local leadership to unleash maximum violence against the enemy.
7. Power lines, railroad tracks, and stations will only be destroyed upon order.

Right at the start, Colonel Arnold led his men openly against the enemy—a maneuver that was entirely a departure from his old strategy in dealing with the Japanese. His men were emboldened—fighting and standing their own ground in all encounters. They no longer left the field and scrambled to safety behind mountain boulders or in the woodlands. They carried the initiative into the enemy lair, and dictated when and where a skirmish should occur.

In prosecuting his campaign, Colonel Arnold directed his 1st

Battalion under Major Valdez to clear northern Ilocos Norte up to Laoag proper; then placed his 2nd Battalion under Capt. Doña — in southern Ilocos Norte from Laoag to Badoc. His 3rd Battalion under Major Sillona was engaged in harassing the enemy spread all over the towns of Cabugao, Sinait, and Lapog.

As a result of this simultaneous operations of all of the 15th Inf units—with companies and platoons attacking various garrisons—the campaign turned out to be a three-stage strategy. The first covered the period from January 4 to February 13; the second, from February 13 to March 2; and the third stage, from March 2 to April 25.

The First Phase

The 15th Inf units—their mission of sabotage accomplished—turned their efforts to reduction by detail of the Japanese garrisons. The 15th Inf—Colonel Arnold in command—simultaneously raided the garrisons in Bangui, Burgos, and Batac. These three offensives netted them arms, equipments, food supplies besides the destruction of 55-gallon drum of gasoline. Priorly, they had already captured 2 AA guns with plenty of ammunitions and killed 216 Japanese, which added up to the recent forays that bagged 1 MG, 1,000 rounds of ammunition, 2 mtr guns cal. not determined, and 70 55-gallon drums of gasoline destroyed and food supplies captured.

From January 4 to the end of the month, activities of the 15th Inf was characterized by a series of ambushes against the enemy, coupled by swift and sudden raids against Japanese garrisons. In southern Ilocos Norte, a 2nd Battalion patrol on January 4, ambushed a surprised group of 7 armed Japanese with rifles and more than 300 pro-Jap Filipinos armed with bolos. More than 100 Filipinos together with an indeterminate number of Japanese were killed. The 15th Inf only suffered with one man wounded. The patrol captured 40 cavans of rice—later distributed to civilians. In the same municipality, two days after, a boloman detail killed 21 Japanese—survivors of a bombed ship. Further north in Paoay, other bolomen also killed 41 Japanese, believed to be a part of the survivors of a ship that sank. In Sinait, the northernmost town of Ilocos Sur, the military mayor, leader of the town's bolomen,

executed 18 Japanese, presumed to have survived from a bombed ship. On the same day that Japanese were being killed in these three towns, 12 Japanese survivors were also killed by bolomen in Pasuquin.

On January 7, A and B Companies operating in Pasuquin, ambushed 61 lightly armed Japanese. From all indications, they belonged to the same units as those killed by the bolomen during the other day in the same town. The Currimao bolomen raided a ship off Gaang port. This ship must have been the carrier of all those scattered Japanese units who met their death in the hands of angry bolomen. They killed 11 including the captain of the ship—this was January 7—and garnered 2 anti-aircraft guns with 6 magazines; 12,780 rounds of 50 cal. ammunition; 846 rounds of 30 cal. ammunition; 144 rounds of 55 cal. ammunition; 25 rounds for AA guns; 1 gas mask. This was also the day when 71 Japanese in the vicinity of Bacarra were captured and executed by bolomen.

On three successive attempts, units of the 15th Inf attacked the Gabu Landing Field with disastrous consequences. On the morning of January 24, all Japanese-occupied houses in the Gabu Landing Field were burned and the ammunition and fuel dumps blasted. Gone up in smoke were 14,560 gallons of gasoline. Again, on the night of the 26th, the 2nd Battalion raided the area. The Japanese were surprised. In the confusion, the attacking units destroyed two twin-engine bombers, one single-engine fighter, ten drums of gasoline, and two trucks. Evidently, the planes were preparing to leave for they were only 300 yards from the runway. Casualty was indeterminable. On January 28—for the third time—the field was raided inflicting a damage of 168 drums of gasoline, two burned trucks, and 168 drums of gasoline salvaged for the use of the 2nd Battalion units.

The 1st Battalion units gave the Japanese a furious battle on January 23 at the San Mateo bridge between Laoag and Sarrat. Having learned of the enemy—estimated at 2,000—that it was going east toward Sarrat, they proceeded to prepare an ambush for them at the bridge by occupying advantageous positions in the vicinity. They did this after they blasted the bridge. Within a short time, the first contingent

appeared at about 0630 and were immediately hailed by volleys of deadly and murderous gunfire.

The battle commenced with the Japanese trying to dislodge the attackers. For the whole day, until 1800, wave after wave assaulted the positions but were repulsed. An envelopment maneuver was anticipated and countered and the Japanese withdrew. Those that did not return went to hide in the sugar-cane field nearby. The field was burned, and the Japanese who fled from the fire were swiftly shot down. That day saw the death of 282 Japanese and 2 killed from the 1st Battalion units, and 4 wounded.

It was a signal victory, for the Japanese realized that the tables were turned—the Filipinos coming out in the open and holding their ground against great odds. In the same general area, on the road from Bacarra to Pasuquin, an enemy truck with 18 Japanese apparently being sent north for reinforcement, was ambushed by B Company, 1st Battalion. The truck was destroyed, the 18 were killed, and the ambushade netted 11 Jap rifles, 500 rounds of ammunition, 1 Japanese LMG, 2 US rifles 30 cal., and 8 hand grenades.

A detachment of the 2nd Battalion raided the Japanese garrison at Gaang in Currimaog and captured 1 MG, 1 rifle, 5,000 rounds of ammunition, and 1 radio set. Ours had no casualty. That was on January 9. Four days later, Company A, 1st Battalion, attacked the garrison at Burgos. The Japanese ran away. The garrison gave up 1 MG 30 cal., 12 mortar guns, 20 naval shells, and 1,000 rounds of different cal. ammo.

Near San Nicolas on January 29, the 2nd Battalion units entered a school and destroyed 168 drums of gasoline, burned 2 trucks, and took 16 drums for the use of the 15th Infantry.

All these widespread destruction, ambushades, and raids in Ilocos Norte decimated the strength, supplies, and morale of the enemy to a considerable extent. They were in a state of insecurity and peril. Actually, they abandoned their town garrisons and concentrated in Laoag, San Nicolas, and Gabu. A mere 1,000 contingent was left of the entire force that occupied the entire province. These 1,000 fear-ridden Japanese were only too willing to surrender to the Americans but not to the Filipinos whom they called **bandidos**.

The Second Phase

All negotiations to make the Japanese peacefully lay down their arms and surrender failed. Subsequently, the 15th Inf units intensified their campaign of annihilation. On the evening of February 13, B Company of the 1st Battalion forced entry into Laoag and drove the Japanese away—burning their quarters before leaving. They also destroyed Laoag (Gilbert) Bridge on their flight toward Gabu. Swiftly the other companies of the 1st Battalion move in and secured the town.

The northern half of Ilocos Norte up to the Laoag (Bonga) River was already liberated from the Japs. The southern half—except Gabu and San Nicolas—was also rid from the Japs. With the 1st Battalion occupying Laoag on the north of the river and the 2nd Battalion patrolling Batac and the surrounding areas, the enemy was now contained and ready for the “kill.”

But before the 2nd Battalion could form its line in Paoay west of their patrol area, the retreating Japanese had already deserted Gabu and force marched to the south. B Company, 1st Battalion, pursuing them from Laoag, overtook them on the road to Paoay Lake on February 15—2 miles south of Gabu.

Completely surprised, they fought without getting off the bulcarts on which they rode. Of the estimated 400, 100 were killed and many others wounded. The next contact with this fleeing remnant was in a barrio northwest of Paoay Lake. The fireworks started when they were preparing their meals. For lack of ammunition, the Filipinos withdrew leaving the kitchen completely destroyed.

Obviously, the Japanese who escaped from the Gabu-San Nicolas areas dispersed in groups. Besides the surprised detachment, others were overtaken in Abacli near the lake and near Nagbabacalan on the Laoag-Balacad Road. All these groups were rushing southward. In these two encounters, the Japanese lost 60 KIA and 1 MG, 1 enfield, 150 rounds of ammunition for 37-mm guns captured. Our loss was 1 KIA and 7 WIA. After these skirmishes, on February 24, the entire province of Ilocos Norte was cleared of the Japanese—the first province liberated in the North Luzon sector. The Gabu Airfield became available to Allied planes.

All the Japanese that were able to escape, sneaked into Ilocos Sur and joined their comrades in the Sinait-Cabugao-Lapog area. After their heels were the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 15th Inf. With the Japanese cornered in northern Ilocos Sur, the 1st Battalion units (minus C Company) were commanded to assembly in Lagangilang, Abra, with the mission to strike the Japanese in Bangued and in Tangadan which were estimated to be 2,000 under General Araki. The 2nd Battalion (minus G Company) followed later. C and G Companies were left to complete destruction of the remnants of the Japanese in the Cabugao-Lapog area, while the 3rd Battalion operated in the general area of Sulvec-Narvacan. This was the situation early in March.

The town of Cabugao was the stronghold of the enemy force that did not move any further southward. They occupied and fortified the town, including the town port of Salomague. C and G Companies took the whole month of March until April 7 to clear the town of the Japanese.

The mission was two-fold. Primarily, they were to prevent the enemy going north; next, they were to reduce them as much as they could. On March 12, they fought 100 Japanese along Hwy #3 going north to Sinait and drove them back with their dead and wounded. One boloman and one woman were killed. Five days later, another attempt was evidently made, or a second encounter took place between the towns of Sinait and Cabugao. This time there was strong enemy resistance. Similar patrol clashes were fought in Gabor and Bio, Cabugao. All attempts failed, and the enemy withdrew to their base line in Cabugao.

Their last effort to move north was on March 20, when they attacked the G Company line at Baracbac-Tepping north of Cabugao, with trench mortars and sub-machineguns. Their failure was followed by our concentrated air-strike on the town garrison, setting fire to ammunition dumps, and forcing evacuations.

Surprisingly, when G Company entered the town on March 22, they were confronted with Japanese opposition. On the following day, both G Company and C Company coming from the east and north respectively attacked the town with one 30 cal. MG and one 50 cal. MG. Enemy reinforcements and

supporting MG forced the G Company to cross the bridge to occupy C Company positions. The encounter lasted until 1630.

On April 1, the Japanese line of resistance followed general line east to west, from Patac-Turod through the town of Salomague. The two companies C and G were on a general line passing west to east through Salapasap-Bessang Sur-Balacayen-Catuedaan to the mountains in the east. This line was on the north side of the Cabugao River.

On April 1, a general advance was executed, with elements of G Company forcing entry and occupying 2/3 of the town while other G Company elements fought the enemy in Salomague. At 1300, heavy enemy reinforcements drove G Company out of town. C Company against the Patac-Turod garrison fought five hours, killing and wounding 80 Japanese. In Salomague, the attack lasted the whole day and night when the enemy fled south and southeast. After this general attack, only Patac-Turod garrison and the town remained in the hands of the Japanese. Two days later, however, a big enemy reinforcement from the south and southeast necessitated the withdrawal of our forces from Salomague, with the enemy returning to the old line of resistance.

The fight for Cabugao became a see-saw affair, with our forces in and then out again, until finally on April 7, the units of C and G Companies entered the town without enemy resistance. A combat patrol sent S to pursue the enemy reported their presence in Magsingal and made contact with the other 15th Inf patrols in Sto. Domingo, a town south of Magsingal.

On April 13, US planes struck enemy troops trying hurriedly to cross the Abra River west of the Banaoang Bridge. There was a big concentration of Japanese in Bantay and the surrounding areas. The two companies, C and G, established their line at the southern vicinity of Magsingal. On April 16, they drove the enemy out of Magsingal, pushing him southward, and occupied the town. The pursuit brought them to a line on the San Ildefonso-Sto. Domingo boundary with the enemy in San Ildefonso. The patrols in this area killed 20 Japanese. There were now about 1,000 Japanese cornered in the Bantay-San Ildefonso area, scurrying eastward of intensive air-strikes in the vicinity. The enemy abandoned Vigan

which was entered by patrols of the C and G Companies on April 16 when they immediately hoisted the American flag. By April 23, after the Japanese remnants had escaped to Tangadan with C Company (less 1 platoon) in hot pursuit, the Ilocos Sur and Ilocos Norte Hwy #3 was declared cleared of the Japanese soldiers. One platoon, C Company, then, was left in Vigan as security patrol. G Company moving by boats from Pandan sailed the sea to join their 2nd Battalion units on the Narvacan-Nagbukel sector of the Tangadan campaign.

The general direction of movement by the escaping Japanese was south and southeast. Throughout the months of January, February, and March, the 15th Inf units chased the Japanese along the coastal plain until the few remnants of what was once an invincible force for town garrisons had escaped by the Gap to Tangadan.

The Third Phase

Before the enemy finally made his escape from Ilocos Sur on March 1, 1945, actual operation already commenced against Tangadan proper. The terrain covers a rolling hilly country, of approximately 96 square miles, bounded on the north by the Abra River, on the east by the Sinalang River, on the south by the Cayapa River, and on the west by the Ilocos Ranges.

About 3 miles directly south of San Quintin on the Abra River, lies the sitio of Tangadan, the highest peak on Hwy #6, on the boundary of Ilocos Sur and Abra, overlooking the surrounding country for miles around. It is on the saddle of a spur debauching from the main Cordillera Central tread-ing West as far as the Banaoang Gap in the Ilocos Ranges.

Tangadan, the focal point of Japanese resistance in North-west Luzon, sits astride Hwy #6 on the boundary line. Standing guard over the southwest approaches of the Tangadan hills—the only opening from that direction for an attacking force to reach the Abra Valley, it was transformed into a formidable citadel, bristling with big guns of various calibers. To the west, on the high and rocky Ilocos ridges, were also emplaced MG's and field pieces. This Tangadan fortress, securely located on the divide, afforded the Japanese excellent observation points and an extensive expanse of fire for their

guns that were pointed to the southwest, south, and southeast, towards Hwy #8, apparently expecting powerful assaults from these directions.

Fortunately, there are numerous arroyos and streams, mostly or generally dry during this season of the year that break away from these hill ranges to the rice lands in the vicinity of Narvacan to the south, and to those of Pidigan and of San Quintin to the north. Also to the east and west are low hills covered with cogon grasses and second-growth tropical scrub trees. All these natural camouflage, running north to south in the southern approaches, provided safe concealment to advancing troops.

The 15th Inf Regt took maximum advantage of the favorable terrain in deploying the troops that were ordered to destroy Tangadan and kill all the Japanese. Their mission included the prevention of the Japanese from joining their comrades in the Cervantes and Bontoc areas. Evidently, right at the start, the 1st Battalion coming from Lagangilang on the northern bank of the Abra River was to move southward through Tayum, Bangued, and Pidigan, to obstruct the Japanese from overrunning the region eastward to Pilar, Penarubia, and Manabo; and to hold them steadfastly where they were already trapped. The 2nd Battalion would re-deploy to reinforce the 3rd Battalion on the south and east sector. The north had the Abra River offering an obstacle to a possible escape which was unlikely, since the enemy would just be going back to Cabugao-Lapog-Sinait area where the other Japanese forces were already being annihilated.

The enemy was definitely committed to the defense of Tangadan which guards the entrance to the Abra River Valley from the south and which garrisoned about 2,500 Japanese who were component elements of the 79th IMB and of the Watari Force, all under Gen. Araki. In a desperate situation he could withdraw to the east, south, or north unless reinforcements from the sea would unexpectedly give him relief from pressure by the 3rd Battalion of the 15th Inf. By March 1, 1945, the enemy withdrew his advanced guards in Narvacan Central, in Lungog, and in Camarao, to the hills north of these three positions. Besides HMG and LMG that the enemy had emplaced in all approaches to the south and north of his

garrison, there definitely checked 75-mm and 37-mm guns on Hwy #3 in Tangadan. Through this Abra River opening, the Japanese from Vigan withdrew to concentrate at Tangadan where the northwest Luzon Japanese choosed to make their last stand. Those that left the southern approaches at Lungog, Aquib, and Parparia must have move north to prepare the Baritbarit hills south of Mt. Marasuso and east-northeast of Tangadan. Due to these enemy operations, the mission of Tangadan, became doubly difficult and hazardous. Against the ground and position advantages of the enemy, added to the prior advantage of knowing that assault was imminent, the 3rd Battalion had to have additional force to cope with the situation.

The initial battle in the Tangadan campaign was fought in the village of Solvec, Narvacan, Ilocos Sur when the 3rd Battalion, 15th Inf made the assault at 11:00 o'clock on March 1, 1945. Solvec at that time was well fortified by the enemy and so situated strategically that it cut off the national highway and consequently all communications along that highway between friendly troops in the area north of Vigan and areas south of Narvacan. The plan for the reduction of Solvec included in capturing the junction of highway #3 and #6, the taking of Mt. Narvacan, and the envelopment of Solvec on the north in order to entirely isolate it from the fortress of Tangadan. This was accomplished by placing one company at the junction, another company to work its way around to the north and thus cut off Solvec from the Tangadan area.

After the first 2 days of battle, Solvec fell into the hands of our troops, however, another threat was again uncovered on the hills of Araniw which covered Solvec with fire and observation. Because of the different topography of Araniw, it was necessary to call in the close support of the Air Force while ground troops advanced yard by yard and ridge by ridge to the final objective which is the highest peak of the Araniw range. But even this was wanting and the enemy held its ground inflicting considerable casualty on the troops of the 3rd Battalion.

It should be mentioned in passing that the fortifications of Araniw consisted of a series of tunnels, MG nests and pill boxes disposed strategically that they provided mutual pro-

tection. Frontal or flank attacks supported by bombing and mortar fire failed to dislodge the enemy. The only possible way of attacking the enemy with a fair degree of success was from the rear but this would expose the attacking unit to possible retaliation from the Japanese garrison at Banawang. However, taking everything into consideration, it was finally decided to attack the rear of Araniw and so one platoon was dispatched to climb the ridge from the left flank under cover of darkness. This platoon, before being sent out was given intensive instructions in night and jungle operations, were equipped with rifles, hand grenades, and LMG's.

At this stage of the campaign, the enemy had tried several times to make a push in the vicinity of the junction with the probable intention of encircling the 3rd Battalion. But time and again, his efforts were thwarted by wide counter-envelopments that threatened that part of Hwy #3 south of the junction which was the main artery of supply and communication of the 3rd Battalion. To forestall this plan of the enemy, Aquib Bridge was made the objective of a secondary attack which was staged by the Battalion mobile reserve.

After the first assault on Aquib Bridge, it was found that the enemy had extensive installations on the place and used this ridge as a spear point against the heart of the 3rd Battalion rear installations. If these were not opportunely attacked, it would have formed the nucleus of a flanking movement to enclose the 3rd Battalion on its right flank and thus drive them right into the Banaoang garrison.

On the left flank, the platoon which was sent to attack the enemy from the rear went into position and at a pre-arranged time, one company was pushed forward at the center by-passing the strong resistance on the hill and was directed to take Camarao thus cutting the company's line of communication from Tangadan and making a pocket of the fortified enemy position.

On March 27, E Company, 66th Inf was relieved of its security detail at the Darigayos-Maragayap area and ordered to move to Narvacan, to report to the CO, 3rd Battalion for duty. Immediately, E Company was sent to reinforce units of the 3rd Battalion in the rear of the enemy at Araniw, with the main mission of pushing forward to connect with M Com-

pany at Camarao. This move completely routed the Japanese entrenched on the Aquib Ridge on April 2, 1945, forcing them to withdraw to Tangadan leaving a large amount of supplies (food) and ammunition behind. This enemy rout and subsequent withdrawal to Tangadan, close the third phase of the Tangadan Campaign.

During the latter part of March, air strikes directed against Lapog area forced the Japanese to move southward and joined their other units in Abra. This movement to the south of the enemy affected greatly the Tangadan Campaign in that it extended the 3rd Battalion line to the right as far as Santa in order to deny to the enemy the use of Hwy #3.

On April 7, 1945, A Company, Casualty and Replacement Battalion, reported to the CO, 3rd Battalion, 15th Inf for duty. Aware of the threat from the Japanese at Lapog, A Company was sent to Santa with the mission of covering the Abra River from the Banaoang Bridge to the sea. In the meantime, air strikes were asked for the Bantay area where the Lapog Japanese were concentrated. The air strike at Bantay precipitated the movement of the Japanese to the south into Abra that when the main body of the enemy moved out they brought with them the Vigan-Bantay-Banaoang garrisons clearing these areas completely of the enemy.

The situation on the 10th of April, found the 3rd Battalion with no appreciable grounds gained, except Mt. Araniw; the 2nd Battalion prepared the ground on the Narvacan-Nagbukel line to be ready to push northward; and the 1st Battalion established on the Penarubia-Pilar Road to west and north of Bangued-Penarubia and Hwy #6 road junction passing through high grounds west of Saotan Hill. Two gaps could not be closed then before the concerted advance of all 15th Inf units—one at the Banaoang Gap below San Quintin, and another in the general area north of Pilar and Villaviciosa along the Sinalang River. To attempt to close the gaps would cause the units to over-extend their already thin lines.

This enveloping movement was accompanied by daily bombing and strafing of all areas within the enclosed territory with particularly disastrous results to the enemy at Pidigan, Tangadan, Langiden, and Baritbarit. Ground moves invariably followed these air strikes which inescapably crippled or neutral-

ized enemy gun emplacements, destroyed his installations, and burned supplies and ammunition dumps.

By April 15, the different elements of the 15th Inf with attached units occupied a line generally from the hills north of Santa eastward through Lungog on the hills north of Ambulongan. The 2nd Battalion advanced and occupied Parparia, Tupao, and the high grounds north of Sarmingan Hill. The 3rd Battalion reached the high ground about 1 mile east of Santa, while the 1st Battalion from the east threatened the Pidigan-Langiden area and Hwy #6 from positions at Palao, Lipcan, and Saotan on the Sinalang River. All units of the 15th Inf, especially, the 3rd Battalion, had steady heavy artillery support as they closed in on all sides. From this position, the fortification of Tangadan was already visible and the attacking units were receiving fire from guns of higher caliber than they have heretofore been confronted.

As a consequence of this envelopment, and because of the constant air strikes, the bulk of the enemy was observed massing to the east-southeast from Tangadan, indicating unequivocally his intention to move east or south or may be both. Pressure was never lifted and the 2nd Battalion frantically raced north to join the 1st Battalion left wing on its general north-south line. The Japanese must have noticed the new direction of force as the 3rd Battalion pushing from the west, watched the vigorous northward push of the 2nd Battalion from the Narvacan-Nagbukel line which was steadily moving on through Sarmingan, Casilagan, Cadacad, and Cosucos.

The main enemy body was now intent on fighting its way out of the closing trap. Marasoso Hill south of Hwy #6 southwest of Pidigan and northeast of Baritbarit was being assaulted from the north and east by the 1st Battalion units who were pushing westward to the San Quintin-Tagadan area. Their patrols verified the Japanese movement east-southeast when they met the Japanese in the vicinity of Sapdaan and Dalimag, northern barrios of Pilar. South of these barrios was Kagotungan, another Pilar barrio which was then being secured by F Company in anticipation of the enemy escaping east-southeast to Manabo on the Abra River.

On April 20, fifty days after the offensive had begun, the 2nd Battalion had already left the Cayapa River bed, had

occupied the foothills on its right bank, and were speedily ascending the upper reaches of the river to secure the northern barrios of Pilar. F Company was in the lead to the right flank of the 2nd Battalion, and was exactly on the path of the main body of the Japanese who were hastily abandoning the Tangadan area. The 1st Battalion with CP at Pao, midway on the Penarubia-Pilar Road, had not quite closed the gap, although they already had contact with F Company. To this weak spot on the line, the Japs brought to bear their trench mortars, heavy machine guns, 37-mm guns, and the fury of their desperate soldiers.

The Pursuit

By April 25, 150 Japanese broke through the F Company defense line; Company A, MP Battalion sent to reinforce F Company could not arrive on time to be effective. Two days later, Tangadan succumbed to the devastating assault of the 3rd Battalion ground troops supported by big artillery pieces and trench mortars, and coordinated air strikes, netting the 15th Inf, important maps and documents, and enemy supplies and ammunitions. Mopping up operations in the abandoned Tangadan-Pamutic-Dalimag area continued unabated by the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Battalion units, except those assigned to the pursuit of the fleeing enemy.

From the engagement at Sapdaan, on the saddle between Dalimag and Cosucos, running battles were fought all the way across the Sinalang River to the Abra River and up to the Gayaman concentration point of the fleeing enemy, on the southern Abra boundary line on the Ilocos Sur side.

E and F Companies, 2nd Battalion, moving directly east from Dalimag area encountered and fought the Japanese at Salnec between Bucay and San Jose. E Company, 66th Inf (atchd) pursued the enemy up the Abra River from their skirmish at Lumaba north of Villaviciosa through Luba to Gayaman. These three companies kept tagging on the heels of the scurrying Japs, while A Company, 1st Battalion, secured Bucay and C Company, 1st Battalion, patrolled Sallapadan with intent to prevent Japanese movement, north and east.

Anticipating the escape of the Japanese to the south, an

encircling force was immediately constituted and sent to envelop the fleeing Japanese on the Abra-Ilocos Sur boundary. F Company, 121st Inf, which operated at that time in the general area on the Ilocos Sur side of the boundary line, arriving ahead of the other units, prepared the ground in the vicinity of Angaki and waited for developments, sending patrols meanwhile to contact the fleeing enemy. Three companies of the 3rd Battalion, 15th Inf, operating in Abra were rushed south as the encircling force, I and M Companies, occupied positions in the vicinity of Matibuey while L Company reinforced F Company, 121st Inf, at Angaki. Thus, Major General Araki with the remnants of his 79th Brigade found himself again entrapped threatened with annihilation.

Even before the break-through at Tangadan, 25th of April, General Araki must have decided to bring all the men he could take to Bontoc by way of Gayaman, Pananuman, and Bessao. It was also apparent that he did not favor marching in force once they could break through the thin line of F Company. Subsequent events which showed scattered contacts with the pursuing 1st and 2nd Battalion units indicated more than the existence of stragglers from Japanese ranks. This must have been part of a clever plan to elude pursuit so as to enable them to reach a previously designated assembly point, with intent to reorganize, to check up survivors, and to execute the forced march to Bontoc.

The assembly point was Gayaman where intelligence reported the presence of about 1,000 Japanese with all signs of restlessness and mobility. The fact that they did not prepare their ground for defense, except providing for defensive positions from surprise attack, gave away their intention to continue their "death march."

Reported subsequent contacts with the enemy in barrios up the Abra River from Gayaman to Malideg and Angaki did not disclose the presence of a big number of Japanese. Yet the first two days of May disclosed their presence in force in Gayaman and Timuken, northeast of Supo, on the south bank of the Utip River. This big group was breaking through tractless, virgin forest to south-southeast, crossing small stream tributaries to the Abra River until the Balasian River

and turning up later in the general area north of the east-west Angaki-Pananuman Line.

The 3rd Battalion units, previously dispatched as encircling force occupied the Angaki-Pananuman Line, disputed their passage east to Besao and Bontoc. The envelopment maneuver was complete. The point of decisive action was to be fought on the Angaki-Pananuman Line as predetermined by higher command. While the 1st and 2nd Battalion units moved up the Abra River valley pursuing the rear and flank guard units of General Araki's 79th Brigade, the 3rd Battalion pounded them on their front, cutting them off entirely from their avenue of escape.

Everything should have ended surprisingly well had it not been for the bombing revelry which threw a kink in the operations. That was May 6, when a napalm stray hit landed on a 3rd Battalion ammo dump on its right flank near the line of K Company. That was the opportune time for the Japanese to stampede. As many as could take the risk, went hurriedly through the gap, occasioned by the temporary disorder in the I Company. They did not stop for breath, once they had the 3rd Battalion behind them. Pushing E through unchartered territory with only the goal in view they raced frantically on, leaving behind them the weak, the malarial, and the indifferent who did not care what fate would overtake them. Company E, 66th Inf under 1st Lt. de Ocampo was detailed to pursue the fleeing Japanese to Bessao.

By May 15, the 2nd Battalion was bivouacking in Bauguen for replenishment, preparatory to their hop to new operational areas. They were given a week's rest to reorganize, followed five days later, by the 1st Battalion, which have assembled at Bucay, prepared to enroute southward. On May 25, the 3rd Battalion went to Baugen, also in anticipation of another engagement in the new sector of the USAFIP, NL. The 1st and 3rd Battalions went to Suyo, while the 2nd Battalion move to Butac, both areas astride Hwy #4 to Cervantes.

Conclusion

This redeployment of the 15th Inf practically concluded the Tangadan operations in Abra, which formally began with the occupation of Sulvec barrio north of Narvacan on March

1st, and ended on May 25th, after the withdrawal of the main units from the Ilocos Sur-Abra sector. The reduction of a few enemy pockets only occupied the time of small detachments of the 15th Inf.

At the start of operations, from 2,500 to 3,000 Japanese under Maj. Araki were reported entrenched in the hilly Tangadan engagements. The 1st and 2nd Battalions were busy in Ilocos Sur. Until they could extend aid together with artillery pieces, the Japanese felt secure in the hill. When these two battalions went into action, and the air strikes became concentrated (after northern Ilocos Sur and Ilocos Norte were cleared), the Japanese turned about to look for a way out.

Previously, the 2nd Battalion operating in the Pidigan-Langiden area, was ordered to prepare the Narvacan-Nagbukel line as a jump-off place for the northward assault against the enemy left-flank defenses. The area to be covered was over ten miles; consequently, the 2nd Battalion mass necessitated the overdrawn thin line over a wide frontage, making possible the "break through." Otherwise, the Tangadan operation would not have dragged on too long.

Another inference is that there must have been going on a steady trek of enemy escapees prior to the formation of the 2nd Battalion stop-gap line; this is because despite intelligence reports of only about 150 Japanese who were able to escape, later check-ups turned out to be about 1,000, in round number, force-marching east to Bontoc.

It is possible, however, that due to the dispersion march undertaken by the enemy from the Tangadan area to their Pananuman redoubt, about a third of their number must have succumbed to bullets of the 15th Inf that pursued them on the run. The reported number that escaped with Gen. Araki from Tangadan was 1,500 in number. Approximately 1,000 of them survived the ordeal of the 15th Inf and from disease and hunger.

Three days after the termination of operations in the Ilocos-Tangadan Campaign, reported enemy casualties amounted to six thousand nine hundred thirty-six (6,936), distributed as follows.

Killed in Action (KIA) 6,406

Wounded in Action (WIA)	510
Prisoners of War (POW's)	20
Total	<u>6,936</u>

This total is roughly 70 percent of the estimated total of ten thousand (10,000) Japanese of mixed units that fought their way out of the cordon that the 15th Inf threw around them during the five months' operation in Northwest Luzon.

In addition to unreported destroyed arms, ammunitions, and large quantities of other captured military supplies, maps, and documents, the booties actually taken or destroyed during the same period of operations summed up to the following:

50,000 — Gallons, Gasoline (Approx.)
3,000 — Bundles, Palay
47 — AA Guns, 25-mm.
14 — Mtn Guns, cal. unknown
1 — Tommy Gun
3 — Mortars
1,000 — Japanese rifles
4 — Guns, cal. unknown
5 — Twin-Engined Bombers
60 — Trucks
1 — V. S. 37-mm AA
20 — Knee mortars
160,000 — Rds, Ammos (Various, Approx.)
40 — Cavans, Rice
14 — MG's, cal. unknown
1 — BAR
1 — 37-mm Gun
12 — 20-mm Guns
3 — Pistols
22 — US Rifles
2 — Single-Fighter Plane
11 — Radio Sets

Chapter VI

THE BATTLE FOR BESSANG PASS

(From a Stalemate to a Decisive Victory for USAFIP, NL)

I. Introduction

In the wake of simultaneous battle operations then raging in North Luzon, few men realized how significant and far-reaching were the results of the battle for Bessang Pass. High above these scraggy mountains, 6,000 feet of desolate terrain, the sturdy Ilocano and Igorot lads were making history. Tirad Pass, looming in the northern horizon, watched the World War II version of valor and heroism. This time the great grandsons of the handful of *Insurrectos* under General Gregorio del Pilar were writing a new page of military history on another Pass. On that road and on those high promontories the day of decision and judgment was to be wrought. It was bloody as it was decisive. At the close of the operations in June, it was a tidal wave of victorious fulfillment.

II. Terrain

The setting of the Bessang operations traversed the regions of the coastal plains skirting the western foot of the Ilocos Mountains due east up the narrow Ilocos ranges down the southern interior basin of the Abra River and up again through the massive Cordillera Central. Between the coastal plains of Tagudin and Bangar and the lowland areas of the Abra River bed at Cervantes, the narrow Ilocos ranges run parallel the coastline. That part which extends from Baguio in the south to the Abra River gap near Vigan is the dominant part of the range.

That cluster of high peaks, so peculiarly irregular and serrated like an ugly row of incisors jabbing the sky, is sometimes known as the Malaya Ranges. This mountainous area is characterized by deep gorges and sharp-crested ridges which are formidable barriers to any movement eastward to the

Cordillera Central and the Cagayan Valley. Steep slopes, impassable dense vegetation, numerous mountain streams, swift with many rapids, destructive flash floods from May to October—all make this region seem impenetrable.

There are only a few passes over these terrain, among them the Tirad Pass and Bessang Pass through which the Libtong-Cervantes highway (Hwy #4) was constructed. The precipitous nature of the hills and ridges allow only a one-lane gravel road; and this becomes a headache to the engineers when the rains pour because landslides and washouts are very frequent, and quick-swelling rapid tear the bridges away. At certain portions of the road, loose dirt soon become slush and mud that runs up to above the knees, bogging down ten-wheeled vehicles and blocking traffic for days. In fact, during the Bessang operations when the uninterrupted flow of supply of food and ammunition was vitally important, discouraging landslides and the "temperamental" Padaquil and Butac Rivers very often balled-up the timetable of the units in the field. In many instances, telephone lines were cut off by an avalanche of logs and rocks completely obliterating portions of the road. Then there was that fatal stroke of the elements when five men of Company K, 121st Inf, who found shelter beneath the ledge of a bluff along the road one squally evening near Tagpo, woke up to find themselves buried in a terrific landslide killing three of them.

The prominent peaks along the Malaya Range around Bessang are Mt. Libo Libo (5,500), Mt. Nalidaoan (5,700), Mt. Namandaraan (6,500), and Mt. Namogucan (6,831). Minor peaks where bloody skirmishes took place are Lamagan, Upper and Lower Magun. All these high grounds are above Baguio's elevation (5,000).

All along Hwy #4, which was the axis of all operations in Bessang, the vegetation was largely made up of cogon grass, thick jungle growths of ferns and scrubs and pine trees or forests. Many places were just plain, bare rock formations, moss-grown and slippery as hell. There are no hog trails to the crest because the deeply incised canyons do not even allow a toe-hold for the audacious hog. Most native trails are strung up following the knife-edge of the ridges. There are no trails

that branch off from the main road to localities in the vicinity. The men had to make them.

The patches of secondary growth provide good cover and concealment but great difficulty to movement of foot troops. In other places, everything is barren, and troop movement in the daytime, especially on the skyline on hostile territory, would certainly draw fire.

Mention must also be made of the leeches, bugs, and vermin which had their share in making life uncomfortable as it was, in that battleground. There are numerous streams and rills in the vicinity of Hwy #4 where the leeches sipped their share of human blood from the foot-sore GIs. The common body lice (*tuma*) cropped up in no time among the shabby, be-grimmed clothes of the boys, out there in their damp fox-holes. There had to be idle hours of de-lousing during a lull in the firing line.

The ubiquitous mosquito and the fly were also around to complete the picture. Malaria took its tool of victims in spite of the vigilance of the medical officers in giving the troops proper atabrine prophylaxis. Diarrhea, dysentery, and other intestinal diseases were not infrequent.

The weather from April to June 15, was a variety of dry and wet spells. However, from Butac up to Yubo, the altitude brought in the cold, mist, fog, and rain in the afternoons. Dawn was cold and chilly, and the sun crept up the giant crags to pierce through the cloudy shrouds of about 0800 hours. At 1100 hours, the fog would set in and visibility became poor. At times one could hardly make out the form of a man standing five yards away. This copious display of fog limited the fighting to light action, although at times, under cover of this screen, the troops would launch a surprise attack and the Japanese did the same. It was imperative to be always on the alert when the fog drifted over no man's land.

This foggy atmosphere stayed for hours. At 1300 hours, a light drizzle set in and rain followed shortly before dark. The average rainfall increased in May and June, and heavy downpours frequently lasted for days. The wet, shivering doughboy clung to his cubicle under his poncho—kept awake far into the weary hours of the deep night as the rain kept

on unabated vigilant for the cunning and sneaking enemy.

Generally, the fog "weathered out" air strikes on strategic targets up the crests of prominent terrains. A clear ceiling permitted air activity from 0700 to 1100 hours. From then on, very seldom were the clear afternoons with visibility enough to make out the outline of enemy fortifications and of the wary Japanese camote-digging detail. These savages and infidels were more concerned in scratching camote patches to ward off starvation than in fighting a one-sided war. Morning and afternoon, rain or shine, they went on in their digging forays apparently careless of their exposure and vulnerability out there in the open. Later on, however, when artillery fire ranged in on them, they scuttled themselves to the reverse slopes of the hills and never again exposed themselves.

III. Enemy Situation

During the initial stage of the Bessang operations, the enemy strength in the environs of the Cervantes area was estimated as follows: Aluling-Baluza, 200 Infantry; Maserokan-Kapangan Hills, 240 Infantry; Liclasan-Comog, 60 Infantry, and Bessang-Garrison, 90 Infantry.

As the fighting wore on, combat intelligence and information gained from POW's, and G-2 agents revealed that the units which built up the enemy defenses were identified with the 75th Regiment, 73rd Regiment, elements of the 79th Brigade, units of the 19th Division, the 357th Independent Battalion, and the 25th Mountain Artillery. All told, it was estimated that there at least 4,500 enemy troops at the Bessang Area which confronted the 121st Inf PA.

Taking an overall view of the whole operations, the enemy's strong points were concentrated at Bessang Pass, Cervantes, Mankayan, Bontoc, and KP 90 along the Mountain Trail. The main line of resistance was strung in the form of a triangle with the apex at Bessang Pass and the other two tips resting at Cervantes and Mankayan, respectively. Along Hwy #11, the 32nd Division faced a determined stand and the main force of the enemy concentrated on both sides of the Mountain Trail to prevent the Americans from reaching further or northward. The Japanese were expecting the 37th Division along the Santa Fe Trail to break through any time and prepared to defend

Bontoc, Polis Pass, and Kiangnan in case they occupied the Cagayan Valley. The threat of our forces coming from the north through Lubuagan was one of the reasons for the defense of Bontoc by the enemy.

It was held likely, therefore, that because the pressure on the Mountain Trail was halted temporarily just as the 37th Division was protracted from debauching into the Cagayan Valley at Balete Pass, it was necessary for the Japanese at the Bessang-Cervantes area to plug that means of approach to their rear. Mankayan was heavily fortified and it was known that the Japanese were storing food and ammunition in the area. Once Bessang and Cervantes were taken away from them, Mankayan, Sabangan, and Bontoc had to be staunchly defended.

As the progress of the operations was underway, it was understandable that the enemy figured out on isolating the 121st Inf by cutting Hwy #4 in the vicinity of Butac. As the USAFIP, NL forces moved farther inland, the supply route invariably offered a tempting objective to the enemy. The Cervantes-Mankayan-KP 90 Road was to be the main axis of operation for them.

IV. Operations

First Phase (Feb. 10-March 27)

The initial mission of securing Japanese-held Suyo on Hwy #4 on the road to Cervantes was given to the 3rd Battalion, 121st Inf, which regiment was under the command of then Major G. M. Barnett. Bitalag Garrison (Libtong) fell to Company L after four days of siege, and the remnants of the Japanese who sneaked out of the place were killed at Becques on January 21-24, 1945. The new Hwy #3 from Bacnotan to Narvacan was cleared of the enemy.

As soon as all units of the 3rd Battalion (Companies K and M) which had just operated in Tangadan, Abra, arrived at Bitalag, the battle for Suyo began. Mt. Tapao, Kimposa, and Suyo succumbed in rapid succession. Butac was subsequently cleared of the enemy and Bessang loomed as the next desideratum.

The operations at San Fernando necessitated the prompt

commitment of elements of the 3rd Battalion to reinforce the 1st Battalion, 121st Inf. Bacsil and San Fernando proper were stubbornly defended for obvious reasons.

The Bessang operations—while the elements of the 121st Inf tackled the enemy at Bacsil and Carlatan—was devolved upon the resources of Company L, 121st Inf.

The first encounter in the fight for Bessang took place on February 10, 1945 by two platoons of Company L, in the vicinity of Bessang, lasting for 38 hours. An enemy outpost north of Bessang (possibly Buccual) was captured. Fifty Japanese were killed in action against 1 killed and 7 WIA on our side. Following the operation, L Company was recalled for the defense of Butac which the Japanese threatened to recapture after having been previously driven away.

On February 12, a platoon of L Company, reinforced by a 3rd Battalion detachment from the regimental headquarters, 121st Inf, engaged the enemy force of estimated strength of 45, at Liclasan along Hwy #4. Fifteen Japanese were killed in this encounter.

Pending the arrival of the component units which formed the Provisional Battalion, Company L of the 121st Inf had to adopt a systematic strategy of striking the enemy at concentrated areas. Having succeeded in the reduction of the Buttac garrison, Company L proceeded to reoccupy the high grounds of Bessang and to their dismay, they realized that the Japanese had already taken over. At about this time BC soldiers, who were captured in the vicinity of Buttac, divulged that there were about 150 Japanese and constabulary soldiers who were garrisoned at Bessang.

The error of not putting a holding force in Bessang after the Pass was within our grasp could be the reason the enemy took over the abandoned territory in order to fortify its high grounds. The Bessang garrison then, which did not have more than a platoon of Japanese was never completely reduced by the Provisional Battalion which operated there.

On February 20, L Company, 121st Inf attacked the Japanese garrison at Cervantes. The church where the Japanese were quartered was razed to the ground and an estimated 60 Japanese and 20 UN's were burned to a crisp. The Japanese

at Bessang who realized the pressure in the Cervantes area tried to reinforce their comrades but they were ambused by platoon of L Company posted west of the town.

On February 24, L Company assaulted the rest of the Japanese in Cervantes and finally occupied the whole town. During this ferocious engagement, 166 Japanese were killed and 47 Filipinos (pro-Japs) were captured. On Our side, 2 EM KIA and 5 WIA.

At this juncture, it became apparent that the Japanese were prepared to bring in reinforcements in order to retain Cervantes and to hold their position in Bessang and the high grounds around it. Several attempts of the enemy to counterattack positions of L Company were repulsed. Company D, 66th Inf, and Company A, 11th Inf, recently formed into the Provisional Battalion, were now confronted with the task of preventing movements along Bessang-Cervantes area. At Comog and Bessang, the Japanese brought in mortars and 2.95 guns then subjected our line to intensive bombardment; but our forces held their grounds. By this time, the enemy had approximately 500 Japanese well-entrenched in fox holes and committed to the front of the Provisional Battalion.

Meanwhile, Cervantes was again recaptured by the Japanese. However, on March 13, the Provisional Battalion wrested the town for the second time after five hours of brisk fighting. This time the enemy fled in groups to Lepanto, Aluling, and Mt. Malaya, packing up their heavy weapons with them. On March 15, the enemy took positions on the Hill south of Cervantes and attempted to dislodge our forces holding the town. Fighting went on in this sector while the Provisional Battalion successfully held their positions at Cervantes. The enemy employed mountain artillery and mortars with disastrous effects. To cope with this situation, the Provisional Battalion retaliated by effectively dividing the enemy into small isolated packets and disrupting the enemy's line of communication. Consequently, the units of the Provisional Battalion were so scattered that coordination on a connected front was sadly mission. Had the enemy brought in additional reinforcements during this period, it could have spelt disaster for the scattered units of the Provisional Battalion.

Farther up north in the 15th Inf Sector, the Japanese in Tangadan, Abra (79th Inf Mixed Brigade under Gen. Araki) were kept busy, to prevent them from reinforcing the Cervantes front. Way down to the south, the 66th Inf, working on the enemy with aggressive sorties along Hwy #11, checked all enemy attempts to join their comrades at the Cervantes-Bessang area.

The San Fernando-Bacsil operation was brought to a successful conclusion on March 24, and the bulk of the 121st Inf was ordered bivouacked in San Juan, La Union, for the purpose of reorganization and of giving a much-needed rest to the troops. In the big overall picture of the whole operations, Hwy #4, which extended up to Bontoc, was obviously a vital link in the drive to push the enemy deep into the interior. The 121st Inf which had succeeded in clearing the Hwy up to Butac had to be committed once again.

Second Phase — (March 27 to April 10)

Moving by shuttles on a motorized convoy to Butac, the 1st Battalion, 121st Inf, left San Juan on March 27, followed shortly by the 2nd Battalion and 3rd Battalion a few days later. The mission of the regiment was to seize Cervantes and the territory east of it as far as Bontoc.

In the afternoon of March 29, 1st Battalion patrols came in contact with the enemy in Lamagan Ridge, one of the high grounds guarding Bessang Pass. The 2nd Battalion was to operate along the road, abreast with it the 1st Battalion moved due east, the 3rd Battalion was on regimental reserve and bivouacked along the road behind the 2nd Battalion. The advance of the 2nd Battalion was checked by the enemy outpost on Yubo Ridge. On March 31, Yubo gate along Hwy #4 was secured and the 1st Battalion continued to dislodge the enemy at Lamagan Ridge.

The Provisional Battalion, then attached to the regiment, coordinated its movement with the pressure exerted by the 1st and 2nd Battalions toward Bessang, and succeeded in preventing the reinforcement of the enemy at Bessang from Bauko, Sabangan, and Bontoc. Some units of this Battalion captured Magun Hill only several thousand yards northeast of Bessang Pass after what appeared to be a "seesaw" affair. The enemy

defenses in Bessang were subsequently cleared off around Magun Hill, and at one time the advance elements of the Provisional Battalion were within 400 yards from the Japanese-held garrison.

The whole set-up now showed that, if the Provisional Battalion succeeded in taking the northern approaches of Bessang, it would be easy for the 2nd Battalion, 121st Inf, to move down into the Cervantes Valley. Stiff and determined resistance, however, in front of these units thwarted the plan to force the Japanese at Bessang to leave. To a certain extent, the 1st Battalion succeeded in extending its southernmost elements up to the approaches of the Malaya Mountains, but it was also apparent that the area to be covered over-extended the line and the terrain features did not allow a fast and aggressive move against the enemy. As a consequence, the only solution was to eject the Japanese from the high grounds on Lamagan, Upper Cadsu, and Nalidaoan in order for them to reach Cervantes.

Supporting artillery for the units of the 121st Inf was sadly lacking. The first semblance of friendly artillery support came in the appearance of a 270-mm gun (Japanese-made) without fire control instruments and sufficient ammunition. Adequate artillery fire could not be brought to bear on the prepared positions of the Japanese on the high grounds of Lamagan, Upper and Lower Cadsu, and Buccual. During all this time, our troops, depending mostly on small-arm fire to hold their positions, ran the risk of being cut to ribbons if they came within the deadly range of Japanese artillery.

Third Phase (April 10 to April 17)

On April 3, the 121st Inf advancing along the axis of Hwy #4 reached the general line Naiba-Yubo Ridge extending up to Napayco, and encountered slight enemy resistance consisting of outposts well-entrenched in pillboxes and tunnels. The Provisional Battalion continued its mission by harassing the enemy at north Bessang, Liclasan, and Comog.

Minor skirmishes characterized the operations of the Provisional Battalion on April 3. East of Cervantes, the enemy continually subjected our troops to mountain gun fire concentrated at Aluling. Reports from G-2 at this juncture in-

licated that about 700 Japanese were moving north to Cervantes from Mankayan with mountain guns and automatic weapons. On April 4, G Company, 121st Inf, which was attached for operational purposes to the Provisional Battalion, attacked from the north towards Langiatan Hill immediately north of Bessang Pass. One platoon of L Company attacked from the northeast the enemy outpost 400 yards north of Langiatan Hill, who was pushed back in spite of his numerous tunnels in this area.

On the morning of April 5, 0600, the Japanese at Bessang suddenly opened up with intense artillery bombardment directed at the 2nd Battalion line strung up from Lower Cadsu to Baragbag Point along Yubo Ridge. This was followed up with a determined assault by the enemy coming from Upper Cadsu and Tagpo. As a result of this, our forces were pushed back and the enemy gained control of Lower Cadsu and Yubo Hidges. The entire 3 companies of the 2nd Battalion put up a desperate attempt to hold their positions. After a bitter hand-to-hand fighting our troops had to withdraw, using the Butac River as their only avenue of exit. Two of the mountain guns (70-mm, Japanese-made) which were the only main-stays of the 2nd Battalion by way of artillery, fell into the hands of the enemy. The gun crews, however, realizing that they were cut off when the Japanese secured Yubo Ridge, dismantled the breech mechanism of these two guns, rendering them useless.

The 3rd Battalion, acting as regimental reserve, had to be committed on April 6, when I Company and E Company (attd) were ordered to advance along the road to drive the enemy away from Yubo Ridge. Our troops succeeded in driving away the Japanese at Yubo Ridge; at the same time they were able to join elements of K Company which was sent to secure Daragdag Point and Yubo Ridge. The 1st Battalion held its grounds and captured Nalidaoan Hill after slight skirmishes. On April 6 the Provisional Battalion overran and occupied southern Langiatan and pushed the enemy southward to Buccual. Enemy attempts to penetrate our lines from Lamagan on April 8 were repulsed. Forward elements of the 1st Battalion continued their advance and seized the Japanese water supply at Diwac, in the vicinity of Nalidaoan Hill. As a result, a big

pocket was formed with the Japanese at Lamagan and Padiwa entirely cut off from Bessang.

At about this time, a close support mission on Bessang area was given the air corps which succeeded in softening the enemy strong points.

The enemy's 19th Division (Tora Butai) which was facing our units at Bessang now appeared to have been heavily reinforced with artillery and auxiliary armaments. Progress was slow as the enemy lines around Bessang began to be more elaborate and well-prepared. At the same time, strong enemy pressure east of Cervantes coming from Bontoc, caused the withdrawal of the Provisional Battalion to a defensive position north of Hwy #4.

On April 19, M Company, 3rd Battalion, acting on orders to seize Lower Cadsu, a prominent and strategic position along Hwy #4, effected a savage attack on this objective. As soon as the crest of the hill was secured, artillery fire from Bessang threw back our forces for a while, but after the barrage was over another bitter hand-to-hand fighting ensued. The Japanese withdrew finally, leaving 40 of their comrades killed in action.

Fourth Phase — April 17 to May 22)

The fourth phase of the battle of Bessang was ushered in when units of the 3rd Battalion, pushing along the road, reached a point approximately 200 yards from the Bessang Garrison. Our 81mm section had been effective in silencing enemy artillery at Bessang, although at times they were subjected to counter-battery fire which was deadly accurate. The Provisional Battalion at the same time effected a counter-attack and captured the last hill on Langiatan Ridge, north of Buccual in the face of stiff enemy resistance. As a result, the Japanese retreated to Buccual and Bessang.

On April 11, having in stock most of the quarter-master supplies and ammunition of the regiment, Butac was subjected to intense artillery barrage from Bessang and Nalidaoan. As a consequence of this, considerable ammunition, arms, clothes, and rations, went up in smoke. This was perhaps the heaviest destructive blow delivered by the enemy against our rear installations. Although the damage was considerable, the am-

muniton and food destroyed was immediately replaced and did not hamper the operations for the period.

The report of operations made by G-3 on April 13 showed that all possible means of exit of the enemy were sealed off at Lamagan by the 121st Inf. The Japanese in this pocket subsisted mainly on camotes which they dug within that limited area. A heavy attack was made on the last enemy stronghold at Buccual, and although the hill was not completely taken, the impact of the assault forced the Japanese to a second line of defense at Upper Magun. Casualties of the enemy on this single engagement was placed at 79 killed. On our side, 1 officer and 3 EM KIA and 11 WIA. Air assaults of SDD's and P-51's on strategic targets continued relentlessly. (Refer to Annex 1, cumulative comparison of casualties of USAFIP NL troops to April 17, 1945).

The disposition of troops as of April 18, in the vicinity of Bessang Pass, clearly showed that a siege had to be effected in order to reduce enemy resistance in Bessang. As it were, the Japanese hang on tenaciously to the high grounds guarding Bessang Pass, denying our troops the use of Hwy #4. Local, minor enemy assaults, and counterattacks by our boys characterized the activities of this period up to the middle of May with no important decision effected by both antagonists.

The suicidal resistance made by the Japanese defenders in the Lamagan area, pocketed and cut off from reinforcements coming from Cervantes, finally fell on April 21, after continuous assaults of elements of the 1st Battalion, 121st Inf. The defenders of this hill were completely wiped out as all avenues of exit were sealed. Elements of the 3rd Battalion, 121st Inf, on April 23, pressed on their slow movement toward Bessang by occupying an isolated hill west of the Pass. This position which was taken after a night of operation allowed them a means of effecting a detour, bringing at least one company into the inner ring of defenses of the Bessang garrison. At about this time, the enemy estimated at 700, fully equipped, effected a break through on the Provision Battalion line, northeast of Bessang. Fighting at close quarter ensued, and our boys were forced to withdraw 200 yards north of Hwy #4 after 7 hours of engagement. Eight EM and 1 officer, KIA, 16 WIA and 68 MIA. The 1st Battalion, meanwhile,

intent on reaching Bessang from the east, forged its way through negligible enemy resistance. This, however, was temporary as the Japanese saw the over-extended line and the exposed flanks. They began to cut off our supply lines. In most instances, units were scattered. Had there been no radio communications between companies and battalion commander, it would have been very difficult to maintain an orderly withdrawal to better organized areas.

On April 29, Lower Cadsu which was a portion of the Lamagan Pocket, lost to the 121st Inf previously, was recaptured by Company M and attached units. The Provisional Battalion counter-attacked and drove the enemy 500 yards southeast from its position at Kinayad. Until the end of April, the 121st Inf repulsed the day and night probable enemy attempts to infiltrate our flanks. Slow but steady progress against stubborn enemy resistance was effected. Lubnakan and Langiatan Hills were occupied in spite of heavy enemy resistance.

One heartening feature of the campaign was the employment of the newly organized 1st FA Battalion which were now equipped with sufficient medium artillery guns to counteract the enemy. Although many things were wanting by way of adequate instruments and training of gun crews, the harassing effect of these artillery pieces contributed much in clamping down enemy movements in the area. No let up of air strikes occurred during the period. Allied planes of the 308th Bomb Wing, guided by the 2nd Support Aircraft Party, were responsible in softening up much of enemy grounds. Demolition and napalm bombs and strafing wrought havoc wherever enemy artillery emplacements, pillboxes, and tunnels were observed. The efficient air-ground liaison may be gathered from a narrative (see appendix) whereby the ground troops and the supporting air arm moved systematically to gain the desired objective. The positions of the enemy confronted by the Provisional Battalion and L Company of the 121st Inf were so well-defended that no amount of small arms fire could dislodge the Japanese from their tunnels and fox holes. When good weather allowed air strikes on enemy areas, it was observed that the Japanese retired to the streams and gulleys until after the air strikes were over. This trick was soon discovered and

all deep stream depressions were given intensive bombing and strafing.

As the air assaults and artillery supporting fires became more accelerated, the Japanese showed signs of making a desperate move in order to break through the cordon that was slowly but inexorably tightening around Bessang. There were unexpected sorties made on rear installations which were stupidly planned and costly to them. Famine prompted them to procure foodstuffs at all costs. The Japanese fighting a war of attrition with their ammunition running lower every day was of secondary importance. Their much-vaunted Samurai virtues gave way to all kinds of ludicrous incidents.

Whenever Japanese reinforcements coming from Mankayan succeeded in gaining access to the Bessang-Cervantes road, they invariably struck with telling effect on the Provisional Battalion, which during this time were sadly depleted because of losses and sickness. A POW confessed that the units defending Bessang area were soon to be reinforced by some more mixed elements of the 19th Division; however, this information did not materially change the operations in this area, although it was apparent that the Japanese who had eluded the 15th Inf. in the north, were fast pouring southward following the course of the Ilocos Ranges and the Abra River Valley. And then, too, there were indications of undetermined number of Japanese in the vicinity of Dadaay and Marmarsing south of Butac. At this time, elements of the 2nd Battalion, were dispatched to the area south of Butac to prevent enemy infiltrations of the 121st Inf. rear areas. From aerial reconnaissance patrols, it became apparent that the Japanese had designs of forcing their way into Butac and cutting off the 121st Inf. from the rear. Several light skirmishes took place, but these did not prevent the enemy's pressing toward Butac. Bombing by pursuit planes in the vicinity of Dadaay did not materially deflect the Japanese from pressing on to their objective.

In spite of this, however, the 1st FA Battalion consisting of 2 105-mm guns (Btry A), 2 75-mm Japanese long range guns (Btry B) and 4 75-mm Pack Howitzer (Btry C), supported the units in the field, whenever situation so demanded. Interdiction fires on Cervantes caused fires to nipa houses in the

town, believed to be enemy supply dumps. A Japanese aid station and hospital along Malaya creek was reported hit. Effective artillery fire from these batteries were also registered on enemy concentrations and pillboxes on Nabiit Hill forcing the withdrawal of enemy troops. Battery C with 4 75-mm Pack Howitzer laid harassing fires on enemy concentrations on Batu Hill. Buccual Ridge was constantly shelled in view of the tenacious and persistent effort of the Japanese to dig camotes along the slopes of the hills. Whenever enemy artillery shells fell on our positions, counter battery became the order of the day.

On May 17, the 1st Battalion, 121st Inf. repulsed a heavy enemy attack on all its fronts. Judging from the intensity of the operations, this was the beginning of a pre-arranged plan intended to cripple the right flank of the 121st Inf. while effecting the thrust at Butac. Hill 99-W and Nalidaoan area were soon taken by the enemy who continued to push the 1st Battalion until the Upper Cadsu and Lamagan were wrested away by them.

Here, indeed, was a critical situation. The Japanese had evidently determined to eliminate the effective artillery support of our units; and by closing in on our lines to diminish the chances of their being bombed or strafed. Not until elements of the 2nd Battalion captured a map from a Japanese officer killed in action which included a field order containing the proposed plans to capture Buttac, did the intelligence units realize that the bulk of the Japanese offensive was really to come south of Butac.

While the 1st Battalion slowly disintegrated and was being pushed back to the rear until Lamagan where it had previously begun its initial operations in the Bessang area, the 3rd Battalion held on to the road and did not withdraw from the grounds in the inner perimeter of Bessang. Japanese artillery from Buccual was unusually active now, and even succeeded in knocking off and in neutralizing the positions of Battery B at Baragbag Point and the 105 Howitzers of Battery A in the rear. The Japanese coming from the south had threatened Battery C to a point where the gun crews had to fight with rifles and fire their guns at point blank range. Only timely reinforcement and adept maneuvers saved this battery from

being captured by the Japanese who paid dearly for these attempts.

For some seventy odd days of desultory fighting since April, 1945 to this time on the same battleground, six thousand feet above the rugged Ilocos and Cordillera mountains, crammed full of action, cold, fog, rain, mud, and combat fatigue, the battle for Bessang Pass showed the unmistakable signs of a stalemate. Something bold, drastic, and something like a master-stroke of strategy had to be done quickly.

Here again, Colonel R. W. Volckmann, bold and aggressive, confident that he knew his enemy, his capabilities, and intentions threw into the foray the punch of two more regiments—the 15th and 66th Infantries—to tip the scale and gave the USAFIP, NL contingent its most decisive victory over General Araki's stubborn veterans.

Fifth and Final Phase (May 22 to June 15)

The 2nd Battalion, 15th Inf, after it had accomplished its mission on mopping up operations in the southern part of Abra, was ordered to go to the vicinity of Butac along Hwy #4. On May 18, it went to its assembly area in the general area of Butac-Tagpan stream junction, and was directed to capture the high grounds of Lower Cadsu-Nalidaoan-Upper Cadsu ridges. On May 20, the enemy infiltrated in the general area on his way of advance threatening the gun positions of Battery C, 1st FA Battalion.

The entry of the elements of the 15th Inf into the theater of operations was timely and strategic. It was imperative to save the supply route from Japanese occupation at Butac since the only way for supplies was through Butac. It was reassuring to the units fighting in the sector of the 121st Inf in view of the desperate situation then confronting the 1st Battalion; operating with 2 companies could not cope with the situation in the Dadaay area, and when the Japanese were within 200 yards from the road, 1st Battalion, 15th Inf saved the day for the whole USAFIP, NL operations in the Bessang front.

Acting under the able command of Lt. Col. Arnold, the 1st Battalion, 15th Inf, was directed to bivouac in the vicinity of Kimposa, in preparation for joining the 2nd Battalion which

had gained considerable success in brushing away the threat on the Bessang-Butac supply line.

On May 22, a platoon of A Company, reinforced by the gun crews of Battery C, 1st FA Battalion, on Hill #3 and supported by another platoon, 1st Battalion, 15th Inf, effected an assault which seized the high ground northeast of Battery C gun position. Enemy casualties amounted to 100 Japanese killed in action. Our casualties were 4 KIA and 5 MIA. Other units of the 1st Battalion moved from Kimpasa along Hwy #4 and on May 23, attacked and occupied Hill #10. Combat patrols of C Company engaged and killed 15 Japanese on their way to Indadangan.

On May 24, 1st Battalion, 15th Inf, occupied Hill #10 in a coordinated attack from 2 directions, and driving northeast from Hill #13 closed in the gap between A and D Companies by occupying the saddles of Hill #9 and #10. Company C recaptured Indadanga Hill preventing enemy envelopment in the south. One complete radio set and 10 boxes of enemy ration were captured. The 2nd Battalion, in mopping up the area assigned to it accounted for 14 Japanese dead while occupying Hill #3.

The 121st Inf at this time was primarily a holding force to prevent the Japanese from infiltrating on the vitally important Hwy #4. While the 1st Battalion, 121st Inf was reorganizing and attempting to reduce Lamagan and vicinity, the 15th Inf, with relentless fury, drove on towards Nalidaon in an effort to prevent the Japanese from consolidating their scattered positions. The Provisional Battalion and L Company continued to put pressure on the northern approaches to Bessang and succeeded in substantially making Langiatan Hill untenable for the Japanese. Enemy sorties all along the road from Upper Cadsu and Lower Cadsu were repulsed by the vigilant efforts of some 100 casualties strung up to guard the road from Bessang to Baragbag Point.

The week ending May 29, weather and visibility was generally fair and warm with light rains and passing thunder showers in the afternoon over the northern side. This favorable weather forecasted another week of active operation.

The 66th Inf was soon reverted to the USAFIP, NL control

from I Corps attachment, and was ordered to join the battle line.

At this juncture, as if in a last attempt to drive through and break down the ever strengthening line of the USAFIP, NL, the enemy struck at our line in Bessang proper and in Langiatan, at the same time making suicidal attempts to hold on at Upper Cadsu, Nalidaoan, and Hill 99-W. Slight withdrawals had to be effected by I and K Companies at the Bessang area. The artillery of the enemy continued to harass our lines especially from Baragbag point to Tagpo.

On May 31, the 122nd FA Battalion (US) moved into positions in the general area at Butac. This support from a veteran artillery outfit sealed the doom of the defenders at Bessang. Their machine-line precision and fire power on all targets had in a great measure cracked up the semi-permanent defensive positions on Hill 99-W and Buccual.

In a letter of Col. R.P. Carlson, CO of the 122nd FA Bn (US) to Col. Volckmann, he said, among other things:

It was not without some misgivings that we embarked on the adventure of Bessang Pass. We had been accustomed to supporting, therefore, only troops with whom we had carefully trained, planned, and fought for more than two years, with whom all officers and men had a close personal acquaintance, mutual knowledge and confidence. The prospect of entering suddenly, a sharp, bitter, critical engagement together with totally strange troops of different race gave us a little pause. The ever-present costly danger, in the difficult terrain, of injuring, by some mischance, error, or misunderstanding, some of your own troops by our own fire, kept us worried.

These misgivings were quickly dissipated. From the very outset, the generous welcome afforded us, the spirit, high courage, and determination of the officers and men of USAFIP, NL, and the comradely gracious manner in which we were treated, inspired us all. We felt, at once, entirely "at home," members of a team, a team that was determined to deal the enemy a crushing blow.

Many of my officers and men have related incidents to me of remarkable battle achievements, individual and collective, all revealing the great personal bravery, spirit and fighting ability of the officers and men of

the 121st, 15th and 66th Infantry Regiments, and of the Provisional Units. I personally witnessed a number of similar incidents and instances during the course of the battle from Butac to Kayan and Lepanto. Those of my officers and men who were privileged to act in Liaison or Forward Observer Parties have been fulsome in their praise for and the highest respect and esteem for your infantrymen. Never have we supported infantry more eager to close with the enemy in hand to hand combat than the men of the 15th Infantry and the 121st Infantry. We have never dared fire any closer overhead fire than was fired in front of the 3rd Battalion, 121st Infantry at the Upper House, Bessang. Nor has any other infantry followed our fire more closely, with more dash.

The 1st Bn, 121st Inf, were able to clear out the Lamagan Hill area, and for the second time occupied this high point with a score of 155 of the enemy killed and considerable bottles captured.

As if medium artillery support was inadequate, the 1st Bn, 123rd Inf. (US) which provided security for the American field artillery battalion, supplied an 81-mm platoon to support elements of the 121st and 15th Infantries along their respective sectors.

On June 5, 1st Bn (less Cos. B and D) of the 66th Inf., following an intense artillery preparation assaulted south of Tagpen and discovered fresh Japanese graves on the slope of the hill. The right flank of the 15th Inf. had now joined with the 66th Inf. which later pressed with time, move due northeast in an effort to come abreast with the 15th Inf.

As soon as the 1st Bn, 121st Inf., had secured Lamagan ridge, it reverted to regimental reserve, while the 2nd Bn, 121st Inf., occupied Yubo and Lower Cadsu and the 3rd Bn held on to its precious grounds from Kiskis to within 50 yards from Bessang Pass.

On June 7, the 2nd Bn, 15th Inf., captured Hill #3 sustaining heavy casualties but effecting the most serious blow to the Japanese on their apparently impregnable position. The 3rd Bn, 15th Inf., after artillery preparations, launched an attack on Hill 99-W under cover of fog and darkness. The Japanese which were pulling out from Hill #13 were discovered

retreating in great number over Hill 99-W on the morning of the 8th. The alert 122nd FA Bn went into action and, in a most spectacular concentrated barrage, literally smothered the columns of Japanese that were group in positions on Hill 99-W. This artillery bombardment was followed with an intense mortal shelling on Hill 99-W within 20 minutes of continuous machine-gun like volleys by four 81-mm mortars.

A clear picture of the operation in this period, following Field Order #27, issued on May 30, 1945, defined the final stages of the campaign of Bessang into three stages:

1. The first stage consisted of the 15th Inf., taking over the area formerly occupied by the 2nd Bn, 121st Inf., south of Butac and the area where the 1st Bn, 121st Inf., had been pushed back by the enemy. The regimental boundary between the 121st and 15th Inf., was Hwy #4. On the right of the 15th Inf., the 66th Inf. was thrown in, to secure the 15th's right flank and also to cut off any enemy attempt to retreat from Nalidaoan area towards the Malaya ranges.

2. The second stage designated a specific time when all the three regiments were abreast extending along a north to south line (Langiatan-Buccual Hill 99-W) in a final effort to force decision and drive the enemy from Bessang Pass on Hwy #4.

3. The third stage defined the mission of the three regiments after their break through at Bessang Pass to secure finally Cervantes. Any enemy pocket on the way were to be contained by one battalion which the rest would have by-passed on to the next objective.

B and D Companies of the 11th Inf., under the command of Herbert Swick, were moved to the area of the Provisional Battalion. At Namebecan, the Provisional Battalion passed to the command of Captain Swick. This force was to attack and capture the high ground north and northeast of Bessang commencing on June 5, 1945. The force was under the overall command of the CO, 121st Infantry.

On June 10, entering the second phase of the final drive for the battle of Bessang, the following operations took place:

1st Bn, 121st Inf., reorganized, coordinated attacks with the 3rd Bn, 121st Inf., against Buccual, 1600 yards northeast

of Tacbo following artillery preparations by the 1st FA Bn. Heavy enemy pressure forced Provisional Battalion to relinquish newly gained grounds and withdrew to its original position on the Spanish Trail, but with the arrival of the two companies of the 11th Inf., the combat power of the Provisional Battalion was greatly enhanced.

With the 15th Inf., 1st Bn was in regimental reserve while the 2nd Bn continued attacks on Hill 99-W, 800 yards southeast of Tacbo against stiff enemy resistance. In the early phase of the attack, at least 50 Japanese were killed.

The 66th Inf, from previous positions at Banata and Hill #2, secured Hill #4, 3100 yards southeast of Butac. The 2nd Bn, following artillery preparations, attacked enemy strong points on Nalidaoan, meeting heavy enemy resistance from well dug-in positions, 200 yards southeast of this village.

On June 10, K Company launched a coordinated attack with mortar preparations on Bessang, and in a bloody encounter succeeded in securing the high grounds in Bessang. Enemy losses mounted to 172 killed. This was perhaps the bitterest 24-hour fight the enemy had to undergo, considering the number of killed and wounded he suffered. The corpses were strewn about in their foxholes and tunnels and had to be buried by the boys of K Company as they occupied their positions.

On the next day, intent on subduing heavy enemy resistance on Buccual, K Company effected only a 75-yard gain and captured 11 Japanese. I Company guarding the right flank of Bessang accounted for 4 Japanese killed and captured 2 knee mortars, 1 sub-machine gun and killed 11 Japanese. I Company guarding the right flank of Bessang accounted for 4 Japanese killed and captured 2 knee mortars, 1 sub-machine gun, and 5 rifles. L Company, attacking along the northern slope, reached to within 400 yards from the highest peak of Buccual. The Provisional Battalion supported by artillery barrage continued a vigorous attack southwest towards Hill 97-V (Upper Magun) meeting increased enemy resistance while steadily gaining ground.

On June 13, it was clearly evident that enemy resistance was fast weakening. The 3rd Bn, 15th, following artillery preparations, finally seized Hill 99-W. Six artillery pieces, 60

rifles, 1 knee mortar, and a large quantity of supplies were captured. Meanwhile, the 121st Inf. repulsed three minor counter-attacks during the night, and following artillery and mortar preparations, advanced 60 yards along the southern slope of Buccual Hill, killing 18 Japanese and capturing three more tunnels. The Provisional Battalion, in an all-night operation, effected a counter-attack and recaptured Hill 99-U and Hill 97-V, killing approximately 100 Japanese. The booty included 1 37-mm gun, 1 Cal. .50 MG, several light MG's, 36 rifles, and one 81-mm mortar with ammunition.

On the morning of June 14, K Company and L Company, 3rd Battalion, 121st Inf, launched a vigorous attack on the weakened enemy strong points towards Buccual Peak. These two companies staged one of the most dramatic assaults in the battle for Bessang. As soon as L Company moved its signal flag on the peak of Buccual, after having wiped out every remnant of the enemy thereat, the order to cease fire was given and the last vestige of organized Japanese resistance was finally eliminated. Seven mountain guns, a considerable number of rifles and machine guns, enemy equipment, numerous ammunition, and enemy documents were among the booties captured. The Provisional Battalion seized Hill 97-T and wiped out the remnants of the retreating Japanese from Buccual Hill.

The 66th Inf. secured Hills #23 and #25 without opposition. They continued attacking to the south and secured Hills 99-X and #15 against practically no enemy opposition. The 3rd Bn moving towards Hill #14 killed 3 Japanese and 1 officer, stragglers of units trying to retreat to Mankayan.

Reorganizing, the 1st and 3rd Bns, 121st Inf, moved towards Cervantes down Hwy #4. All points along the road were cleared of isolated enemy snipers, and by June 15, elements of the 3rd Bn, 121st Inf., had already reached Cervantes and engaged the enemy, driving them across the Abra River. Orders emanating from GHQ, USAFIP, NL, however, ordered the 121st Inf. to secure the high grounds north of Cervantes, while the 15th Inf., moved in to occupy the town. Throughout all this period, intense air activities exploited the withdrawal of the Japanese from Bessang to Cervantes and further on to the Cordilleras. The 122nd FA Bn immediately moved on to

Bessang Pass and from this position, effectively shelled every area in the surrounding vicinity of Cervantes.

Considering the factors that had hampered the operations during the stalemate period for the battle of Bessang, the different regimental commanders, in spite of their enthusiasms to carry out the contents of Field Order #27 must have doubted that the drive towards Cervantes could be finished within 15 days after the field order was issued. But on that fateful day of June 14, the intensity of the attack launched by the three regiments finally made the Japanese give way. On June 15, according to schedule, the bulk of the USAFIP, NL stormed into the Cervantes Valley and finished the most decisive battle of its colorful saga.

CHAPTER VII

THE LEPANTO — MANKAYAN OPERATIONS

I. Introduction

The Lepanto-Mankayan operation in which the whole elements of the 66th Infantry Regiment were committed, was carried out in conjunction with the operation of the 15th Infantry Regiment in the Bauko-Sabangan operation. These campaigns were undertaken in an enveloping movement to trap the Japanese in the triangular area bounded roughly by Cervantes (852.5-2055.5), Bontoc (881.0-2067.0) and Loo Valley (864.8-2032.0).

The pincer movement of the two regiments, the 15th Inf., acting as the left prong in its drive towards Sabangan, while the 66th Inf. driving towards Mankayan acting as the right prong, was the result of the final collapse of determined resistance and subsequent enemy retreat in the Bessang-Cervantes-area.

The following narration is a portrayal of the operations of the 66th Infantry to drive the enemy from the Mankayan-Lepanto area and force him into the triangular trap.

The importance of the Mankayan-Lepanto area to the enemy was obvious and its subsequent defense was very evident on three points namely: (1) the Lepanto-Mankayan area is the gateway into the fertile Loo Valley, known as the Japanese breadbasket, and strategic KP 90; (2) the area was not only rich in gold, silver, manganese, and chromite deposits but it was also in this area where a lot of supplies and ammo were stored; and (3) it guarded the approaches into Ifugao where the enemy was determined to make a last stand.

II. The Terrain

At the outbreak of the war, only a big trail connected Cervantes and Mankayan. When the Japs occupied the Philippines, the enemy converted the trail into a road, hard surfaced, pass-

able by vehicles, which was used in transporting copper from the Lepanto mines.

On both sides of the Cervantes-Mankayan Road are two ridges rising upward to Mankayan. East and West of these high ridges are minor ridges separated by gulleys and streams. On these ridges were located a series of Japanese defense works which consisted of an elaborate network of pillboxes and tunnels prepared at strategic points with a good command of any possible hostile approach.

Lepanto, which guards the northern approaches is situated on a high ground overlooking the only road due north to south. Flanked on the eastern side by strategic and carefully planned system of interlocking tunnels, pillboxes were constructed out of concrete with 18-inch thick walls, reinforced with steel bars. These defenses were supplemented by artillery guns of various calibers mounted in carefully camouflaged places. To make a direct frontal attack on these prepared enemy defenses would have been suicidal as the Japs waited in pillboxes so well camouflaged you might walk over them without knowing they were there. The attacking forces were forced to go around these well prepared defenses but in so doing they had to pass through steep trails with sheer drops of several hundred feet and to scale slopes that were almost perpendicular, towering over 6,000 feet above sea level. They had to go through a jungle rising hundreds of feet high. The forest was dense with undergrowths, with tangles of brush which gave our troops plenty of trouble cutting their way out into the open. That was the kind of terrain which the 66th had to content with.

III. Enemy Situation

Intelligence reports and information taken from POW's revealed that approximately 600 troops escaped from Cervantes to Mankayan following the collapse of their defenses in the Bessang-Cervantes area. One identified enemy unit in the Mankayan area was the 3rd Bn of the 25th Mtn Arty Regt (Batteries 7 and 9), 19th Division, with an approximate strength of 300. Other units identified were the 19th Div. Field Hospital, 2 Companies of the 78th Regt and elements of the 19th Div. Tpt. Unit with a reported strength of 750.

The fall of Baguio forced the remnants of 58th IBM, 23rd Div. Artillery, and the 6th, 9th, 11th, and 12th Prov. Bns to withdraw up the Mountain Trail and their arrival at Mankayan explained the presence of additional troops in that area.

Air reconnaissance patrols reported that enemy activity was going at a fast pace in the Mankayan-Lepanto area. He was hurriedly putting up defensive installations which were located in the following areas: 2 small caves and 3 AA positions were located at (59.8-39.00), 4 gun positions at (60.50-38.75) and to the right across these positions were observed two other gun positions at (59.50-34.78) near Mankayan.

So important was this area that the Japanese began fortifying it three years before. Large quantities of food supplies and equipment were stored here. These fortifications were greatly augmented and plans for their defense were perfected long before the liberation forces landed. The Japanese may be said to have made complete preparations to stand a siege of long duration.

The return of fleeing troops from Cervantes and the arrival of reinforcements from KP 90 area gave the enemy a sizable force with which to defend Mankayan.

IV. Operations

A — *The Initial Phase of the Operation*

After the occupation of Cervantes by the 15th Infantry, the 66th Infantry, as per FO No. 29, dated June 14, 1945, was ordered (1) to patrol aggressively as far to the southeast as Mankayan; and (2) to occupy and fortify such trail junction or junctions south of Hwy #4 so as to oppose any attempt of the enemy to occupy in force the high ground south of and commanding Hwy #4.

Acting on the instruction of FO No. 29, the Regimental CO issued to the Bn Commanders instructions which would give them in their initial operations against the Japanese.

a) 1st Bn, less D Company, sent out strong patrols as far south as Comillas, 4700 yards south-southeast of Cervantes and secured that town against strong enemy forces acting as rear guards of the main body of the enemy which was hastily withdrawing southeast to Mankayan.

b) 2nd Bn, F Company, continued to secure the communication route south of Hwy #4 with no enemy contact.

Companies G and H were to secure Dinwide (48.5-53.0) 7,000 yards south of Cervantes.

c) 3rd Bn (less Company M) occupied and secured Nandaraan (Mt.) (48-50), 9,000 yards southwest of Cervantes against slight opposition.

As the elements of the 1st Bn moved farther south of Cervantes, enemy resistance became more intense. The CO of the regiment established his CP at Comillas after it had been occupied and secured by the 1st Bn at 10:00 o'clock, June 17. From Comillas, the Regimental CO directed the initial phase of the Lepanto-Mankayan operations. In this initial stage of the operation, only the 1st Bn was committed in the drive against the Japanese with the 3rd Bn securing its right flank and the 2nd Bn acting in regimental reserve.

In securing the right flank of the 1st Bn, the 3rd Bn started its drive from Malaya to Kabiten by way of Baduyos, wiping out enemy stragglers and clearing small pockets of enemy resistance with the enemy leaving 154 KIA. This operation lasted from June 17 to 24.

On June 21, the 1st Bn, less D Company, started its drive southward towards the Lepanto Copper mines, until it reached the Kabiten area where the enemy first offered stiff resistance. A and C Companies, leading the attack of the 1st Bn, started their drive auspiciously at 0600, June 25, which later in the day was slowed down by heavy MG fires which finally pinned them down half way to the hill-top, about 300 yards from the enemy. This initial drive of A and C Companies brought them 800 yards from their point of departure.

At 0440, on June 26, 50 Japanese from three directions staged on of their famous Banzai attacks against the hillside positions of A and C Companies. The three-pronged counter-attack was repulsed successfully when the fighting ceased at daybreak with the Japs withdrawing and leaving 13 enemy dead. The failure of the enemy counterattack encouraged A and C Companies to press harder their drive until Kabiten which was sized and secured at 1000 on the same day.

From this point, the 3rd Bn with three companies (L, I, and K) resumed the advance as the 1st Bn was disposed in reserve and as security for rear units as well as grounds gained. The enemy remnants retreated toward the slope of Kolos Hill. Strong patrols from the 3rd Bn were sent out toward Baduto and Baduyos, followed immediately by the main body of the battalion which overran enemy resistance and which resulted in the seizure and capture of their objectives-Baduto and Baduyos.

B — *The Fight for Kolos Ridge*

Meanwhile, elements of the 2nd Bn (E and F Cos.) were disposed on the ridges east of the Cervantes-Mankayan Road to seize and secure the high grounds on the right flank of the enemy. The 3rd Bn (Cos. L, I, and K) at center rapidly advanced astride the road, with I Company acting as the spearhead and L and K Companies acting as the left and right prong of the Battalion's pincer movement against the enemy position on Kolos Hill.

After an artillery preparation, the three companies advanced, making slight gains against the enemy counter-artillery, mortar, and heavy machine gun fires. As the heavy enemy fire threatened to stalemate the operation in that area, D Company of the 1st Bn was immediately ordered to cover the area between D and K Companies. The enemy at this sector had three sets of earthen and stone dykes with all kinds of zigzag and parallel trenches. About 8 enemy heavy MG's and some undetermined number of knee mortars were emplaced at high grounds completely commanding all possible routes of approach. The ground covered by the three companies (D, I, and K) was 500 yards wide and a depth of 300 yards.

On July 1, the 1st Bn, less D Company, set out on a circuitous route on the high ridges on the enemy left, as the 3rd Bn resumed the attack on the enemy's right. The 3rd Bn sector readily proved to be the enemy's strongest line and fighting became most bitter and savage. Despite artillery and air support, the 3rd Bn made small headway in its advance despite the fact that it reorganized its line four times during the day.

While the 3rd Bn remained practically pinned down, units of the 2nd Bn, which were committed to take the ridges east

of the Cervantes-Mankayan Road, gained more grounds against comparatively slighter enemy resistance. The 1st Bn, which was operating on the Regiment's right flank, also covered and secured enemy grounds of about 300 yards against light enemy resistance. The Japanese in this sector were taken completely by surprise as they did not expect A and B Companies to come from the direction of a route that was rough and circuitous. The 76th Inf. Brigade, which was committed to defend that sector, was completely annihilated and all equipment were captured.

Although the 1st and 2nd Bns were practically over-running the enemy defense positions in their respective areas, the 3rd Bn in the center of the line was pinned down completely by the enemy who was inflicting a heavy toll with his heavy MG and knee mortar fires. For that day alone, the 3rd Bn suffered 19 KIA and 26 WIA.

On July 2, the whole elements of the 66th Infantry Regiment, being committed to an all-out offensive, effected a pincer movement and made spectacular gains for the day. On the same day units of C Company effected a junction with and established a perimeter of defense on the right flank of, the 3rd Bn, which, although heavily opposed by increased enemy resistance, resumed its assaults against well prepared Japanese positions pushing back the enemy 150 yards. At 1600 o'clock the same day following a lull in the fighting, the Japanese launched a fierce counter-attack supported by a mountain gun, knee mortar, and heavy MG's. It did not, however, hold out long when elements of the 3rd Bn including D Company not only fought them savagely and stubbornly but also drove them to gain an additional 50 yards. In this fierce fight, 80 Japanese were killed while the 3rd including D Company (attached) lost 5 KIA, with 13 WIA including 2 officers who led the assault. The setback of the enemy at this point gave the 3rd Bn, for the first time, an upper hand in that sector. On July 3, all elements of the 66th Inf. Regt. prepared another concerted assault against the enemy to follow an artillery preparation and air strikes in order to end the stalemate in the 3rd Bn sector. This fire support came from detachments of the 694th FA Bn, the 121st FA Bn, the 1st FA Bn of the USAFIP, NL and one platoon of the 85th Chem. Mortar Bn.

After the barrage the 66th Inf. moved forward as follows: (a) Elements of the 1st Bn spearheaded by the Special Service platoon of A Company seized and secured the high ridges 1500 yards north of Sapnit after a brief but fierce encounter. Then followed the main body of the 1st Bn which secured the right flank of the 3rd Bn. (b) The 2nd Bn driving on the left flank of the 3rd Bn also secured the high ridges from Dacudac to Payeo, with F Company making considerable gains toward Sesecan and Patrat ridges. (c) In the 3rd Bn sector, two attempts to seize the enemy positions were repulsed by Mountain guns and heavy MG's well emplaced on commanding grounds and high ridges north of Mankayan.

On July 4, elements of the 1st Bn on the right flank of the 3rd Bn, were making considerable headway in their drive towards the Lepanto Mines area, with the Special Weapons Platoon and the 2nd Platoon of A Company occupying and securing the high grounds of Sapnit and the high ridges 1,000 yards south of it. These gains were made notwithstanding a two-day very heavy shelling of the 1st Bn main body from the same Mountain guns that held up the 3rd Bn.

On the same day, E Company of the 2nd Battalion was pulled out from Kabiten to reinforce the 3rd Bn with D Company attached. On the left flank, in the 2nd Bn sector, a general frontline was formed from 600 to 800 yards north of Sesecan. The line of departure runs from Balongabingan to Payeo. Strong combat intelligence patrols were sent out continuously toward Sesecan and Patpat Ridges.

As enemy resistance on both flanks (1st and 2nd Bns Sectors) continued to be moderate, opposition in the 3rd Bn sector remained stiff and undiminished as all approaches to the enemy positions were well covered by heavy MG'S and Mtn Guns. Early on the morning of July 5, Battery A of the 121st FA and 1st FA Bn, USAFIP, NL, concentrated their fires on the enemy defenses and supporting positions. When the artillery barrage was lifted, elements of the 1st Bn on the right flank of the Regiment's line, advanced rapidly, seizing and securing all the high ridges 2,500 to 3,000 yards south and southwest of the Lepanto Mines area. Meanwhile, the 2nd Bn drives towards the south at the left flank swung to northwest direction, also towards the Lepanto Mine area.

While the 1st and 2nd Bns were completing the pincer movement as planned, the 3rd Bn was making a third assault on the Japanese garrison at the center of the line. The enemy, however, refused to give ground despite the artillery support given the attacking forces. At 2300 o'clock of the same day, the Japanese staged two counter-attacks against the 3rd Bn sector which were repulsed successfully in spite of a continuous barrage from the supporting enemy artillery. The timely support of the 121st FA Bn and the 1st Platoon of the Chemical Mortar Bn contributed much to the collapse of the enemy counter-attacks.

On the following days, after another artillery preparation by supporting units, the Regiment's three prongs advanced. The 1st Bn made the most spectacular gains for the day when they seized, occupied, and secured the high ridge, 1000 yards west of Lepanto, which faced a front approximately 3000 yards. In the center of the line, the 3rd Bn sector, as usual, received the brunt of enemy fire which could not deny a 12-yard gain of well earned ground.

At 11:00 o'clock, the same day, the 2nd Bn started a two-pronged drive (F Co to the east acting the left prong and E Co to the west, right prong) towards Sesecan covering a 200-yard front. E and F Companies engaged the enemy, well-entrenched on a ridge 400 yards northwest of Sesecan, in what was considered the most bitter fight ever encountered by the 2nd Bn for the last five days. Superior fire from the 2nd Bn, however, forced the Japanese to withdraw to a higher knoll, 250 yards away with elements of the 2nd Bn after them. After 24 hours of bitter fighting, the 2nd Bn secured the northernmost knoll on Sesecan Ridge. The 16 KIA and 36 WIA inflicted by the enemy on the 2nd Bn speaks well of the kind of battle that took place in that area.

On July 7, elements of the 1st Bn (A Co) attacked and assaulted enemy positions killing a total of 73 Japanese, including 15 officers. The newly-gained positions turned out to have been an outpost and HQ of the enemy, which were to be used as an observation post by the 1st Bn. While the 1st Bn waited for the other elements of the Regiment to keep abreast with its line, it used the captured observation post to direct air strikes, fire missions, and mortar fires, as a result of which

direct hits were scored contributing greatly to the collapse of the Lepanto defenses. The complete annihilation of the Japanese forces west and southwest of Lepanto gave the 1st Battalion a chance to attack the enemy from the rear.

On July 9, two hours of artillery preparation and mortar fires badly shattered the Japanese garrison, made of concrete pillbox, forcing the Japanese to abandon their positions. As the artillery barrage was lifted, elements of the 1st Bn (B Co) seized, occupied, and secured the garrison with only slight opposition, only killing 7 Japanese. That crushed the Japanese MLR in the Lepanto Mine area.

On July 10, at 1945, another Japanese garrison, similar to the one captured by B Company, was also captured by C Company which met only sniper fires after the Japanese had withdrawn to a higher hill overlooking the captured pillboxes. From here on, the enemy resorted to tactics using the long-prepared cave-and-tunnel defenses.

C. The Collapse of the Lepanto-Mankayan Defense

While the elements of the 1st Bn were advancing rapidly, the 3rd and 2nd Bns in the center and left prongs respectively of the Regiment's line of attack were being pined down by the enemy's undiminished volume of heavy and small arm fires. Several assaults launched by the 2nd and 3rd Bns could hardly make no dent on enemy's defense position as the Japanese stubbornly repulsed every assault.

To break the stalemate, plans were made to knock out the enemy Mtn gun which had been giving valuable support to their front line position. On July 13, planes bombed and strafed all other objectives including the well-defended Japanese garrison that had repulsed nine consecutive assaults. An artillery barrage of 45 minutes directed against the Mtn gun, believed to be 500 yards southwest of Mankayan, followed the bombing and strafing. As the enemy Mtn gun was silenced, units of the 1st Bn launched a perfectly timed assault closely supported by 60-mm mortars and knocked out the Japanese stronghold. The capture of the Japanese stronghold at 1330, July 13, greatly weakened the enemy's left flank.

With the reduction of their left flank, the Japanese counterattacked from their right at 0300, July 14, in an effort to

break through the 2nd Bn line. It was desperate and ferocious lasting 2 hours with our line intact after the battle. At the time, the Japanese threatened the 2nd Bn line, they also launched a simultaneous attack against the 3rd Bn sector at the center of the line. This attack was also repulsed successfully. For the rest of the day sporadic firing continued in the Patpat-Sesecan sector, enemy snipers being most active.

As enemy resistance in the Patpat-Sesecan sector continued to hold the 2nd Bn line, E Co was pulled out from the left flank of L Co and was given a mission to outflank the enemy's MLR in that area.

For the whole day E Co was enroute to Bato passing Balili which was secured by H Company. To support F and H Companies in their drives to the top of Patpat and Sesecan Ridges, another air strike and artillery barrage was lifted at 0900 the same day, F and H Cos. rushed ahead from their initial positions and a bitter fight for the control of the Patpat-Sesecan Ridges ensued. Meanwhile, E Co., operating east and southeast of Patpat, and closely supported by the Combat Co, threatened the enemy's right rear forcing the Japs to withdraw before the advancing F and H Companies which seized and secured Sesecan and the knolls on both sides of the ridge. Patpat was not captured although its fall became imminent when it was sandwiched by the advancing elements of the two companies approaching from two directions. Fire superiority of the advancing forces forced the Japanese to withdraw, leaving only a detachment armed with MG's and machine rifles to effect delaying actions.

On July 17, the final drive to dislodge and annihilate the enemy at Patpat Ridge was launched culminating in its capture at 1200 o'clock the same day despite heavy enemy MG, Mortar, and small arm fires.

The occupation of Patpat and Sesecan Ridges, two strategic points, gave the Regiment complete control of all the adjacent areas, completing the pincer movement as planned at the start of the operations. From the commanding grounds gained at Sapnit, Patpat, Sesecan, and Bato, the final drive against Lepanto and Mankayan was launched. The 1st Bn and 3rd Bn in a coordinated attack with the 2nd Bn, converged

towards Lepanto proper and Mankayan. In one big push on July 19, the 2nd Bn swung their line and advanced southwest and made a junction with the right flank of the 2nd Bn. At 1030 of the same day, one platoon of F Company advanced to a position 100 yards north of Muller's Place. The advance patrol encountered only 15 Japanese, presumably left as rear guards, who fled after giving a brief exchange of fire. By 1100, the place was completely cleared of the enemy. Lepanto and Mankayan were simultaneously seized and secured by elements of the 2nd Bn at 0830, July 20, with only slight enemy opposition as the main force of the enemy fled towards Bulacao and KP 90.

The fall of Lepanto and Mankayan which took the Japanese three years to prepare eliminated one of the best fortified enemy positions in North Luzon. It also forced the enemy into the triangular trap and reduced further their area of operation to within the confines of the Loo Valley.

Chapter VIII

THE BAUKO-SABANGAN OPERATION

I. The Terrain

The area—east and south of Cervantes to which the Japanese retreated after the collapse of their prepared defenses—at Bessang Pass and Cervantes centered on Hill #13 east of the town, and covered the triangular area bounded roughly by Cervantes (852.0-2055.5), Bontoc (881.0-2067.0) and Loo Valley (8640.0-2032) extending over Mountain Province and Ilocos Sur. This area covered one of the remaining enemy strongholds in North Luzon.

The terrain, covered with virgin forests, studded with high mountain peaks rising majestically to heights ranging from 2,500 to 7,500 feet. To the east and to the southeast, the hills become higher and more rugged, canyons become steeper and narrower until the ranges west of Hwy #11, better known as the Mountain Trail. To the north, the Abra River breaks the monotony of evergreen growths as its tributaries cut their way through winding routes to the main trunk.

Running parallel to the Abra, Abit, and Imbuni Rivers are the Cervantes-Sabangan Road known as Hwy #4 and the Cervantes-Mankayan Road. These roads which are hard-surfaced and not all-weather with many sharp curves and treacherous cutbacks, climb their way along the rugged and steep mountain sides. Few landslides occur during ordinary rains except in certain places where slides are more frequent. Except for these roads, there are no signs that this vast expanse of evergreen growths have been touched by human hands. Yet, to these roads were centered two vital operations of the USAFIP, NL that helped reduce to a considerable extent Japanese resistance in North Luzon.

The road junction of Hwy #4 and #11 became an enemy strong point in the Cervantes-Sabangan operation, the point

to which the 15th Inf Regt was committed to seize and secure because of its strategic importance. And because the mountainous terrain gave the enemy much defensive advantages, the Bauko-Sabangan operation became one of the most bitterly contested battles fought by the 15th Regiment.

II. Enemy Situation

Immediately after the fall of Bessang and the subsequent capture of Cervantes on June 15, 1945, the enemy was determined to defend the approaches to Bontoc via the Mountain Trail in an effort to secure their supply route in the triangular area bounded by Bontoc, Cervantes, and the Loo Valley. Remnants of the 19th Division and units sent to reinforce it retreated east via Aluling to Kayan, Tadian, and Sabangan. These units joined forces with the remnants of the 79th Inf Brigade, the 75th Inf Regt, elements of the 58th IMB and 103rd Div who had moved up to Bontoc from KP 90 supported by two battalions of the 25th Mountain Artillery Regiment. All were committed to defend the approaches to Bontoc. There were also other miscellaneous semi-combat units that were hurriedly organized to supplement the main defense force of the enemy such as the Yoshioka, Goto, Kawaye, Kurioka, Veda, Matsuioka, Takahashi, and Sato units.

The estimated strength of the enemy at the beginning of the Bauko-Sabangan operations was distributed as follows: Kayan, 200; Tadian, 300; and Tue, 200. Aside from the above-named enemy concentration, an estimated number of 3,029 Japanese were also distributed in the towns and sitios southwest of Bontoc such as Bauko, Balili, Balatuan, and Taed.

Reconnaissance patrols infiltrating deep into enemy rear areas reported that the Japanese were hurriedly putting up defensive installations in the forms of tunnels, pillboxes, foxholes, and other underground fortifications running from Kayan in the southwest to Besao in the north. Aerial photographs made on enemy positions revealed the construction of caves and gun positions extending from 3,000 yards west of Bontoc to the town itself. Approximately 3 miles north of Guinsadan were four caves in the hill on the east side of the road. These excavations were used for gun placements to cover the approaches to Guinsadan. The main enemy defense was centered

on the mountainous terrain which favored him a decided advantage over our attacking forces in a way that he needed a small force to defend a big area.

III. Operations

A. *The Collapse of the Japanese Tadian-Kayan-Tue Triangular Defense* (June 18-27, 1945)

At the start of the Bauko-Sapangan operations, the different units of the 15th Infantry Regiment which went into training immediately after the occupation of Cervantes on June 15, 1945, were bivouacked in and around the vicinity of the town as follows:

- 1st Bn CP, vic (39.05-51.50)
- A Co, vic (41.40-51.65)
- B Co, vic (53.18-53.58)
- C Co, vic (54.10-52.50)
- D Co, vic (39.80-51.60)
- 2nd Bn CP, vic (42.26-51.40)

The 2nd Bn troops were deployed in the vicinity (42.26-51.40)-(42.60-50.85), east of Cervantes across the Abra River. This Bn was assigned the task of establishing a perimeter of defense to Regimental CP.

3rd Bn CP, vic Cervantes.

The general offensive of the different units of the 15th Infantry was preceded by intensive reconnaissance patrols east and southeast of Cervantes locating organized and well-entrenched enemy defense positions along Tadian vicinity (62.2-56.7), Kayan (62.00-54.83) area approximately 10,000 yards east of Cervantes. These Japanese were serving as rear guards of the retreating enemy from Cervantes besides serving as security units for Hwy #4 and Hwy #11 at Sabangan (74.6-56.7).

With the above information, the Regimental Commander of the 15th Infantry issued verbal orders to the different Battalion Commanders which would guide them in their projected operations against the Japanese as follows:

1. The 1st Bn was committed to take initially Kagubaten (63.5-50.5) and all the high grounds directly south of the RJ to Kayan.

2. The 2nd Bn continued to remain in Regimental Reserve

east of Cervantes at the same time to act as security to the Regimental CP.

3. The 3rd Bn was ordered to move immediately eastward along Hwy #4 to occupy, secure and establish outposts at strategic grounds overlooking Kayan.

Preparatory to the move of the 1st and 3rd Bns of the 15th Inf to carry out their objectives, Batteries A, B, and C of the 122nd FA Bn (US) emplaced in the vic (5.65-46.65), fired on enemy concentrations at the vic (55.37-46.38), (54.62-47.25) and (55.35-47.06) covering the entire area and destroyed machine gun emplacements.

Following the heavy artillery preparation of the 122nd FA Bn (US) forward elements of the 3rd Bn (Cos I, L, and M) moved eastward along Hwy #4 and established outposts at strategic grounds overlooking Kayan (62.00-54.83), 800 yards west of the town with only slight enemy resistance. While 3rd Bn units were advancing towards Kayan along Hwy #4, units of the 1st Bn (Cos B and C) farther south seized and occupied Kagubaten, its first objective, on the 26th of June, 1945 and pursued the fleeing Japanese which retreated to the hill just east of the town. The fall of Kagubaten threatened the Japanese positions at Tue, to which A Company of the 1st Bn was committed to seize and secure. A Company which was driving towards Tue was counterattacked by the enemy after capturing the high ground overlooking Tue (86.38-2053.1). A Company held firmly its line but was not able to advance due to three .30 cal. MG emplacements which blocked all attempts of the Company to push forward. Elements of B Company was ordered to coordinate action with A Company in the attack on Tue by way of the USAFFE Trail from Kagubaten.

As units of the 1st Bn occupied Kagubaten, the entire elements of the 3rd Bn advancing toward Kayan from the west, north and east directions were deployed across an open country against enemy cal. 30 and 50 MG's coming from the southwest and northeast of Kayan. The attack formation of units of the 3rd Bn were as follows:

I Company approached Kayan from the west to south direction to secure the top of a ridge where Japanese .50 and .30 MG's fired from the southern slope of the same ridge, pinning down the company's advance.

L Company followed I Company at approximately 500 yards along a trail to secure the top of the same ridge from the west towards the east.

M Company approached Kayan from the southwest from a point 1500 yards of the town.

K Company was in reserve following up L Company 250 yards behind.

The high ground southwest of Kayan became the key to the security of the town and it was that hill where the 3rd Bn units concerted their drive. Despite the enemy's use of TG's, MG's, and automatic rifles, the attacking units of the 3rd Bn advanced and dislodged the Japanese from their well-prepared pillboxes, foxholes, and cave defenses and forced the enemy to retreat after suffering heavy casualties. The capture of the high ground southwest of Kayan by our forces sealed the fate of the Japanese in the town who were forced to flee eastward in the face of the determined and concerted drive of the whole elements of the 3rd Bn. As early as the morning of June 26, 1945, 400 Japanese, some sick and wounded, were observed moving on foot from Kayan to Sabangan. This enemy movement preceded the mass withdrawal of the Japanese eastward as forward elements of the 15th Infantry reached Kayan at 1145 hours on June 27, 1945. The fall of Kayan pushed back the apex of the Japanese Tue-Kayan-Tadian triangular defense.

As Kayan fell to units of the 3rd Bn, A Company of 1st Bn was able to break through the strong enemy defenses which pinned down their advance the previous day. In breaking through enemy defenses which was centered on a high ground overlooking Tue, A company staged a series of attacks directed against a network of well prepared pill-box-and-cave defenses which collapsed after a determined assault and forced the enemy to retreat eastward in disorder. The main body of A Company captured Tue on the night of June 27, 1945, as forward elements of the company pursued the Japs along Hwy #4 as far as the high grounds east of Kabunagan. Tue, the first important objective of the 15th Infantry's drive to Sabangan, having fallen 10 hours after elements of the 3rd Bn had captured Kayan earlier in the day, served as a strategic springboard for the Company's attack on Bauko.

B. *The Battle of Bauko* (June 28 - July 7, 1954)

Immediately after the fall of Tue, the Regimental CP of the 15th Inf was established in the town. A Japanese prisoner captured by B Company, 1st Bn on June 28, 1945, disclosed the following information:

1. That there were 14 tunnels under pine trees north of Tadian where mules and bulcarts loaded with supplies and ammunitions were hidden. These positions had communication contacts with Kayan (already captured) and Bauko;

2. That 900 Japanese were well entrenched on three hills (Maluba, Tabio, and Magopecpec) astride Hwy #4.

Using the above information, the entire elements of the 15th Infantry Regiment were committed to the capture and seizure of Bauko, the last enemy strong point west of Sabangan. The 2nd Bn which had been held in regimental reserve, dispatched strong combat patrols to establish road block at a RJ 700 yards east of Bauko.

Elements of G Company, 2nd Bn, occupied before sundown, June 28, strategic grounds in the Bauko sector southwest of the road junction of Sabangan with two platoons of C Company supporting its rear.

From Tue, elements of the 1st Bn from previous positions advanced 1,200 yards east along Hwy #4 with Company B moving east southeast towards Guisadan (67.8-51.8) until they reached and established their position on the ridge about 300 yards east of Mayag, meeting only scattered enemy resistance. To the north, elements of the 3rd Bn, supporting the fast and aggressive drive of the 1st Bn eastward, advanced 3000 yards towards Bauko against moderate enemy resistance.

Forward elements of the 1st (A Company) and 3rd Bns (K Company) after making a junction west of Balawa (54.8-64.9) continued their advance eastward and occupied strategic high ground and ridges including the highest peak south of Hwy #4, on the road leading to Bauko.

After the occupation of Balawa by K Company at 1300 hours, June 29, the other elements of the 3rd Bn (Cos I, L, and M) and those of the 1st Bn (Cos A, B, and 2 platoons of C Company) with L Company as spearhead, advanced 1-1/2 kms from their previous positions and pushed eastward along Hwy

#4 to Bauko. Cabunagan was occupied after 3 hours of heavy fighting on the afternoon of June 29.

The advance of the 1st and 3rd Bns eastward toward Bauko continued satisfactorily although elements of the 3rd Bn (Cos I and K) were pinned down on the peak northeast of Cabunagan, over-looking the road to Bauko and approximately 1,000 yards west of Bauko, by heavy enemy resistance with artillery support. Meanwhile, strong patrols of G Company cut off communication links to Bauko and Otukan (70.0-56.5) and between Otukan and Tupang (72.5-57.4) by establishing a road block west of Sabangan. Here in their newly gained positions, A Company was pinned down by heavy enemy mountain fires, forcing the troops to dig in for the night. B Company elements, also trying to evade the enemy shelling, outflanked him from the south along the ridge northward with effective initial result and inflicted heavy enemy casualties. However, this advance was also halted by the same enemy mountain gun that pinned down A Company.

Following heavy artillery preparations by the 694th FA Bn (US) which relieved the 122nd FA Bn (US) directed against the mountain gun emplacements that halted the drives of A and B Companies, elements of the 1st and 3rd Bns renewed coordinated attacks at dawn, July 3, against the high ground 1,500 yards west of Bauko. The 1st Bn attacked from the west and southwest and occupied the northern knoll of the high ground west of Bauko. Forward elements of the same battalion reached positions only 500 yards, south of Bauko. The 3rd Bn attacked from the north and northwest against stubborn opposition.

At dawn on July 4, the Japanese staged a suicidal counter-attack against the newly gained positions of A and B Cos with disastrous result to the enemy as they were met with equally determined fire from our forces. The Japanese left 42 dead and lost 2 37-mm guns as a result of their unsuccessful counter-attack.

Meanwhile, Co C which was supporting the advance of G Co west of Sabangan, withdrew from its former position and moved to the vicinity of Banao (59.0-53.0) in preparation for an attack on Bauko from the southeast.

Company G also withdrew from its position 2,200 yards southwest of Sabangan to the vicinity of Banao to coordinate attacks with Company C on Bauko. At this juncture, C Co launched an all-out attack against the enemy from the southeast and gained position to within 500 yards south of Bauko. Meanwhile, G Co which was ordered to support C Co was redesignated to operate and harass enemy positions 2,200 yards west of Sabangan.

To the southwest, A and B Cos and a platoon of D Co attacked 200 Japanese on Hill #9 (66.0-54.5) early July 6th and advanced to Hill #10 (67.12-55.2) within 600 yards west of Bauko. In the meantime, C Co which was driving northward towards Bauko also advanced to within 250 yards south of the town proper.

The elimination of the enemy resistance on the high ground overlooking Bauko from the west, sealed the fate of the Japanese defenders of the town proper, C Co driving from the east seized and occupied Bauko against strong enemy resistance on July 7 at 0600 hours followed by A and B Cos from Hill #10, to the west, previously captured.

As the elements of the 1st Bn occupied Bauko, elements of the 2nd Bn completed the mopping up operation west of Bauko against scattered enemy resistance, thus was eliminated the strongest Japanese defense line west of Sabangan.

C. *Sabangan Falls* (July 7-9, 1945).

As the Japanese line in Bauko cracked up, the enemy fled north eastward with elements of the 1st Bn (Cos C and D) close to their heels. After an artillery preparation against moderate enemy resistance, Cos C and D seized and occupied Otukan (69.7-56.8), 4,700 yards west of Sabangan at 0700 hours on July 8.

While elements of the 1st Bn were busy driving the Japanese from the Bauko-Otukan area, elements of the 3rd Bn (Cos K, L, and M) seized the high ground 2,800 yards northwest of Bauko meeting only moderate opposition as a result of weakening enemy resistance.

To the south, strong combat patrols of G Co, 2nd Bn, occupied Pingad (73.0-51.5) and Bonayan (72.5-52.5), 4,000 and 3,100 yards south of Sabangan respectively. This move of the

2nd Bn cut off further enemy reinforcement coming along the Baguio-Sabangan Road (Hwy #11). Just before the fall of Bauko, 129 Japanese fully armed were seen moving towards Sabangan from Tabbag to reinforce their forces there.

Preparing for the final thrust toward Sabangan, the whole elements of the 15th Infantry Regiment were deployed in the following areas:

1st Bn —

A Co, 400 yards east of Otukan.

C and D Cos, established perimeter of defense with strong force facing towards Pingad to meet Japanese threat of counter-attack.

B Co, in reserve at Bauko and acting as security.

2nd Bn — advanced along Pingad-Otukan trail.

3rd Bn — completing mopping up operations north and northwest of Bauko.

On the other hand, the disposition of enemy troops at this period were as follows:

1. Japanese of unknown number were concentrated in (71.7-56.0) approximately 2,900 yards west southwest of Sabangan.
2. Unknown number of Japanese were located in the wooded areas on the western slope of the ridge that overlook Sabangan, approximately 2,800 yards west southwest of Sabangan.

With the above information an air strike was requested on the Japanese concentrations including the town of Sabangan proper. Immediately after the air strike was lifted, the 1st and 2nd Bns pushed eastward to Sabangan, eliminating what slight enemy resistance was left on both sides of Hwys #4 and #11. Cos A, B, and D (less one platoon), entered Sabangan from the north at 1400 hours, July 9, and declared the town free from Japanese. Cos G and F of the 2nd Bn also entered and occupied Sabangan from the south, thus ending the fight for the control of Sabangan after three hours of fighting.

Immediately after the fall of Sabangan, the 1st Bn which bore the brunt of the Bauko-Sabangan operations went into regimental reserve and established its CP at Sabangan. Acting as security for the town, the 1st Bn continuously sent out patrols to areas suspected to be occupied by Japanese. The 2nd Bn continuing the 1st Bn push, drove southward along Hwy #11 until Bonayan, Pingad, and the surrounding high grounds were secured.

Chapter IX

THE 11TH INFANTRY OPERATIONS

The operations of the 11th Infantry Regiment which took place in the province of Cagayan and Mt. Province and Bontoc and Ifugao, Mt. Province may be divided into five sections classified as follows:

- A. The Bontoc-Ifugao Campaign
- B. The Western Cagayan Campaign
- C. The Eastern Cagayan Campaign
- D. The Aparri-Dugo Campaign
- E. The Eastern Bontoc and Eastern Ifugao Campaign

A. The Bontoc-Ifugao Campaign was carried on from Nov. 1944 to June, 1945. Its objectives were threefold, namely, (a) to harass the enemy, (b) to check his movements, and (c) to capture arms and equipment.

At the beginning, the campaign started in ambushes, blasting of roads and bridges, capture of enemy arms and equipment, and the recovery of telephone wires. The intensification of the operation in the latter part of the campaign prevented the enemy from moving northward into Apayao.

Netting a total of 300 Japanese killed, the campaign resulted in the liberation of the entire sub-province of Kalinga and all the areas north of Bontoc, Bontoc.

In this campaign, the 11th Infantry Regiment engaged the enemy in four important battles, namely:

1. The Nagagang-Mabigil Battle. This took place in Nagagang to Mabigil through Suyo and Ankideng, all barrios of Sagada, Bontoc. In this battle, 176 men of D Co of the 11th Inf engaged 214 Japanese officers and men on April 19-22, 1945, lasting 61 hours until the enemy retreated leaving 102 men killed, and 4 Jap rifles, several rounds of enemy ammunition, and 5 steel helmets.

2. The attack on the Sagada Garrison. This operation

was an aftermath of the Nagagang-Mabigil Battle which took place a week earlier. When the fleeing Japanese joined the enemy force at Sagada, D Co, less 1 platoon, that routed the Japanese in the Nagagang-Mabigil Battle, again was committed in this operation. The attack on the Sagada Garrison of approximately 240 men commenced at 0400 and continued until May 4 when the requested air support came. When the air strike was lifted, D Co resumed the attack until dark on May 5, 1945 when they withdrew for a much-needed rest after inflicting the enemy with 72 dead.

3. The Battle of Tadian. While the main force of D Co was attacking the Sagada Garrison, one platoon of the same Co attacked the Japanese in Ngadangad Mt., 300 yards above Tadian to prevent enemy reinforcement to the Sagada Garrison coming from that direction.

4. The attack of Wakaran. This battle was a part of the 11th Inf operation to clear Bontoc and its surrounding areas of Japs. In this operation, B Co of the 11th Inf, attacked Bontoc Central from the west at about 0830, June 3, with 81-mm trench mortar. Advancing towards Bontoc Central, D Co engaged approximately 400 Japanese, well-entrenched at Wakaran. In 30 hours of bitter fighting, D Co captured the enemy position after inflicting 86 Japanese dead and wounding 47 others.

B. The Western Cagayan Campaign covering the period from Dec. 1944 to May 1945 was carried out to drive the Japanese out of the wide, rich area west of the Cagayan River; to prevent the drawing of food supplies from said area; and to protect the intelligence work of the 11th Inf. Regiment.

This campaign of the 11th Inf may be subdivided into: (1) Soiana-Enrile Campaign; (2) The Northern Coast Campaign; and (3) Babayuan Campaign.

(1) The Solana-Enrile Campaign was a series of battles waged by E and I Cos to expel the Japanese in the said areas resulting in the liberation of Enrile and Solana and the whole Itawis district including the towns of Tuao, Piat, Rizal, and Faire.

To secure the liberated areas, the 1st Bn, 11th Inf was transferred early in January 1945 from the Bontoc area to the

west bank of the Cagayan River, from Solana to the Cagayan-Isabela boundary in the south.

The enemy, needing more and more food supply to support his forces concentrated on the east side of the Cagayan River, made several attempts to regain his lost territory on the west. All these attempts were repulsed by units of the 3rd Bn of the 11th Inf with heavy losses on the part of the enemy, who, driven to the east side of the river, now had the great disadvantage of having to cross the wide Cagayan River to invade western Cagayan. The most significant of the enemy's attempt was made on March 8, 1945 when 2 big boats loaded with approximately 150 well-armed Japanese were sunk by 50-cal MG fire from the river guards of the 3rd Bn.

(2) The Northern Coast Campaign was carried out by F and H Cos of the 11th Inf to clear the northern coast of the enemy. The Lubban (Abulug) enemy garrison of 150 to 250 Japanese was destroyed; the Japanese in the towns of Abulug, Claveria, Langan, and Ballesteros were dislodged in a series of engagements; a good many of the enemy defense installations were destroyed; equipment, supplies, and trucks were captured. Also captured were 6 barges of arms, and ammunition—all of which were used by the regiment in its subsequent operations against the enemy. In the battle of Buquig, a barrio of Aparri, on the west side of the Cagayan River, on March 15, 1945, 93 Japanese were killed including an officer definitely identified as a Lt. Colonel.

(3) The Babayuan operation was the hardest battle ever fought in the 11th Inf in the Western Cagayan Campaign. It included several engagements in the Zinundungan area as well as in Fabrica in Sicunig, and in the Lafu Island in the Cagayan River remained—that of the enemy fortification at Babayuan. This enemy fortification was protected by natural caves, installed artillery pieces, machine guns, and trench mortars. The stronghold was the west-flank guard of the enemy's main line of defense (from a landing on the north coast) running from Dugo, Camalaniugan to Pattao, Buguey. The fortification itself was manned by an estimated strength of 500 to 700 Japanese. With air support, the 2nd Bn, 11th Inf, on June 19, 1945, and therefrom to the east side of Cagayan River before the entry of the 37th Div. in Tuguegarao. Since

the fall of Babayuan, the enemy never again bothered the wide territory on the west side of the Cagayan River.

C. The Eastern Cagayan Campaign. With the area west of the Cagayan River from Solana town to the Cagayan-Isabela boundary on the south sufficiently secured, and while the attacks on Babayuan were in progress, the 11th Infantry launched a harassing campaign against the enemy east of the river. This campaign which covered the period from April to June, 1945 was carried out in a series of surprise-attacks on enemy garrisons and concentrations and the destruction of enemy supplies, particularly in the Tuguegarao-Gattaran-Iguig-Penablanca areas. It culminated in the attempt to capture Tuguegarao and its airfields on June 20-22, 1945.

D. The Aparri-Dugo Campaign. These operations were carried out in conjunction with American units attached to the 11th Inf under Lt. Col. Blackburn early in June, 1945. The different units attached to the 11th Inf were as follows:

1. Co B, 6th Ranger Inf Bn
2. Co G, 127th Inf
3. 81-mm Mortar Plat, Co H, 127th Inf
4. Detachment 510 Eng Lt Plat Co
5. Co C (less 1 plat) 339th Engr Const Bn
6. Btry C, 694th FA Bn
7. 24th Portable Surgical Hosp
8. 1st Plat, 637th Med Clearing Co
9. 4 Sections, 276th Post Co
10. Det. Co Hq, 601st QM Graves Reg Co
11. Det, 58th Signal Bn

The above-named units combined with the 2nd Bn of the 11th Inf became what was called Force B under the command of Maj. Robert V. Conolly and Lt. Col. Blackburn who waged a campaign from June 5-25, 1945, to occupy and secure the port of Aparri and the Dugo-Gonzaga road junction, which was located in the vicinity of the Japanese main line of defense in Cagayan, which was of great value to the enemy, particularly in his withdrawal, then in progress, from Cagayan into Isabela, with evident intention to reinforce his defense lines in Nueva Vizcaya. Also, the operations were carried out by the combined forces to prepare the ground for the landing of American paratroopers on the north.

B Rangers Co occupied Aparri on June 21, 1945 without resistance at 0220. As the landing in Aparri was being effected, patrols of the 2nd Bn, 11th Inf, crossed to Dugo, followed by the main body of the battalion, which immediately took possession of the Dugo-Gonzaga road junction. On the morning of June 23, Gypsy Force (1st Bn, 511th Parachute Infantry Combat Team) landed in the vicinity of Camalaniugan Airfield with forward elements moving south astride Hwy #5 reaching the vicinity (62.9-05.5) and (67.4-08.08) 4300 yards north north-east and 7200 yards northeast of Lallo (60.90-01.50) with no reported enemy contact.

E. Eastern Bontoc and Eastern Ifugao Campaign. In a period of 27 days (July 13 to August 9) the 11th Inf Regiment less 1st and 2nd Bn with the 1st Bn, 14th Inf attached, swept through eastern Bontoc and eastern Ifugao from three different directions. This campaign was centered on the Mayaoyao operations, where in the enemy estimated at 1,000, well-entrenched in strategic grounds, offered stiff resistance. The enemy offered slight resistance during the first phase of the operation but defended Mayaoyao aggressively from July 26-August 8, when the apex commanding all Mayaoyao Ridges fell.

After dislodging an enemy force estimated at 110 in Buntian (15.6-51.3) at about noon July 25, the Combat Co advanced towards Mayaoyao (09.7-53.1), meeting scattered resistance on the way. At the close of the day, the company was held up by a large force of enemy in a well dug-in position Balangbang barrio (11.7-49.2) 4 kms south southeast of Mayaoyao Central.

With other elements of the Provisional Bn joining in the attack, the enemy was driven out on the day following, but succeeded to reorganize (the enemy strength in Balangbang was estimated at 300 on that day), immediately launched a stiff counter-attack and pushed back the Provisional Bn and regained all his lost ground.

Intelligence reports taken from captured Japanese disclosed that approximately 200 Japanese were in Mayaoyao Central and another force estimated at 400 to 500 was entrenched in a well-concealed position along the main trail to, and near, Mayaoyao Central. With the above information, the Com-

manding Officer of the Regiment left Bunhian for Mayaoyao to direct personally the operation there.

On the following day, July 28, the attack on Mayaoyao commenced with K Co, 11th Inf, and 2 platoons of M Co of the same Regiment. To counteract the enemy move towards Liwo (07.3-43.3), 8.7 kms south southwest of Mayaoyao Central, A Co, 14th Inf which was then at Bunhian, was ordered to proceed to Mayaoyao. At 0800, July 30, the advance of the company was checked by MG fire from a ridge east northeast of Mayaoyao Central. At about the same time K Co, 11th Inf attached to the Prov Bn, was subjected to MG barrage from the summit of the same ridge while other elements of the Prov Bn received mortar fire from the municipal building at Mayaoyao Central. B Co, 14th Inf, which relieved K Co, 11th Inf, made considerable gain to within 100 yards from its objective. The company held its position despite the *Banzai* counter-attack launched by the enemy the following day, July 31, which inflicted heavy casualties on B Company, 14th Infantry.

Hurled back, Company B, 14th Inf, despite its heavy losses, renewed its attack and forced the enemy to withdraw.

Meanwhile, in the vicinity of Bunhian, 5 kms SE of the town, enemy activity was reported in progress from Mayaoyao towards which a good trail ran from Alimit. To meet the situation, 1 platoon of L Co, 11th Inf was sent to the sitios SE of Bunhian and another platoon of M Co was dispatched to cover the trail from Bunhian to Alimit (10.2-44.6) as a precautionary measure against enemy intentions to attack Bunhian, cut off the supply line of the 11th Inf and get into position to hit the line of the 11th Inf and get into position to hit the attacking forces in Mayaoyao Central from the rear.

On July 31, at 1100 hours, after 20 P-38's delivered an air strike on Japanese positions, the whole elements of the 11th Inf Regiment closed in on the enemy with A and C Cos of the 14th Inf as spearhead. At 1500 hours, a Japanese force with 1 MG emplaced on the southern end of a ridge at (12.7-53.3) east of Mayaoyao Central, attacked M Co advancing towards the end of the ridge, while another enemy unit on the eastern slope of the same ridge sniped at the men of M Co who were

then in the center of the ridge. Undaunted by the enemy's determination to hold their line, the attacking forces pressed forward until the Japanese were forced to withdraw from their well-prepared positions.

At 2200, August 2, an enemy force of undetermined strength armed with 3 MG's launched another determined counter-attack in a vain attempt to hit the elements of the 11th Inf (K and M Cos) from the rear, but it was repulsed, the Japanese leaving several dead.

In the meantime, the 1st Bn, 14th Inf (attached) and the 3rd Bn, 11th Inf, continued attacking Mayaoyao making slow progress due to stiff resistance. To break the stalemate in this area, the Regimental Co, after a conference with his staff, decided on a new plan to take Mayaoyao. The new plan involved the taking of Chaya (10.2-54.2) first and therefore attack the apex while other elements of the regiment continue to strike at the enemy from their original positions.

In accordance with the new plan of the Regimental Commander, K Co, 11th Inf, moved towards Chaya and occupied the ridge overlooking it in the afternoon of August 6. This move was followed by a relentless attack on the enemy position which continued through the night, with all units making considerable progress. At exactly 1020 on August 7, the apex, key to Mayaoyao, fell to elements of I Co, 11th Inf followed by C Co (attached) Replacement and Casualty Bn.

Now at a disadvantage, the enemy to save himself from annihilation, withdrew in force, carrying trench mortars, machine rifles, grenades and rifles, towards Alimit (10.2-44.5) and therefrom to the north via Bunhian, and from Guinhon (03.2-52.5) towards Cadaclan (06-67.9) on the north leaving behind only a small force to defend Mayaoyao Central while he effected this 2-point withdrawal.

Dawn of August 8 saw the 11th Inf storming the town of Mayaoyao. Rushing in from different directions, the Regiment wiped out the enemy defenders, who held their ground as long as they could; capture their arms, and several pieces of equipment including their battle flags. With L and M Cos left as security of the captured town, the Regiment proceeded

to the west to effect junction with the American forces in Ducligan.

The junction between the 11th Inf Regt and the elements of the 6th Division was effected on the eve of Aug. 9, the very day Mayaoyao fell. The junction, which ended the mopping-up operations in Eastern Bontoc and Eastern Ifugao, brought to a close the almost three years' operations of the 11th Inf, from Bontoc to Kalinga, from Kalinga to Ifugao, and from Ifugao to Apayao and then to Cagayan and from there back to Bontoc and Ifugao. The 11th Inf Regt was in bivouac at Banaue waiting for orders to embark on a new mission when the order for the cessation of hostilities was received by it, bringing to a close World War II.

Chapter X

THE 14TH INFANTRY OPERATIONS

The 14th Infantry, USAFIP, NL under Lt. Col. R. A. Manriquez as Regimental Commander was operating in the Cagayan Valley sector from Nueva Vizcaya to Isabela when D-Day finally arrived. In December, 1944, this regiment was disposed as follows: the 1st Bn was assigned to operate all along Hwy #5 from the boundary line of Isabela and Cagayan to Echague; the 2nd Bn was assigned to operate along Hwy #5 from Echague to Batu Ferry; while the 3rd Bn was assigned to the area from Batu Ferry to Balete Pass. These battalions were given the mission to operate in these areas until these areas were liberated, except Cos I, K, and M which were attached to GHQ, USAFIP, NL.

Due to lack of arms and ammunitions, and also due to the fact that it was operating in areas which were still infested with Japanese, so far from other areas of operations in which the USAFIP, NL was currently engaged, this regiment resorted to all sorts of tactics in warfare like harassing the enemy in all nooks and corners, ambushing them at every turn, cutting off their lines of supplies and communications, attacking and burning their supply dumps and garrisons, thus continually baffling the enemy at every turn and contributing materially to the final defeat of Yamashita and his retreating hordes. It was quite impracticable to give them the necessary air and artillery support which they needed very badly for obvious tactical reasons. In spite of these adverse conditions, however, this regiment continued to pillage, ambush and harass the enemy until July 1, 1945 when it was attached to the 6th Infantry Division in the Kiangnan Campaign.

Roughly, the operations of the 14th Infantry may be divided into two parts:

1. Isabela-Nueva Vizcaya Campaign.

This campaign covered the period from December 1944 to

June 1945 Its purpose was to ambush, harass, and destroy enemy patrols, concentrations and lines of communication; destroy important bridges and strategic points along Hwy #5, and collect and transmit intelligence information.

In December, 1944 when the Isabela-Nueva Vizcaya campaign began, the 14th Infantry Regiment had a total strength of 2179 officers and enlisted men. The campaign began with sporadic ambushing and harassing of enemy patrols, concentrations and lines of communications along Hwy #5 in the provinces of Isabela, Nueva Vizcaya, and even Mountain Province.

By the middle of February, 1945, the regiment began to fight the enemy in open terrains, especially along Hwy #5 and in different towns where they were strongly entrenched. The first of these major battles was in Sta. Cruz, Aurora, Isabela on February 21, 1945. Eighty men of B and the Special Co, 1st Bn. met a large force of Japanese, when the Japanese attacked them near their CP at Santa Cruz. Due to lack of arms and ammunitions, the CP had to be evacuated but not until after accounting for 200 Japanese killed. The regiment lost 6 EM and 8 wounded. Three days later on February 24, 1945 Cos G, I, and M of the 2nd Bn, 14th Inf under Capt. Z. Paredes met a large force of Japanese at Paniqui, Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya. The Japanese were far superior in number and arms so that the three companies had to withdraw. Killed were 217 Japanese and on our side 1 EM was wounded, 1 boloman was killed, and 1 boloman was wounded.

The most ferocious and bitter battle in the whole campaign, however, was the battle of Hapid. Hapid is a village in Kiangan, Ifugao, Mt. Province. The battle raged from March 25 to April 4, 1945. Cos H, E, G, the Combat Co, C Co, Engr. Bn and the Demolition Platoon, all commanded by Maj Z. Paredes, CO of the 2nd Bn. Hapid Airstrip was taken by the enemy after continuous and heavy fighting for 11 days. Our troops were fighting day and night without relief and were forced to withdraw later due to shortage of ammo and food.

The next major battle was for Gamu, Isabela from April 9-12, 1945. Our force engaged was B Company. The Japanese had 120 killed and 44 wounded. On our side, one EM was missing. Gamu, Isabela was at last secured. On May 1-4,

1945, A Co with 72 men met the Japanese in the Battle of Paramban, Gamu, Isabela. After a protracted struggle, the Company CP fell into the hands of the enemy, but not until after evacuating the place and accounting for 466 Japanese killed and 178 wounded. On our side only two were wounded. Vira, Gamu, Isabela was also another scene of another major battle. The battle was fought on May 6, 1945. Engaged in this fight were 159 EM and 7 officers of the 1st Bn, 14th Inf, commanded by Maj B. Capayas. Accounted for by our boys were 180 Japanese killed. However, in the later part of the day, our men had to withdraw to near positions to check the enemy who were heavily reinforced.

Meanwhile, in Panupdupan, Kiangnan, Ifugao, Mt. Province, from the 21st of April to the 28th, 1945, another battle was fought in which Hq and Service Co, Co C, Engr Bn Combat Co, I. Co, E Co, and F Co, commanded by Maj Dingcong were engaged by a numerically superior Japanese force. Killed were 105 Japanese and an unknown number were wounded. Twelve Taiwans surrendered. On our side, 6 were killed, 4 were wounded and 1 civilian was killed. After fighting continuously for 8 days without relief, our troops withdrew to near positions due to shortage of ammo and food.

Besides these major engagements during the operations of the 14th Infantry in the Isabela-Nueva Vizcaya sector, there were several other important battles fought in diverse places. These ambushing and harassing of all enemy concentrations in these areas were very demoralizing to the Japanese. It destroyed the fighting effectivity of the Japanese in these sectors to a large extent. They were scattered actions with no time table or large-scale moves. They were designed to cripple or paralyze enemy potency and they succeeded to a great degree. Enemy garrisons at Lamut, Kiangnan; Gamu, Isabela; Casiguran, Tayabas; Unoan; Garita; Cabogan, Isabela; raids on enemy concentrations along Hwy #5, Villa Visaya, Cauayan, Isabela; Cabogan, Isabela, etc.; ambushes at Cauayan and Angadanan, Isabela; Gabut, Aritao; Bagabag, N. Vizcaya; Hwy #5 between Ilagan and Naguilian, Isabela and hundred of other activities wrought havoc among the Japanese concentrated in Isabela, Nueva Vizcaya, and Kiangnan.

On July 1, 1945 the 14th Infantry was attached to the

6th Infantry Div and ordered to proceed to Kiangnan to mop up and clear the area, Palao-Haliap-Antipolo-Admuntog of the enemy scattered groups and stragglers.

2. *Kiangnan Campaign*

With northern Isabela for its territory, the 1st Bn, 14th Inf, was attached to the 11th Infantry on May 7, 1945 for tactical and administration purposes. It was this Bn which took part in the bitter Kiangnan Campaign which culminated finally in the steep, rugged mountains of Ifugao and Benguet when Gen. Yamashita finally ordered his men to lay down their arms in obedience to the rescript of their emperor on August 15, 1945.

The 1st Bn, 14th Inf, with the 2nd Bn, 11th Inf and other units of the 6th Infantry Div were organized into what was called Force B under Maj Conolly. On July 9, 1945 a new set-up was formed. The 1st Bn of the 14th Inf, the 3rd Bn, 11th Inf and some other units of the 11th Infantry were organized into a regiment under Lt. Col. Blackburn, CO of the 11th Infantry, for the purpose of conducting operations in Eastern Bontoc and Eastern Ifugao. This was the set-up until August 9 when Mayaoyao fell after a 13-day engagement with an enemy force estimated at more than 1,000. Col. D. D. Blackburn committed all of these three battalions in his campaigns in Eastern Bontoc and Eastern Ifugao.

In these operations, our forces were very much handicapped by an over-extended supply line, also by lack of air and artillery support because of poor visibility and unscalable terrains. Then the enemy was entrenched in well prepared and commanding grounds which gave them a decided superiority in position over our forces. In spite of all these obstacles, the forces under and attached to Col. Blackburn came off with flying colors, culminating in the great battle of Mayaoyao in which the 1st Bn, 14th Infantry played a great part.

In June, 1945, before the Kiangnan Campaign, C and D Co 14th Inf which were attached to the 1st Bn, 11th Inf took part in the battle of Tuguegarao. On June 20, 1945 after a heavy air strike, I and M Cos, 11th Inf, and C Co, 14th Inf crossed the Cagayan River at three points and advanced therefrom towards the town with the mission to occupy it and size the air-

fields thereat. These forces were met by 500 Japanese supported by seven tanks. At 0145, June 21, the enemy launched a counter-attack against the three companies, two tanks supporting the attack against C Co, 14th Inf, forcing one platoon to the west side of the Cagayan River. This platoon, however, was able to recross the river and reoccupy its position. On the 21st, D Co of the 14th Inf was thrown in. The enemy, reinforced began to attack against all our positions using seven tanks in this operation. In order to prevent encirclement by numerically superior forces, the four companies had to withdraw on June 22. In this operation one 75-mm gun and two of the seven tanks were destroyed by our forces.

The battle of Mayaoyao, in Ifugao, which was the most furious battle fought in the Kiangnan Campaign was fought from July 26 to August 8, 1945. The forces engaged were the 1st Bn, 14th Inf; 3rd Bn, 11th Inf; and the Provisional Bn, 11th Inf; versus a well entrenched enemy force estimated at more than 1,000 which arrived with 2.95 cannons, trench mortars, machine guns, rifles and hand grenades. In the whole operation, ending in the battle of Mayaoyao, 1122 Japanese were killed, 153 Japanese were captured, one 2.95 cannon, several rifles, various pieces of equipments, documents, and food supplies were captured. Our losses consisted of 30 KIA, 87 WIA, and 37 MIA.

The battle for Mayaoyao began on July 25, 1945 with units of the 11th Inf dislodging enemy forces at Bunhain (15.6-51.3) Mayaoyao was defended by a force estimated at 400 to 500 in positions along the main trail to Mayaoyao and by another force of about 200 in Central Mayaoyao itself. The whole 1st Bn of the 14th Inf was committed in this operation. The details of the battle itself have been described on 11th Inf Operations. At exactly 1020 on August 7, 1945, the apex which was the key to Mayaoyao fell which led to the withdrawal of the Japanese forces defending Mayaoyao leaving only a small force to defend Mayaoyao Central. On the eve of August 9, Mayaoyao fell to the hands of the 11th and 14th Infantry boys ending the Kiangnan Campaign.

Chapter XI

LOO VALLEY — TOCUCAN OPERATIONS

Estimate of the Situation

After the collapse of the Japanese stand in the Bessang-Cervantes operations, the 121st, 15th, 66th and the 11th Inf Regiments continued to deal a series of decisive defeats to the Japanese. These defeats reduced to a great extent the enemy's area of operation in North Luzon until he was cornered on the hills and ridges above the Loo Valley (864.8-2032.0) to within the limits of the northeastern portion of Benguet and southwestern Ifugao.

The main enemy defense line in the Loo Valley-Tocucan area was centered on the hills which guarded the approaches to Tocucan from the north, north northwest, west, south southwest, and south of the said town. Throughout the operations, these hills were designated as follows:

Hill	4-W	(71.7 — 35.8)
"	4-V	(69.8 — 35.60)
"	4-X	(72.10 — 35.43)
"	4-Y	(77.45 — 34.13)
"	5-G	(68.3 — 30.6)
"	5-Q	(67.25 — 29.30)
"	6-C	(64.71 — 26.30)
"	6-D	(64.45 — 26.35)
"	6-E	(72.2 — 26.25)
"	6-F	(65.10 — 25.25)
"	6-G	(68.50 — 30.50)
"	6-U	(68.45 — 21.68)
"	6-W	(69.7 — 20.84)
"	6-Y	(72.68 — 27.68)

The occupation of KP 90, Mt. Trail, by elements of A Co, 66th Inf, at 1700, July 25, prompted the shifting of troops by the enemy southeastward. The remaining troops in Hwy #11 retreated toward the direction of Buguias and the Loo Valley

area where they prepared supplementary defensive positions at Loo Valley and along the road to Badayan.

Information given by a PW captured on July 25, disclosed that the 19th Division Headquarters issued an order for the general withdrawal of all 19th Division units from the vicinity of KP 90 and KP 92 Mt. Trail, to Tocucan (7000 yards east of Buguias). That this movement was planned in advance was also disclosed by the testimony of another PW captured on July 28, that a month ago, feverish preparations for defense positions were being made at Tocucan for the eventual use of that town as a major stronghold.

Aside from the large concentrations of from 1500 to 2000 enemy troops reported in the Loo Valley and in the Badayan vicinity, the enemy also concentrated his troops in the following areas: Sabita, 200; Buguias, 500; Catlogong, 100; Lebong, 50; Manhoyhoy, 200; Palugluko, 500.

The enemy had deliberately regrouped the main strength of his forces on a narrower front, hence he had gained the advantage of troop massing on a decidedly favorable terrain. The constricting of his lines of defense had materially reduced his supply problems. The enemy's capability of protracted defense in Tocucan had been enhanced rather than diminished by the concentration of his forces on a shorter line nearer his source of supply. It was to this area where the Japanese retreated after they were routed in the Sabangan, Bontoc, and Mankayan operations.

The enemy had used great care in selecting his defensive positions especially emplacing his artillery pieces in high grounds covering the approach to Tocucan which constitute a formidable threat to the attacking forces. The rich resources of Loo Valley had enable the enemy to conserve food supply for his troops.

In this operation, our men faced an enemy imbued with the now-familiar fatalistic mental attitude and indoctrinated with the offensive spirit to such an extent, that now that he was cornered, his only objective was to live to do damage as long as possible. In this operation, our men faced an enemy who fought tenaciously and skillfully to the bitter end, using to advantage all available weapons and barriers, natural and

artificial. Throughout this operation, the enemy staged frequent suicidal counter-attacks which, at times, slowed down but did not stop the advance of our forces who fought back with equal ferocity coupled with the grim determination to wipe out the last semblance of enemy resistance in North Luzon.

To carry out the Loo Valley operation successfully, all elements of the USAIP, NL, were committed, supported by other friendly troops (32nd Div, 6th Div, 694th FA Bn, 1st Platoon B Co, 85th Chemical Mortal Bn, and the 309th Bombardment Wing), which furnished ground, aerial and artillery support.

Operations: First Phase (July 28 - August 5, 1945)

On July 28, 1945, three days after the occupation of KP 90 by A Co, of the 66th Inf Regiment, other units of the USAIP, NL, as well as friendly troops committed for the final thrust against the Japanese, were disposed in the following areas:

121st Inf:

Regimental CP at KP 90

A Co, (63.3-29.2)

B Co, (63.6-30.6)

C Co, (Less) Vic Palugluko

D Co, (63.5-31.50)

1st Bn CP (62.95-32.50)

2nd " " (less) at Samoki

H Co, at Talubin

E " " Malitep

3rd Bn CP (less) moving to KP 90

15th Inf:

Regimental CP (70.0-44.0)

1st Bn (less) moving to (70.0-44.0)

C Co, Vic Loo

2nd Bn Cp (65.5-36.1)

" " (less) (68.0-39.0)

E Co (61.9-37.0) — (64.2-38.0)

H " (64.5-35.1)

3rd Bn CP at Busa

66th Inf:

Regimental CP at KP 90

1st Bn CP and A and B Cos, at KP 90

C Co, (61.55-36.40)

D Co, (61.55-36.40)

2nd Bn Cp at KP 90

" " (less) Vic (62.7-32.0)

H Co (61.0-34.2)

3rd Bn (less) vic Bayayo Gate
 M Co (62.8-13.4) vicinity Kabayan
 694th FA Bn:
 Bn CP and HQ Btry vic Pingad
 Battery A at Busa
 " B vicinity Lepanto
 " C at Tabbag
 1st FA Bn and Btry A 2nd FA Bn (PA)
 vic KP 90
 Battery A 121st FA Bn vic Lepanto
 85th Chemical Mortar Bn, 1st Platoon
 at KP 90

From their respective positions, the different elements of the USAFIP, NL as well as the friendly troops attached for operations purposes, started their final drive against the Japanese. The drive became more intensified as the different units effected junctions with each other. Elements of the 15th Inf (A Co, 1st Bn) and units of the 66th Inf Regiment met at KP 90 while forward elements of the 66th Inf Regiment joined forces with forward units of the 127th RCT, 32nd Div (US) at KP 77.5 on Hwy #11. After the junction of the 15th and 66th Inf Regiments, elements of the 1st Bn, 15th Inf continued to operate patrols along Hwy #11 from KP 90 to Sabangan. A platoon of B Co driving from Mt. Abao 7900 yards east of Mt. Data seized and occupied Mt. Kapiligan without opposition at 1700 July 30. C Co maintained and operated combat patrols around positions vic (66.0-33.0). The 3rd Bn secured Bontoc and dispatched strong combat patrols to the east of its positions. In the meantime, elements of the 3rd Bn, 66th Inf continued mopping up operations immediately east and west of Hwy #11 from KP 77.5 to KP 90. The said junctions completed the encirclement of the enemy and forced them into the triangular trap which had been the objectives of the Sabangan, Bontoc, and Mankayan operations.

Elements of the 1st Bn, 121st Inf, reverted to the control of its parent unit after its attachment to the 66th Inf for tactical operations, started the drive southeast towards Badayan (63.9-27.4) to seize high grounds 1500 yards southeast Badayan as its objective. Forward elements of the 1st Bn, 121st Inf Regiment was the first to establish contact with the enemy at their prepared positions on a ridge vic (63.00-228.00), 4500 yards southeast KP 90. During this initial advance, only

light enemy resistance was encountered. However, on July 30, an enemy gun of unknown caliber emplaced in the vic (63.00-27.95) approximately 800 yards northwest of Badayan, registered unreported number of rounds on the position of A Co, 121st Inf, deployed in the vicinity (63.3-29.8) — (63.8-29.8) on KP 90-Badayan Road. B Co was deployed 3,300 yards due north Badayan with one platoon of C Co supporting its drive. As a result of the enemy barrages during this stage of the operation, the advance of the 1st Bn (less D Co) 121st Inf Regiment towards Badayan proper was pinned down 2000 yards north of Badayan by 200 Japanese with MG's and mortars from well-prepared positions. Two platoons of C Co of the same which was committed to take Mt. Palugluko advanced 200 yards. Mt. Palugluko was occupied by C Co after eliminating enemy opposition coming from the summit of the mountain at 1130 on July 31.

From 1800 hours, July 21 to 1500 hours, August 1, A Co was counter-attacked by the enemy from all sides at Mt. Palugluko which forced our troops to readjust their position 800 yards northwest of Mt. Palugluko to escape encirclement. To help the threatened position of C Co, elements of the 2nd Bn, 121st Inf, initiated movements to reinforce C Co with elements of E and F Cos advancing north toward high ground (68.33-33.28)), 2700 yards north of their objective, Mt. Palugluko.

For the same period, the 694th FA Bn (US) with attached units registered excellent results on enemy gun emplacements at (65.80-24.02) silenced and neutralized no less than 10 enemy guns.

Meanwhile, the 3rd Bn of the same regiment moved to the high ground vic (60.85-27.70) and initiated attacks on Sabita (62.60-25.25) 2500 yards southwest Badayan. The drive on Sabita was spearheaded by L Co supported by M Co of the 3rd Bn. The defenses of Sabita was centered on three strategic hills designated as Hill 6-F (65.1-25.2); Hill 6-D (64.5-26.4); and Hill 6-C (64.54-26.86). It was to these three hills that the 3rd Bn centered its attacks preparatory to the capture of Sabita which our forces by-passed. On July 30, elements of the 3rd Bn (a platoon each of L Co and M Co) advanced and secured Hills 6-F and 6-D after elements of the 694th FA Bn (US) shelled the enemy's prepared positions des-

trouing 1 ammo dump and silencing 2 mountain guns, which made possible the occupation of said hills almost without opposition. Shortly after Hills 6-F and 6-D were secured, the main body of L Co occupied Sabita. The enemy launched a counter-attack at 0200, July 31 in an attempt to regain their lost ground, but they were repulsed leaving several Japanese dead. On the three strategic hills, only Hill 6-C remained under enemy hands but it was not enough to provide security for the enemy troops at Sabita so that he was forced to withdraw his forces in the town without offering any opposition. Hill 6-C was later occupied by D Co against slight enemy resistance at 1530, August 1. In this drive, D Co was supported by one platoon of M Co which attacked Hill 6-C from Hill 6-D. Meanwhile, elements of the 3rd Bn continued to secure and mop up Sabita and vicinity and continued their advance west and southwest towards Mt. Bulbul (66.48-22.4) and the high grounds vic (67.60-25.50). L Co (less) secured Hill 6-F while one platoon of K Co and one platoon of L Co initiated movements to attack Hills 6-S (66.48-22.45) and 6-G (68.50-30.50) at 1530 August 1.

On August 1, elements of the 1st Bn, 121st Inf, scored their greatest gain for the period with the capture of Badayan by B Co at 0900 o'clock. After the collapse of enemy resistance in Badayan, elements of the 1st Bn advanced northeast and southeast of the town when the enemy continued to defend aggressively against the advance of elements of the 121st Inf in the vicinity of Hills 6-G and 6-S and 6-V, where the enemy prepared a secondary defense line 2900 yards northwest of Tocucan.

To the northeast, C Co of the same Bn after repulsing the enemy counter-attack on its position at Mt. Palugluko, continued to advance towards another high ground designated as Hill 5-Q. This drive, however, was pinned down by heavy enemy mortar and artillery barrages coming from the summit of Hill 5-Q. In support of the 121st Inf operation, the 1st platoon B Co, of the 85th Chemical Mortar Bn, laid concentrated barrages on Hill 5-Q with undisclosed results. Meanwhile, A Co, MP Bn attached to the 15th Inf in a belated report disclosed that it established contact with L Co, 6th Div (US) at Awan Iguid (90.0-52.3).

On August 2, an enemy mountain gun of unknown caliber fired 6 shells towards the position of D Co, 121st Inf. On the same day, six shells landed on the position of M Co of the same Regiment from an artillery gun of unknown caliber believed emplaced in the vicinity of the junction of a foot trail and the road to Badayan. For the same period, A Co, 121st Inf, attacked the enemy position vic Hill 6-G (68.50-30.50) but its advance was pinned down in that area by heavy enemy MG and rifle fire. Northwest of Tocucan, approximately 4500 yards, a platoon of K Co, 121st Inf occupied Hill 6-S (66.48-22.45) against stubborn enemy resistance.

In the Asin-Palugluko-Catlubong area, the enemy defended aggressively and initiated counter-attacks against our troops. One hundred twenty Japanese with their tommy guns, automatic rifles, rifles, and grenades, attacked the position of C Co, 15th Inf vic (69.2-26.2) at about 0200 August 3. Thirty Japanese were killed out of the 120 and the rest withdrew to Hill 4-X (72.2-35.8) after 3 hours of fighting.

Meanwhile, elements of the 2nd Bn, 121st Inf initiated movements to reinforce C Co in the attack on Mt. Palugluko. Advanced units of E and F cos reached the high ground vic (68.33-33.28), 2700 yards north Mt. Palugluko. On the same day, L Co, 121 Inf pressed its advance to Catlubong (66.40-25.25) killing 32 Japanese on the way. On the following day August 3, elements of the 3rd Bn, L Co, 121st Inf assaulted and later on seized and occupied Labong (68.1-23.9) 2100 yards northeast Mt. Bulbul as they pressed their drive east and southeast encountering only slight resistance. Strong combat patrols of K Co probed enemy position on high ground vic (68.45-21.68), 6700 yards southeast Sabita while I Co continued to secure Sabita.

On August 5, elements of the 1st Bn, 121st Inf (A and D Cos) gained 50 yards in their drive toward Hill 5-Q against stiff enemy resistance. In the meantime, F Co of the 2nd Bn reached to within 50 yards from the summit of Mt. Palugluko.

In the meantime, 1st Bn, 15th Inf continued to occupy and secure strategic high ground to prevent enemy movement northward.

Second Phase of the Loo Valley-Tocucan Operations (Aug. 6-Aug. 15, 1945)

With the fall of Badayan and Sabita, two Japanese strong points in the Loo Valley-Tocucan Area and the steady progress of the other units of the USAFIP, NL, against Japanese positions in other areas, the enemy defenses could be identified in the following areas:

1. To the area west of Tocucan, 700 men were deployed along the trails leading from Catlobong (66.1-25.2)-Lebong (68.1-23.9)-Manhoyhoy (69.8-23.0) toward Tocucan. This force had 12 LMG's, 4 HMG's and 275-mm mountain guns.

2. To the area northwest of Tocucan, 800 men were committed for the defense of the area. This group had 4 mountain guns, several LMG's and HMG's well entrenched in tunnels and foxholes.

3. In the entire Mt. Palugluko-Badayan Tocucan area, there were 13 artillery pieces of different caliber. An artillery piece of unknown caliber was emplaced near a tunnel in the vicinity of (65.5-27.1) 1300 yards southeast of Badayan. On August 8, 10 mountain guns of unknown caliber were reported emplaced in the vicinity of Tocucan. On August 10, one 75-mm gun was reported emplaced 1500 yards east vicinity (69.20-25.50) 1100 yards northwest of Tocucan. On the same day a 47-mm gun was reported emplaced in the vicinity of (70.5-36.0), 5500 yards north northeast of Mt. Palugluko.

During the week, the stubborn resistance put up by the enemy southeast of Badayan collapsed. The Japanese were forced to withdraw farther southeast and occupied the commanding grounds southwest of Tocucan.

Northeast of Badayan, little gain was made by our troops. Towards the end of the period, it was reported that there were still 200 Japanese stubbornly resisting the advance of the 2nd Bn (less H Co, 121st Inf in the vic south of Hill 5-G (68.28-30.55). The same number of Japanese with MG's rifles and grenades were reported putting up a strong opposition against C Co, 121st Inf in the vic of Hill 5-Q (67.38-29.27). In the vic of Bangao (66.45-27.20) and Hill 5-Q, 250 Japanese were reported offering a strong opposition against the advance of A and D Cos, 121st Inf.

During the period, our artillery batteries were active laying concentration, preparation, and harassing fire on enemy gun emplacements. On August 5, a 47-mm gun emplaced in a tunnel vic (65.1-27.1) was silenced after continuous concentration of artillery barrages from the 684th FA Bn. On the following day, one 47-mm gun was captured by A and D Cos, 121st Inf during their advance toward the enemy positions in vic (67.38-29.27). On August 7, two 75-mm enemy guns were captured in the vic (62.3-28.3), 800 yards west of Tocucan, after an artillery preparation by the 694th FA Bn. On the same day, an MG position in the vic (65.10-28.67), 2000 yards northeast of Badayan was silenced by fire concentration of the 1st FA Bn.

During the early part of the period combat patrols of F Co, 121st Inf assaulted the Japanese positions in Mt. Palugluko (68.28-30.35), followed later on by the main body of the 2nd Bn. The enemy defended themselves from dug-in positions, using mortars, MG's, rifles, and grenades in an attempt to retard the advance of the 2nd Bn. At 0730, August 7, E and F, and G Cos reached the summit of Mt. Palugluko against heavy enemy resistance, by-passing 4 turnels. The rest of the enemy fled towards Hill 4-Z (68.33-33.28). During the same period, Baculongan (64.80-31.60) and the southern slope of Hill 4-Y were occupied without enemy resistance by H Co, 121st Inf. On August 7, an estimated company of the enemy attacked the positions of E Co, 121st Inf in Hill 5-G (68.28-30.55) but was repulsed. The enemy withdrew towards Hill 5-Q (67.38-29.27) 1400 yards southwest of Hill 5-B.

Approximately 200 Japanese in concealed positions, armed with MG's, rifles and automatic weapons in Hill 5-Q stopped the advance of C Co, 121 Inf. On August 9, A and D Cos, 121st Inf continued to advance from the southwest towards Hill 5-Q (67.38-29.27), 5500 yards northwest of Tocucan and reached a point 40 yards from the enemy's position against stiff resistance. On the same day, C Co, 121st assaulted the enemy from northwest direction of the same Hill and reached a point 800 yards from the enemy's positions. Simultaneously, G and E Cos, 121st Inf, coordinating attacks with elements 1st Bn, under close artillery support occupied the S slope of Hill 5-Q (67.38-29.27). Meanwhile, 3rd Bn elements continued their attacks on high grounds (68.45-21.68) 2100 yards southeast Mt.

Bulbul with forward elements 1700 yards west northwest from the summit, encountering stiff enemy resistance. After relentless attacks by the 2nd Bn, 121st Inf, the enemy's defenses in Hill 5-Q (67.38-29.27) weakened and the forward elements of the 3rd Bn, same regiment, reached the top of the hill on August 11 against stubborn resistance.

The enemy in Hill 6-U (68.45-21.68) halted the advance of I and K Cos, 3rd Bn, 121st Inf.

In the Mt. Kapilingan-Mt. Abao area, an estimated platoon of the enemy from the vic (73.6-38.0) initiated counter-attack on the positions of a platoon of D Co, 15th Inf, August 5. The enemy was repulsed after 2 hours fighting. He withdrew towards Hill 4-X (72.2-35.8) approximately 6000 yards northeast Mt. Palugluko. On August 8, the enemy from Hill 4-W (71.7-35.8) made a considerable volume of fire against the position of D Co, 15th Inf, forcing our troops to withdraw from the vic (71.5-36.3).

On August 9, C and D Cos, 15th Inf, continued to advance from the northeast towards Hill 4-V (69.80-35.60) and captured and occupied the summit of Hill 4-X. On the following day, same Cos, same Regt, advanced towards 4-W (71.64-35.77) but was pinned down by heavy enemy tommy gun, automatic rifle, MG and rifle fire coming from the southeast slope of the hill facing our troops.

At the close of the period, enemy troops were located occupying the high grounds north northeast Tocucan in the vic of Asin 74.15-33.85; Hill 4-X (72.10-35.43) and Hill 4-Y (77.45-34.13). Some were located southwest of Tocucan in the vic of Hill 6-U (68.45-21.68); south southeast of Lebong (68.10-23.60); Manhoyhoy (69.85-23.90) and north northwest of Tocucan in the vic of Pugo (69.2-26.8) and Lingao (69.7-29.4).

When the "cease fire" orders from the CG of the XIV Corp was given on the night of August 15, the different units of the USAFIP, NL were busy pounding the Japanese in their respective areas as follows: The 121st Inf Regt following motar preparations, seized and secured high ground 1600 yards southwest Mt. Palugluko against stiff enemy opposition. The 1st Bn (less Co B), later reinforced by Cos A and C, 66th Inf, resumed attacks east and southeast toward Pugo, 5,300 yards east Ba-

dayan. In the 3rd Bn zone, minor contacts were made in its advance towards Tocucan. In the 15th Inf sector, different elements of this regiment repulsed several three strong enemy counter-attacks on hills 5400 yards south southeast, 4100 yards southeast, and 6100 yards east southeast of Mt. Data. Minor enemy contacts were reported in the areas 1000 yards north of Mt. Kapilingan and 4000 yards southeast Tabbac. The 66th Inf Regiment continued its mopping up operations astride Hwy #11 from KP 90 without enemy contact. Meanwhile, elements of the 1st Bn of this Regiment (A and C Cos) passed to the operational control of the 121st Infantry Inf Regiment to co-ordinate attacks against the enemy in the Tocucan area. B Co of the same Bn, moved to Badayan. Third Bn (less) secured Sabita Hill (65.10-25.16) and Hill (66.48-22.4). The 694th FA Bn with attached units, fired several harassing fires against enemy strong points and gun positions vic (71.45-35.26), (67.84-25.08), (71.73-34.68), (65.93-27.21) and (64.77-27.78) until the night of August 16, 1945 when the "cease fire" order was given.

Throughout the campaign, up to the time of the "cease fire" order, the enemy took advantage of the difficult terrain to compensate his inferior fire power and in spite of the use of all available arms in his possession, he failed to stem the progress of our advancing troops. It became, obvious, however, that the stiff resistance put up by the enemy was but a protracted delaying action to enable his forces to withdraw towards Tinoc and Hungduan from Tocucan.

Chapter XII

AIR STRIKES AND AIR GROUND LIAISON

In all the major operations of the different units of the USAFIP, NL from D-Day to the cessation of hostilities, the effectiveness and potency of air strikes on enemy installations cannot be overlooked. The support given by the 5th Air Force through the 308th and 309th Bomb Wings, stationed at Lingayen, the 310th at Mindoro and the 13th Air Force stationed at Palawan, the 24th Marine Air Group and the 2nd SAP, have been responsible for the expeditious completion of all tactical and strategic air support missions in North Luzon.

In the early stages of the campaign, shortly after contact had been made with the Sixth Army, air support was relatively a new thing to the USAFIP, NL. As soon as liaison with elements of the Sixth Army was accomplished after January 10, 1945, instructions were received as regards the availability of air support in the attack of strategic targets in the area of the USAFIP, NL.

On January 17, a request was made to Sixth Army Hqs for the bombing of San Fernando Convent and the adjoining areas of Langcuas and Camansi which were known to be enemy bivouac areas. The request was granted and the targets described were attacked to the satisfaction of the ground forces. This request was followed up by subsequent missions with Sixth Army promptly advised of the exact location of targets including accompanying maps to give accurate locations of these targets.

On January 28, the Sixth Army advised that the Lingsat School in the San Fernando Central was to be bombed as per request of the 121st Infantry. The air strike on January 29 on Lingsat School was considered effective and a report was made with a view to making assistance in planning future operations a success. On February 8, HQ USAFIP, NL advised all regimental commanders to submit request for air strikes

at least 72 hours prior to planned action. Targets were to be definitely described with respect to prominent buildings and terrain features in coordination with ground forces. Request for air strikes other than coordinated attack may be made provided areas to be bombed were clear of friendly troops and appropriate for airplane action.

In order to avoid US Army planes from inflicting casualties to our friendly troops, it was necessary to request 6th Army airmen to observe the NL panel signal wherever it was displayed; also, through the instigation of the HQ, USAFIP, NL, bomb limits were defined as follows:

From San Fernando to the north to Mt. Polog, then south-east to Aritao to southeast Dinalongan. In areas north of the bomb line, air support missions may be requested direct. The 308th Bomb Wing was to forward a copy of all requests, informations, sketches, and instructions to the G-2, Sixth Army, and would make clearance from G-3, Sixth Army before the execution of the request. Instructions were also made to the effect that three copies of targets including the area to be bombed and the location of friendly troops and their front lines were to be designated.

The old procedure of air support was to make the request 3 days in advance and to mark the front lines with white squad panels. The panel sign "NL" was to be displayed near the CP of the unit at the designated time of the air strike. Upon arrival in the area, the planes were to circle clock-wise three times over the target, during which time the front lines were supposed to be alerted. Smoke shells from trench mortars or an arrow giving the approximate direction of the target, panels should be displayed within sight of the airmen. After the bombing and the strafing were over, the attacking planes were to make dummy passes on the target, wobble their wings and make a sharp right turn and then a left turn to signal that the air strike was over. This was the method used before any appreciable air ground liaison could be given to the USAFIP NL forces.

On February 16, the Commanding Officer, USAFIP NL informed all regimental commanders the latest procedure on "request for air strikes." The request was to be accompanied with a sketch showing friendly and enemy troops concentra-

tion and installations. In such a request, the following points were to be observed: panel signals, visual signals to be used in the coordination of air and ground forces, direction of the strike, nature of the target, type of air strikes and whether the targets were free of civilians and of our troops.

When the 24th Marine Air Group brought in their VHF moving van to the vicinity of the front-line units of the 121st Inf at San Fernando, a comparatively new type of air ground liaison was to be inaugurated. Credit is due to Capt. Macaloney of the USMC who was supposed to have pioneered with air-ground liaison. While operating with front-line units, a powerful radio set was connected to a forward observer who could, by voice, direct planes to their respective targets. This forward observer was in direct contact with the Commanding Officer of the ground forces, who in turn was in close contact with the troops in the frontline by handy talkies. It will be observed that during the San Fernando operations, the 24th Marine Air Group supported units extensively and was responsible for directing various flights into the targets around San Fernando. Planes on bombing raids to Formosa and elsewhere in North Luzon which could not otherwise accomplish their mission because of adverse weather were contacted by "JOJO" (24th MAG Code name) and were assigned target then available in the San Fernando area.

The 20th SAP which later became the 2nd SAP took over the mission of the marines and adopted a new type of air-ground liaison with the use of three cub planes (L-5's) with VHF radio sets. This party ("Nephew") were composed of five officers and twenty enlisted men who were made up into six ground stations. These ground stations were assigned and attached to the different Infantry Regiments of the USAFIP, NL then operating in North Luzon. With the aid of adequate powerful radio equipments, the 2nd SAP was able to contact the 308th, 309th, and 310th Bomb Wings for whatever missions and air strikes were requested within 24 hours. A cub plane was assigned to reconnoiter, observe and direct strikes in coordination with the air support party that was supposed to be in contact with the unit commander on the ground in the vicinity of the area to be hit.

The 2nd SAP under the able direction of Lts. Jacob Peltz

and Peter G. Lombardo for the duration of their assignment with the USAFIP, NL forces, have tackled a vitally important job and they came through with flying colors. They caused approximately 8000 planes with a gross total load of 6000 tons of high explosives and 32000 gallons of Napalm bombs to destroy and wreak havoc, on all bombing missions in North Luzon for a period of 3-1/2 months. No other divisional unit in the Philippines during the North Luzon campaign had been accorded so extensive and intensive a "going-over" as was given by elements of the 5th Air Force to the USAFIP, NL in its assigned area. Of particular interest is the fact that on many a bombing mission, the P-38's, B-25's, A-20's, P-51's and P-47's made up for close support of ground troops unleashing one-tonners (1000 lbs.) H. E. to within 300 yards from the front-line of friendly troops to the target. And as for strafing, the Lightings would open up their .50 cal. MGs to within 50 yards from the front-line of friendly troops to the target. And as for strafing, the Lightings would open up their .50 cal. MGs to within 50 yards from the boys to the Japanese.

At Tuguegarao, Cagayan there was more volume of planes (720 planes in 3 days) for various missions than any number of planes for the same length of time in the Okinawa and Luzon campaigns. It was elaborate, but it was a great help, especially on rugged terrain. The panel and smoke display of USAFIP, NL forces was commented upon as among the best by competent air force personnel.

The L-5's were the biggest nuisance to the Japanese wherever they were observed, flying over enemy territory. The Japs knew too well that when this "abominable" little *dragonfly* hovered above, hell would break loose in no time. Air strikes or artillery concentration, the L-5's did a nifty job with their VHF radio sets. On several occasions, the daring cub pilot would edge close to a bluff at the bend of a road and quite wantonly lob a few hand grenades on the baffled Japs. Another acrobatic flyer is known to have unloaded the clips of his automatic pistol and dispersed a group of camote-digging Japs, knocking off a number of them, much to their chagrin and consternation. These stunts, although uncalled for and very risky, only served to demoralize the Japs the more. Exploits of this kind were unofficially verified by Japanese officers who surrendered later.

The greatest handicap on air strikes was of course bad weather and fog. This was especially experienced at Bessang where planes scheduled for bombing were weathered out causing a cancellation of the mission for the day. Although the ground troops could most often resort to field artillery for close support, there were times when even the forward observers of the artillery could not sense the effect of their fires.

The following are reports gathered from the G-2 journal, USAFIP, NL which are the results of air activities covered from the early part of February to the cessation of hostilities:

Initial reports on May 7 airstrikes (59 planes) covering Cervantes proper, Kayan (Mt. Prov.) Buccual, Magun, and Langiatian state hits were scored on enemy positions with resulting fires and explosions observed.

Ilocos Sur Province, May 9, 1945. Information furnished by a surrendered BC indicates that two 37-mm guns formerly operating in the Bessang area were disabled by bombs.

A statement by this same BC regarding the houses previously reported destroyed May 4, on the northeast slope of Buccual Hill, reveals that several Japs located therein were killed. Following this strike, some of the enemy troops this vicinity immediately moved down to the creek northeast of Buccual and commenced construction of more tunnels and fox-holes.

He further stated that a group of enemy cavalrymen (with horses) attempting to reinforce Bessang were wiped out by air-men sometime in April (date not stated).

Of the previously reported 124 Japs known killed in the Bessang area for the week ending May 12, 74 were killed as a result of airstrikes in the Bessang area on May 6, according to 5 surrendered Japanese. These prisoners also stated the strength of their pocket just east of Bessang was formerly 1000 but had been reduced to 50 by air strikes, ground action and disease.

Cagayan Province. Gov. Marcelo Adduru of Cagayan, previously held in custody by the enemy in Tuguegarao, succeeded in making his escape on May 5. Gov. Adduru stated that airstrikes in the Tuguegarao and Peñablanca areas have had a terrific effect on the enemy supply situation.

Adduru testified that:

The planes destroyed many of the supply depots, ammunition, and fuel dumps in Peñablanca and in the barrios of Tuguegarao, particularly Gosi where even the Japanese salt storage was burned; the planes even got armories in Peñablanca with the result that most of the Japs there are without arms.

Mrs. Adduru supplemented her husband's statement by saying that even the enemy clothing deposits in Tuguegarao were hit.

Isabela Province, May 24, 1945. An estimated 1000 Japanese were killed during an airstrike on Angadanan Viejo, April 12. The number of wounded was not determined. Six houses were burned. However, until further confirmation is received, the figure can only be tentatively accepted.

Tumauni Central was more than disturbed at 1400 on April 29 by 10 P-38's who bagged an estimated 300 Japs killed and an unestimated number of wounded. Thirty houses were destroyed by fire including the church and the warehouse.

Cagayan Province, June 3, 1945. The Maraburab, Piggatan, and Pinupoc areas of Alcala (Targets F-267, F-320, F-351, and F-362) were heavily bombed and strafed on May 27. The Japs, southward bound, were caught flat-footed in these daytime bivouac areas; agents and civilians estimated enemy casualties to have been approximately 200. The targets are still good.

Isabela Province, June 3, 1945. It has been reported that the delayed-action parachute bombs, recently dropped on wooded enemy bivouac areas, had been especially effective in killing Japs. The bombs hit the forest canopy, hang suspended from the tops until the raid is over, and after the unsuspecting Japs have crawled out from their shelters, explode high in the tree tops.

Cagayan Province, June 13, 1945. Upon request of the GLO, 309th Bomb Wing, the following report regarding the effectiveness of napalm was received from the 11th Inf:

Reports from the Gattaran area show that better results are obtained with napalm. Napalm is particularly effective in destroying enemy installations located in forested areas, in sugarcane plantations and in banana plantations. More ammunition dumps, fuel

dumps and supply depots have been destroyed since planes began using these fire bombs. On June 2, the first time napalm was used at Calaoagan Bassit, Gattaran, 20 rice granaries hidden under trees were totally destroyed. Napalm is also very effective in dispersing troop concentrations and in driving Japs from their quarters. All houses used by enemy along the Dummon River in Calaoagan Bassit, Gattaran, were destroyed on June 2. On June 7, napalm burned a wide area in Aparri Central resulting in loud explosions and thick smoke (indicating fuel) from the former Chinese cemetery. As a result of napalm bombing of enemy concentrations along Highway #5, there has been a noticeable decrease in the frequency and volume of enemy fire received from the east bank of the river. In the Cattaran area some Japs were reported to have put on gas masks the first time napalm was used. Supplementary reports will be submitted.

Isabela Province, June 14, 1945. Enemy installations in the Echague and Garit areas were hit almost daily between May 27 and June 6 by P-38's and B-25's. Food supplies, fuel dumps, dugouts, many houses and one motor vehicle were destroyed. The majority of working animals, commandeered by the Japs, were killed during the course of these raids. Enemy casualties were believed considerable.

A further report regarding the May 30 air attacks on Buaya, San Luis, and Cordon (See par 13 Isabela "Results" June 13), stated that large fires were started in the target areas.

Sta. Monica, Villa Fermin, and Atilan (Echague) were bombed and strafed on June 1 by B-25's. Five Japs are known to have been killed, 60 rifles were destroyed, and one house containing 200 cavaness of rice was likewise destroyed.

Pangal (8-185) and San Francisco (Jones) and Garit Airfield were bombed and strafed on May 30. Ten drums of gasoline were destroyed and 8 Japs are known to have been killed. An undertermined number of enemy were wounded.

Angadanan Nuevo, Angadanan Viejo, Angadanan Airfield and Minanga areas were raided on May 25 and 26. Enemy-occupied houses were destroyed and 150 Japs were killed. The number of wounded was not known.

Isabela Province, June 18, 1945. The following was taken from an Alamo Scout report:

Heavy air strine on Naguilian (9 mi SSW Ilagan) 16 May destroyed Jap garrison. Casualties are not confirmed as agents could not enter town due to Japs in trenches surrounding it; however, screams could be heard coming from burning buildings. Direct bomb hits were scored in bamboo groove where 7 tanks and some trucks were hidden. Reports are from B Co, 14th Inf, PA . . . Japs were observed in small groups in ricefields a few hours after the attack.

Civilian report states that Jap casualties in Tamauni and surrounding barrios due to bombing and strafing attacks have been high. On night of June 14, Japs used one truck all night to take their dead and wounded northward.

Ilocos Sur Province, June 20, 1945. In Aluling (2 mi SE Cervantes) several Jap bodies mutilated by bombs were seen by a reconnaissance patrol of the 15th Inf. An American flag believed to have been used by the Japs to deceive American planes was recovered.

Cagayan Province, June 21, 1945. Iguig Central (Target F-418) was bombed and strafed by 6 American planes, 11 June. Direct hits on enemy concentration killed 60 Japs. The same target and vicinity was again raided June 12 and another 50 Japs were killed, making a total of 110 killed in this area in these two strikes. The target was no longer good.

Chapter XIII

A CRITIQUE ON THE USAFIP, NL OPERATIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED

Acting upon explicit orders from SWPA "to unleash its maximum violence" against the enemy in preparation for D-Day, the USAFIP, NL forces in its initial operations may be said to have "come of age" as an effective, cohesive force with the full punch of a quinto-lateral infantry division. In most instances, it challenged the enemy on any terrain within the scope of North Luzon and dealt a sustained blow-for-blow engagement.

During the initial phases of the operations, there were certain fundamental elements easily wanting and although these handicaps were overcome later, they served to retard and deter the efficiency of the units in combat. These shortcomings were:

1. Inadequate training in all phases of offensive warfare for officers and men.
2. Insufficient arms, ammo, and equipment.
3. Inadequate trained personnel with the special services.
4. Lack of artillery support in the initial phases of the campaign.

In spite of these, however, the 218 days from January 15 to August, 1945 were crammed full of action and bloody fighting. Considering that there was so much to be desired by way of training and armaments, the fool-hardy Ilocano and Igorot boys plunged into the foray with their morale sky-high and their savagery and violence nearly as fever-pitched as the fanatical Japanese themselves.

OPERATIONAL

Old Terrain and Old Tactics

Guerrillas or otherwise, the boys certainly knew their terrain. From the lowlands up to the rugged, wild, and densely vegetated mountains they sought the enemy where small bands

and big groups in heavily defended positions (such as Bessang Pass) meant to give real trouble. If the Japanese intended to elude mechanized troops by taking advantage of the mountain terrain, jungle and adverse weather, he was ironically mistaken. The USAFIP, NL boys were there to fix and finish him. They pushed through his position, no matter in what jugged nook or boulder he ensconced, maneuvered to his flanks and rear, and routed him out without giving him a chance to recover. At San Fernando, Tangadan, and Mankayan, the enemy once cut-off from the rear by a decisive push, became a hopeless, confused mob. And in all cases, the old immutable fundamental principles of war were exploited maximally: fire and movement, offensive, mass, economy of force, simplicity, surprise—there was nothing new that the Japanese had not known before except, perhaps, the surprisingly terrific fire power that was used against them. As it turned out, the Japanese did not put up anything now by way of tactics or strategy. On the defense of Bessang, perhaps, the one most bitterly contested sector in the whole USAFIP, NL campaigns, the Japanese came near to taking Butac in what appeared to be a juicy chance to cut off the 121st Infantry. But the flanking movement did not have enough impact and fizzled away before it could do any appreciable damage.

Artillery and Air Support

In most of the campaigns nothing was more reassuring than the effectiveness of artillery and air support against all enemy strong points and rear installations. The employment of air in depth on all objectives made possible a steady movement as soon as the area was "softened up" by constant air strikes. As soon as air activity was over, artillery preparation by the crack 122nd FA Bn (US), 694th FA Bn (US) and the revitalized 1st and 2nd FA Bns (USAFIP, NL) made every objective untenable and accelerated the movement and progress of the troops. The air-artillery-ground coordinated movement was polished up to a perfection that later on the boys just couldn't go over the top without some kind of preparatory aerial or artillery bombardment. At the San Fernando and Tangadan operations, however, artillery support was practically nil. The captured Jap 75's, 37's, and 47's were without fire control instruments, enough ammo, nor the trained personnel to man

them. The feeble artillery that USAFIP, NL Hqs could put on the line were no match to what the Japs had carried up to the hills. But as soon as US artillery came to the scene—modern, complete, trained, and experienced personnel—they out-fire-powered the Japs' to a neat one-sided affair. But before the American 75's, 105's and 155's joined in the operations, air support was available from the outset and kept on without any let-up until V-J day. Air strikes alone immobilized the enemy, disrupted his supply routes, communications, defensive positions and caused him numerous and constant casualties. The incessant pounding gave him no rest and shattered his low morale. POW's statements and even the pronouncements of the Japanese ranking generals who surrendered later attest to the effectiveness of air and artillery preparation and concentrated attacks. To escape this punishment, he had either to withdraw or die in the heat of an ill-time *banzai* charge.

How Jap Strong Points Were Overcome

Most of the engagements with the Japs after they had retired to the interior of Mt. Province, were fought on high grounds, with the enemy choosing to defend the crest of the hills overlooking strategic trails and highways. This was a favorite delay-action maneuver which was aimed to cause as much trouble to the mechanized troops that tried to penetrate into the mountain country. The Japanese strong points were characterized by having their flanks secured by natural barriers of deep gorges and steep ravines (Lower Cadsu and Bucual Ridge, for examples) along Hwy #4. Frontal attacks on these strong points were never as successful as flanking movements where maximum pressure was given on a side where the enemy least expected it to come. When these defended areas pinned down friendly troops, a close support of artillery concentration fire followed by a systematic synchronized assault on such a position, was most always successful. A maximum volume of fire brought to bear on enemy points especially from the rear and from the flanks cracked the Japanese positions. Obviously, the enemy had a limited amount of ammunition and would not use it unless he was cornered. In many cases during the daytime, it was expected that the troops dig in at about 1700 hours and hold their ground against enemy infiltration at night.

Enemy artillery, cleverly concealed on higher grounds, usually fired at daybreak or sunrise (0630-0700) and during dusk at evening. This was done at a time when there was possibly no aerial observation. Such harassing fires from Jap artillery were of short duration, and except for exceptional circumstances, they were never massed nor concentrated to give much trouble.

In spite of persistent instructions emanating from higher headquarters about camouflage discipline, the frontline units never were able to make the troops learn the fundamental principles of concealment. The boys would stay out in the open in broad daylight, against the skyline without any regard for cover. Only when they were subjected to hostile mortar or MG fire did they take heed, but even then they still continued to erect their shelter halves and pop tents without any concern for camouflage discipline.

As to the Jap claim that our forces were rather slow in pursuing them and following up a decisive engagement with them, it was never meant to allow units to advance through rough and dangerous jungle terrain without first securing and exploiting the areas taken over; in fact, the Infantry Commander, Col. Parker Calvert, casually remarked, "that the Japs ran so fast we could not catch up with them."

The Special Weapons Platoon

The fire power and shock effect of the Special Weapons Platoon was clearly demonstrated in many of the campaigns in North Luzon. The Browning Automatic Rifle, the TSMG, the Bazooka and the Flame Thrower—weapons which were relatively new to the troops—were utilized to the maximum advantage whenever strongly fortified pill-boxes and tunnels were encountered. An assault team using maximum automatic weapons, always came out with flying colors.

The flame thrower has been found to be very effective, but rather too bulky and the duration of its liquid fire short-lived. It has been found that the best way to clean out tunnels and pillboxes is still the use of fragmentation (hand) and smoke grenades whenever it was possible to close-in on the tunnels. The light MG, Cal. 30, air-cooled, has proved to be a very handy weapon especially on rough terrain.

The 60-mm Trench Mortar has been undoubtedly the best weapon to use in the kind of terrain that was prevalent along Hwy #4 and #11. In spite of the enfiladed positions of the enemy which could not be covered effectively by artillery fire, the 60-mm mortar served to cover every inch of the ground with disastrous effect. It was easy to man, and effective against enemy machine gun nests.

It was noted that our boys were rather indifferent to the use of captured Japanese machine guns (heavy and light) for a number of reasons: (1) that they were not familiar with its manipulation, and (2) its use at night often confused friendly troops in adjacent areas.

Radio Equipment

The handy talkie and the Radio Set-300 were of inestimable value to the front-line units specially in rugged terrain. For once, the regiment and battalion CP's were closer to the Company Commander and the platoons. Movements were always directed on the spot with facility and detail, and any report of developments in the field were reported promptly to the higher echelons. It was indispensable during air strikes and close support artillery concentrations. As a means of communication during long-range patrol activities, it was dependable as it was expedient. In no instances were enemy interference with Radio Set 300 ever observed during this operation. While radio communication was established between units, the telephone was nevertheless resorted to, as it insured contact between units especially in protracted operations.

Combat Intelligence

This phase of training was never developed extensively in our front-line units. Patrol activity was limited only to a small percentage of intelligent men who could evaluate enemy information right on the spot. In most cases, scouts were composed of "rookies" who did not know how to obtain sufficient intelligence reports of the enemy to be of use to their respective units; in fact, during the earlier stage of the campaign, bolomen and loyal civilians were used to obtain enemy troop movements and disposition even in the theater of operations. Every soldier must have sufficient training of scouting and patrolling

and must be able to use his common sense and think independently when the occasion so demands.

The Combat Company

Like the Special Weapons Platoon, the Combat Company of the Regiment, with its complements of 81-mm Trench Mortar and Cal. .50 MG served to support our lines where the maximum concentration of fire was needed. Whenever ammunition supply was not a problem, mortar barrage of 81-mm Trench Mortar captured from the enemy, were as valuable in supplementing our American Trench Mortars of the same caliber. Although we captured a considerable number of enemy mortar from the enemy, they were never extensively used except when no other kind of guns could be used.

Constant stoppages to Cal. .50 MG attest to the fact that the machine gun crews were not sufficiently trained to remedy minor defects of the weapon while in action.

Night Operations

Our troops should have more training on night operations with a view to acquainting them with the use of booby traps, flares, and ways and means of effecting surprise movement during night operations. The Japs used night operations to advantage because there was no air observation at night and enough local security for our units. Another nasty habit of our boys was their indiscriminate firing at night revealing their positions to the enemy especially in the dark. Tracer bullets, when fired by automatic weapons, would easily reveal the position of such a weapon at night.

Trip flares and flares by mortar and rifle grenades were used to advantage during the Bessang operations, and served to beat off any attempt of infiltration by the enemy. The use of booby traps to guard weak points and possible enemy approaches should be made of common knowledge to our troops fighting in this kind of terrain.

Care and Up-keep of Weapons

Our boys were very careless in the care and up-keep of their weapons. Their guns were left out in the rain, their bolts and bores were rusty, were not constantly oiled, and conse-

quently caused trouble when they were in action. Ammunition were uselessly strewn about along the trenches and fox-holes and they did not care to make every round count in their favor. This was especially true in the case of the 121st, 15th and 66th Inf's. in the Battle of Bessang.

An ordnance detachment composed of three or four especially trained enlisted men for every Company, disposed to make fixtures of all kinds of small arms weapons during prolonged operations, would obviate the wrong and bad practice of sending a lot of unserviceable weapons back to the rear areas thru the Bn and Regimental S-4's.

Supply and Evacuation

Rations (Type K and C) for the men in the field were always sufficient and did not offer a serious problem except when transportation was done by cargadores and bolomen. The problem of procuring civilian help was facilitated with the aid of the G-5 Section which recruited the services of all men available for this job. While there was always a pressing need for sufficient trucks for transporting ammunition and rations to the men in the line, this did not serve to deter the offensive whenever it was scheduled. There was always a lack of sufficient ambulances and organic transportation especially when there was only a one-lane road linking the front and rear echelons.

Special mention is made of the use of the transportation planes (C-47) in many air drops at places which could not be reached by motor vehicles. The L-5's contributed much in the timely evacuation of serious surgical patients from clearing hospitals (Cervantes) to the base hospital.

Personnel Matters

The Casualty and Replacement Bn served to tackle the problem of sufficient replacements due to losses in action. There were times, however, that the replacements taken to the line were not sufficiently trained to be an asset to the service. In order to break them and train them the hard way, it was expedient to assign the new man under the veterans who already had sufficient experience in frontline combat. Casualties for the entire operations in North Luzon were kept to the minimum, in spite of the odds facing the USAFIP, NL. The

ratio of our casualties as against that of the enemy was 36 to one.

Combat fatigue was another problem that had to be solved in these operations in view of the sad lack of reserves that could be used to relieve units that were continuously fighting for weeks and months. The resourcefulness and leadership of the unit commander in this particular instance was brought to play and his success in gaining the soldier's confidence served to lessen combat fatigue of troops in the line. When the men had sufficient clothing, blankets, equipments, toilet facilities and cigarettes doled to them at the right time, their morale was invariably high and this was the best way to combat front-line fatigue.

Medical and Surgical Attention

(See "Medics on the Job" Annex.)

Engineer Battalion

(See "Engineers on the Job" Annex.)

The problems encountered by this organization were the lack of complete heavy engineer equipment to cope with the work expected to be accomplished, the lack of trained personnel for the operations and maintenance of the equipment recently turned over from the Sixth Army, and the constant and repeated breakdown of these equipments, plus the difficulty to requisition and procure vital spare parts. All these were partially solved and remedied with the help of American enlisted men detailed and attached to this unit as instructors and also by the ingenuity and resourcefulness of the mechanics and craftsmen in the battalion.

However, in spite of these difficulties, the Engr Bn achieved some outstanding feats like the construction of the Butac Truss Bridge, the longest spanned wooden bridge everconstructed in the Islands; the metalling of the Luna Airstrip with steel matings; the construction of the Abra River Pontoon Bridge and the Sabangan Bridge.

Thus the operations and maintenance of the latest types of engineer equipments, the construction of the Baily Bridge, the steel-matting of airstrips and roads were learned in these operations.

Finis

One lesson which the Philippine Army should not lose sight of in making future plans for the defense of the Philippines is the utilization by the Japs of the numerous mountain ranges in maintaining the last Jap vestige in the Philippines. They had no chance against the mechanized force of the Americans along the beach and flat ground where mechanized units could do a lot of damage. They retreated to the mountains and fought the battle in a terrain of their own choice. Were it not for the fact that the Americans were operating in a territory where the natives are on their side, the liberation of the Philippines would have been more difficult, more costly in manpower, and longer in duration.

In this campaign, the USAFIP, NL killed 52,033 Japs and captured a total of 32,001 POW as of October, 1945. Losses on our side were heavy, casualties totalling 1441 KIA, 3475 WIA and 84 MIA. The losses suffered by the five regiments are distributed as follows:

UNIT	KIA	WIA	MIA	TOTAL
121st Infantry	622	1786	34	2442
15th Infantry	238	525	7	770
66th Infantry	280	568	6	854
11th Infantry	145	310	12	467
14th Infantry	110	196	14	320
TOTAL *	1395	3385	73	4853

V-J Day came unexpectedly on August 15, 1945 when the three crack regiments were closing in for the "kill" on the Tuccucan area where the starving and battered soldiers of Yamashita were pocketed. "Cease firing" was ordered and the fight was over.

Victory to the USAFIP, NL boys—many of them veterans of Bataan and Corregidor and patriots of the cause who never surrendered—is as significant as it is sacred. Again, the freedom-loving Fil-Americans had been vindicated.

The world will always remember these gallant men.

* This does not include 46 KIA, 90 WIA, 11 MIA in other smaller units of this command.

SALIENT FACTS AND FIGURES

I. Casualties (Jan. 4 to Oct. 17, 1945)

A. Japanese: POW - 32001

KIA - 52033

 84034 - Estimated Japanese Army
Strength of forces facing
the USAFIP, NL during the
entire campaign.

Other Nationals (Aliens)

Taiwans (Formosans) - 809

Koreans - 144

Javanese - 57

 Total - 1010

84034

 Total Japs & Aliens - 85044

B. USAFIP, NL:

KIA - 1441

WIA - 3475

MIA - 84

 Total Casualties - 5000

II. Strength of the USAFIP, NL:

A. Present Strength - 20,664

B. Total casualties - 5,000

Total Strength

 Against Japs - 25,664

III. Evaluation of Data:

A. Our Casualties:

KIA/Strength, USAFIP, NL - 6.52%

WIA/Strength, USAFIP, NL - 15.72%

MIA/Strength, USAFIP, NL - 0.38%

Total Casualties/All-Over Strength, USAFIP, NL - 22.62%

B. The Enemy:

KIA/Strength, Enemy - 61.92%

Captured (POW) - 38.08%

Ratio of KIA, USAFIP, NL/KIA of Enemy - 1:36

Casualties — Enemy

Japanese POW - 32001; Other Nationals - 1010; Total -

KIA - 52033 33011

84034 - 14th Army, I.J.F. (Yamashita)

Casualties - USAFIP, NL

KIA - 1441 Strength of USAFIP - 20,664

WIA - 3475 Casualty - 25% of Div. Strength

MIA - 84

5000

PART III
(Surrender Documents)

Chapter XIV

**INTERVIEWS WITH SURRENDERED JAPANESE
GENERAL OFFICERS**

Introductory Note to Part III

With a view to comparing notes on tactical operations and on the capabilities and intentions of both protagonists, it was believed that it could be interesting and enlightening to interrogate these ranking Japanese general officers of the Army and the Navy soon after they had formally surrendered to the CO of the USAFIP, NL, at Camp Spencer.

These Japanese POW were brought before Colonel Calixto Duque, AC of S, G-3, and with the aid of a capable interpreter, were interrogated freely and without any attempt to influence their statements. They were told that within accepted procedure of civilized warfare, it was considered proper that after the cessation of hostilities, the vanquished would be disposed to account for all details of his part in the war. To this, they were calm and decorous, although, in some cases, they were evasive and non-plussed.

Certain interesting highlights may be deduced from all the testimonies of these ranking Japanese officers. Briefly, they averred that:

1. The reason for the collapse of Japanese defenses in the Philippines was the lack of reinforcement, supplies, and adequate armaments from the Japanese homeland.
2. The reason for the retreat of the Japanese to mountainous terrain was to avoid contact with mechanized troops to delay the engagement and to prolong the Philippine war by drawing our troops to the mountainous terrain, and possibly, to solve the precarious problem of food and supplies.
3. The Air Corps was a very potent factor in destroying

permanent emplacements, rear installations, and troop concentrations.

4. According to the plan of Hqs of the Japanese Army of the Philippines (14th Army of Yamashita), the last stand was to be in a general area bounded by Mankayan-Polis-Banaue-Kiangan-Mt. Polog-Kabayan-Mt. Osdung.

5. Three of the ranking Japanese general admit that Bes-sang Pass (Tacho) and Mankayan were some of the bitterest and costliest engagement (with respect to casualties incurred) in the North Luzon campaign.

6. Admiral Kyoguro Simamoto, Asst. Chief of Staff, in the Philippines was in command of a submarine unit that went to attack Pearl Harbor and disclosed certain interesting facts about the Pearl Harbor sneak attack.

7. The 23rd Division that confronted the Americans in the vicinity of Pozurubio and west of Sison suffered from 5 to 6000 killed and wounded; in the battle of Rosario, the Japs lost 1400 at one time.

8. The general criticism on our troops is that our rear installations were supposedly weak and not well defended and that our troops (Americans included) were slow in following up (pursuit) our gains.

9. Most of the units confronting the USAFIP, NL were strangers to the terrain of North Luzon as they had just arrived from China or Manchuria (19th and 23rd Divs.)

10. All the ranking generals and admirals interviewed disclaim any knowledge of certain political prisoners (Americans and Filipinos) taken by them from Manila, Baguio, Bayombong, and elsewhere.

Record of interrogation made by Colonel Calixto Duque, G-3, USAFIP, NL of Prisoner of War, Colonel Sotomu Terau, Chief of Staff of the 19th Division, Japanese Imperial Army, in the Office of the Commanding Officer, USAFIP, NL on September 12, 1945:

Q — We would like to ask you a few questions, Colonel, on the operations of the 19th Division. We want you to answer frankly and truthfully; after all, the war is over.

A — Yes.

Q — I understand you were the Chief of Staff of Gen. Ozaki,

Commanding General of the 19th Division. Is this correct?

A — It is correct.

Q — Where was the 19th Division initially deployed during the landing of the Americans in Lingayen?

A — At San Fernando, La Union.

Q — Was San Fernando the Headquarters of the 19th Division?

A — Yes, it was.

Q — What were the identification of the component regiments, their number?

A — The 19th Division is composed of the 73rd Infantry, the 75th Infantry and the 76th Infantry; the 25th Mountain Artillery; the 19th Engineering Regt; the 19th Transporting Regiment; an investigation company; a medical company; 2 field hospitals. Of these, 1/3 of the total strength were left in Formosa and this 1/3 was expected to arrive in San Fernando on January 6, 1945, but in view of the unexpected landing of the Americans in Lingayen, they had to turn back.

Q — When did your Division land in San Fernando, La Union?

A — We landed on December 28 and 31, 1944. We expected American landings to be made on February of 1945. Naturally, all arms and ammunitions were scattered along the seacoast north and south of San Fernando. The 1/3 of the 19th Division left in Formosa was expected to land in Salomague and preparations were being made for the unloading of supplies and ammunitions in that place. Had the Americans landed in San Fernando in January, we would have had a hard time because we were rather short of ammunitions; fortunately they landed in Pangasinan.

Q — What Japanese Division was on the left defending south of San Fernando towards Damortis?

A — The 23rd Division commanded by (forgot the name). This Division had an extra brigade commanded by Major General Sato.

Q — Was there a Division in the area from Salomague to Ilocos Norte?

A — There was one brigade commanded by General Araki.

Q — When the Americans landed in Lingayen, did the 19th Division withdraw to Baguio or stay and defend the Coast?

A — They were scattered along the Naguilian Road from Bauang to Baguio.

Q — In other words, they defended the general area from Bauang-Naguilian-Baguio?

A — From Bauang until Baguio, the 19th Div had plenty of rear guard elements. At that time, there were still many

troops belonging to a shipping unit at San Fernando. These units were not under the command of the 19th Division but it was only attached to this Division when the Americans landed in Lingayen on January. This Division met with much difficulty when it came to the Philippines. It was originally stationed in Korea and was supposed to fight the Russians in that area; then suddenly it was shifted to the Philippines. Shortly, after its arrival here, the Americans landed in Lingayen. We did not have much time therefore to acquaint ourselves with the landscape and we were totally ignorant of the place. There was not much time to spend in familiarizing ourselves with the terrain.

- Q — During the early part of January 1945, our forces attacked the Japanese in San Fernando. Who commanded the units in San Fernando who fought against us?
- A — During the first phases of the encounter, our forces in that area was commanded by a Naval Colonel Tatabe, but later on he was changed by Army Colonel Hayashi.
- Q — How many men had Col. Hayashi defending San Fernando?
- A — Around 3,000 men. Altho the approximate strength is 3,000, the unit as a whole was made up of mixed elements and the fighting strength was not so big.
- Q — What regiment of the 19th Division among the three: the 73rd, the 75th, and 76th, fought in San Fernando?
- A — No regiment of our division fought there. The 19th Division was located from Bauang to Baguio.
- Q — When did the 19th Division commence to withdraw from Bauang to Baguio?
- A — The order to withdraw was received on the 19th of February, 1945 altho the actual withdrawal was made during the last part of February. The withdrawal was towards Baguio and finally to Bontoc. For this reason, the defense of Baguio was not in the hands of the 19th Division. Only an insignificant portion was engaged in Baguio while the main part was at KP 90.
- Q — Going back to the operations in San Fernando, when did the units commanded by Col. Hayashi withdraw from San Fernando to Baguio?
- A — About the last part of March.
- Q — Of the total men which Col. Hayashi had in San Fernando which was about 3,000, at least how many reached Baguio?
- A — Only about 1/2.
- Q — In other words, about 1/2 were either killed, wounded or captured?
- A — Yes, the 1/2 that reached Baguio included patients.

Q — Where did the 19th Division have its first engagement, inasmuch as the elements that fought in San Fernando were not part of the 19th Division?

A — In the beginning of February, the units of Col. Hayashi needed some reinforcements; so some units of the 19th Division were sent from Naguilian to attack the rear of the troops fighting Col. Hayashi's. One battalion of the 75th Inf Regiment was sent for this purpose. The initial commander of this battalion was wounded by mortar fire; a captain who took his place was killed; the 3rd one, Major Tauchi, was also killed and also Capt. Yokj who succeeded him; Capt. Homma (now a Major) took over command of this Battalion. When Major Tauchi was killed the maps showing the location of our troops were taken from him. Yesterday, I had a meeting with Col. Barnett and he told us that he found out about the maps. When the Commander was wounded, he had given the maps to his Adjutant who was subsequently killed. The capture of the maps is one reason why we failed.

Q — What unit was defending Bacsil during the months of January and February?

A — A part of the unit commanded by Col. Hayashi.

Q — What do you think of the bombing by our airplanes in San Fernando area?

A — The casualty in men as a result of the bombings by airplanes was not much; practically we had no man wounded or killed by the planes. Indirectly, however, we suffered much in the sense that supplies and materials were burned or destroyed and medical facilities and equipments for keeping the health of the men were destroyed.

Q — Where did the one battalion from the 75th Inf Regt attack?

A — The battalion under the command of Major Tauchi moved from Naguilian along the Naguilian River towards Tanquigan (hitting the left flank of 1 battalion of friendly troops under Major Borje: Interrogator's). The first days of the attack were successful.

Q — Was this the same battalion that reached the vicinity of San Juan?

A — It was.

Q — Did the ammunitions and equipment stored between Carlatan and San Juan belong to the 19th Division?

A — Yes, they did.

Q — Is the 19th Division the unit which brought about 500 Chinese coolies in San Fernando?

A — No, the 19th Division came from Korea, you know.

Q — How many men of the 19th Division landed in San Fernando?

A — Around 9,800 officers and soldiers.

Q — How many were left in Formosa?

A — Around 3,500.

Q — We go back to your withdrawal from Bauang to Naguilian to Baguio. Did you have any encounter with our troops from Naguilian to Baguio?

A — There was no attack made by our troops.

Q — We had 1 company in the vicinity of Naguilian harassing the Japanese troops in that place and patrols in this direction. Did your troops know of the presence of this company there?

A — No, we did not. There was a half of a battalion occupying the eastern part of Baguio; 2 battalions in Naguilian; 1 battalion from Salat to Sablan; 1 battalion from there to Irisan. Because there was no attack launched by the American troops, we could withdraw to Bontoc easily.

Q — Did these units stationed around Salat, Sablan and Irisan have any encounter with the Americans coming from Bauang?

A — There was none, because the units commanded by Gen. Sato took over the sector occupied by units of the 19th.

Q — So the units commanded by Gen. Sato were the ones who fought the Americans between Bauang and Baguio?

A — Yes, that unit fought very well in Aringay but not much on the Naguilian Road.

Q — Was the unit of the Gen. Sato, the 20th?

A — No, it was an independent brigade, attached to the 23rd.

Q — Where did Gen. Sato pass in going to Bauang and Naguilian?

A — The unit commanded by Gen. Sato was originally stationed in Lingayen since two years before the American landing. This unit fought in that area. From Lingayen, Gen. Sato made his way to Baguio; from there to Naguilian and Bauang.

Q — Let us go to the fight in Bessang. It was the 19th Division who fought there, wasn't it?

A — Yes.

Q — How many regiments were placed in Bessang?

A — In Suyu, there was 1 battalion of artillery, a part of the 19th Division. In the middle of March, the 19th Div was located at Bontoc, then advanced to Cervantes passing Sabangan and finally placed that unit in Suyu. It was the 73rd Inf Regt that went to Tacbo.

Q — Where was the Headquarters of Gen. Osaki at that time?

A — In KP 94 near Mankayan.

Q — What was the general plan of attack of the 19th Div against the USAFIP, NL forces on the road from Suyo to Bessang?

A — The area from Sabangan to Suyo was under the 73d Inf Regt. Our scheme of maneuver was that the 73d Inf Regt would defend Bessang Pass. The 73d and 3 complete battalions. The 75th Regt (less 1 battalion then in Formosa) was in the vicinity of KP 94 during the last part of April. The Division Headquarters was in KP 94 and later on in Mankayan. On April 29, 1 battalion of the 76th Inf Regt moved to Ampusungan to attack the forces of USAFIP, NL in the vicinity of Butac. The battalion moved only at night and reached the vicinity of Butac about May 10. At first, it was the plan for the forces of Gen. Araki to attack Cervantes from Angaki, but this was abandoned due to American pressure in Bayombong. Nueva Vizcaya which necessitated reinforcements to block the troops of Americans coming from that direction.

Q — Where was the mountain artillery emplaced in the defense of Bessang?

A — Eight guns and the rest of the regimental artillery were emplaced near Bessang.

Q — In the attempted attack on Butac, what was the report received by your Headquarters? Was it successful or unsuccessful?

A — Not as successful as the Division commander expected.

Q — What was the result of the operations of the battalion of the 76th Inf?

A — That is what we should like to ask from you.

(Col. Duque: There was not much damage inflicted.) This battalion of the 76th did not attack Butac for a long time. They stayed around that place for about 3 days only. When this unit were near the objective, they found the American troops were no longer there. Had our forces attacked Butac then, they would have been successful, but they stayed there for only 2 or 3 days.

Q — How many of the men who went to Butac were able to come back?

A — Of the 600 original men, only about 450 returned.

Q — Where did they withdraw when they failed to get their objective?

A — They withdrew in an easterly direction, reinforcing the forces at Bessang. It was 3 days that they stayed there without being successful, so they decided to withdraw to

Bessang.

Q — You know that our troops finally captured Bessang. Tell us frankly the cause of your failure to defend Bessang.

A — It was because we lacked a steady flow of supplies from the rear.

Q — How many men of the regiment that defended Bessang survived?

A — Around 1000 only, including the sick and wounded.

Q — In other words, you lost about 2/3 of your troops in Bessang?

A — Just a little more than 1/2. The 73d Inf Regt sustained the most casualty, but in all, the total was a little more than 1/2.

Q — When your troops withdrew from Bessang, where did they go?

A — The 73d Inf went to Kayan and Tadian; 1 battalion of the 76th withdrew to Mankayan.

Q — Where did the 75th Inf and the troops of Gen. Araki fight?

A — The 75th Inf was staying in Bontoc and did not fight in Bessang. Before the 73d Inf withdrew from Bessang to Kayan and Tadian, Gen. Araki's units from Tangadan moved to Kiangnan. The first scheme was for the forces of Gen. Araki to attack the USAFIP, NL forces at Cervantes to help the hard-pressed 73d, but this was abandoned and they went to Kiangnan thru Bontoc.

Q — Why did not Gen. Araki help the 73d?

A — Because the enemy attacks at Bangbang, near Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya was very successful and Gen. Araki was sent to reinforce the troops there.

Q — What is your opinion of the fighting ability of our forces who attacked your forces in Bessang?

A — Their way of attacking was steady. Once they occupied a place, they established a good defense, then threw mortar fires against us and advanced again. Your troops always held on to their newly gained grounds, altho you had more ammunitions and materials. Then there was the splendid cooperation between the artillery, infantry, and your airplanes. Their only fault was that they lacked enough guards or sentinels at night. Another is the failure of your soldiers to pursue us when we are withdrawing. (Remark by Col. Calvert: The Japs were running too fast that our supplies could not catch up with them.)

Q — Airplanes very often bombed Bessang Pass. Was that very effective and did it cause your withdrawal from that area?

A — No, it was the lack of supplies. Our trucks could not

transport materials from Mankayan and soldiers had to do the carrying. If we had supplies from Mankayan, we might have been successful in our fight against your troops. The casualty we suffered was caused primarily by mortar fire and by bombs.

Q — The next fight was in Dadian. How many men defended Tadian?

A — About 1500 men.

Q — You withdrew from Tadian to Sabangan. Was your withdrawal caused by the pressure of our troops or by your lack of supplies?

A — It was because of the attack. The regiment in Tadian was committed to fight till death; troops were all along the hills and the shipping units on the road. The place was rather easy to defend, but later on, we received orders from the Headquarters of the Japanese Army in the Philippines to withdraw and we all moved to Loo Valley. Troops of America had penetrated the road and were already at the rear of the 73d Regt which was faced with much difficulty. However, were it not for this order from the Japanese Army in the Philippines, the men would have fought there till death.

Q — You stated that the troops moved to the vicinity of KP 94 and 90. What was your plan for going there?

A — It was the scheme of the Headquarters of the Japanese Army in the Philippines that we were to make a last stand in a general area from Mankayan-Polis Pass-Banaue-Kiangan-Pulog-Kabayan-Mt. Osdung.

Q — At this stage, where was the Headquarters of Gen. Yamashita?

A — West of Kiangan in Hungduan. Later on, he moved from place to place.

Q — Let us go back to the operation in Mankayan. How many men defended Mankayan?

A — About 800 men.

Q — Was that the 76th Inf Regt?

A — Yes, including the Engineering troops and a part of the mountain artillery.

Q — What was the cause of your withdrawal from Mankayan to KP 90?

A — Because the troops had already accomplished their mission in the Mankayan area.

A — In the beginning, their attack was from the east side of the road but this failed; then they took the west side. They failed again so they took the east side but failed. Finally, they attacked on both sides, enveloping us.

Q — Which of these attacks was very effective against your troops?

A — The attack from both sides enveloping us was most effective, especially by the troops that came from the east. We had a hard time in Mankayan because of mortar fires and airplanes. Colonel Furumi, the regimental commander was killed there. We lost about 1/2 of the 800 men.

Q — When your troops were about to be enveloped in Mankayan, where did they withdraw? To Loo or KP 90?

A — They withdrew to Suyoc between Mankayan and KP 90.

Q — You stated that the defense of Mankayan was in the hands of the 76th Regt and the Engineers. Was there no reinforcement?

A — There was none.

Q — Did you have a defensive position in Mt. Data?

A — Yes, sir.

Q — How many troops defended Mt. Data?

A — Almost none.

Q — What was the reason why you withdrew from Mt. Data?

A — We had to withdraw on orders of the JIA in the Philippines.

Q — We had intelligence reports that there were about 100 American prisoners in Mt. Data. What became of them?

A — There were no American prisoners.

Q — Were not the American and Filipino prisoners of war brought to the Mountain Trail?

A — I do not know anything about that. I was not the one in charge.

Q — Do you know where these American and Filipino prisoners of war brought from Baguio?

A — I do not know because I was too busy in KP 90.

Q — We had two kinds of bombs, the Napalm bomb (incendiary) and the explosion bomb. Which was more effective?

A — The explosion bomb. The fire bombs did not do much damage to the troops. Our worst enemy was the observation plane. It flew so low and so slow, but we had no anti-aircraft gun to shoot it down.

Q — How did you communicate with your troops in the field?

A — By radio. When our battery was exhausted, we tried to operate it without battery, and we succeeded in a way.

Q — Were you always in contact by radio with Tokyo?

A — No, but the headquarters of Gen. Yamashita did. The Navy had better radio facilities than we did and was in

constant contact with Tokyo, too.

Q — Did you ever intercept some of our messages?

A — We did some.

Q — You said that your troops withdrew from Mt. Data. Was it because of the pressure coming from Hwy 11 or the one from Mankayan?

A — The pressure coming from Mankayan.

Q — You mean to say then that the attack from Sabangan to Mt. Data was not as effective as the attack from Mankayan?

A — Yes, sir.

Q — Therefore, the attack coming from Sabangan on Hwy 11 was not as strong as you expected?

A — Mt. Data was very easy to defend and we knew that an attack from the rear would be very hard. Naturally, the Americans would not attack from there. We did not expect that the Americans would move south on Hwy #11, but we rather thought that they would go back to Cervantes and attack from Mankayan.

Q — You mean to say that you were surprised of the strength of the attack on the side of Hwy #11?

A — No, because the ground was easy to defend. I was hoping that your troops would attack on Hwy 11 with a big force and I was sure we could fight them well there.

Q — But the attack on Hwy 11 was strong.

A — Not so strong. But I think the troops coming from Mankayan fought very well. Especially, they had big air support as airplanes flew in the skies as much as 300 planes a day. The units attacking Tacbo and Mankayan fought very well.

Q — (By Major Rigor) Who is this Captain Cume?

A — He was in charge of the Bessang operations. He is now a Major. The Cume Unit is not of the 19th. Before the landing of the 19th in San Fernando, Cume's unit was already staying in Suyo.

Q — Was this Cume force in Suyo a part of the unit of Gen. Araki?

A — Yes.

Q — In the fight at Bessang, did Araki's unit reinforce the forces originally stationed in Bessang?

A — They did not.

Q — (Continuation by Col. Duque) Regarding this last stand you were to make in Loo Valley, was it previously planned or it came only because of the three-pronged attack of our troops?

A — It was the plan of Gen. Yamashita and I did not know of it.

Q — You knew that our trucks were moving to and fro on Hwy 4 and -11. Why did you not place any land mines there?

A — Our dynamites had been already exhausted.

Q — Your initial plan of attack was for Gen. Araki to strike from Angaki to Cervantes. Why did it not materialize?

A — As I previously said, American troops were successful in their attacks on Bangbang, near Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya and Gen. Araki was ordered to reinforce the units in Kiangnan area; so this plan had to be abandoned.

(2)

Interview of Rear Admiral Kyoguro Simamoto, Assistant Chief of Staff, Japanese Imperial Navy in the Philippines, at the Office of the AC of S, G-3, USAFIP, NL on September 18, 1945:

Question by Col. Calixto Duque: Admiral, the war is now over; we just like to have some information from you for historical purposes. Would you be willing to answer a few questions we would ask?

A — I shall answer as far as I know.

Q — In what capacity in the Imperial Japanese Navy were you at the outbreak of the war?

A — I was in the Personnel Department of the Ministry of the in Tokyo.

Q — Were you one of the commanders of the submarine flotilla that went to attack Pearl Harbor?

A — I was appointed Commanding Officer of a submarine division about one month before the beginning of the war.

Q — How many submarines were under your command?

A — About three as that is the strength of a submarine division in the Japanese Navy.

Q — Who was the Admiral commanding the Japanese Fleet that went to Pearl Harbor?

A — The Commander was Vice-Admiral Nagumo who was later killed in Saipan.

Q — Did you leave Japan at the same time with the fleet under Admiral Nagumo?

A — About the same time.

Q — When did you leave Japan for Pearl Harbor?

A — I don't exactly remember, but it was about the middle of November 1941.

Q — Did the fleet under Vice Admiral Nagumo leave Japan at

the same time with Ambassador Saburo Kurusu?

A — I do not know. I was in a submarine and communication by radio was very poor.

Q — Where did you start?

A — We started from the Yokosaka Naval Base (near Yokohama).

Q — Where did you proceed from there?

A — We traveled directly to the East.

Q — Where was your first stopping place?

A — We made no stop on the way.

Q — What was the complement or strength of the fleet under Vice Admiral Nagumo?

A — I do not know exactly but it was approximately made up of 5 aircraft carriers, 2 battle cruisers, several 10,000-ton cruisers (about 6 I guess), several destroyers and about 10 submarines.

Q — When you left the base at Yokosaka, you knew already that you were going to Pearl Harbor?

A — Yes, we knew.

Q — How was it possible for the fleet of Admiral Nagumo to worm its way towards Pearl Harbor when it is said that Pearl Harbor is well-defended?

A — I do not know with the surface units. My unit was composed of submarines and usually we submerged during the day and came to the surface at nights.

Q — On the way, did you encounter any of the American fleet?

A — Not a single ship or airplane.

Q — When you arrived in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor or Hawaii, did you have instructions already to attack?

A — I received instructions two or three days before December 8, 1941 that the time was coming.

Q — You knew already that there was war between Japan and America when the Imperial Japanese Navy attacked Pearl Harbor on Dec. 8?

A — I only knew that the war coming two or three days before the attack.

Q — How many ships did the Americans lose?

A — I do not know exactly, but from the radio news from Tokyo, the Americans lost about 11 capital ships and cruisers.

Q — During the attack on the naval installations in Pearl Harbor, were there any attempt on the part of the Americans to fight back?

A — Some anti-submarine units and small boats came out from

Pearl Harbor to attack us and I know of one Japanese submarine which they sank.

Q — How many submarines did you lose at Pearl Harbor?

A — I remember only one.

Q — In other words, you achieved one of the principles of war, that is surprise.

A — I think so; when we arrived near Oahu Island, a light house was burning and all the houses near the seashore had their lights on. I noticed these, and it may be that we really surprised the Americans.

Q — Do you think the US Navy lost many submarines at Pearl Harbor?

A — I do not know about the losses of the US Navy.

Q — Your division consisted of 3 submarines. How many American ships did your submarines sink?

A — I am sorry to say there was none.

Q — Which caused the most destruction at Pearl Harbor? Airplanes, submarines, artillery fire from the battleships?

A — The destruction inflicted were mostly done by airplanes.

Q — What do you suppose was the intention of the Japanese High Command in dealing the blow at Pearl Harbor before the termination of the Washington conference between Cordell Hull and Admiral Nomuro assisted by Ambassador Kurusu?

A — I do not know about that because I had no connections with the high command. I was then commander of a submarine division and was on voyage to Pearl Harbor from the middle of November.

Q — When did you receive the orders to attack Pearl Harbor?

A — Two or three days before the outbreak of the war.

Q — How far were you then from Pearl Harbor?

A — About 500 to 600 miles away.

Q — Did you stop on the way before you attacked Pearl Harbor?

A — We made no stops. We went straight.

Q — Why did not the High Command (Tokyo) order the invasion and occupation of Hawaii?

A — I do not know. That is strategy and I had nothing to do with that.

Q — What is your opinion as to why there was no occupation or invasion of Hawaii?

A — As a naval officer, I think it would have been very hard for the Japanese Forces to invade and occupy Hawaii because it was too heavily defended.

Q — Before the invasion of the Philippines by the Americans

in September 1944, did you still have a very strong Navy?

A — I think our Navy was just as strong as when the war began. There were some ships sunk, but there were also some launched.

Q — Where did you lose the greater portion of your naval forces?

A — The losses the Japanese Navy suffered in Leyte and off Formosa are about the same.

Q — How many capital ships did you lose around Leyte?

A — I do not know exactly; I don't have much news about the sea battles but I think our loss must have been 3 capital ships and 4 cruisers sunk. Even among us in the Navy, losses were not made known.

Q — Do you have an idea now of the strength of the Imperial Japanese Navy at the time of surrender?

A — I do not know.

Q — Will you give us a narrative of the history of your services from the outbreak of the war to the cessation of hostilities on August 15, 1945?

A — At the beginning of the war, I was a Commanding Officer of a submarine division. Later, I was made Commanding Officer of the target ship *Settsu*, about 20,000 tons, for 5 months. Then I was appointed Chief of Staff of the Sixth Fleet or submarine forces under Vice Admiral Marquis Kamatsu and then later on under Vice Admiral Takagi.

Q — How many ships or submarines are there in this Sixth Fleet?

A — About 30 submarines.

Q — Where did the Sixth Fleet operate?

A — In many places; in the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean.

Q — How long did you operate with the Sixth Fleet?

A — About one year.

Q — Did you participate in the naval battle off the Indian Ocean between the English and Japanese Fleets?

A — No. I think there was no battle between the English and Japanese Fleets there.

Q — After your duty with the Sixth Fleet, what was your next assignment?

A — I was appointed Chief of Staff of the Convoy Forces covering all the areas in the Pacific and the Indian Ocean.

Q — Where was your Headquarters?

A — In Tokyo.

Q — How long did you hold this position?

A — Three months for after that time I was appointed sub-

Chief of Staff of the same forces. A vice admiral was appointed Chief of Staff and I being a Rear Admiral, I had to be in a lower position.

Q — How did it happen that you are now in Philippine soil and not somewhere else?

A — I was later appointed Chief of Staff of the Naval Forces in the Philippines with Headquarters in Manila.

Q — Were you in Manila when the Americans landed in Leyte?

A — Yes.

Q — Were you in Manila when the Americans landed in Lingayen?

A — Yes.

Q — I understand from Gen. Osaki that the Navy defended part of Manila. Is this correct?

A — I remember it was a Japanese Naval Officer who commanded the Japanese forces in Manila. He was under the command of Gen. Yamashita.

Q — When the Americans occupied Manila, you withdrew to the Cagayan Valley?

A — I left Manila on the 25th of January 1945 and proceeded to Bayombong.

Q — Did you have some troops with you?

A — I had about 200 officers and men as my escort.

Q — Where had you been staying during the period from the time you reached Bayombong to the time Japan asked for peace?

A — I stayed in Bayombong until the 21st of March when I moved to Baguio where I stayed for about half a month. I left Baguio about the middle of April to KP 90 on Hwy #11.

Q — You had been staying with 19th (Tora) Division?

A — They were near us, but we were separated.

Q — Did you graduate from an American school?

A — No, but I studied in the American University of Pennsylvania for one year in 1924.

Q — Did you study in any more place in America?

A — No more. I graduated from the Imperial Naval Academy and War College in Tokyo.

Q — Have you been with the embassy?

A — No, I was only a student officer sent to America. I had no connections with the Embassy.

Q — Do you know of a certain General by the name of Narra? He was student in an American university in 1926 and was with the Embassy in Washington, D.C.

A — I only know a Baron Nara, a full general in the Japanese

- Army, but retired, about 60-70 years old.
- Q — How many planes participated in the attack on Pearl Harbor?
- A — I guess about 400.
- Q — Did you not lose any plane?
- A — They lost more than 30, I think.
- Q — Did they not bomb also the Army Post at Pearl Harbor, Schofield Barracks?
- A — I do not know about that?
- Q — About what time of the day did you attack Pearl Harbor?
- A — About 8:00 in the morning, Japanese Central Time. It was a little after sunrise.
- Q — When you were about 40 miles from Pearl Harbor, did you see American planes reconnoitering?
- A — Yes, but they did not attack. They could not see us because we were submerged.
- Q — Did not the planes see the surface units?
- A — The ships were about 200-300 miles from the shore.
- Q — In other words, the submarines went first to Pearl Harbor?
- A — Yes.
- Q — Were they the first to make the attack?
- A — No. The airplanes first.
- Q — Did the Americans come out from Pearl Harbor?
- A — As I have said, some small boats came out to attack us.
- Q — When these small boats came out to attack you, were the capital ships in the harbor already destroyed?
- A — I don't know about it.
- Q — Did you enter the bay inside Pearl Harbor?
- A — Oh, no. We were about 20-40 miles away from the sea-shore.
- Q — In other words, most of the damage inflicted on naval installations at Pearl Harbor was done by the airplanes?
- A — I guess so.
- Question by Major Rigor: Do you know of any special flotilla of submarines that were able to enter the harbor itself and attack the ships there?
- A — I do not know about that. It was quite different from my business.
- Q — When you left Pearl Harbor after destroying the naval installations, where did you go?
- A — I went back to Yokosaka Naval Base.
- Q — Was the fleet under Admiral Nagumo the same fleet that attacked Guam and Wake?

A — No, a different fleet.

Q — After the attack on Pearl Harbor, did the fleet of Nagumo go back to Yokosaka Naval Base.

A — Yes.

Q — When the Japanese attacked Malaya, why did they not also attack Australia?

A — It was very far.

Q — Do you think it would have been a Japanese victory if you had captured Australia and denied the Americans of its use as a base of operations in the Pacific?

A — Of course it would have been, but Japan did not have enough force to undertake the attack. Australia is a very big area.

Question by Major Rigor: Did not the Japanese also plan to attack Panama Canal?

A — No, we did not have instructions to do so. It was too far and a fleet had to be re-supplied before it could reach that far. Panama is about 8000 miles from Japan?

Q — Did the High Command ever plan to invade the American mainland?

A — I do not know anything about that; but there were some submarines that bombarded the west coast.

Question by Capt. Galang: Were you in Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya in October, and December of 1944?

A — No, I was in Manila until January 25th 1945 when I went to Bayombong.

Q — Who was the Chief of the Kenpei Tai (Military Police) in Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya?

A — I do not exactly know; but he was a Colonel and it seems his name was Takayama. It maybe incorrect. I am not sure.

Q — Do you remember having seen or heard about 1000 Filipino political prisoners that were kept in Bayombong?

A — I do not know of any.

Q — Who were the officers of the Kenpei Tai in Bayombong?

A — As I said, I do not know them. All I remember was that the commander was a Colonel and his name was Takayama. But I said I am not sure about the name.

Question by Col. Duque: Do you know of one General Santos?

A — Yes.

Q — I understand he was in Bayombong. Is this correct?

A — I do not know about that, but I met him in Davao last October.

Q — Was he not in Nueva Vizcaya after January 1945?

A — I do not know where he was in January.

(3)

Interview of Lieut. General Fukutaro Nishiyama, Commanding General, 23rd Division, Japanese Imperial Army, at the Office of the AC of S, G-3, USAFIP, NL on September 19, 1945:

Question by Colonel Calixto Duque: Give us your name, rank and the unit you commanded?

A — My name is Fukutaro Nishiyama, lieutenant general in the Japanese Imperial Army and commanding general of the 23rd Japanese Division in the Philippines.

Q — When did your division arrive in the Philippines?

A — On December, 1944.

Q — Where did you come from?

A — From Hairau in Manchuria.

Q — Where did you land?

A — Half of the division landed at San Fernando, La Union and the other half at Manila.

Q — When you arrived in the Philippines, what area was your Division assigned to defend?

A — From Lingayen Gulf to Baguio.

Q — Did you defend the general line along the coast from San Fernando, La Union to San Fabian?

A — Another division was ordered to defend San Fernando. My division stayed in San Fabian.

Q — (Interrogator showing map of Lingayen and vicinity) Show us the general line which you defended.

A — My division was assigned to the general line Lingayen-Agno River-Villasis-Asingan; actually however, we occupied and garrisoned the general area in the mountains of Cabaruan Hills, thence north towards Manaoag, thence to the mountains west of Pozurubio and Sison then to Rosario. At that time, I was in command of a brigade.

Q — What was the name of that brigade?

A — The 5th Brigade.

Q — Where was the 58th Brigade deployed?

A — From Manaoag Hills to the north following the mountains west of Pozurubio and Sison.

Q — When the Americans landed in Lingayen, were you still in command of the forces in the area of the hills from Manacag to Rosario?

A — Yes.

Q — Was there any other Japanese unit on your left?

A — There was not much force left except a few men guarding the bridges. After the landing of the Americans, tank units came out.

Q — What is the identity and strength of that tank unit? and where did they come from?

A — I do not know because it was not originally under my command. It was only attached to my division.

Q — How many tanks were sent to help you?

A — Approximately 20 tanks.

Q — How long did you hold your line which you occupied on the hills from Manaoag to Rosario?

A — Around two weeks?

Q — Was it your division which defended and prepared the trenches in that area?

A — Yes.

Q — What division was on your right from Damortis to the north?

A — The 19th Division.

Q — Was that division commanded by Gen. Osaki?

A — Yes.

Q — You previously stated that you were in command of the 23rd Division. Is the 58th Brigade a part of the 23rd Division?

A — It is quite different, but I was assigned to command both.

Q — So you commanded both the 58th Brigade and the 23rd Division?

A — Yes.

Q — Where was the greater portion of your defensive position in the area you defended?

A — On the right side.

Q — You were then anticipating that the Americans would land in the Damortis area in the same manner as the Japanese forces did in December, 1941?

A — Generally, that was the idea.

Q — Did you not expect the Americans to land or establish a beachhead between San Fabian and Lingayen?

A — We expect a landing to be made mostly in San Fabian, but not in Lingayen because of the topography of the terrain.

Q — How many divisions actually defended the general area from San Fernando-Damortis-San Fabian-Lingayen?

A — A little more than 2 divisions.

Q — Where was your headquarters?

A — In the beginning, in Sison, then in Hill 488 in Mt. Karingan.

Q — When you withdrew from your positions on the hills from Manaoag towards Rosario, where did you occupy next?

A — We occupied the general line running from Lebang-Bikis-Yabao-Camp 3-Mt. Mangitkiran-Mt. Lusoc.

Q — How long did you hold this line?

A — Around two months.

Q — Where did you suffer the most casualties?

A — In the forward slopes of Mt. Jones and hills west of Pozurubio and west of Sison.

Q — When you withdrew from this line, what was your next defensive position?

A — The general line from Mt. Kamote to Mt. Imogan, with our reserves somewhere in the mountains north of Benneng River.

Q — When you arrived in this defensive line, what was the strength of your division?

A — We had around 10,000 officers and men including sick. We had lost about 5,000-6,000 men then.

Q — What was the strength of your division before the Americans landed in Lingayen?

A — More or less 14,000 men.

Q — What division defended Balet Pass?

A — It is called the Tettu (Iron) Division.

Q — Where did they come from?

A — I do not know.

Q — At that time, where was the headquarters of Gen. Yamashita?

A — In Baguio.

Q — During the landing of the Americans in Lingayen, where was the headquarters of Gen. Yamashita?

A — In Baguio.

Q — Where in Baguio?

A — I do not know the exact place, but it was in the southwestern part of Baguio.

Q — When you withdraw from your last line in the mountains north of Benneng River, where did you withdraw next?

A — To the general line from Adaway, Mt. Padansa to Daclato.

Q — Was that your last defensive position?

A — Yes.

Q — In other words, you were there when you received orders from higher headquarters in Tokyo to surrender?

A — Yes.

Q — Were you attacked by American forces in your last line?

A — Generally, not the whole line, but only part of it.

Q — What side, your right or left, was subject to attack?

A — The right side.

Q — What was the general plan of higher headquarters for your last defense in the area?

A — That was a plan conceived by higher headquarters from the beginning.

Q — I understand the general plan of superior headquarters that the line from Baguio-KP 90-Lusen-Hungduan-Banaue-Kiangan would be the place for you to make your last stand. Is this correct?

A — The orders of superior headquarters was to make a last stand around Mt. Pulog.

Q — What the other divisions? Were they ordered to join you at Mt. Pulog like the 19th Division.

A — The left side was the GKI Division, on the right side the Tora Division.

Q — Who commanded the GKI Division?

A — Lieut. Gen. Yowanaka.

Q — Who commanded the forces that protected your rear?

A — There were no forces in our rear.

Q — At this time, where was the headquarters of Gen. Yamashita?

A — Communication was difficult then; he moved his headquarters from time to time, but it was somewhere around Hungduan.

Q — What was the strength of the American forces that attacked you in the vicinity of Sison?

A — I think around 2 divisions.

Q — What was it that inflicted the most casualties on your men — artillery, planes?

A — In the beginning, it was artillery fire that caused the most casualties. Later on planes and artillery were becoming and less and less destructive.

Q — What worried the 23rd Division most? Artillery or planes?

A — By artillery. During the day, the movement of our troops was checked by the airplanes and directed artillery fire.

Q — What do you consider the weapon most destructive to your forces?

A — The mortars and artillery fires.

Q — What kind of bomb worried you most — the Napalm (fire bomb) or the high explosives?

A — The high explosives.

Q — Where did you lose the most men? Around Damortis or in Camp 3?

A — Around Rosario.

Q — How many men, more or less, did you lose in the battle around Rosario?

A — We lost about 1400 men. The fighting was fierce.

Q — Did you ever get any reinforcement sent you by superior headquarters?

A — We got some reinforcements of about 1500 men.

Q — Do you know Gen. Santos?

A — No.

Q — What is the date, more or less, when you arrived in the Philippines from Manchuria?

A — I arrived on the 1st of December, but the men arrived here by increments and completed movements about the end of December.

Q — Did all the organic elements of your division arrive?

A — No. 2 ships were sunk and we lost about 4-5000 officers and men.

Q — Where were the ships sunk?

A — One near Korea and the other in San Fernando, La Union.

Q — Were you with the invasion forces of the Japanese Army which invaded the Philippines in December 1941?

A — No.

Q — When the Japanese forces landed in the Philippines, where were you?

A — In Tokyo.

Q — What was your position in Tokyo at that time?

A — I was an attache to the Eastern Headquarters of the Defence of Japan.

Q — Were you a retired officer before the war?

A — No, I was in actual service.

Q — How old are you?

A — 57 years old.

Q — Did you ever serve in China?

A — Yes.

Q — Did you participate in the Sino-Japanese War?

A — Yes.

Q — Did you serve with the Japanese Army during those border troubles between Russia and Manchuria?

A — No.

Q — What is your opinion of the mortar fire of American

forces?

A — American mortar fire is very effective.

Q — What is your comment of American forces? What were their errors if you noticed any?

A — I could hardly see any failings. I appreciate their highly mechanized units.

Q — How about the scheme of maneuver or tactics of attack?

A — Americans are very skillful when it comes to mechanized methods. And their artillery.

Q — What do you think of the observation planes making adjustment of artillery fire?

A — It was very destructive to us in a big way. We had no anti-aircraft to fire with. We could not risk using the machine gun or rifle, because then we would expose our positions.

Q — What is your estimate of the forces that fought against you in Rosario?

A — Oh, they were well-trained and efficient.

Q — Which of the artillery shells did the most damage — the one that exploded in mid-air or the other which bursts when it reaches the ground?

A — The one that bursts when it reaches the ground, the high explosive.

Q — What do you consider as the greatest error of our forces?

A — The defense of rear installations is very weak. Another is the failure of your troops to come after us when we make a retreat. Your pursuit is very slow.

Q — What do you consider as the cause of your continuous withdrawal from Rosario to Mt. Pulog?

A — As I have said, the Americans were highly mechanized and it was a very good weapon against us, especially in the plains. We had the idea that if we brought them to the mountains, the use of mechanized units would be denied them. And for one thing, American planes were always flying and watching our movements.

Q — Did you have enough supply of food and ammunitions?

A — Not much.

Q — What were short of most?

A — Mostly in food.

Q — Who was your Chief of Staff?

A — Major General Kyoshima Kakatsu.

Q — What did you do with the American prisoners of war you captured in Rosario and Kennon Road?

A — We did not capture any.

Q—How about those in Baguio?

A—I do not know about that. I did not see any.

Q—Do you have anything more to tell us, General?

A—As I have said, my division came here only in December and it was not long before the Americans landed. We did not have time to study the lay-out of the place. Our ignorance caused us plenty of casualties.

Q—You did not expect the Americans to land in Lingayen?

A—I expected that they would land there. I do not know what the High Command thought regarding the matter.

(4)

Interview of Major General Toshimitsu Takatsu, Chief of Staff, 23rd Division, Japanese Imperial Army, at the Office of the AC of S, G-3, USAFIP, NL on September 20, 1945:

Question by Col. Calixto Duque: Will you give us your name, rank, and the position which you held prior to the surrender of the Japanese Imperial Forces in the Philippines?

A—My name is Toshimitsu Takatsu, a major general in the Japanese Army and Chief of Staff of the 23rd Division. I am 48 years old.

Q—Were you a graduate of the Imperial Military Academy and War College in Tokyo?

A—Yes, I am a graduate of both.

Q—Were you ever sent to Germany for further military study?

A—Never.

Q—When were you promoted Major General?

A—Only last March, 1945.

Q—When did you arrive in the Philippines?

A—I arrived in Manila on December 4, 1944.

Q—Did you arrive at the same time with Gen. Nishiyama?

A—I was later.

Q—Where did you come from?

A—From Shanghai.

Q—Gen. Nishiyama said that he came from Manchuria.

A—He came from there.

Q—Were you his Chief of Staff in Manchuria?

A—No, I was made Chief of Staff when I arrived in Manila. The Chief of Staff of Gen. Nishiyama was killed at sea and I succeeded him.

Q—Were you with Gen. Nishiyama in the defense of the general area from Cabaruan-Hills-Manaoag-Hills west of Pozorubio and Sison towards Rosario?

A — Yes.

Q — Before the Americans landed in Lingayen, will you show us the disposition of your troops?

A — Before the American landing, our troops were disposed of as follows: the general area running from north in the hills west of Pozurubio-Manaoag-Cabaruan-Hills forward slopes of Sacanay and the forward slopes of the mountains in the vicinity of Limayan, north of Binalonan.

Q — Where was the headquarters of the 23rd Division at that time?

A — At Sison.

Q — Did you not have troops in the vicinity of Rosario?

A — There was another brigade attached to the 23rd Division, the 58th Brigade.

Q — Who commanded this brigade?

A — Major General Sato, altho his unit was attached to the 23rd Division under the command of Gen. Nishima.

Q — What was the general line of the 58th Brigade in Rosario?

A — The general line running in a north to south direction from Caruban to Palapat to the south; our secondary position ran from north to south astride Rosario from Cuarna to Artatacho.

Q — Where was the general headquarters of Gen. Sato?

A — In Saitan above Camp One.

Q — Who was in command of the unit in the right of Gen. Sato?

A — A part of the 19th (Tora) Division under Gen. Osaki.

Q — Where was the boundary between the Tora Division and the units commanded by Gen. Nishiyama?

A — The general line from Sta. Ana-Lusen-Mt. Caluganga.

Q — So the Tora Division was assigned the area from Aringay-Bauang-San Fernando?

A — Generally, that vicinity, but more attention on the Naguilian Road.

Q — How long did you hold your first line of defense?

A — About the end of January 1945.

Q — Where did the Americans penetrate your lines most — on your left by envelopment or by penetration thru the Damortis Road?

A — By penetration from Bilao to Sison and an envelopment on our left in the vicinity of Manaoag.

Q — How about the penetration made by the Americans on the Damortis-Rosario Road? Was it not strong?

A — The initial offense was very strong.

Q — How many men did you lose in the battle for your first

line of defense?

A — I cannot tell exactly, but it was more or less 2-3000 men.

Q — Where was your next defensive line after your withdrawal from the line Sta. Ana-Lusen-Mt. Caluganga?

A — We established our line running from a west to east direction in the general line from Caarosigan, then following the forward slopes of Koriyan Ridge then north to south from Puto to Rosario.

Q — Was the fight fierce in your second line?

A — Not as fierce as the first.

Q — What part of your line was heavily attacked?

A — Our right flank.

Q — You stated that the Americans made an envelopment against your line in the vicinity of Manaoag. Did the American force that enveloped Manaoag continue to move north?

A — At the beginning, they came with a stronger force straight east; when they reached our defense line, they turned north.

Q — How long did you hold your second defensive line?

A — Until the middle of February.

Q — At what point of your line did the Americans make the penetration?

A — We only withdrew to previously planned positions, on orders of higher headquarters to the general line from Mt. Lusen-Mantiten-Camp 3-Pangan-Balusbus-Lubong.

Q — Was there intense fighting in your third line?

A — Not much although the heaviest fighting took place at Camp 3 from the direction of Pugo.

Q — Where was your headquarters at that time?

A — Southeast of Baguio. General Sato was then in Bannagan.

Q — How many men did you lose in your 3rd defense line?

A — About 1500-1600 men.

Q — How long did you stay in your 3rd line?

A — Until about the end of April.

Q — Where did you establish your next defensive position?

A — The general line from Atok and south to Mt. Agu.

Q — Where was your headquarters?

A — At Ambuclao.

Q — Do you know the location of the 19th Division at that time?

A — I do not know because we had no communications with them.

Q — How long did you hold your fourth line?

- A — Until the end of May.
- Q — Was there severe fighting in your fourth line?
- A — There was a rather heavy fight in the vicinity of Atok.
- Q — What was the loss you suffered?
- A — About 500-600 men.
- Q — Was Gen. Sato with you?
- A — He was in Camp 30, but later moved to Mt. Toyangan.
- Q — When you withdrew from your fourth line at the end of May, where did you go next?
- A — To the general line from Andaway-Mt. Palansa-Bayacbac-Ambaguio. We established our headquarters in the vicinity of Tukiak.
- Q — Where did Gen. Sato establish his headquarters?
- A — Northeast of Mt. Aki.
- Q — Were there no troops west and in front of Gen. Sato?
- A — No. By that time Gen. Sato's Brigade was transferred to the command of the Tora Division.
- Q — You held on to your fifth line up to the time you received order from the headquarters in Tokyo to surrender?
- A — Generally, yes. Part of our line was giving way by then.
- Q — Was there any severe fight in your fifth line?
- A — Only on the right side; but not very fierce. We suffered only about 100 men killed.
- Q — What was your estimate of your enemy strength when you were in your first line of defense?
- A — Around 2 divisions.
- Q — When you were in your second line?
- A — About 3 divisions.
- Q — In your third line?
- A — Approximately 1-1/2 divisions.
- Q — In your fourth line?
- A — Much less. About 1 regiment or half a division.
- Q — In your fifth line?
- A — About the same as in the fourth.
- Q — Did the Americans use any tanks against you in your first line of defense?
- A — Yes, they did.
- Q — What weapons did the Americans use that were most destructive to your troops?
- A — Artillery and mortar fires.
- Q — Was the fire from the artillery accurate?
- A — Very accurate.

- Q — What was your reason for your continuous withdrawal to the northeast? Was it because you were hard-pressed or because you wanted to change or shorten your line?
- A — Originally, we had planned to go to the mountains, but the Americans had launched the offensive much earlier than we thought and we had to abandon our positions in the plains and make for the mountains before the time originally planned.
- Q — What was the condition of your food and ammunition supplies?
- A — We were rather short of both.
- Q — How did you transport your food supplies and ammunitions to your front lines from the rear?
- A — Food came from Bangbang and ammunition from Baguio. We could not use trucks in both cases and the supplies had to be carried by men.
- Q — All in all, what do you think of the operations?
- A — We were hopeless since the beginning. Our mechanized unit was destroyed right at the start. Then the Americans came to attack us with a highly mechanized unit. So we planned to go to the mountains. We could fight there better because then, the Americans could not make much use of their mechanized units.
- Q — What is your criticism of the American soldier?
- A — They are very highly trained to use mechanized units and artillery. They always inflicted heavy casualties on our troops. The mountains were the only solution to lessen our losses.
- Q — What was your objective in withdrawing to the mountains when you said, your case was hopeless since the beginning? Was it to inflict as much casualties as you could?
- A — We figured that if we moved to the mountains, we would be safe there.
- Q — Did your High Command hope to dislodge the Americans once they landed in Luzon, to drive them back to the sea?
- A — I do not know about that.
- Q — Your plan was to go to the mountains, was it not?
- A — I think the high command had such an idea, but our troops were ordered to move there little by little only and we could not understand why we were suddenly all concentrated in the hills.

(5)

Interview with Lieut. General Marauka, Commanding General, 103rd Division, Japanese Imperial Army, at the Office

of the AC of S, G-3, USAFIP, NL on September 28, 1945:

Question by Col. Calixto Duque: Give your name, rank, age, and the unit you commanded?

A — My name is Yutaka Marauka, 55 years old, Lieutenant General in the Imperial Japanese Army and commanding general of the 103rd Division in the Philippines.

Q — When did you arrive in the Philippines?

A — In July 1944.

Q — Where did you land in the Philippines?

A — In Manila, arriving there by plane.

Q — When did your division arrive in the Philippines?

A — I did not bring any men along. The 103rd Division was organized in the Philippines, 1/2 of the strength having been drawn from soldiers then stationed here and the other half came from Japan.

Q — What was the composition of the 103rd Division?

A — There were eight infantry battalions, the 175th, the 176th, 177th, 178th, 179th, 180th, 356th and the 357th; 4 batteries of artillery; 10 companies of engineers; the 103rd Div Field Hospital of 450 men; QM Co of 200 men and 100 men for labor purposes.

Q — Where was your division assigned when the Americans landed on Luzon?

A — The division was assigned to defend the line from Gonzaga to Aparri. A greater portion of the reserve troops was in the vicinity southeast of road junction of Hwy #5 and the highway to Gonzaga, southeast of Camalaniugan. One battalion with headquarters in Tuguegarao was guarding the road from Tuguegarao to Camalaniugan. The artillery was emplaced southeast of Camalaniugan.

Q — When the American airborne troops landed in the vicinity of Camalaniugan, where were you at that time?

A — I was no longer there. On May 10, 1945, the division moved to the vicinity of Cauayan, Isabela for the purpose of meeting the northward movement of the American troops. Movement was made during night as troops were harassed during the day by planes.

Q — When you arrived in the general area of Cauayan, where was your next defensive position?

A — We moved south to Orion on Hwy #5. The whole division was not assembled for this movement and only 1 company of my division encountered the enemy tanks in the vicinity of Orion, Nueva Vizcaya.

Q — Was that your first encounter with the American troops?

A — Yes, that was on June 7, 1945. The first company of my

troops called in for reinforcement, but they suffered many casualties and eventually one battalion was sent to reinforce them. Fighting lasted for 6 days when our line was penetrated.

Q — Did you not establish a defensive position when your line was penetrated in Orion?

A — We were not able to make a defensive line as the roads were all destroyed. We proceeded south.

Q — In other words, when the Americans penetrated your line around Orion, they continued moving freely to the north? Where was your next defensive position?

A — We did not have any more defense line.

Q — Where was your next encounter with the Americans?

A — There was a transportation unit in Cauayan which engaged the enemy in the vicinity of the Magat River.

Q — I remember that in one of the dispatches from the American Army there was some fierce resistance offered by Japanese troops in Cauayan on the Magat River. Was that your unit?

A — There was an independent battalion in that area which was later attached to the 103rd Division.

Q — (By Major Conrado Rigor) — What was the identity of this battalion attached to your division?

A — The men were air corps personnel doing engineering maintenance on airfields.

Q — What airfield did they come from?

A — I do not know; maybe Manila or Echague.

Q — Did you know of any Japanese airfields in the area of your division?

A — There was an airfield in each of the towns of Tuguegarao, Aparri, and Echague.

Q — After the engagement in Cauayan, where was your next defensive position?

A — Before my division came to Cauayan, there were 2 companies to the 105th Division defending that town, another company of Ilagan and another in Palanan. When my Division arrived there, the 105th units in Ilagan and Cauayan were relieved by men under my command and the 105th unit in Palanan was attached to my division. When our defense line in Orion was broken, the 105th companies remaining in Cauayan took over the area and later retreated to Kiangnan. It was then that 2 tank companies arrived from the south to help us.

Q — Where was your next engagement when the 105th retreated to Kiangnan and you took over their area?

- A — I was in Santiago when the defense was made by the 105th Division and some of my troops in the Magat River. Reinforcement was asked for and I sent a staff officer to look over the situation there; he never returned for he was killed and I never learned what really happened there. After that I was made commander of all remaining forces in Vizcaya and Isabela.
- Q — What other units besides the 105th and the 103rd were in that area?
- A — Only the 103rd and 105th were operating there, altho there was an independent Transportation Unit.
- Q — What was your estimated strength then?
- A — After crossing the Magat River and re-assembled in the mountains west of it, there were about 3,000 officers and men left.
- Q — What was your estimated losses in the battles of Orion and the Magat River?
- A — Total losses in Orion was about 100 men. I cannot say what loss we suffered in Magat because my staff officer whom I sent there was killed and never returned.
- Q — From your position in the mountains west of Magat River, what was your next troop disposition?
- A — We decided to go to Mayaoyao. Gen. Toguzama, an air corps officer commanded these forces that went to Mayaoyao.
- Q — After the engagement in Magat, do you know of any more unit left in that area?
- A — Two battalions of the 103rd were left in that area. Major Gen. Yogochoi was ordered to take command of these remaining troops. Our forces were bivouacked in the vicinity of Mayaoyao.
- Q — After you retreated to Mayaoyao, did you encounter any enemy in that area?
- A — There were some scattered engagements. About 1000 men died of malaria and when we finally reached Mayaoyao, only about 400 reached the place. On July 25 to August 20, we did some fighting in the vicinity of Mayaoyao. There was a day in which we fought continuously. Later on, the troops were scattered and many more died of malaria. The troops that were left in Magat finally joined us and all in all, there were 350 of us left. Because there were too many patients, we decided to go to Bontoc. From the top of the mountains, we could see Americans moving north. I thought the American forces were already in Banaue. I left Natonin on September 6.

Q — When the cease firing order was given on August 16, were you still in the vicinity of Mayaoyao?

A — I left Mayaoyao on August 2 and on the 15th, I contacted Gen. Toguzama. On September 7, I learned that peace had come. It was only then that I knew of it because our transmitter was destroyed many weeks before. Our forces were suffering from malaria and beriberi and could not move around.

Q — In your engagement in Mayaoyao, did you know the units you were fighting against?

A — I did not know their identity, but we know that there were Filipino forces. We thought also that some Americans were around us because plenty of American planes bombed us everyday. When I learned that peace had come, I did not know where to surrender and so I sent a messenger to find out where the American forces and learned that there were forces in Bontoc area. When the messenger returned, we proceeded to Bontoc.

Q — In the whole Cagayan Valley campaign, what do you consider the most savage fighting you engaged in?

A — The engagement in Orion because we were continuously subjected to bombing, shelling by the artillery.

Q — What weapons of the Americans do you believe inflicted the most damage to your troops?

A — The airplanes. We operated on new areas and we had no trenches made. So we were easy targets for strafing.

Q — Did you know of a previous plan of your high command to retreat to the Mountain Province?

A — No.

Q — How many of your officers were still under your command when you surrendered?

A — Only 75 officers.

Q — What is your comment on the manner in which the Americans conducted the operations against your forces?

A — We never learned of their exact strength; we expected them to be very few, but we were deceived and we had a hard time. And then there were their airplanes and we were shelled too often by their artillery.

Q — Did you use any Filipinos to carry your food and ammunition in the mountains?

A — No, we never used any outside labor.

Q — What was the condition of your food and ammunition supply after the battle of Orion?

A — We had enough ammunition but we could not bring them all along with us and each man had to carry the most

that he could carry. So when we reached the mountains, we ran short of ammunition, especially during the engagement in Mayaoyao.

(6)

Record of interrogation made by Major Conrado B. Rigor, G-3, USAFIP, NL on prisoner of war, Lieut. General Fujisawa, 2nd Division, Air and Ground Liaison Signal Corps, Japanese Imperial Army, in the Office of the AC of S, G-3, on October 8, 1945:

Q — We would like to know your rank, position, and the name of your command in your operations in North Luzon.

A — I am Lieut. Gen. Fujisawa of the 2nd Division, Air and Ground Liaison Signal Corps.

Q — When did you arrive in the Philippines?

A — I arrived in the Philippines on June 6, 1944.

Q — Where were you at the outbreak of the war?

A — I was at that time with the Air Corps and Signal School at Mitu, near Tokyo.

Q — What position did you hold when you were in the Philippines?

A — I was the commanding general of all signal communication and air signal communication in the Philippines.

Q — Give us a brief idea or narrative of your activities from the time you came to the Philippines up to the landings of the Americans at Leyte.

A — When I arrived at Manila on June 6, 1944, I was designated to organize units and distribute them to various places, necessarily at strategic places.

Q — Where were the main signal communication centers in the Philippines during your incumbency as Chief of the Air Corps and Ground Liaison Signal Corps?

A — The main signal communication centers in the Philippines were found in Manila, Bacolod, Negros and Clark Field in Pampanga.

Q. — Were there other important signal communication centers in North Luzon?

A — There were no other important signal communication centers in North Luzon except the above-mentioned centers.

Q — Did you know of any signal communication center in Gabu and Aparri?

A — There were no signal communication centers in those places.

Q — What were the important functions of this signal communication?

- A — These signal units were used to transmit orders to airplanes that were based on those places where signal communication center were established.
- Q — Were you in-charge directly of radar stations?
- A — Yes, I was directly in charge of all radar stations in the Philippines.
- Q — Where were some of these radar stations located?
- A — Some of these radar stations were located at Aparri, Paracale, Baler, Lucena, Mindoro, Bolinao, Taft of Samar and Surigao. We also wanted to construct one in Davao but its equipments were destroyed on its way by a submarine, operating in Philippine waters.
- Q — Were you in charge of collecting informations about aerial movements?
- A — Yes, I was in-charge of collecting informations and dispositions of enemy airplanes.
- Q — Tell us of the places where you have been from the time you evacuated Manila up to the time when you surrendered.
- A — I left Manila, 9 January 1945 and arrived in Echague 13 January 1945, and on the 22nd of March I went to Santiago, Isabela. On 9 April, I proceeded SW of Cauayan. On 12 June of the same year, I proceeded to Cabaatuan, W of Cauayan. On 10 June I proceeded to Santa Cruz, Isabela, crossing the Magat River. On 5 June, I started for the mountains E of Natonin where my units were scattered and dispersed.
- Q — Were you in command of any body of troops while you were in the province of Nueva Vizcaya and Isabela?
- A — Yes, when I was in Echague, Isabela I commanded the remaining Signal Corps units, but afterwards my line of duty was changed, that of the procurement of supplies in the rear.
- Q — What was the strength of your command at the time you went to Echague?
- A — I had about 50 men including officers, but many of the soldiers were already stationed to the different stations.
- Q — What I want to know is the actual number of men under your command.
- A — About 500 men.
- Q — Were this 500 men who were with you armed?
- A — To some extent they were armed.
- Q — What kind of signal equipment did you have at the time?
- A — They were radio equipments, transmitting and receiving sets.

Q — With what signal units were you in contact then when you were in Echague?

A — I could communicate with every signal unit in the Philippines, but gradually I lost contact with the units because of enemy air activity.

Q — Were your radar stations still functioning at the time you were in Echague?

A — No more except the radar station located in Lucena, Tayabas, which was still active.

Q — What about the other radar stations?

A — They were rendered useless due to intense enemy air activity.

Q — While you were at Echague were you in communication with Tokyo?

A — Yes, but did not communicate directly with Tokyo, but via Formosa.

Q — When you were at Echague, do you know of any communication by air between Luzon and Taiwan?

A — The transmission of air communication was not under my jurisdiction, and I do not know of any air communication between Luzon and Taiwan.

Q — Did you ever intercept some of our radio messages by air?

A — That is what I do not know, because as I have said I do not have any jurisdiction on air communication.

Q — Do you have any unit under your command in-charge of intercepting radio messages.

A — There were no units under my command responsible for intercepting radio messages.

Q — What other signal communication instruments besides the radio did you have?

A — Well, we have the telephone and the telegraph.

Q — Did you have visual signalling?

A — No, we did not have any visual signalling.

Q — You mentioned at the outset General that you were procuring supplies in the rear, how did you go about procuring supplies?

A — To tell you there were already stored food stuffs and bought the other food supplies that we did not have.

Q — What were the supplies that you bought from the civilians?

A — We bought rice, peanuts and livestock.

Q — Were you working directly under Gen. Yamashita?

A — I was directly under the command of Gen. Yamashita assigned to control the Transportation Section, QM Dept.

Q — Who were the other ranking Japanese Generals who were

with you at Natonin?

A — Well, I know only of Lt. Gen. Mikami and Lt. Gen. Marauka.

Q — Of all the equipments that you have with you, how many were still functioning during your surrender?

Q — When was your last contact with higher headquarters?

A — On 8 June, I could communicate with QM Headquarters and that was the last radio communication that I received.

Q — Since that time on, what kind of communication did you use?

A — When I could not make contacts with any of the units, I used the runner system.

Q — Where were you on 15 August when the order to cease fire was given?

A — North of Natonin.

Q — When the order to cease fire was given did you transmit the order to your men that the hostilities has already ceased?

A — Yes, but did not use radio communication as I could not make contact with units and higher headquarters, so I used runners to transmit communications.

Q — Where are your radio equipments now that you used in Isabela?

A — The radio equipments that I have been using in Isabela had been sunk in a river when I proceeded for Bontoc. The current of the river had been so strong, we have to use a horse in bringing the equipments on the other side of the river; but unfortunately, the equipments slipped off on the horse's back, it went to the bottom of the river.

Q — Were you able to receive news coming from Japan as late as 18 September 1944?

A — It depended upon static on the air, but when conditions is good we could receive radio news from Domei.

Q — What were some of the important highlights of the news you received from Tokyo?

A — The biggest news that I received from Tokyo was the Imperial rescript ordering units to cease fire, but they could not so well understand the contents because the outline was only given. Another news that I received was the signing of the treaty on 2 September.

Q — Would you mind General to give us some of your personal circumstances?

A — I am 53 years old, born in 1892 at Siga near Kyoto.

Q — Did you ever go abroad or study in some of the universities of America?

A — No, I did not.

Q — Did you study in a Japanese military academy?

A — Yes, I studied in a military university and in a war college in Tokyo.

Q — Were you ever assigned as military attaché?

A — No, I was never assigned as military attaché, but I have gone to China and Manchuria to engage myself in military campaigns.

Q — Were you in the Philippines sometime before you were sent here?

A — No, I was not.

Q — Do you know of any American and Filipino prisoners taken from Manila to Bayombong after you left Manila?

A — So far as I know, I do not know anything of that kind.

Q — What are your reasons for the collapse and defeat of the Japanese defenses in the Philippines, as well as in other countries?

A — In my personal opinion, I think the defeat of Japanese defenses was due to economic situation which was very weak, and also the supply capacity of the home land was powerless. It could not manufacture airplanes and other war materials to reinforce its units.

Q — What was the best weapon that the Americans used against the Japanese Army.

A — I do not know because I did not engage in actual fighting; but the airplane has played an important role in the total achievement of victory by the Allied Nations.

PART IV (Appendices)

Chapter XV

ENGINEER BATTALION ON THE JOB

In the early part of January 1945, when the USAFIP, NL started the full scale operations in North Luzon to drive the enemy away, the immediate need for an engineer unit was acutely felt to repair and reconstruct roads and demolished bridges in the entire operations area to facilitate the movement of troops, supplies, arms and ammunitions. Hence, the 1st Engineer Company was ordered to be organized according to Special Orders No. 17, dated January 20, 1945, GHQ, USAFIP, NL, composed of a Headquarters Platoon and a Security Platoon, under the aegis of the 121 Infantry. Most of the personnel came from the 3rd Battalion of the said 121st Inf who knew something of engineering, carpentry, construction or demolition. Major Dominador Cepeda, then a Captain, was named the Commanding Officer of this newly formed unit, with 1st Lt. Manuel Jaranillo as Executive Officer and 2nd Lieut Manuel L. Reyna as Junior Officer. However, since Major Cepeda was then also the Assistant to the Chief of Staff, Lts. Jaranillo and Reyna, more or less, directed and supervised actually the activities of the company

The sector assigned to the 1st Engr Co was from Narvacan, Ilocos Sur to San Fernando, La Union. The first project that it was given to accomplish after the construction of the Burgos Airfield, was the repair and reconstruction of the Sta. Rita Steel Bridge, the southern tip of which dropped from its pier. Materials for this job had to be commandeered from nearby towns and hauled by bull-carts and carretelas while the food rations of the men were contributed and supplied by loyal civilians. This project was completed after six days, principally due to the presence of highly skilled carpenters who volunteered to join, providing their own tools because there was absolutely no tolls of any kind for the outfit to begin and work with.

The next task to be done was the construction of a detour for the Amburayan River Bridge, Bio, Tagudin, Ilocus Sur. During the Japanese occupation, the southern approach to this bridge, about 160 feet in length, was shed out. Enough materials was not available for this length, so that a detour bridge had to be constructed. The materials for this job were appropriated from demolished government buildings and the railway bodega at Sudipen, and from civilian houses which had extra timber and lumber underneath. Nails and other hardwares needed in this construction were all designed and improvised for the purpose by skilled blacksmiths who volunteered with materials and tools salvaged from abandoned Japanese shops. This work was completed in two and a half days.

After this, the Libtong Bridge was next extended and was completed in 1-1/2 days because no piles were driven, but instead, the burned posts were spliced. In addition, all blasted culverts between Tagudin and Libtong were repaired.

At this juncture, the Engineer Battalion was authorized and ordered organized per General Orders No. 1-A, GHQ, USAFIP, NL, composed of a Headquarters and Service Company, 4 line Companies (A, B, C, and D) and a Medical Detachment. The 1st Engineer Co was redesignated A Co and ordered to proceed to Darigayos and bivouac there. It was also ordered to repair the Maragayap, Dumarang and construct the Darigayos detour bridges. Food and clothing rations were drawn from the Quartermaster, but no engineer tools nor equipment were yet issued. All volunteer carpenters and blacksmiths were inducted in the middle of February 1945. A call for engineer officers was made, and those who responded were detailed to the Training School for Engineer Troops at Luna, La Union, after having been inducted. The A Co, after ten days training, was subsequently ordered to construct a road to San Jose in the outskirts of San Fernando and San Juan, La Union for the 1st Bn of the 121st Inf to outflank the Japanese lines in the Battle of San Fernando.

About the first week of March 1945, a rush order was issued by the GHQ, USAFIP, NL for the construction of a five-span wooden bridge with an approximate length of 16 feet per span in Carlatan, San Fernando, La Union. Since there were absolutely no equipment nor timber materials available for this construc-

tion, coconut trunks and lumber taken from the Tabacalera Bodega had to be substituted for stringers. This construction was started early in the morning and finished in the afternoon of the next day, the boys ceaselessly working day and night. It was here that this unit received its first baptism of fire because it offered an ideal target to the enemy guns, there having been absolutely no cover nor concealment. No casualty though, was suffered.

After the completion of this construction, words were received of the approach of the enemy tanks. As a precautionary measure, gasoline was poured all over the newly finished structure ready to be ignited at a moment's notice after the road ahead was blocked. The 121st Inf was able, however, to repulse them with bazookas and two days later, these same tanks were bombed by American planes which sighted them.

A Co was again redesignated the Headquarters and Service Co and a new A Co composed of ex-servicemen and reservists who had just reported. Also B Co was formed in compliance to General Orders No. 1-A. C Co, attached to the 14th Inf and D Co, attached to the 11th Inf, were also formed by virtue of the authority for their organization embodied in said General Orders No. 1-A.

The headquarters and Service Co, A Co and B Co were then ordered to train in the Training School for Engr Troops, Luna, La Union. On March 23, 1945, A Co was ordered to move to Suyo, Ilocos Sur, to maintain the Bitalag-Cabugao Section of Hwy #4. They arrived at their destination ahead of the Infantry who were then resting in San Juan, La Union, at that time and following three days after. In addition, A Co was also assigned the mission to construct 7 bridges which were constructed in 10 days, largely because 12 truckloads of urgently needed construction materials like piles, planks, stringers, nails and other hardwares were supplied by the Sixth Army at the instance of an American engineer colonel who went to Suyo to look things over. A Co was detailed after the construction of the seven bridges to maintain the road to Butac and on the early part of April 1945, the Hq and Service Co also proceeded to Butac to open the road from there which was made impassable due to heavy rains. Afterwards, the Hq and Service Co was

ordered to build the Butac Howe Truss Bridge while the A Co was assigned to maintain the Butac-Manubac Section of Hwy #3. When the Butac Bridge was half completed, the Hq and Service Co was withdrawn and assigned to Suyo to construct the Bailey Bridge there, while A and B Companies continued the construction of the Butac Bridge. During this period, the Hq and Service Co was barraged now and then by enemy artillery though no casualties were suffered.

On May 4, 1945, the CO, USAFIP, NL gave verbal orders and authority for the organization of the Operations and Maintenance Detachment to take charge of the heavy engineer equipment turned over to the Engr Bn by the US Army. The personnel of this new unit was taken from the different line companies and also by voluntary enlistment of chauffeurs, mechanics, electricians, and artisans.

The D Co, operating in the sector of the 11th Inf from February 20, 1945 to June 30, 1945, opened and maintained 170 kms of one-lane all-weather road and 114 kms trail for jeeps. It also constructed 95 bridges with an aggregate length of 3200 feet, five air strips with a total area of 260,000 sq.m. All these jobs have been accomplished in record time in spite of the insufficiency of tools and bad weather.

Among the important projects undertaken by this Co in Cagayan was the construction of the Tuao-Luchan Road. This road, a total distance of 90 kms, passes thru virgin forest, and entirely new road located thru rough terrain. In 40 working days, the following were accomplished:

48 trestle bridges and girder span, an aggregate length of 1234 feet

78 kms of seasonal jeep road, 1 lane

12 kms of all-weather road, 1 lane

During the early part of June, 1945 an order was received to attach two platoons of this company to the Connolly Task Force in northern Cagayan Valley. The mission of these two platoons was to open and maintain the Pasaleng-Ballesteros Road. That this unit has merited the commendation of higher Army headquarters in this particular assignment shows how ably and well they have done their job. Thirty-four bridges were constructed with an aggregate length of 900 ft. in a period of eight

weeks. Two ferries were also made. All these works have been done with the few tools that the men of this unit have been able to commandeer from civilians. For lack of picks and shovels in some sections of these projects, wooden sticks were used. No modern equipment of any kind was then available.

In the later stage of the North Luzon operations, the whole Engr Bn was assigned to open and maintain Hwy #3 from Libtong to Bontoc, Hwy #11 from Bontoc to KP 90, construct the road from Cervantes to Mankayan. It also constructed the airstrips and landing fields over all strategic points of the entire operations area.

During the first days of the battalion, only pioneer tools and equipment were utilized in the different construction and maintenance jobs. Sometimes, improvised and crude tools had to be devised and rigged up to hasten and accelerate the completion of the rush tasks to be accomplished. It was only with the transfer of some Engr equipment and vehicles from the Sixth Army, like cargo and dump trucks, dozers, shovels, graders, carry-alls, compressors, and machine shop trucks, that this unit was able to accomplish and execute all jobs assigned to it in record time.

The problems encountered by this organization were the lack of complete heavy engineer equipment to cope with the work expected to be accomplished, the lack of trained personnel for the operations and maintenance of the equipment recently turned over from the Sixth Army, and the constant and repeated breaking up of these equipment on hand because they were hardly better than junks, plus the difficulty to requisition and procure vital spare parts. All these were partially solved and remedied with the help of American enlisted men detailed and attached to this unit as instructors, and also by the ingenuity and resourcefulness of the mechanics and craftsmen in the battalion.

The key personnel connected with the organization, their duties and their outstanding achievements are:

Major Dominador Cepeda, the Bn Comdr, who personally directed and supervised all the field operations of the Bn and was also solely responsible for the acquisition of urgently needed supplies, equipment and critical items from the Sixth Army.

Captain Jose F. Asperrilla, Executive Officer of the Bn, who took charge of the training of all Engr Troops and carried out the details in the administrative and field activities of the unit. His masterly execution of the ideas and plans of the Commanding Officer made things all running smoothly and under control.

1st Lieut. Nemesio Tacderas, S-2 and S-3, who was responsible for the field surveys in the operation sector of the battalion and supervised some of the important construction and maintenance projects undertaken by the organization.

2nd Lieut. Bienvenido Azurin, S-1 and Adjutant during the early period of the battalion, who took charge of the personnel, training, morale, housing, and recreational program of the entire unit from the time of its activation.

2nd Lieut. Restituto C. Mil, S-4, who handled the supply, equipment, arms and ammunition problems of the battalion very capably.

1st Lieut. Manuel F. Jaramillo, Commanding Officer of the Headquarters and Service Company, who designed and executed the difficult construction projects of the battalion. The efficiency of his unit which was assigned the brunt of all bridge constructions is noteworthy.

1st Lieut. Joaquin P. Flores, Commanding Officer of the D Company, who handled his unit with such energy and initiative to earn the commendation of the American Forces to which his company was attached.

1st Lieut. Toribio Azada, Commanding Officer of the B Company, who led the advance construction platoon of the battalion in the immediate front line vicinity, and was able to maintain his sector inspite of heavy enemy activities, thus keeping the route open for the Infantry and other troops as well as badly needed supplies and ammunitions to pass through.

The accomplishments of the battalion from the date of its activation up to the present are as follows:

Constructions:

I. Airstrips:

1. Burgos Airfield
2. Manitpit Airstrip
3. Volckmann Airstrip, Camp Spencer

4. Luna Airstrip
5. Tuao Airstrip
6. Claveria Airstrip
7. Ballesteros Airstrip
8. Cervantes Airstrip
9. Comillas Airstrip
10. Bontoc Airstrip

II. Pontoon, Ferries, and Bridges:

1. Sta. Rita Bridge
2. Amburayan Bridge (Detour)
3. Suyo Bailey Bridge
4. Butac Howe Truss Bridge
5. Libtong Wooden Bridge
6. Darigayos Bridge
7. Maragayap Bridge
8. Dumarang Bridge
9. Abra River Ponton Bridge, Hwy #4
10. Carlatan Bridge
11. Las-ud Bridge
12. Bauko Bridge
13. Otukan Trestle Bridge
14. Comillas Half Bridge
15. Piagad Half Bridge
16. Tabbac Half Bridge
17. Kolalo Girder Bridge
18. All wooden bridges, Mauanan-Lucban-Tuao road
19. All wooden bridges, Pasalang-Aparri Sector Hwy #3
20. All wooden bridges, Camalaniugan-Aparri road
21. All wooden bridges, Tuao-Faire-Dungao road
22. Pangul River Bridge
23. Lucban Ferry
24. Pamplona Ferry
25. All wooden bridges, Liwan-Palca road
26. Naguiling Ferry
27. Mauanan Ferry
28. Sabangan Suspension Bridge
29. Talubia Truss Bridge
30. Gubano Wooden Bridge
31. Eight half bridges on road to Mt. Data

III. Roads

1. Tuao-Toga Road
2. Barnett-Borje Road
3. Tuao-Lucban Road
4. Bauguen-Galimuyod Road
5. KP 90-Loo Valley Road

Reopening and Maintenance:

1. Libtong-Cervantes Road, Hwy #4
2. Cervantes-Bontoc Road, Hwy #4
3. Cervantes-Mankayan Road
4. Sabangan-Piagad Section, Hwy #11
5. Calanan-Tuao Road
6. Calanan-Enrile Road
7. Enrile-Tuao Road
8. Liwan-Palca Road
9. Tuao-Rizal Road
10. Tuao-Lucban Road
11. Tuao-Faire Road
12. Claveria-Ballesteros Road
13. Bontoc-KP 90 Road
14. KP 90-Loo Valley Road

Miscellaneous:

1. Survey, San Fernando-Sudipen RR line
2. Survey, Camp Spencer
3. Construction of Rail to Artillery Emplacement
vic Butac
4. Construction, Base Hospital, Liwan
5. Construction, Officers Quarters and Barracks,
Bulagao
6. Construction, Officers Quarters and Barracks,
Liwan
7. Construction, Labor Camps along Tuao-Lucban
Road
8. Survey, construction and improvement of Train-
ing Camp, Luna
9. Construction of road to Radar Station
10. Clearing Cervantes Area of debris
11. Metalling Luna Airstrip

Some of the outstanding feats performed by the Engineer Battalion were the construction of the Butac Howe Truss Bridge, the longest spanned wooden bridge ever constructed in the Islands with a total span of 160 feet, the construction of which, the Bureau of Public Works of the Commonwealth Government would not have permitted, but instead, would have prescribed a steel structure; the construction of the Abra Airstrips with steel mattings; the construction of the Abra River Pontoon Bridge composed of rafts buoyed and floated by empty gasoline drums; and construction of the Sabangan Bridge in a surprisingly short time.

The most important lessons learned during these operations are the construction and assembling of the Bailey Bridge, the operations and maintenance of the latest types of engineer equipment, and the steel-mating of airstrips and roads that would otherwise be impractical to construct or maintain in any other way.

Chapter XVI

MEDICS ON THE JOB

Organization

1. S. O. No. 133, Par. 1, GHQ, USAFIP, NL dated December 13, 1944 authorized the organization of HQ Hospital Co, Hq Bn, USAFIP, NL, stationed at Camp Utopia. Before the above date there was no definite organization of a medical unit under the GHQ, USAFIP NL.

2. G. O. No. 2, Par. 6, GHQ, USAFIP, NL, dated February 6, 1945 redesignated the HQ Hospital Co, to Medical and Hospital Co, HQ, Bn, USAFIP, NL. This Hospital Co consisted of the following:

- a. Company Headquarters
- b. Base Hospital Unit
- c. Dispensary Unit

The Hospital and Dispensary Units were primarily intended for transients and GHQ personnel.

The Medical and Hospital Co, HQ Bn, USAFIP, NL was stationed at Camp Spencer, Darigayos, Luna, La Union.

3. G. O. No. 10, Par. 6, GHQ, USAFIP, NL, dated March 5, 1945 further redesignated the Medical and Hospital Co, HQ Bn, USAFIP, NL to Medical and Hospital Co, USAFIP, NL. This Hospital consisted of the following:

- a. Company Headquarters
- b. Base Hospital Unit
- c. Dispensary Unit

The Dispensary Unit was primarily intended for GHQ personnel. The Base Hospital Unit was organized for the whole USAFIP, NL.

For the months of March, April, and May the Base Hospital was stationed at Camp Spencer. At the beginning it had a bed capacity of one hundred and fifty (150). As the num-

ber of patients both surgical and medical steadily increased, the hospital was likewise steadily expanded until by the month of May, 1945, it reached its maximum limit of expansion which was an eight-hundred-bed capacity.

On May 10, 1945, the Chief Surgeon with the approval of the CO, USAFIP, NL, decided to transfer the hospital to Tagudin, Ilocos Sur. The reasons for the transfer of the hospital and selection of Tagudin, for the location were:

- a. No space for further expansion of the hospital at Camp Spencer;
- b. Poor drainage of hospital site at Spencer; with the first rain by the month of April the place was flooded.
- c. At Tagudin, there are big buildings where patients can be housed. There are wide spaces where ward tents can be erected. Drainage is good.
- d. Evacuation of battle casualties from the frontline to Tagudin is of shorter distance and consequently easier.
- e. The supply depot at Sudipen is nearer, hence, drawing of food supplies is facilitated.

On May 27, the transfer of the hospital was began, and by June 1 the transfer was completed. A hospital of 2,000 bed capacity was put up in buildings and ward tents.

Strength

Headquarters Hospital Company, HQ, Bn, USAFIP, NL

- a. Officers — 6
- b. EM — 16

This hospital company did not have any definite T/O prescribed by GHQ, USAFIP, NL.

Medical and Hospital Co, HQ Bn, USAFIP, NL

- a. Officers — 10
- b. EM — 62

The T/O of this company as authorized by G. O. No. 2, GHQ, USAFIP NL, is the following:

Medical officers	— 4
Dental Officer	— 1
ANC	— 5
EM	— 68

Medical and Hospital Co, USAFIP, NL:

- a. Officers — 14
- b. EM — 98

The T/O of this company as authorized by G. O. No. 10, GHQ, USAFIP, NL, is the following:

Medical Officers	— 5
Dental Officer	— 1
ANC	— 8
EM	—101

During the last week of February, 1945, operations against the enemy became intensified, especially in the sector of the 121st Inf, USAFIP, NL. Battle casualties and medical patients steadily increased in number. As the strength of the Medical and Hospital Co, as authorized by G. O. No. 10, was found inadequate to take care of the increasing number of patients, the Chief Surgeon, thru his recommendation and with the approval of CO, USAFIP, NL, employed civilian doctors and nurses and attendants as needed. By the month of May, the strength of the Base Hospital was as follows:

Medical Officers	— 5	
Dental Officer	— 1	
ANC	— 8	
EM	— 98	assigned
	46	attached
Civilian Employees:		
Physicians	— 8	
Nurses	— 23	
Pharmacist	— 1	
Attendants	— 96	

With this great increase in personnel, it was still found inadequate to render the best care to the sick and wounded soldiers. There was continuous daily evacuation of sick and wounded from the front to the hospital. With so big a hospital and with so great a number of patients, the personnel of the Base Hospital were practically on 24-hour duty.

The CO, USAFIP, NL, visited the hospital. Gen. Valdez saw the very inadequate number of medical personnel, especially medical officers and nurses, to take care of so many patients. At this period, there were about 1,700 patients in the hospital. Only one medical officer was available for every 100 patients, and only one nurse was available for every 160 patients. However, the General found out to his satisfaction and appreciation, the way every one was doing his or her utmost to render the

best they could to the patients and to keep at the same time the sanitation of the hospital to be at par with USA hospitals. The General, on leaving, promised to send medical officers and army nurses from HPA to report for duty to the Base Hospital, in order to relieve the heavy burden that was on the shoulders of the personnel. The General also promised to have the civilian nurses commissioned, in the army nurse corps, PA, in recognition for the sacrifices they were rendering voluntarily to our soldiers. On July 28, 10 medical officers from HPA reported for duty in the Base Hospital. On July 29, another 4 medical officers reported for duty. On August 10, 15 ANC from HPA reported for duty. On August 14, 14 civilian nurses of the Hospital were commissioned 3rd Lieutenants. Some of the civilian nurses were not commissioned due to some physical defects.

By the month of July, the enemy frontage began to narrow, so that the different infantries of USAFIP, NL, were getting closer to each other and becoming consolidated. The Hospital companies that were serving them, were no longer necessary in the front. They were ordered to be merged with the Base Hospital, inasmuch as all battle casualties and sick soldiers from the front were all evacuated to the Base Hospital.

The following are the strength of the Hospital companies and the corresponding dates when they were merged with the Base Hospital:

- a. Hospital Co, 3rd District

Date:	July 6, 1945	
Strength:	Officers	— 10
	EM	— 66
	CE	— 3
- b. Hospital Co, 1st District

Date:	June 7, 1945	
Strength:	Officers	— 9
	EM	— 25
	CE	— 0
- c. Hospital Co, 5th District

Date:	July 27, 1945	
	Officers	— 11
	EM	— 41
- d. Hospital Co, 7th District

Date:	August 31, 1945	
-------	-----------------	--

Strength:	Officers	-- 10
	EM	-- 14

The 2nd Hospital Co, 2nd District was left in the field to establish the Clearing Station for USAFIP NL.

The following is the total strength of the Base Hospital as of September 30:

Medical Officers	-- 49
Dental Surgeon	-- 3
ANC	-- 75
EM	-- 529
CE	-- 225

Training of Officers and Men

1. Basic Military Training:
2. Technical Training:
 - a. Close Order Drill — Instruction of close order drill is usually given for thirty minutes after reveille and retreat.
 - b. Military discipline and custom of the service — Instruction of this subject were given by lectures and demonstrations from 19 to 21 hours three times a week for two weeks.
 - c. Company administration and guard duty roster — This was given in lectures from 19 to 21 hours two times a week for three weeks.
2. Technical Training:
 - a. First aid treatment: Instructions were given by lectures and demonstrations from 19 to 21 hours for four weeks.
 - b. Military hygiene and sanitation: Instructions were given by lectures from 19 to 21 hours two times a week for three weeks.

Number of Medical and Surgical Cases Taken Cared of

December 1944

Admissions:

Surgical	-- 5
Medical	-- 19

January 1945

Admissions:

Surgical	-- 9
Medical	-- 56

February 1945

Admissions:

Surgical	— 146
Medical	— 186

Operations: — 6

1. Appendectomy	— 1
2. Incision and drainage	— 1
3. Suturing	— 1
4. Extraction of Shrapnel	— 3

Deaths:

Surgical	— 374
Medical	— 289

Operations — 51

1. Appendectomy	— 19
2. Laparotomy	— 10
3. Incision	— 3
4. Extraction of Shrapnel	— 7
5. Amputations	— 4
6. Suturing	— 2
7. Disarticulation	— 4
8. Excision	— 2

Deaths:

Surgical Cases	— 14
Medical Cases	— 2

May 1945

Admissions:

Surgical	— 505
Medical	— 327

Operations — 68

1. Appendectomy	— 20
2. Laparotomy	— 1
3. Extraction of Shrapnel	— 13
4. Amputation	— 3
5. Plaster Cast	— 12
6. Hemorrhoidectomy	— 4
7. Herniectomy	— 2
8. Thoracotomy	— 1
9. Disarticulation	— 5
10. Suturing	— 5
11. Incision	— 3
12. Enucleation	— 1
13. Enterectomy	— 1

Deaths:

Surgical Cases	— 8
Medical Cases	— 6

June 1945

Admissions:

Surgical	— 470
Medical	— 887

Operations — 89

1. Appendectomy	— 16
2. Laparatomy	— 5
3. Extraction of Shrapnel	— 26
4. Amputations	— 3
5. Plaster Casting	— 5
6. Hemorrhoidectomy	— 5
7. Disarticulation	— 8
8. Incision	— 6
9. Fistulotomy	— 1
10. Skin Grafting	— 1
11. Enterorrhaphy	— 1
12. Podalic Version	— 2
13. Enucleation	— 2
14. Herniatomy	— 6
15. Suturing	— 1
16. Tracheotomy	— 1

Deaths:

Surgical Cases	— 15
Medical Cases	— 8

July 1945

Admissions:

Surgical	— 358
Medical	— 737

Operations — 101

1. Appendectomy	— 14
2. Lapartomy	— 1
3. Extraction of Shrapnel	— 28
4. Amputation	— 1
5. Plaster Casting	— 10
6. Hemorrhoidectomy	— 1
7. Thoracentesis	— 3
8. Currentage	— 2
9. Insertion of Permanent Catheters	— 2
10. Reduction of Omentum	— 1
11. Enucleation	— 4
12. Tonsilectomy	— 4
13. Incision	— 8
14. Hernioplasty	— 4
15. Paracethesis	— 3

16. Suturing	— 11
17. Cystostomy	— 1
18. Herniatomy	— 1
19. Sounding of Urinary Bladder	— 1
20. Circumcision	— 1

Deaths:

Surgical Cases	— 1
Medical Cases	— 4

August 1945

Admissions:

Surgical	— 334
Medical	— 930

Operations: 81

1. Appendectomy	— 16
2. Laparatomy	— 1
3. Extraction of Sharpnel	— 5
4. Amputation	— 2
5. Plaster Cast	— 5
6. Hemorrhoidectomy	— 4
7. Herniatomy	— 4
8. Disarticulation	— 4
9. Suturing	— 5
10. Sounding of the Bladder	— 1
11. Enucleation	— 1
12. Cystostomy	— 3
13. Incision	— 19
14. Orthoplasty	— 1
15. Tonsilectomy	— 1
16. Turbinectomy	— 1
17. Fndonartrisis	— 1
18. Ptyregium, Plastic Operation	— 1
19. Splinting	— 1

Deaths:

Surgical Cases	— 3
Medical	— 6

September 1945

Admissions:

Surgical Cases	— 69
Medical Cases	— 442

Operations: — 94

1. Appendectomy	— 28
2. Hermorrhoidectomy	— 6
3. Herniatomy	— 3

4. Tonsilectomy	—	8
5. Turbinectomy	—	9
6. Extraction of Shrapnel	—	16
7. Circumcision	—	2
8. Excision	—	5
9. Exploratomy	—	1
10. Incision	—	6
11. Ligation of Blood Vessel	—	2
12. Amputation	—	1
13. Sounding of Urinary Tract	—	1
14. Laparatomy	—	1
15. Disarticulation	—	1
16. Fistulotomy	—	1
17. Repair of lacerated wound	—	1

Deaths:

Surgical Cases	—	4
Medical Cases	—	8

Most Common Diseases Treated

1. Malaria
2. Influenza
3. Common Diarrhea

Control of Malaria:

- a. The use of mosquito bars
- b. The daily taking of atabrine prophylaxis, which is two tablets a day. In the beginning, atabrine for prophylaxis was being distributed by the medical services. Later on, it was found out that unit commanders did not fully cooperate in enforcing the taking of atabrine amongst their men. So the Infantry Commander issued an order making the taking of atabrine for prophylaxis a command function. Any officer or enlisted man sick with malaria should be investigated, and if found to be negligent in his atabrine prophylaxis, will be subjected to court martial. This step reduced malaria morbidity among our troops to 60%.

Medicines, Medical Supplies and Equipments

Before D-Day, medical supplies were actually acquired either by purchase, commandeering under receipt or through donations.

On December 18, 1944, and January 10, 1945, medicines were landed at Santiago Cove and Darigayos, Luna, La Union, respectively by submarines. These were the first medicines that were received from the US Army. They were brought to Camp Utopia and were distributed to HQ Hospital Co, and the different Hospital and Medical Companies of USAFIP, NL.

On February 4 and 7, 1945 respectively, medical supplies and some surgical instruments were air-dropped at Luna Airstrip, Luna, La Union. These medical supplies and surgical instruments were requisitioned personally by the Chief Surgeon, from Base M 6th Army, at San Fabian, Pangasinan.

For the months of February and March, subsequent medical supplies were brought by LCMs, thru requisitions brought personally either by the Chief Surgeon or Chief Nurse, USAFIP, NL at Base M, San Fabian, Pangasinan.

On April, when the enemies at San Fernando, La Union were dislodged and pushed farther east to the mountains, and the highway to San Fabian was opened to traffic, medical supplies were brought to Camp Spencer by trucks. There was then a closer contact between Base M, 6th Army and the GHQ, USAFIP, NL. From this time all medicines, medical supplies, and surgical instruments and hospital equipments received were shared proportionately between the Base Hospital and the different Hospital and Medical Companies.

From June requisitions of medical supplies became very much easier because Base M was then transferred to San Fernando, La Union. Requisitions for medical supplies could be brought to Base M in the morning, filled and brought back in the afternoon to the Base Hospital.

From July to August 1945, more surgical instruments and hospital equipments were given to the Base Hospital, thus the operating room became better equipped. Two major surgical operations could then be performed at one time.

Laboratory facilities of the hospital were so inadequate. It was only the month of May that a sort of a laboratory was put up. Dr. Ramon Valenzuela, a civilian doctor was able to bring some of his laboratory equipments for routine examination of blood, urine and feces.

During the time of the Hq, Hospital Co, there were very few surgical instruments, barely enough for dressing of minor surgical wounds. When civilian physicians were employed some of them were able to save some of their instruments from the ravages of the enemy. These instruments were offered, freely for the use of the hospital.

Evacuation of Casualties

For the months of February, March, and April, when facilities of the Base Hospital were so inadequate nearly all surgical cases needing major operations or X-ray and some obscure medical cases requiring laboratory examination for their diagnosis were sent to US Army station hospitals at San Fabian or Lingayen, by planes and at times by LCM when immediate surgical intervention was not urgent.

Since June, 1945 when more surgical instruments were received less patients were evacuated to US Army hospitals. Only those cases that needed to be X-rayed were transferred. From this time, transfer of patients were effected by ambulance.

Re-evacuation of frontline casualties, a brief description of the terrain of operation, employment of medical personnel, and means of transportation used, is needed.

- a. The terrain is usually mountainous with a third class road.
- b. Each company has 2 company aid-men, and 4 litter bearers from Bn Aid-Station.
- c. Eight litter bearers from collecting platoon are attached to each Bn, Aid Station. These litter bearers can be used to reinforce litter bearers of Bn Aid Station to carry wounded from the front if needed.
- d. One collecting station for each infantry regiment.
- e. One clearing station for the whole USAFIP, NL.
- f. Before March, 1945, means of transportation used, were carretelas. On April, May, and June, eight ambulances were received from the US Army. Of these eight, two or three are most of the time in the motor shop for repair, so that only six or five are available at a time. One ambulance is assigned to each collecting station.

When a soldier gets wounded, he is given first aid treatment by a company aid man, and brought to the Bn aid station by the litter bearers. Walking patients are usually di-

rected to the aid station. In the Bn aid station, the patient is tagged by the Bn surgeon, wounds examined and proper treatment instituted. If further evacuation to the rear is needed, he is brought either by ambulance if the place is accessible by road, or carried by litter bearers of the collecting platoon to the collecting station if the place is not accessible by the ambulance. In the collecting station, the patient is again examined by the medical officer incharge of the station. If the condition of the patient warrants further evacuation, he is evacuated either to the clearing station or direct to the Base Hospital.

Before March 1945, when we did not have any litter at all, casualties were carried in bamboo beds or hammocks.

Care of Sick and Wounded

When a patient arrives in the hospital, he is brought immediately to the Receiving and Sorting Section. All his belongings, including arms, are taken, packed, tagged and deposited in the patients equipment room. In the receiving section, the medical officer incharge examines the patient to determine whether the case is surgical or medical. The patient is then given a chart and sent either to the medical or surgical ward or to the operating room if immediate surgical intervention is needed. In the ward, the patient is given a pajama, OD blanket, mosquito bar, and bed sheet. His personal clothing is collected and sent with his other belongings to patient's equipment room.

During the months of December, 1944, January and part of February, because the hospital was not yet organized, and because of the small amount of hospital linens, the above method of admitting patients was not practiced.

Some of the patients, especially the battle casualties who were evacuated to the hospital, only had with them undershirts and drawers, or fatigue or khaki suits soaked with blood and torn with shrapnel, bullet or purposely cut by the attending Bn Surgeon at the site of injury, so as to treat the wound better without unnecessary handling of the injured part of the body. These patients when discharged from the hospital are issued a pair of clothing.

In the wards during the first months of the organization

of the hospital, due to shortage of personnel, one attendant was usually assigned to attend to 20 or more patients. As the number of medical personnel increased, more attendants were being assigned to take charge of a ward, so that better care were then rendered.

Measures Taken to Prevent Outbreak of Epidemic

1. Immunization of the men with triple typhoid and cholera vaccine.
2. Sterilization of drinking water with halazone or calcium hypochlorite.
3. Close supervision of the sanitary disposal of sewage and garbage.
4. In spite of the handicaps or lack of medicines and facilities and inadequate training of medical personnel, there was no epidemic among the troops. This is due to the untiring efforts, continuous surveillance by all regimental and battalion surgeons.

Conclusion

As shown by the above report, the Base Hospital, especially during the first months of its existence, was very much handicapped due to the inadequate number of medical personnel, inadequate training, lack of facilities to cope with the existing emergency. But the guiding spirit and influence of the CO, USAFIP, NL, the unselfish efforts of the American liaison officers for USAFIP, NL, at Base M, Sixth Army, to obtain for the hospital the much needed medical supplies, surgical instruments and hospital equipment, from the Sixth Army. the diligence, devotion to duty, untiring energy and constant supervision of the Chief Surgeon, have given incentive and whole-hearted cooperation of all members of the Hospital to forge on and overcome all obstacles in the performance of their duties.

Chapter XVII

THE SIGNAL MEN ON THE JOB

Early Beginning

The early beginning of the Signal Company has a unique and a very interesting aspect, replete with many handicaps, personal sacrifices, and the will to succeed. It is a fact that this Company started from practically nothing to its present set-up with all the latest and most modern communication sets and equipment.

On the 21st of August, 1944, upon reporting for duty at Comp 1122 in the fields, Major Timoteo C. Sinay who was then a Captain, Signal Corps Reserve was officially designated as the Chief Signal Officer. It therefore fell upon his shoulders as well as his direct responsibility to use his initiative to organize a Signal unit at Headquarters. Along with the arrival of Major Sinay, was a radiotician of no mean ability in the person of Crispo Hernando, a civilian volunteer who was later commissioned. These two radio men found upon their arrival in Headquarters a Signal man in the person of S/Sgt Pete L. Luz, a member of the Reconnaissance Battalion, Philippine Regiment of the Army of the United States. Along with S/Sgt Luz who was later commissioned as 1st Lieut. Carlos F. Ancheta, AUS. Luz and Ancheta arrived two days earlier. They were members of the secret landing party of the Reconnaissance Battalion, Philippine Regiment of the Army of the United States. These four men started the organization by improvising a poser pack to operate an old radio set which was the only available set in Camp.

Continuous Constructions of Radio Sets

After the completion of the power pack, a transmitter and receiver was next made. About this time, this Headquarters began contacting the net control station of General MacArthur whose call sign then was MACA. Subsequently,

this improvised Radio Station received instructions from General MacArthur's Headquarters directing this Headquarters to commence contacting SWPA. The call sign of SWPA then was *King Able Zebra*. The communication with SWPA was maintained with the greatest difficulty due to the fact that the sets were weak considering the distance covered by the communication. But this unselfish group of hard men, conscious of the importance and the necessity of the task entrusted to them again began constructing another set, a bigger transmitter this time which had an output of about 30 watts. This set after it was finally made, succeeded in contacting SWPA after several failures.

Arrival of Signal Equipment

There is now a common expression among the officers and the enlisted personnel of this company when they refer to the time when the first Signal equipment arrived from Australia. It is affectionately referred to as the "landing." The first three landings were made along the beaches of Bangui, Ilocos Norte, along Santiago Cove, and along Darigayos Beach, near the present site of the Headquarters. The radio sets that were received during those three submarine landings were as follows:

- 3-B-Z, Receiver and Transmitter, US Make
- T-50-M, Transmitter and Receiver, US Make
- ATR-4, Receiver and Transmitter, US Make
- 3-M-K, Transceiver, US Make
- N-E-I, Transceiver, Dutch Make

Different Signal equipment have also been received during the three submarine landings such as Radio Testers, Power units of the PE-236 model, Battery Chargers of the Thermo-Couple types, and other Power units of the Pioneer and Briggs-Stratton models.

The transmitters and receivers that were received were promptly distributed and sent to the different regiments in North Luzon. The first sectors that received these radio sets were the forces in the sectors of Ilocos Sur, Isabela, and the province of Cagayan. Priority were given to these sectors due to their distance from Headquarters. With these radio sets and equipment, enlisted personnel who were full-pledged radio operators and cryptomen were sent along.

Organizing the Company

Sometime in the early part of December 1944 when the American forces were about to land at the vicinity of Lingayen, Pangasinan, a radio instruction was received to have this Headquarters contact that landing station. At this time, the enlisted personnel was gradually increasing by volunteer enlistment from the outlying towns near Headquarters. Radio operators who were former employees of the Bureau of Posts came to enlist one or few at a time. A little later, another radio instruction arrived to the effect that this Headquarters was under the net command of the US Sixth Army which was then established in Calasiao, Pangasinan. Sometime in the early part of February, 1945, Major Sinay was sent to the 6th Army Headquarters at Calasiao to confer with the Chief Signal Officer therein and to obtain some more radio sets and equipment.

Upon the arrival of Major Sinay, radio officers were sent to the different regiments of North Luzon to organize and train as quickly as possible Signal Platoons in each regiment. These Signal Communication Platoons found in every regiment must not be confused with those of the Land Communication Platoons whose work or functions were very different from those of the former. All this time, the personnel continued to increase.

With the arrival of General Order No. 2 Headquarters, USAFIP NL, dated February 6, 1945, the Signal Company, under the Headquarters Battalion of the USAFIP, NL was officially authorized and ordered to be organized. This Company then had 349 officers and enlisted men. The Company was organized and authorized to consist of the following sections:

- 1 — Company Headquarters
- 1 — Radio Operational Platoon
- 1 — Radio Message Center Platoon
- 1 — Telephone Communication Platoon
- 1 — Land Communication Platoon
- 1 — Visual Signal Platoon

Later on the Land Communication Platoon was detached from the Signal Company when the Land Communication Service Battalion was organized and formed. The Visual Signal Platoon was later abolished.

The personnel of the Company when USAFIP, NL General Headquarters No. 2 arrived was as follows:

13 Officers
336 Enlisted Men

With the arrival of HPA General Order No. 127, dated August 7, 1945 which organized the USAFIP, NL to the 2nd Regular Division of the Philippine Army and with subsequent arrival of USAFIP, NL General Order No. 54, dated August 23, 1945, the 2nd Signal Company, Special Troops of the Philippine Army came to official existence with the following number of personnel:

4 — Officers assigned
1 — Officer attached
96 — Enlisted Men
Its present personnel strength is as follows:
8 — Officers assigned
7 — Officers attached
203 — Enlisted Men

Its present equipment

The 2nd Signal Company has now in its possession the latest radio receivers and transmitters such as the following:

8	—	sets	—	Model	3BZ
5	—	"	—	"	3MK-11
2	—	"	—	"	679-J
2	—	"	—	"	AMR-100
1	—	"	—	NEI-11	Model
1	—	"	—	T-50—M	"
2	—	"	—	SCR—	188 "
3	—	"	—	"	193 "
21	—	"	—	"	284 "
14	—	"	—	"	300 "
1	—	"	—	"	506 "
24	—	"	—	"	511 "
143	—	"	—	"	536 "
1	—	"	—	"	543 "
17	—	"	—	"	610 "
17	—	"	—	"	694 "

The Company has also the following numbers of Telephone Switchboards:

18 — Model B-71
10 — " BD-72
1 — " BD-89-C with cabinet

It has also the following Signal equipment and sets:

- 13 — Telegraph sets
- 4 — Telegraph printer sets
- 31 — Radio generators, GN — 45
- 10 — Remote Control Units
- 5 — Volemeters
- 56 — Converters
- 113 — Headsets, TS-10
- 57 — Headsets, HS-30
- 55 — Holders, M-167
- 205 — Lantern Port Hand
- 20 — Sets of linemen equipment
- 9 — Sets of maintenance equipment
- 45 — Microphones of the T-30 Model

There are also adequate numbers of the following: axles, belts, cable assemblies, chests, climbers, flagsets, flashlights, and other minor equipment needed in signal communication work.

All these radio sets and signal equipment were secured from the "I" Corps and from Base M gradually since the time the Sixth US Army landed.

CONTRIBUTION OF THE PEOPLE OF ABRA TO THE DEFENSE AND LIBERATION OF THE PHILIPPINES

Col. Robert H. Arnold

Foreword

The following personal account of my experiences in Abra during World War II has been written for the Abra Historical Association at the request of the Association through my good friend, Attorney Rosalio B. Bobila (Major, Infantry Reserve, AFP), Archivist of the Association. As the commanding officer of the only American troops stationed in the Ilocos region at the outbreak of World War II, and as the Commanding Officer of the 15th Infantry USAFIP, NL during the entire Campaign of Liberation of the Philippines, I was intimately involved in the beginning of the resistance movement in Abra and its liberation from the Japanese. The periods before and after those periods covered by this paper as well as the long intervening period, although crucial ones, have been deliberately left blank because the writer was then actively engaged in other sectors. Perhaps others who were in Abra and were in a position to know of the conduct of the war, may complete this historical account during the periods not known to the writer.

The Beginning of Resistance

In a world beset with internal subversion and subordination of public good to personal interest, it is well to ponder the heroic, unselfish patriotism of friends and relatives in days past. When the world thinks of heroic patriotism in World War II, it can never forget the beleaguered resistance of Fil-American fighters in Luzon. Though Abra is some distance from Bataan, and even Lingayen, it is entitled to an important place in the annals of the Philippine Resistance Movement. It was here in the municipality of Lagangilang,

Abra, on December 27, 1941 that with the assistance of Mayor Cagaïd Umali, I posted a historic notice in the municipal office of Langangilang and the surrounding towns of Dolores, San Juan, and Tayum. This notice posted with the cooperation of the mayors and officials of all those towns called upon all reservists and other military personnel not assigned for duty to report to the undersigned in defense of their country. Almost immediately over three hundred men from all over Abra reported for duty. These were later joined by scores of volunteers. No man responded negatively when asked if he was prepared to die for his country if necessary. These patriots plus thirty-two Americans previously under my command were the nucleus of what later became the 121st Infantry, PA, USAFIP, NL. It is regretted that I do not have a full and complete list of all those resistance fighters who were included in this command, but it is hoped that this article will bring forth responses from those who were with the Command and are still alive so as to supply further verifiable information to complete the history of those days.

Among those who joined this resistance force was the well-known American civilian miner, Walter Cushing. As part owner and general manager of a gold mine in Basy, Abra, Cushing's life had been stalled with the invasion of the Japanese military forces, and he was quick to promise his fullest support in our plans to strike at the invading enemy. These services were indeed very substantial and were only surpassed by his consuming ambition to publicize himself as the leader and inspirer of all guerrilla activities in Northern Luzon. With Cushing's help and that of several municipal officials, our newly organized Army command was able to beat the Japanese to the nearby Philippine Army Supply Depot in Bangued. This stocked our organization with a good supply of Browning Automatic rifles, Enfield rifles, 30 caliber ammunitions, and hand grenades. Added to the machine guns and other weapons of the American contingent it provided substantial fire power for the new guerrilla force.

In the first week of January, 1942, I assigned Cushing five volunteers to assist in a bridge demolition mission south of Vigan near Narvacan so as to obstruct southbound Japanese troop and supply movements. Cushing later reported a success-

ful demolition and also having sighted a truckload of Japanese troops but with no fire fight or casualties on either side. This mission was later reported in a USAFIP, NL historical narrative by quoting after the war was over from Cushing's friend, M. B. Ordun (not in Abra or Ilocos Sur in January, 1942) saying that "they ambushed a truckload of Japs near Narvacan, Ilocos Sur, killing 12 out of 14 occupants."¹ Although such tales may have a place as friendly propaganda in wartime, they need careful verification before being called history.

In the second week of January, 1942 I declared to commit the Abra Provisional Battalion to action along Highway No. 3 south of Vigan, some place in the vicinity of Candon. Moving the troops from Lagangilang to Pilar and then San Emilio and Lidlidda, Ilocos Sur, Cushing and I reconnoitered the Candon area for a large-scale ambush. Early in the morning of January 18, 1942 the troops were moved into Candon from their bivouac in Bauguen. Utilizing our field telephones and telephone wire, a telephone connection was set up from an Observation Post north of the town to my Command post along the road near the bridge immediately south of Candon. At midmorning our post at the north of the town reported to me by telephone the approach of a Japanese truck convoy. According to our plan, we pulled an empty overturned *calesa* into the middle of the road so as to block passage across the bridge. A few minutes later, the lead vehicle in the convoy reached the bridge and stopped to shove the *calesa* aside. As it was doing this, the other vehicles had to slow up and they closed their intervals with the trucks ahead. At a signal from me, the troops which I had stationed in the houses on the east side of the road opened a barrage of fire on all ten vehicles in the convoy. Within one hour all trucks and supplies had been destroyed along with sixty Japanese troops, some of whom had never been able to jump from their vehicles. A single American was the only casualty on the side of the newly organized resistance fighters. This man was Sergeant Pennington, a brave and aggressive automatic rifleman who distinguished himself during the engagement, but was shot in the leg by a Japanese soldier thought to be dead. The success of this first large ambush in North Luzon

¹ Historical Record Section, G-3 *Guerrilla Days in North Luzon* (Camp Spencer, Luna, La Union: USAFIP, NL, 1946), p. 9.

was a tribute to the Abra veterans who executed the detailed plans of this encounter with masterful precision.

Early the following morning, Cushing departed from our bivouac area in Bauguen leaving the veterans of the Candon ambush to face a search-and-destroy Japanese force of approximately 500 enemy soldiers outside of Bauguen. A rear guard action was fought at a bridge east of the town and civilians later reported an estimated 200 Japanese were killed or wounded. Sergeant Clyde McHenry and Corporals Goldie, Goldbrum, and Benedum were recommended by me for Bronze Star Medals for extraordinary courage over and above the call of duty during this battle. Our troops withdrew to General del Pilar, unpursued by the badly wounded enemy force, but this is the story of another province and another action. Cushing joined me a few days later at General del Pilar and advised that he had seen Colonel John P. Horan at Lepanto and had received an initial commission of Major in the AUS. However, I learned that this commission was later confirmed as Captain for AUS for policy reasons and considering Captain Cushing's very short military service. About this time I was directed to proceed to the Mt. Province with one squad of Filipino troops to make an armed reconnaissance of this area as the next possible area of operations. After two ambushes on the Mt. Trail for which Col. Horan twice cited me, followed by an injury to my leg, Gen. Wainwright radioed my re-assignment to the 14th Infantry, P. A. There I commanded the Headquarters Battalion until October, 1942 when I assumed that Regimental Command.

The Campaign of Liberation

The next time I saw Abra was in November, 1944 on my way back to Ilocos Norte to take command of the newly organized 15th Infantry USAFIP, NL from Captain John P. O'Day. I was then accompanied by Captain Jose Valera and his landing party from Australia. Stopping at Lagangilang again to rest briefly on the way from Colonel Volckmann's USAFIP, NL headquarters at Camp 5 in Benguet, I was delighted to note the same amazing loyalty and support for the Armed Forces that had existed from the beginning in Abra. The mayor of the town was then Mr. Rufo Dacanay whom I learned had never surrendered to the Japanese during the almost three

years of enemy occupation of the province. Under his direction I found that a *Bolo Unit*² had been set up to serve as civilian logistical and communications support for the Resistance Forces. Similarly, a Women's Auxilliary Service had been organized to render volunteer services on the distaff side. The ladies of the Bobila and Bigornia families were very active with this organization and the community hospital. These civilian volunteer organizations which were paralleled in the other principal municipalities of Abra, made a wonderful contribution to the morale, health, and success of the 15th Infantry during my stay in Abra.

Staying at the home of the gracious and patriotic Jose Reyna's (Principal of the Lagangilang Agricultural High School), I learned that some weeks earlier the enemy had withdrawn his troops from the eastern side of the Abra river. His main body was in Bangued with patrols reaching as far as the west bank of the Abra River. While in Abra at this time I got some reports of abuse of civilians accused of collaboration with the enemy. Therefore, I took the occasion to advise all commanders in Abra that henceforth I would not tolerate any brutality or killings without first being apprised of the findings of the court of trial and then personally approving the findings. Fortunately, no such matter was ever brought to my attention from that day until the return of Civil Government in Abra after the hostilities were over.

In the first week of December, I departed for Ilocos Norte with my party where I formally took command of all Fil-American troops in Ilocos Norte as well as Abra and Ilocos Sur. One of the earliest official orders which I issued affecting the civilians of the three northern Ilocos provinces was to transfer judicial authority in cases involving civilians from the Army to the military mayors whom I had appointed or confirmed. These mayors were directed to set up bolomen juries of unimpeachable character to try violations of the law to include treason if such were alleged. Although I understood that these juries were not within the scope of the normal peacetime legal system which made no provision for trial by jury, the effectiveness and justice of these courts were acclaimed by the civilian and

² Bolo is a heavy-bladed knif of about two feet long and three inches wide, similar to a machete.

the military sectors alike.

In Ilocos Norte, the all-out drive against the enemy forces began with the execution of D-Day missions on January 9, 1945. Laoag was liberated on February 12, and by the end of the month the enemy forces were virtually eliminated from that province as a result of the well-coordinated attacks of the 15th Infantry. Accordingly, in the last week of February, the 2nd Battalion was directed to move to Abra via Nueva Era and to set up an initial command post near Dolores. At the same time, I moved the Regimental Command Post from Batac to Lagangilang. This was followed next by the movement of the 1st Battalion into Abra. On March 1, the 3rd Battalion with its CP at Narvacan launched an attack against enemy-held Solvec north of Narvacan and the Battle of Tangadan was on.

Initial intelligence estimates of Japanese intentions in northwest Luzon indicated that after being forced to flee from Ilocos Norte and northern Ilocos Sur by the coordinated attacks of the 15th Infantry there would be a regrouping of enemy forces in the Tangadan area with three possible options for them to follow, i.e., (1) to stand and fight until overcome; (2) to retreat southward either along Highway No. 3 or along the Abra Valley toward Cervantes with the object of joining the Japanese 19th Division in the Bessang area; (3) to retreat east through Bangued and Lagangilang and on to the Mt. Province with the objective of joining Yamashita's last-stand forces in those rugged mountains. Since I had already directed the 3rd Battalion to occupy Narvacan and block the enemy from moving south along Highway No. 3, it was to prevent, if possible, General Araki and his 79th Infantry Brigade from breaking out to the east that influenced my decision to move the 1st and 2nd Battalions as well as the Regimental troops into the Abra Valley east of Bangued. The Abra River was the jump off in our drive toward the back door of Tangadan and the liberation of Bangued.

The Liberation of Bangued and the Battle of Tangadan

Tangadan, the center of Japanese resistance in Northwest Luzon, rises astride Highway No. 6 near the Abra-Ilocos Sur border. The Tangadan hills stand guard over this principal approach into the province of Abra, Bangued, and the whole

Abra Valley. Early in 1945, Tangadan had been converted into a formidable citadel with entrenched guns of various calibers. Located on the highest ground in the area, the Japanese enjoyed a series of fine observation points overlooking the arena of battle with excellent fields of fire for their guns that were pointed to the southwest, south, and southeast.

At the start of operations at Tangadan, Major General Araki's troops in the area were variously estimated at 2500 to 6000. His command included the 79th Infantry Brigade and attached units originally stationed in Ilocos Norte and Ilocos Sur. The Battle of Tangadan began on March 1 with the attack of the 3rd Battalion on Solvec. Solvec fell to our forces in two days, but the fight was continued on the hills of Araniw which held out for many more days. After Highway No. 3 was secured, the 3rd Battalion began its attack abreast of Highway No. 6 toward Tangadan. Major John O'Day, my Regimental Executive Officer, coordinated these attacks with close support from the U. S. Air Force. These ground attacks on Tangadan were aggressively supported by one battery of the USAFIP, NL's Artillery Battalion. Lt. Col. Alfonso Arellano (later Lt. General and Chief of Staff, AFP) had organized and commanded this battalion while Captain Segundo Velasco (later General and Chief of Staff, AFP) had organized and commanded his battery which was attached to the 15th Infantry. Captain Velasco's artillery, utilizing 75 mm howitzers, was in direct support of the 3rd Battalion, 15th Infantry and later the 2nd Battalion, 15th Infantry as well until the fall of the Tangadan fortress.

By this time, the 2nd Battalion less Company G had crossed the Abra River from its staging area in Dolores and moved towards Tayum. Japanese outposts in this area withdrew in front of our advancing soldiers. The highest co-operation was extended by Mayor Felix Tuanguin and his municipal and barrio officials in the movement of our troops through this area. The 2nd Battalion continued its advance until our men were in sight of Cassamata Hill. Since our intelligence patrols reported numerous well-fortified gun emplacements, an air strike was scheduled to be followed by an assault on the enemy strong points. Since Cassamata Hill overlooks the provincial capitol of Bangued, capture of the hill would enable us to liberate and

control the town.

The 2nd Battalion less Company G was given the mission of taking Cassamata Hill. On the day designated for the air strike, the 2nd Battalion advanced rapidly westward from Tayum, abreast of and to the south of the Tayum-Bangued Road. Most pockets of enemy resistance were over-run and our troops had advanced almost to the base of Cassamata Hill when the U.S. Navy SDB planes came over for the air support mission. Our frontlines were indicated by panels clearly visible from the air. After dive bombing runs had scored hits on enemy emplacements, the planes circled low for their strafing runs. As the first plane came in for its strafing run, a by-passed pocket of Japanese opened up on the low flying plane with its automatic weapons. The other planes seeing our troops along the road forward of the Japanese pocket, assumed we were also the enemy, and all planes repeatedly strafed my command party and troops with their 50 caliber guns. The Japanese, taking advantage of our casualties and disruption, opened up a counter-attack. The effect of this unfortunate incident merely served to delay our all-out attack on the enemy positions on Cassamata Hill.

The victorious drive on the Hill was made a few days later by bringing up the 1st Battalion less Company C and attacking from the east while elements of the 2nd Battalion outflanked the Japanese from the south. Cassamata Hill was overrun without further air support and Bangued was liberated for good from the enemy. This was the third provincial capital liberated by the 15th Infantry in 1945. Young Sergeant Esteban Cabanos, the now popular President of the Philippines Veterans Bank, was one of those who played a leading role in this battle.

In the first week of April 1945 I directed the 2nd Battalion then under Major Harley Heib to move to a position on the right flank of the hard-pressed 3rd Battalion along the Narvacan-Nagbukel line. Major Celedonio A. Ancheta as S-3 (and later 2nd Battalion Commander) assisted in this new deployment for the attack on Tangadan. At the same time, the 1st Battalion under the very able and resourceful leadership of Major Simeon Valdez (now Congressman) was directed to attack westward from their positions along the Bangued-Peñarubia-Pilar Road. Contact was to be established with the right

flank of the 2nd Battalion which was to attack northward and try to penetrate the enemy's Tangadan defenses. By this time, the 3rd Battalion under Major Gaudencio Sillona's experienced leadership had been reinforced by Company E of the 66th Infantry and Company A of the USAFIP, NL Casualty and Replacement Battalion. It was already pressing very hard on the enemy by its attack from the west, coordinated with large air strikes by the U.S. 5th Air Force which devastated the enemy's positions and morale. During these attacks of the 3rd Battalion, Captain Julio Acosta distinguished himself with his courage and aggressiveness beyond the call of duty. In spite of being seriously wounded by enemy fire, he insisted on being returned to his Company I to lead his men in further combat against the enemy. His repeated acts of quiet courage in battle in 1945 marked him as one of the Philippines bravest patriots and won for him the Silver Star for Gallantry in Action.

After the redistribution of the battalions as indicated above, made possible by the pressure put upon the enemy by the 1st and 2nd Battalions, it became evident that the Japanese would not attempt to break out of the Tangadan encirclement by marching directly east through Lagangilang to the Mt. Province. The chief threat was now a breakout to the southernmost, probably through Narvacan and down Highway No. 3. I, therefore, moved the Regimental Command Post from Lagangilang, Abra to San Esteban, Ilocos Sur so as to be able to ensure that I could block any attempt by the enemy to break out in this direction which would have cut our supply line and endangered the rear of the 121st Infantry.

Soon after the move of my Command Post to San Esteban it became evident that there was a need for a Provincial Governor of Abra to see to the needs of the civilians of that province and to plan for an orderly transition from a war-ravaged economy to a peacetime economy and society. The man most prepared and willing to accept this great responsibility at this time seemed to be Mr. Zacarias A. Crispin whom I had previously appointed the military mayor of Langiden. As a military mayor, Mr. Crispin had proved to be a most able, dedicated, and articulate administrator, fully cognizant of the needs of the civilian and military sectors alike. Therefore, it was without hesitation that I appointed Zacarias A. Crispin as military governor of Abra

at this critical time. One of his accomplishments of both civilian and military value was the construction of the Patong, Magsingal Trail to Bañacao, Bangued. This Trail which I later learned had been named the Arnold Trail, linked the people and activities of Ilocos Sur more directly with those of Abra. It also assisted the 15th Infantry in its encirclement of Tangadan. Over-all supervision of the construction of the Trail was largely accomplished by then Sergeant Rosalio B. Bobila of the 3rd Battalion, 15th Infantry.

By the 15th of April, the 15th Infantry had almost completed the encirclement of General Araki's forces. The general disposition of our forces were as shown on the situation map herewith. Enemy escape to the south via Highway No. 3 had been effectively blocked. Escape to the east had been blocked. Escape to the north was an impossibility. Escape to the southwest through the over-extended front of the 2nd Battalion or between the 1st and 2nd Battalions was the only possibility of escape for the desperate Japanese forces decimated by the U. S. Air Force strikes and the relentless attacks of our troops. On April 25, the Japanese began their breakout by driving a wedge through the thin defensive line of F Company. Reinforcements sent up could not arrive in time to be effective. Two days later the 3rd Battalion overran Tangadan and the few enemy troops that still remained. The 1st and 3rd Battalions immediately started mopping up operations while Companies E and F of the 2nd Battalion pursued and harassed the fleeing enemy.

As soon as the direction and intent of the fleeing Japanese could be ascertained, an encircling force was immediately constituted, and moved by trucks as far as Bauguen, Ilocos Sur, from where these troops (the 3rd Battalion) marched to Angaki. These encircling troops set up a defense on the high ground of the Angaki-Pananuman line. As the enemy fled up the Abra Valley pursued by the 1st and 2nd Battalion units, he ran into our blocking force of I and M Companies where he was further decimated before he could break out to the east towards Bessao. The Battle of Tangadan was over and Abra was completely liberated from the Japanese forces which could never return.

The *After-Battle Report* concluded that of the estimated almost 10,000 Japanese in the sector of the 15th Infantry in Ilocos Norte, Ilocos Sur, and Abra in January, 1945, approxi-

mately 70 percent of them had become casualties and prisoners of war by the end of the Tangadan campaign, victims of air and ground action initiated by the 15th Infantry. General Walter Krueger, commanding the U. S. Sixth Army's liberation force was so delighted with the destruction of the enemy in North-west Luzon and at Tangadan that he wrote a special letter of commendation to the officers and men of the 15th Infantry citing them for outstanding combat achievement in the Northern Luzon campaign. This was a fitting tribute—the only one of its kind—to the people of Abra where the resistance movement was born as well as to the fighting men of the 15th Infantry whose exploits were written in blood for their country's annals.

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH ARMY
Office of the Commanding General
APO 442

15 June 1945

Subject: Letter of Appreciation

To: Commanding Officer, 15th Infantry (PA)
(Thru: Commanding Officer USAFIP, NL)

It has come to my attention that the 15th Infantry (PA) was instrumental in containing and smashing the enemy 79th Infantry Brigade and liberating practically the entire province of Ilocos Sur.

Please convey to the officers and men of your command my appreciation of their outstanding combat achievements which have contributed greatly to the success of our arms in the Luzon campaign.

(SGD.) WALTER KRUEGER
General, U. S. Army
Commanding

1st Indorsement
19 June 1945

GHQ, USAFIP, NL

To: C. O., 15th Infantry, PA

1. Forwarded.
2. I wish to add my appreciation to that of the Commanding General, Sixth Army, for the splendid work accomplished by yourself and the officers and men of your command.

(SGD.) R. W. VOLCKMANN
Colonel, Infantry, AUS
Commanding

GENERAL AGENT
3rd Bn. 15th Inf. (PA) USAFIP, NL
In the Field

15 February 1945

SUBJECT: Report

TO : Capt. G. Sillona

1. This is to report the completion today of the Abra-Ilocos Sur trail, a line from Patong, Magsingal to Bañacao, Bangued, cutting through the Cordillera range. This trail has been blazed in accordance with your order given to me, dated the 29th of January 1945. Constructed under my direct supervision and control, the work was accomplished with the co-operation of the military mayors of La Paz, Danglas, Dolores, Lagayan, Langiden, and Magsingal. Considering the hardships encountered in the course of the undertaking and the relatively short time expended in its accomplishments, it is with justifiable pride that I must state that my mission in this regard has been fulfilled beyond expectations.

2. The completion of this trail fills a long-felt need in this area and undoubtedly when the current conflict is over, the military and civilians alike will be able to make use of it to their mutual advantage. Since the early days of the Philippine Revolution when guerrillas of the Katipunan honeycombed our mountains for shelter and for strategic military purposes, there existed the necessity of establishing some form of communication between the provinces of Abra and Ilocos Sur. and now this dream has come true: to the greater glory of the 15th Infantry.

3. It is natural upon the establishment of roads, highways and trails, to name these works to the memory of some personality or object sacred to those who have builded them. At this juncture, as a matter of fact even long before this, only one name seemed to us as the most deserving of the honor of having the Ilocos Sur-Abra trail named after him. That man, who is in the true sense of the word, both an officer and a gentleman, has shown liberality of spirit and generosity of the soul, instilling in the hearts of civilians freedom from fear during the most critical days of the war. That man has, by his distinguished services to our people, won our hearts and enshrined his name in the pages of our history. His name will live long after this war is finished, long after we are dead. This man is Major R. H. Arnold. C. O. of the 15th.

4. This matter is being submitted to your consideration: that we name the completed Abra-Ilocos Sur trail after revered commanding officer, to whose achievements a worthy monument

indeed should be erected. And as the people of Abra are not yet in a position to build worthier monuments to his name, it is fitting and proper that the trail that binds two neighbor sister provinces be named "The Arnold Trail."

5. The trail has been made possible by the sacrifices of the men of Abra and Ilocos Sur, who under the sterling leadership of Major Arnold, have fought in this war both on and behind the frontlines. And I know the officers and men of our regiment and loyal civilians will remember the high-minded patriotism of Major Arnold every time they pass by it in the course of the present war and long after it. Strangers passing through the trail will inquire and ponder the deeds of our beloved leader, Major Arnold.

6. Please let me know of your decision on this matter.

7. Best regards and good luck.

(SGD.) ROSALIO B. BOBILA
Gen. Agent & Spec. Investigator
3rd Bn. 15th Infantry, NL
Bn S-2

HEADQUARTERS USAFIP
North Luzon

Feb. 20, 1943

SPECIAL ORDERS:

No. 3

1. Under authority contained in radiogram Number 20, from General MacARTHUR, dated February 14, 1943, Captain WILLIAM ARTHUR, O-S90378, is hereby given command of the troops of the 121st Infantry in the provinces of Ilocos Sur and Abra following the reported death of Capt. Walter Cushing on September 29, 1942 in Jones, Isabela.

2. The orders of Capt. Arthur will be obeyed by all concerned.

(SGD.) ARTHUR K. NOBLE
Lt. Col. U.S.A.

(SGD.) MARTIN MOSES
Lt. Col. U.S.A.

A TRUE COPY:

(SGD.) H. LUMANG
Capt. Inf. PA
Adjutant

SIMEON A. OLA
(1865-1952)

Celedonio A. Ancheta

Simeon Arboleda Ola, the last Filipino general who surrendered on September 25, 1903 to the Americans during the Filipino-American War, is often the subject of controversy in many Philippine Historical Association's seminars whether his rank was a *general* and the *last* general to surrender. We cannot be indifferent and dismiss the case of Ola without seriously looking into it. "The only behavior befitting to a scholar is scholarly behavior, which means the consistent application of reasons, and the creative intellectual imagination to one's field of competence."

Ola risked his life for the national cause during the Philippine Revolution like many other Filipino patriots. We should not allow ourselves to commit the same mistakes like "the mass media of the Old Society exercised the freedom of the press and expression ruthlessly, in the process destroying a more precious right, the right of a man to a good name and the individual's right to human dignity."

We should investigate our past and be guided by the lesson of history. We should not be like Henry Ford, with his colossal fortune made him in the eyes of his contemporaries, dismissed history as "bunk". "He may have considered history to be bunk, but his own company could not have function without the data which the past alone provides." Therefore, when we re-write our history we must investigate our past to understand fully the truth of our struggle for freedom in order to guide us in our search for national identity.

This monograph on Ola may be in narrative form so as to reconstruct the events as they happened, but I may prefer to concentrate in analysis rather than description.

To begin with, Simeon Ola was born on September 2, 1865 in Guinobatan, Albay. His parents were Vicente Ola and Apo-




Simeon A. Ola (1865-1952), of Guinobatan, Albay last Filipino general who surrendered to the Americans on September 25, 1903 during the Filipino-American War.



Simeon Mandac (1879-1960), twice elected Provincial Governor of Ilocos Norte in 1910 and 1930, was the right-hand man of Mons. Gregorio Aglipay during the Philippine Revolution and the founding of the Philippine Independent Church.



Lt. Alberto S. Aranzaso (1917-1942), 6th Pursuit Squadron, Philippine Air Corps, hero, died as an officer and gentleman during the Second World War. He graduated from the Philippine Military Academy, class 1940.



Two of the four Chinese monuments in the Chinese cemetery, Manila in honor of the Chinese guerrillas who sacrificed their lives during the Japanese occupation in World War II.

lonia Arboleda. They belong to a middle class Filipino family. Simeon Ola's first wife gave him no child. He had two boys and two girls with his second wife, Trinidad Ostria. Fausto, the eldest, is a Colonel in the Reserve Force in the Armed Forces of the Philippines, while Tomas the younger son is presently employed with the BIR in Bicol. The two daughters are Vicenta and Maximina, both deceased.

Young Simeon Ola left his studies at the Colegio de Nueva Caceres at Naga, Camarines Sur when the Philippine Revolution broke out in 1896. He joined the *Katipunán* secret society at his home town, which was organized by Jose Glicerio Delgado, the emissary of Andres Bonifacio to the Bicol region.

One night, one Pepito Sarte from Ligao, Albay arrived in Guinobatan with two boxes of Remington rifles, twenty four guns in all with ammunitions. As *Teniente de Cuadrillos* in Guinobatan, trusted and confident of the parish priest, Fr. Carlos Cabido, no one ever suspected that Simeon Ola was a member of the *Katipunán* society. Ola hid these guns up in the ceiling of the house of Don Tomas Gallegos located just in front of the Catholic Church of Guinobatan.

The first move of Ola was to recruit men in order to free about 93 of his townmates who were arrested and imprisoned by the Spaniards for revolutionary activities. He was able to free them through the connivance of Sgt. Antonio Loamo, the key keeper of the jail. They fled, about 300 of them to the mountains of Albay, and defiantly fought the Spaniards in any opportune time. Ola assumed leadership of his fellow *Katipuneros* in the Bicol region.

Ola was appointed as Captain of the Revolutionary Forces by Gen. Vito Belarmino, the over-all commander in the Bicol region, for his fearless leadership and gallantry in action when he captured seventy two *Casadores Españoles* with their arms in the battle of Camalig, Albay in April, 1898.

Another achievement of Ola was the delivery without mishap of the amount of ₱42,000.00, all in silver coins in forty two empty petroleum boxes to Gen. Mariano Trias, Secretary of Finance of the first Aguinaldo cabinet, somewhere in Cavite as war contributions collected from the rich merchants of Albay. For two months and eight days, back and forth, Ola and his

men traveled through rugged mountains and trails with all the risk from being captured by the enemy. He had successfully accomplished his mission. If Ola is a bandit or a dishonest man he could have easily disappeared with the money without fear of being discovered.

On January 23, 1900 he had an encounter against the American troops that landed at Legaspi, Albay. The Americans suffered heavy losses. Ola was wounded on the thigh. In this fight, he captured three American soldiers with their arms, by the name of Dubose, Fred Hunter and Russell. After this encounter, General Belarmino promoted him to the rank of major.

In February 1900 at barrio Arimbay, Legaspi, Ola lost Jose Arboleda, his bolo Battalion Commander, because the later failed to follow the order not to pursue the retreating Americans. Ola suspected that the fleeing Americans were leading his men to a deep muddy pit. Sure enough, Arboleda was trapped in the mud. He could not get out of it before the Americans shot him to death.

One important engagement that Ola and his men participated was the defense of his home town, Guinobatan against the Americans entering the town from Naga, Camarines Sur. Ola together with Col. Engracio Orence at barrio Binogsacan, Guinobatan fought furiously the enemy who out-numbered them. In spite of overwhelming odds, they were able to prevent the Americans from occupying the town. While Ola and his men were fighting the Americans in Binogsacan, General Pawa's men¹ were burning the Colegio de San Buenaventura seminary in Guinobatan proper and the big house of the town mayor, Don Cirilo Jaucian, which was used as headquarters of the Americans.

On July 4, 1901 General Belarmino surrendered² to the Americans after the capture of General Aguinaldo at Palanan, Isabela on March 23, 1901. It was reported to the Adjutant of the Philippine Constabulary in Manila on July 3, 1901 by First Lieutenant E. R. Heggins, District Adjutant, that Simeon Ola, native of Guinobatan, Albay, "ex-major of Insurgents, surrendered at Legaspi on July 4, 1901, and returned to the hills as chief of the bandits soon after".³ In the *Annual Report of the War Department*, "Commandante Simeon Ola, Nicolas Espada, and Juan Salasar, with 12 officers and 37 men, 33

rifles, 3 revolvers, and 1,000 rounds of ammunitions, surrendered on July 5, 1901".⁴ There is a discrepancy on the correct date. Most probably, the correct date of the so-called "surrender" is on July 5, because according to the personal diary of Ola entitled, *Gotos na Estoria ni Simeon Ola*, that when General Belarmino received the first letter of General Trias which ordered them to surrender with his men, Ola refused. A second letter was received, again urging them to surrender, Ola said, "what can I do. I have to obey my superior. But it was not a surrender." According to him, he just accompanied General Belarmino to Manila so as to see General Aguinaldo.

They stayed in a house somewhere in Sta. Ana for about a month. While in Manila, all the generals and officers of General Aguinaldo, among them General Miguel Malvar, had conferences. In one of these conferences, Ola informed General Aguinaldo that when he returns to Bicol, he will go back to the hills and carry on the fight against the Americans. Being with General Belarmino when he surrendered, did not mean that he had also surrendered. He said that he accompanied General Belarmino because he was already sickly and almost blind.

When Ola returned to Albay on August 1, 1901, he was advised by some of his men not to proceed to Guinobatan because many of his men were already arrested and executed. His father, Vicente Ola, was executed by spies employed by the Americans for refusing to divulge the whereabouts of his son. The execution of his father consequently spurred Ola's determination to continue the struggle against the imposition of American rule in the Philippines.

When General Belarmino became almost blind and sick, he ordered Ola to assume his post as commanding general of the revolutionary forces in the Bicol region. General Malvar, who assumed the leadership of the revolution after the capture of General Aguinaldo, confirmed the rank of Ola as Brigadier-General, and over-all commander of Bicolandia.

So from here on, General Ola reorganized his forces. More recruits flocked to his headquarters in the mountain numbering more or less about 1,500 men.

On August 11, 1902 at about 7:30 p.m., General Ola and

his force entered the town of Oas, Albay and raided the Municipal Hall, and without resistance the municipal police was disarmed, securing 4 shotguns, 3 revolvers and a quantity of ammunitions.

On August 21, 1902 a detachment of 11 constabulary soldiers on patrol in the vicinity of barrio Macabugos, Libon, Albay were attacked at about 2:00 o'clock a.m. by the men of General Ola numbering about 50. The revolutionists captured 6 constabulary soldiers with their arms and ammunitions including one American officer. Two of the soldiers were wounded. They were finally released and joined Ola's forces.

On October 1, 1902, one Pedro Arambulo, emissary of Don Ramon Santos, the *presidente*, went to General Ola's camp at barrio Tomacobtacob, Ligao, Albay and informed him the desire of Santos for a conference with him to negotiate terms of his surrender. General Ola told the emissary that he interposed no objection receiving Don Ramon Santos. On the third day of the same month, Ramon Santos together with Major Jesse S. Garwood and Lieutenant Neri arrived in Ola's camp. They offered Ola P10,000.00 in cash which they brought with them and told him that the money were war contributions from the rich merchants from Albay in exchange for his surrender with his men and their arms. General Ola became angry and boldly answered them saying: UNA SOLA BALA DE MIS FUCILES NO SE PUEDE COMPRAR POR TODO EL ORO DEL MUNDO.⁵ (One single bullet of my guns cannot be bought by all the gold in the whole world). So, the three returned to the town without Ola. After so many promises and conferences extending over a period of forty days during which hostilities were suspended, Ola broke off negotiations and withdrew to the hills with his entire force and a large number of additional recruits that he had secured during the armistice.

In November, 1902 General Ola sent a message to Major Garwood, who was commander of the thirteen provinces in Southern Luzon, that he would like to discuss terms of surrender if he (Garwood), would come to his mountain stronghold alone. It was a dangerous insolent invitation, but Garwood in the spirit of the constabulary tradition, that "always allow opponent the first shot, then you have proved he is an outlaw," did not hesitate. He was met by guides at a designated spot. The en-

trepid officer was led blindfolded over many miles of rough trails, finally to find himself in the presence of General Ola amidst hundreds of armed men.

Ola as his captured records show, had no intention of surrendering and probably "had issued the invitation more of a challenge — a gesture of defiance" rather than a desire to surrender. But major Garwood was utterly unpredictable and as many other American officer have done in line of duty, he risked his life with casualness. Garwood had a pleasant conference with Ola while both were eating stewed grasshoppers around a camp fire with the great delight of the soldiers in camp. After the conference, Garwood picked up his cartridge belt and revolver which he had discarded, as usual, to show confidence, and mounting his horse, was led back to his waiting men. In admiration for the boldness of the constabulary chief, for the Filipino soldier admires that quality in others — Ola allowed him to return to his headquarters unharmed.⁹

General Ola had used Garwood's visit as a propaganda to increase his force and prestige among his men. This conference was hailed far and wide as a recognition of General Ola as an equal of the Americans. As a result, more recruits flocked to Ola's camp and joined the revolution.

General Ola resumed his resistance against the Americans. On July 15, 1903, the first really important and decisive battle took place in the town of Jovellar, which was garrisoned by the 31 Co., Philippine Scout. On this day, there was a detachment of only 25 scout soldiers in the town under the charge of Sgt. Nicolas Napolis when they were attacked by nearly all of Ola's force, including 60 riflemen and about 250 bolomen. The revolutionists made a fierce and determined attack upon the scout's barracks, but were met by a most obstinate and gallant defense. General Ola's force suffered 20 killed in action and 30 wounded.

It was Col. Harry Hills Bandholtz who finally forced the surrender of General Ola. But not until he had employed 12 companies of scout soldiers and an equal number of constabulary soldiers. Fighting resumed for non-compliance by the Philippine Commission of their promises of amnesty. The minor skirmishes against General Ola were innumerable, and they occupied a period of many months.

On September 25, 1903, Eligio Arboleda, Ramon Santos, Epifanio Orozco, Lts. Frank L. Pyle, John Paegelow, J. B. Allison, Joseph Rogers and Teotimo Guevarra as escort, went to sitio Malagnatong, Mapaco, Guinobatan, Albay to secure the surrender of General Ola. They were sent by Colonel Bandholtz, the Assistant Chief of the Philippine Constabulary. So at half past 3:00 o'clock p.m. on the same day they all came down from the hills to the town plaza where Colonel Bandholtz and Governor Betts were waiting at the municipal building for General Ola's formal surrender.

It is pertinent to quote a part of the report of Colonel Bandholtz regarding the surrender:

In the later part of September, Simeon Ola, with my knowledge and consent, entered into communication with the *Presidente* of Guinobatan, and desired a conference. I permitted the *Presidente* of Guinobatan, Don Ramon Santos and Lieutenants Paegelow and Pyle to go to Ola's camp, giving them instructions that no armistice would be allowed and that nothing but unconditional surrender would be received, authorizing them to add, however, that none of the outlaws would be shot or hung on the plaza of the town immediately on arrival, but that they would be treated as prisoners until the court had decided as to their fate. As a result of this conference Ola accompanied the above mentioned gentlemen into Guinobatan with all of the men and guns then with him. He turned over that date 33 fire-arms, which was the first large surrender that had been accomplished. In the beginning he wished an armistice of ten days to get his men together, but I had previously instructed my officers that nothing of the kind would be allowed, but that he should surrender with all the soldiers present with him and that he would be allowed to bring the others subsequently . . . I wish to add that from the day Ola surrendered he acted in the most honorable way on all occasions, and worked sincerely and effectively in inducing and enforcing the surrender of the other outlaws.⁷

Due to lack of food for his men, and his failing health, Ola finally gave way for the diligent pleadings of relatives and of his first cousin, Eligio Arboleda, to surrender. Before signing the oath of allegiance to the United States, General Ola said: "I surrender to bring peace to the minds of my townmates."

In the report of the Chief of the Constabulary, Brig. Gen. Henry T. Allen, to the Civil Governor of the Philippines, on December 23, 1903 he reported that in the later part of September, 1903 Ola surrendered himself and 33 firearms to Lieutenants Paegelow and Pyle.^s

General Ola was tried in the Court of First Instance of Albay, under the sedition law, presided by Judge Adam C. Carson, on November 10, 1903. He was sentenced to 30 years imprisonment, but on the proclamation of amnesty to all political prisoners by the United States, he and his men were finally released on October 8, 1904.

General Ola was elected municipal president of his home town of Guinobatan for two terms, the first in 1910 to 1913, and second in 1916 to 1919. He died on February 14, 1952 at the age of 86 years, 5 months and 12 days to be exact.

In due recognition of General Ola's patriotic service during the Philippine Revolution and the Filipino-American War, the Philippine Veterans Administration, through a duly approved Resolution No. 72, adopted on March 30, 1965, confirmed Ola's rank of Brigadier General.

Republic of the Philippines
Office of the President
PHILIPPINE VETERANS ADMINISTRATION
Veterans Memorial Building
Arroceros St., Manila

RESOLUTION NO. 72

RESOLUTION CONFIRMING RANK OF BRIG. GENERAL
SIMEON OLA Y ARBOLEDA

WHEREAS, a request for classification of rank of the late revolutionary leader and pensioner, Simeon Ola y Arboleda, by one of his heirs, Fausto Ola, was presented by Deputy Administration GACAD;

WHEREFORE, on the basis of the rank indicated in the appendix to Item 10 of the application and in accordance with Resolution No. 19, s. 1964, on motion of Deputy Administrator MARTINEZ, duly seconded by Deputy Administrator ESTANISLAO, the Board of Administrator, in grateful and undying tribute to his patriotic service to God and country unanimously RESOLVED, as it is hereby resolved, to confirm his rank of BRIGADIER GENERAL; Resolved, finally, that the accrued

and uncollected pension by reason of such classification and/or confirmation be paid to the surviving heirs, effective June 17, 1950 (RA 539) up to his death on February 14, 1952, subject to availability of funds and the usual auditing requirements.

Adopted — March 30, 1965.

(SGD.) ALBERTO A. VILLAVERTE
Administrator

(SGD.) ANTONIO A. MARTINEZ (SGD.) JUAN Y. GACAD
1st Deputy Administrator 2nd Deputy Administrator

(SGD.) SOFRONIO S. TACARO
3rd Deputy Administrator

(SGD.) RUPERTO ESTANISLAO
4th Deputy Administrator

A T T E S T :

(SGD.) LEANARD A. RUIZ
Board Secretary

To honor his distinguished son, the Municipal Council of Guinobatan, approved Resolution No. 51 s. 1965, and duly endorsed by the Provincial Board of Albay, Resolution No. 163 s. 1965, which is the basis for Presidential Proclamation No. 439, declaring Thursday, September 2, 1965 as a Special Public Holiday in Guinobatan, Albay as Gen. Simeon A. Ola, Birth Centenary Year.

On September 24, 1965, President Diosdado Macapagal of the Republic of the Philippines signed Proclamation No. 456 declaring Saturday, September 25, 1965 as a Special Public Holiday in the Province of Albay.

BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES
PROCLAMATION NO. 456
DECLARING SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 25, 1965,
AS A SPECIAL PUBLIC HOLIDAY IN THE PROVINCE
OF ALBAY

WHEREAS Saturday, September 25, 1965, marks the 62nd anniversary of the surrender of General Simeon Ola, one of the last Filipino generals to surrender during the Filipino-American war; and

WHEREAS, the people of his province should be afforded

an opportunity to celebrate the event with appropriate ceremonies;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, DIOSDADO MACAPAGAL, President of the Philippines, pursuant to the authority vested in me by Section 30 of the Revised Administrative Code, do hereby declare Saturday, September 25, 1965, as a Special Public Holiday in the Province of Albay.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hands and caused the seal of the Republic of the Philippines to be affixed.

Done in the City of Manila, this 24th day of September, in the year of our Lord, nineteen hundred and sixty-five.
(SGD.) DIOSDADO MACAPAGAL

By the President:
(SGD.) SALVADOR L. MARIÑO
Acting Executive Secretary

On September 23, 1967 President Ferdinand E. Marcos signed Proclamation No. 269, declaring Monday, September 25, 1967 as a Special Public Holiday in Guinobatan, Albay.

MALACAÑANG
RESIDENCE OF THE PRESIDENT
OF THE PHILIPPINES
MANILA

BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES
PROCLAMATION NO. 269

DECLARING MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 25, 1967, AS A
SPECIAL PUBLIC HOLIDAY IN GUINOBATAN, ALBAY

WHEREAS, Monday September 25, 1967, marks the 64th anniversary of the surrender of General Simeon Ola, one of the last generals to surrender during the Filipino-American war; and

WHEREAS, the people of Guinobatan, Albay, should be afforded an opportunity to render homage to the honored General;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the authority vested in me by Section 30 of the Revised Administrative Code, do hereby declare Monday, September 25, 1967, as a special public holiday in Guinobatan, Albay.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the Republic of the Philippines to be affixed.

Done in the City of Manila, this 23rd day of September,
in the year of our Lord, nineteen hundred and sixty-seven.

(SGD.) FERDINAND E. MARCOS⁹
President of the Philippines

By the President:
(SGD.) RAFAEL M. SALAS
Executive Secretary

Not to be left behind in honoring the favorite son of Bicolandia, the Guinobatan Historical and Cultural Association (GHACA), commemorated the 71st Anniversary of the Historic Surrender (1903-1974), of General Simeon Arboleda Ola on September 25, 1974.

OLA'S RANK

From the *Fourth Annual Report of the Philippine Commission, 1903*, certified by Harold T. Pinkett, Chief of Natural Resources Branch, National Archives Records Service, Washington, D. C., the following is quoted, a part of the account of the Albay Insurrection as reported by Colonel Bandholtz on December 15, 1903:

On June 30, nearly all the towns of this province were reconcentrated, and both the constabulary and scout were actively and persistently engaged in operations against the ladron bands of "General" Simeon Ola, "Colonel" Lazaro Toledo, "Lieut.-Col." Tito Saculo and "Lieut.-Col." Augustin Saria. These different chiefs had with them a total of nearly 1,000 men, mostly armed with bolos and with about 150 firearms, according to our estimates.¹⁰

In a letter of April 15, 1904 of Colonel Bandholtz to United States Senator J. C. Burrows from Michigan, in an unguarded moment and with casualness, he wrote:

The ladron movement in Albay assumed rather large proportions, and was led by a native named General Simeon Ola, who had nearly 1,500 followers and about 200 firearms. Good luck again attended my efforts, and, inside of four months, I had brought about capture of the entire outfit, including Ola himself.¹¹

The rank of Ola as General, appears both in the *Fourth Annual Report* of the Philippine Commission and in a letter

of Colonel Bandholtz to Senator Burrows. Colonel Bandholtz could not have been mistaken of the rank of Ola as Brigadier General.

But the National Historical Commission now National Historical Institute in spite of the confirmation of Ola's rank by the Philippine Veterans Administration says that "the honorific title *General* as the proper rank of this patriotic man in Philippine-American War is still under study."

The Chairman of the National Institute wrote:

5 May 1975

President, Guinobatan Historical
and Cultural Association
Guinobatan, Albay

Dear Mrs. Carmen P. Neric

This has reference to your letter of April 3, 1975 sending us a copy of Resolution No. 1 s. 1975 of the Guinobatan Historical and Cultural Association on the proposed renaming of "Regan Barracks" in Legaspi City, to "Camp General Simeon A. Ola." Please be informed that the said proposal was taken up at the meeting of the members of the National Historical Institute last April 17, 1975.

The National Historical Institute interposes no objection to the renaming of the said camp provided that the former name *Regan Barracks* does not bear any historical significance to the Bicol regions; and provided that the camp is renamed simply as *Camp Simeon Ola*, dropping the honorific title "*General*", as the proper rank of this patriotic man in the Philippine-American War is still under study.

The continuous interest your association has in the popularization of eminent local personages is truly commendable.

Very truly yours,

ESTEBAN A. DE OCAMPO
Chairman

Ola rose from the lowest rank of a commissioned officer in the Spanish regime as *Teniente de Cuadrillos*, Captain in the Revolutionary Forces, Major in February, 1900, Colonel in June 1901, and finally Brigadier General.¹² Three days before General Belarmino, the Zone Commander and immediate chief of Ola, surrendered to the Americans, he ordered Ola to assume the command as General of the Revolutionary Forces in Bicolandia. General Belarmino had to transfer the command to Ola because he was then a very sick man, and almost blind.

Ola's rank as Brigadier General was confirmed by General Miguel Malvar, who on July 1901, issued a military order "announcing his assumption of the post of the highest authority in the islands, the Supreme Head and Commander-in-Chief of the Filipino Government, thus virtually becoming its President."

We can recall, that as early as November 12, 1899, General Aguinaldo disbands the regular army and orders guerrilla warfare against the American army. In a guerrilla warfare, a commander has the authority to appoint or to promote men under his command. So, in the case of Ola, his promotion need not come from the highest authority. Most of the generals of the Philippine Revolution got their ranks in the same manner as Ola. If Ola is not a *general*, Aguinaldo, who was chairman of the Board of Pension for Veterans could have interposed his objection when Ola applied for his pension as Brigadier General.

OLA AS LADRON

Ola being dubbed as *ladron*, is not unusual. All those resisting the imposition of American rule in the Philippines, as guerrillas, including Generals Malvar and Lukban, are called bandits by the Americans. During the Japanese occupation, the guerrillas in the hills are called also bandits by the Japanese.

Let us hear from a respectable American, Judge James H. Blount what he said about the insurgents or the so-called bandits:

Their avowed purpose was to subvert the existing government. The use of this word "insurrection" in connection of the various disturbance recalls a pertinent incident. In 1904 there was a vacancy on the Supreme Bench of the Islands. Some of my friends, member of the Bar of my district got up a petition to the then

Governor-General setting forth in most partial terms alleged qualifications for the place. Now in the Philippines, in the candor of informal social intercourse all of us always called a spade, a spade, i.e., we called an insurrection an insurrection, instead of referring to the disturbance in the guarded and euphemistic terms which you find in all the official reports intended for home consumptions. . . .

Think of this great government *negotiating* with the leader of a band of thieves who were openly and flagrantly defying its authority!¹³

OLA'S SURRENDER

The record shows that Ola surrendered on July 4, or 5, 1901, and then returned to the hills to resume fighting the Americans. Then on September 25, 1903 he was *captured* or *surrendered* himself to Lieutenants Paegelow and Pyle. Colonel Bandholtz in his letter to Senator Burrows stated that "I had brought about the capture of the entire outfit, including Ola himself."¹⁴

Let us see what the GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION, says in a letter to the son, Fausto Ola:

NATIONAL ARCHIVES & RECORDS SERVICE
Washington D. C. 20408
May 14, 1965

Major Fausto O. Ola
Guinobatan, Albay
Philippines

Dear Major Ola:

Your letter of May 6, 1965, requested information about the date of the surrender of General Simeon Ola of Bicol.

The report of the Chief of the Philippine Constabulary for 1903 is among the record of the former Bureau of Insular Affairs of the War Department in the National Archives. Included in this report is a report of July 3, 1903 to the Adjutant of the Philippine Constabulary, Manila, from Headquarters, Second District, Philippine Constabulary, Tayabas, Philippines, by First Lieutenant E. R. Higgins, District Adjutant. In his report Lieutenant Higgins, stated "Albay: —Simeon Ola, Bicol, native of Guinobatan, ex-major of Insurgents, surrendered at Legaspi, July 4, 1901 and returned to the hills as chief of bandits soon after". (1 page \$1.25). In the report of the Chief of the

Constabulary, Brigadier General Henry T. Allen, to the Civil Governor of the Philippines, dated December 23, 1903, General Allen reported that in the latter part of September 1903 Simeon Ola surrendered himself and 33 firearms to Lieutenant Paegelow and Pyle. (2 pages \$2.00). These records do not contain any other mention of the surrender of General Ola.

We can furnish certified negative photostats of the item described above for the prices indicated. If you wish to order copies please make remittance to the Collections Officer, National Archives and Record Service, General Service Administration, 8th Street and Pennsylvania Avenue, Northwest, Washington, D. C. 20408, by international money order drawn in United States dollars on a bank in the United States and made payable to the General Services Administration (NCRE).

Sincerely yours,
(SGD.) Miss JANE F. SMITH
Chief, Social and Economic Branch
Office of the Civil Archives

The fact that Ola returned to the hills, the so-called "surrender" on July 4, 1901, is immaterial. Ola has all the right and reason to return to the hills and start his own revolution. General Aguinaldo did not surrender but he was captured, and therefore, the remnants of his army could very well justify themselves to continue the revolution.

OLA A PENSIONER

In recognition of his service during the Philippine Revolution and Filipino-American War, he was awarded a pension by the Board of Pension for Veterans¹⁵

Republic of the Philippines
Office of the President
PHILIPPINE VETERANS ADMINISTRATION
Veterans Memorial Building
Arroceros St., Manila

April 20, 1967

Statement of Back Pension, due to increase of Pension from P15.00 as Private, to P100.00, as Brigadier General under Commonwealth Act No. 605, as Amended, Payable to the Heirs of Brigadier General Simeon A. Ola.

Period Covered	Amount of Differential Pension per Month	Total
June 17-30, 1950	P85.00	P 39.67
July 1, 1950-June 30, 1950	85.00	1,020 00
July 1, 1951-Feb. 14, 1952	85.00	637.00

Grand Total P1,697.17

Above statement is as per Directive No. 14-a, dated April 26, 1965, of the Board of Administrators of the Philippine Veterans Administration payment of which was held pending due to non-availability of corresponding funds.

CERTIFIED CORRECT:

(Sgd.) CARLOS R. LARDIZABAL
Chief Accountant IV
Chief, Accounting Division

OLA THE MAN

During the Japanese occupation, Gen. Artemio Ricarte, *Vibora*, of Revolutionary fame, came over here from Japan, in two letters on May 14, and September 14, 1942 asked General Ola to help establish peace among our people. General Ola refused for reason of advanced age. But the fact was that he abhorred the idea of suppressing the guerrilla movement, which was fighting the same idealism as he was during the revolution, to liberate his country against the imposition of a foreign rule.

"Gallantry, integrity, honesty, loyalty, versatility, perseverance, freedom-loving, civic-spiritedness are but a few of General Ola's outstanding traits. General Simeon Arboleda Ola serves well his country in war and in peace. The credit goes to him as the last Filipino General to surrender to the enemy!"¹⁶

R E F E R E N C E S

1. Gen. Jose Ignacio Pawa, a Chinese national, who fought in Bicol during the Philippine Revolution.
2. *Annual Report of the War Department for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1902*. IX (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1902), p. 342.
3. Letter of Jane F. Smith, Chief, Social and Economic Branch, Office of Civil Archives, Washington, D.C., May 14, 1965 to Major Fausto O. Ola of Guinobatan, Albay, Philippines.
4. *Annual Report, op. cit.*, p. 342.
5. See General Ola's application for pension in the Philippine Veterans Administration Office, Manila.

6. Col. Harold Hanne Elarth, *The Story of the Philippine Constabulary*, (Los Angeles: Globe Printing Co., 1949), pp. 27-31; also see Vic Hurley, *Jungle Patrol: The Story of the Philippine Constabulary* (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1938), pp. 56, 95, 147, 151 & 380.
7. *Fourth Annual Report of the Philippine Commission*, 1903, part 3, p. 92. Copy is certified by Harold T. Pinket, chief, Natural Resources Branch, National Archives and Record Service, Washington, D.C., pp. 8-9, OB 253-254, Group No. 350, 5/9/74.
8. Letter of Jane F. Smith, *op. cit.*
9. Another, Proclamation No. 96, declaring A Special Public Holiday in Guinobatan, Albay, signed by President Marcos on August 31, 1966.
10. *Fourth Annual Report*, *op. cit.*, p. 6; OB 251.
11. Letter of Col. Harry Hills Bandholtz, Assistant Chief, Philippine Constabulary to United States Senator Hon J. C. Burrows, April 15, 1904, sheet No. 2. This letter is in the Michigan Historical Collection, Michigan University, Ann Arbor Dr. Robert Warner, in charge.
12. *Annual Report*, *op. cit.*, pp. 340, 342, 345, & 360.
13. James H. Blount, *American Occupation of the Philippines 1898-1912*. (New York: G. P. Putnam's, 1913), pp. 422-423 & 436.
14. Letter of Colonel Bandholtz, *op. cit.*
15. Primitivo C. Milan, "General Simeon Ola, 1865-1952," *Philippine Free Press*, Manila (May 28, 1955), pp. 27, 45 & 47.
16. Take note that Gen. Vicente Lukban (1860-1916), surrendered on February 18, 1902 at Tami, Samar; while Gen. Miguel Malvar (1865-1911), surrendered in Lipa, Batangas on April 16, 1902.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Documents

- Annual Reports of the War Department for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1902.* IX, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1902.
- Fourth Annual Report of Philippine Commission, 1903.* Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1903.
- Letter, Col. Harry Hills Bandholtz, Assistant Chief of the Philippine Constabulary to United States Senator J. C. Burrows from Michigan, April 15, 1904.
- Letter, Miss Jane F. Smith, Chief, Social and Economic Branch, Office of Civil Archives, Washington, D.C. to Major Fausto O. Ola of Guinobatan, Albay, Philippines.
- Letter, Esteban A. de Ocampo, Chairman, National Historical Commission to Mrs. Carmen P. Neric, President, Guinobatan Historical and Cultural Association, May 5, 1975.
- Proclamation No. 456, Declaring Monday, September 25, 1965, as A Special Public Holiday in the Province of Albay by President Diosdado Macapagal.
- Proclamation No. 269, Declaring Monday, September 25, 1967, as A Special Public Holiday in Guinobatan, Albay by President Ferdinand E. Marcos.
- Resolution No 72, Resolution Confirming Rank of Brigadier General of Simeon Ola y Arboleda, Philippine Veterans Administration, Republic of the Philippines, March 30, 1965.

Statement of Back Pension of Brigadier General Simeon A. Ola, Philippine Veterans Administration, Republic of the Philippines, April 20, 1967.

Books

- Blount, James H. *American Occupation of the Philippines, 1898-1912*. New York: G. P. Putnam's, 1913.
- Elarth, Harold Hanne, ed. *The Story of the Philippine Constabulary*. Los Angeles: Globe Printing Co., 1949.
- Hurley, Vic. *Jungle Patrol: The Story of the Philippine Constabulary*. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1938.
- National Historical Commission, Publication No. 1. *Eminent Filipinos*. Manila: Philippine Textbook Publishers, 1965.
- Willis, Henry Parker. *Our Philippine Problem: A Study of American Colonial Policy*. New York: Henry Holt Co., 1905.

Articles

- Gwekoh, Sol H. "Simeon A. Ola: Revolutionary General in Bicol." *Manila Times*, September 25, 1965.
- Lagmay, Marcelo S. "Simeon A. Ola: Magiting na Bikolano," *Taliba*, Manila, January 5, 1969.
- Milan Primitivo C. "General Simeon Ola, 1865-1952," *Philippine Free Press*, Manila, May 28, 1955.
- . "Long After the End of Hostilities," *Saturday Mirror Magazine*, Manila, October 12, 1957.
- Ola Fausto Ostria, "Ola or Nothing: The Last General to Surrender," *Philippine Free Press*, Manila, September 25, 1965.
- . "Malvar or Ola", *Daily Express*, Manila, September 25, 1973.
- Zapanta, Pet. "Last to Surrender: Malvar — Or Ola?" *The Sunday Times Magazine*, Manila, August 25, 1970.

GREGORIO AGLIPAY
(1860-1940)

Simeon Mandac

Gregorio Aglipay was born in Batac, Ilocos Norte, on May 8, 1860. His parents, Pedro Aglipay and Victoria Labayan, belonged to the middle class, and were engaged in farming for their livelihood. His grandparents on his father's side were from Caoayan, Ilocos Sur; and his maternal grandparents were Hilario Labayan and Eduvigis Romas, natives of Batac, Ilocos Norte.

He became orphaned of mother at his tender age and was taken care of by his maternal granduncle and grandaunties, Francisco Amor Romas, Nicolasa Romas and Marcela Romas.

When he was six year old, his father secretly took him to Aparri, Cagayan, to the great sorrow of his granduncle and grandaunts who planned to enroll him in the primary school. But he had been in Aparri for only one year.

In his early boyhood, he helped his parents in tilling the soil. He enjoyed riding spirited horses, swimming in deep waters and in swift rivers; climbing up to the top of big trees, and fighting with his playmates although he usually got licked.

During his early days it was compulsory to plant tobacco for the King of Spain, then ruler of the Philippines. One day, he and his older brother, Canuto, were arrested by order of the *Gobernadorcillo* of the town, and threatened to be flogged, because they had not yet planted tobacco for that year. The brothers were not whipped because they explained to the *Gobernadorcillo* that since there was not much rain yet, it was difficult and almost impossible to plow the soil. But they were jailed. While in jail they decided to leave the Ilocos region after their release from prison.

The above happening was coincident with a conversation that took place in Manila between the Rector of Santo Tomas

and the old gate-keeper of San Juan de Letran. This old man had seemed quite queer because for thirty long years he refused to receive any salary for his services. The Rector asked him: "Why do you not like to receive your salary?" And the gate-keeper answered:

"Father, I came here to serve God, and being a bachelor, I have no need for money." The Rector was profoundly affected, and prompted by his desire to compensate the old man, he suggested that he should write to his relatives in the province to send to Manila a nephew or a grandchild of his, and he (Rector) would take care of his education.

As a result of the Rector's suggestion, the two Aglipay brothers were brought to Manila, and young Gregorio, then fourteen years old, was presented to the Rector. He was enrolled in the College of San Juan de Letran, while his brother, Canuto, was registered in the Escuela Normal de Maestros.

Gregorio's life as a student was full of thrills and scholastic triumphs and achievements. When he was already taking up Metaphysics, he was at the same time appointed a student-tutor in Philosophy. That year he protested with unusual courage against his professor's decision to award the first prize in Philosophy to one of his classmates. Due to his protest he was subjected to a rigorous oral examination which lasted for four hours — from four o'clock in the afternoon to eight o'clock in the evening. When the ordeal had lasted so long, he began to think it was probably a mistake for him to have protested, realizing that it might be impossible for a student to beat his professor who, in that instance, was one of the examiners. But he managed to rise equal to the situation and the long and taxing examination ultimately resulted in his winning the coveted first prize.

In 1880 he met Jose Rizal and the two became fast friends. Together, they studied, fenced and wrestled. He planned to study law, but Rizal persuaded him to take Theology. In this way they would be able to help each other in the task of freeing the country from Spanish rule. Aglipay's role would be to watch and to sway the enemies within the country, and Rizal, those outside thereof.

In order to accomplish his part in this undertaking, Aglipay befriended all the employees of the churches and convents in

Manila, and through them he would learned the plans and secrets of the friars — the all-powerful masters of the Church.

For thirteen years he resided in San Juan de Letran as a member of the church personnel, the last six years of which were partly devoted to giving lessons in *eskrima* to the students as well as to the servants to prepare them to fight for the freedom of the country.

In the towns of Indang (Cavite), San Pablo (Laguna), San Antonio (Nueva Ecija), Bocaue (Bulacan), and Victoria (Tarlac), where he was successively assigned as *coadjutor*, he taught the people their duties as human beings and citizens, particularly that of not fearing the *guardia civil*. His teachings were not in vain. In said towns, government agents for the maintenance of peace and order were disarmed whenever they abused. The people in those towns became the foremost rebels against Spain.

Mons. Aglipay was famous for his extraordinary physical strength. Dr. Dominador Gomez who could easily lift a barrel of cement over his head, said of Mons. Aglipay: "I recognized the superior strength of no one except Mons. Aglipay." Aglipay could lift for several minutes a horse with its rider on; his palms touching only the belly of the animal. With the first phalanx of his forefinger inserted at the end of the barrel of a rifle of the Spanish civil guard, he could raise the weapon slowly until it is perpendicular to the ground with the butt end up, and then lower it back slowly without bumping the gun on the ground.

Mons. Aglipay's superior intellect was recognized both by his classmates and his professors in Theology and Morals. In praising Aglipay's intelligence before a professor who just arrived from Spain, his own professor asserted that there was no theory in Theology that Aglipay could not reverse. As a matter of fact, Aglipay argued for two months with his professor in Theology on the proposition that: "With the same eyes we have in this life, we shall be able with the help of God, to see after our death the Creator's face." He succeeded in convincing his professor.

What appeared obscure and dubious to an ordinary mind becomes clear and easily understood after Mons. Aglipay had

explained the problem.

He had a profound knowledge of human nature, that is why he had so many followers. Besides his kindness and generosity, he knew how to adjust himself to circumstances without affectation and dissimulation. Whenever he talked to a grammar student, he would suit his language to the mental level of the student. In this way he encouraged him to do his best and get over with his shyness with the wise and the intelligent. He was all erudition and wisdom in his remarks and observations. For instance when Miss Alice Roosevelt, an American, during a reception in Malacañang, someone expressed astonishment about his ability in maintaining (not necessarily monopolizing) the conversation with her for an hour. The former Governor General Henry C. Ide said of him: "Aglipay is a man of high mentality who has at his command a great organized force; he founded a church for the Filipinos."

He never boasted of his extraordinary intellect nor of his herculean strength. They were known only to his intimate friends; he used them sparingly and only in case of necessity.

In Iloos Norte he led the revolutionists against the Americans. Without rifles but *bolos* and lances or spears, more than seven thousand men were gathered around him to fight the well equipped American soldiers. When the enemy, for instance, of one hundred men, he would deploy five times that number for ambush on both sides of the most probable route to be taken by the enemy, at five meters interval between men. And as soon as the enemy would have reached the center of the ambushing forces, he would shout, advance! to the top of his voice. His men would dart out of their hiding place with their *bolos* and slash the enemy furiously and thereby scare the Americans into confusion, causing many of their arms to fall into the hands of the Filipinos. During the three months from March to May, 1900, they wrested three hundred rifles in that way from the Americans.

The Filipinos' attempt to obtain their political emancipation in war first against Spain and then America having failed, Mons. Aglipay realized the necessity of organizing and establishing the Philippine Independent Church upon the warm blood of the Filipino martyrs and patriots, who unselfishly sacrificed their lives for the freedom of the motherland. He was animated

by the freedom of worship embodied in the Bill of Rights of the Organic Law of July 1, 1902. With the founding of the Philippine Independent Church, the spiritual independence of the Filipinos was finally secured.

Effect of the Assassination of General Antonio Luna

The treacherous killing of General Antonio Luna submerged the country in profound consternation and produced a general dismay. The motherland recognized him as the strongest arm of the Revolution, and in its heart the nefarious crime was incrustated to be detested by all generations.

Its immediate effect was the fall of the government headed by President and Captain General Emilio Aguinaldo, and the surrender of some of his generals to the enemy. The most prudent among the generals returned to their respective provinces to organize forces of combat without Aguinaldo's intervention in order to continue fighting for our political liberty.

Gregorio Aglipay Arrived in Ilocos Norte

Vicar General of War and Lieutenant General Gregorio Aglipay came up to Ilocos Norte in December 1899 to organize forces of combat. Many patriots put themselves under his command. Among them are Bartolome Franco, Higidio Layaoen, Isidro Morales, Leonardo Corpus, Agustin Quiaoit, Agustin Garcia, Santiago Madrid, Rufino Diaz, Eulalio Diaz, Cecilio Espiritu, Luis Quiamzon, Ambrosio Antipolo, Julian Aglipay, Benigno Pascua, Numeriano Evangelista, Alejandro Calaycay, Laureano Calaycay, Meraclio Edmalin, Gabriel Pagdilao, Gavino Jamias, Bernabe Edralin, Mauro Quevedo, Jose Ver, Justo Villafior, Adriano Jambaro, Santiago Palacio, Agustin Ramon, Estanislao Magno, Andres Magno, Santiago Espiritu, Facundo Esteban, Gabriel Maulit, Ismael Valenciano, Abraham Peralta, Meliton Mamartillo, Simeon Mandac, Laureano Mandac, Miguel Ruiz, Faustino Adiarte, Pancracito Adiarte, Manuel Agcaoili, and Nicomedes Agra.

Mons. Aglipay immediately assigned Colonel Simeon Mandac to establish a military cordon from Batac to Bacarra which was literally accomplished in only one night.

Encampment at Mabalang

Mons. Aglipay established his first encampment at Ma-

balang (Batac), now jurisdiction of the town of Pinili. It was located in such a way that it cannot be seen from the tops of the surrounding mountain. Its entrance is a ravine of four and a half feet high that only strong ponies could climb up.

Engagements at Several Towns

On December 30, 1899 there was a skirmish at Barbarangay (Batac) of a company of American cavalry and a unit commanded by sergeant Agustin Quiaoit. Quiaoit was promoted to Captain for his courage.

In March, 1900 Mons. Aglipay had engagements with the Americans at Dalayap (Paoay) and at San Lorenzo (San Nicolas).

On April 6, 1900 at seven o'clock in the evening Colonel Simeon Mandac with ten men from San Nicolas entered the town of Laoag to apprehend two principal pro-Americans who, for their despotism and cruelty to the people caused bloody tortures of peaceful and innocent citizens. They were armed with long bolos. Before seeing the pro-Americans they had an encounter with scout soldiers. The scout soldiers ran away because their capsules did not explode, abandoning a wounded comrade and a gun with fixed bayonet. It was the belief that Simeon Mandac had *Anting-Anting* so that he could not be shot at. Mandac was reprimanded by Aglipay for his boldness being suicidal, and advised not to repeat it.

On April 15, 1900 Mons. Aglipay had an engagement at Gabor (Badoc) now a part of Pinili.

On April 16, 1900 a company of American cavalry passing early in the morning near the bivouac area at Mabalang was fired at by the men of Captain Quiaoit. A battle ensued. In this fight Captain Quiaoit lost two fingers of his right hand. The Americans set fire on the houses. This act irritated the Filipinos. They came out of their prepared ambush position and attacked the Americans. The firebrands ran away upon observing the great number of the attackers. Riding on their horses the Americans' only ways of escape were the beds of rivers with long curves, while the insurgents pursued them straight through the hills and valleys, and jumping over fences to overtake them. The chase lasted for three hours from Mabalang to the town of Batac. From Laoag reinforcement

arrived to help the Americans. The battle lasted until midnight that day. The Americans were annihilated.

After this battle Mons. Aglipay had encamped at Payao with seven thousand men. Everyday after breakfast, three hundred selected men armed with rifles and bolos were marching in combat formation ever ready to meet the enemy.

Outside the town of Batac there are many valleys with seventy meters wide or less. Ambush parties were placed at the foot of hills and on both sides of valleys properly hidden from the outside to wait for the Americans to pass. Thus the Filipinos without great risk of their lives could inflict heavy casualties to the Americans and capture their rifles. Aglipay often said to his men, that "since the Americans are killing us with their rifles, so we kill them in the best way we can. They know much more than we do; we are only imitating their acts."

The proximity of the Filipino encampment at Payao to the town of Batac where there was a permanent American military post made possible a daily engagement. Sometimes there were three engagements in a day, because the Filipinos did not want to miss any opportunity to reduce the number of the enemy.

On April 18, 1900 Gabino Jamias entered at night in Laoag with seven riflemen and three hundred bolomen. He caused the Americans forty-seven casualties, and on his part he lost an equal number of men.

In May 1900, Aglipay fought against the enemy at Baracbac (Badoc) now jurisdiction of Pinili, and at Sumader (Batac).

At the middle of June, while he was placing his men in ambush along the probable route to be taken by the Americans, another American company attacked the encampment at Payao killing ninety-four of the men there.

At midnight Aglipay vacated the encampment at Payao to establish another at Maoakoakar, a mountain where the owls' nests are. Going up a slope, a plain is reached surrounded by mountain tufts, thirty meters high from the plain below. Here the revolutionists built their cottages where they believed they could rest and recover their health because almost all of them were sick and worn-out by fatigue. But early in the morning of the fourth day they were attacked. The Americans came from every direction, Dingras, Banna, Badoc and Batac. Only

the sentries could exchanged fire with the attackers killing twenty-seven of them. The revolutionists suffered an equal number of casualties.

All the sick men scattered and went up to the mountain tufts.

During the skirmish Aglipay fell from his horse. He sheltered himself at the side of a big boulder. Fragments of lead were taken later on from one of his eyelids.

From the mountain tufts the revolutionists could see the second and third waves of attackers who came with interval of two hours. On their way they were burning houses, cottages and granaries.

It did not take long when Aglipay had other engagements with the Americans at Bongo (Banna) in July and at Quiom (Batac) in August.

The Americans offered \$50,000.00 for Aglipay's head. The Americans conducted a mopping-up operations outside the towns. They burned houses, granaries and anything that may give shelter to the insurgents. They shot any person they saw in the barrios. Because of these reprisals by the enemy Aglipay and his men retreated up to mount Simminoblan. Here the foodstuffs given by the towns could not reach him because of the difficult terrain. He and his men had to live on ration with the small quantities of rice that they could carry with them.

Aglipay fell sick as the effect of fatigue and hunger. His sickness lasted for seven days at the end of which he seemed to be dead because he stopped breathing for twenty-four hours. Then some of his men proposed to cut off his head in order to present it to the Americans; but others opposed the idea and instead they would prefer to carry his corpse secretly to the cemetery of Batac without burying it so that the public may divulge to the Americans that Aglipay is already dead. During the discussion, one who was searching something to eat in Aglipay's bag, found out a piece of medicinal wood of which he used to speak about. His men boiled a piece thereof and administered it to him. When the liquid settled in his stomach, his breast clattered and he began to breath. All of his men were astonished. It was a miracle and gloried with the new

life of their leader. Little by little he gained strength to be able to go down to the plain below.

In December, 1900 he struck again the Americans at Tipcal (Batac) causing them hundreds of casualties.

In February, 1901 he had engaged the enemy at Posuak (Batac).

In March, 1901, seeing the futile result of the military efforts, he stopped his warlike attitude after the capture of President Emilio Aguinaldo on March 23, 1901 at Palanan, Isabela.

On April 30, 1901 Aglipay surrendered himself to Colonel MacCaskey at Laoag Ilocos Norte, accompanied from the field by his bosom friend, Dr. Telesforo Ejercito, who came from Manila as emissary of the Federal Party organized for the pacification of the Philippines.

The Americans took advantage of his surrender to attract to peaceful life the revolutionists who were still in the mountains fighting and struggling for independence.

Together with the interpreter of the Americans Aglipay had an interview with the revolutionary chiefs of Sarrat, Ilocos Norte, and told them that, "Every human being continuously toiling without rest, dies soon. You must take rest. Soon we shall renew the battle". These axiomatic words were obeyed. The morning of May 25, 1901 was designated for the surrender of all the revolutionists of Ilocos Norte.

The American soldiers with a brass band awaited for the revolutionaries at the east of the town of Laoag at a designated time in a place four kilometers away from the entrance to the town. The revolutionary chiefs riding on their horses, and with their men were escorted to the office building of the American military commander.

Colonel McCaskey addressed them. The response in the name of all the surrenderees was by Colonel Simeon Mandac, Aglipay's second-in-command.

The peace, thus restored in Ilocos Norte, was celebrated with masses, ringing of bells, and music for three days. This was particularly by the families of more than seven hundred

political prisoners who were released at the day of the surrender.

Mons. Aglipay lived in Laoag for a while in the house of Father Jose Evangelista, who later on, became Bishop of Cebu, of the Philippine Independent Church. He left for Manila at the end of June, 1901. During the first fifteen days of June, most of his hair suddenly turned white, an extraordinary event, which was attributed to his grave preoccupation on the ending of the war without the friars being driven out of the country, nor the lands they usurped recovered.

He invited Simeon Mandac to stay with him in Manila, promising him that he (Mandac) could continue his education. Mandac studied law. He served as Aglipay's secretary. They lived in the house No. 54 at Ezpeleta Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila from the end of June, 1901 to the end of October, 1907.

Disinterestedly and without curtailing sacrifices Aglipay took steps for the release of all the priests in jail.

Thanks to his activities and tact, the interests of religion and those of the Church were not injured, which was expected to occur because of the hatred and contempt of many Filipinos towards everything related to religious corporations.

On November 15, 1898, he was appointed Ecclesiastical Governor by Bishop Jose Hevia Campomanes through the proposal and request of the clergy in Nueva Segovia, represented by the Foreign vicars of Cagayan, Ilocos Norte, Ilocos Sur, Abra, La Union and Pangasinan.

On May 4, 1899, it was dictated against him the penalty of *excommunication mayor* by Archbishop Bernardino Nozaleda; because this and the friars saw in his activities as perpetual prohibition of the source of wealth they had formerly enjoyed.

The said excommunication was baseless as shown by his manifesto exposed to the people and clergy of the Philippines on August 19, 1899:

TO THE FILIPINO PEOPLE AND CLERGY

The news that the former Archbishop of Manila believing himself still Supreme Ecclesiastical Chief in the Philippines as in the time of Spanish domination, and ignoring the new order of things produced by the

Revolution, has declared me usurper of the ecclesiastical jurisdiction and condemned me with the penalty of *excommunication mayor*, because I invited the Filipino Clergy to reunite and organize themselves for the best maintenance and administration of its secular rights which have been always ignored and, besides, because the Philippine Government has recognized me Vicar General of War.

The mentioned archbishop, in order to give legal appearance to his resolution, has cited opinions and sentences of Popes and Papal Bulls, thinking perhaps that the Filipino people and clergy will feel convinced at the sight of his citations in Latin and will believe his words without hesitation as if the Popes and Fathers of the Church could foresee the providential events in the Philippines which are not and cannot be mere reproduction of those narrated in either the laical or ecclesiastical history.

Now, there exists by chance in the Philippines any ecclesiastical jurisdiction like those formerly exercised by the Spanish Prelates in order that I may be called usurper of ecclesiastical jurisdiction? No, because it was blotted out sweepingly by the Revolution, since the Spanish prelates became enemies of the Filipino people and clergy and even of the Roman Catholic Church itself from the day and hour that they jointly and severally with the religious corporations, set themselves upon the Filipino people as absolute lords underestimating the people and clergy rights as well as the prestige of the Holy Church.

If Archbishop Nozaleda regrets the lose of his jurisdiction he should fire his impotent ire against the Philippine Revolution and the Divine Providence which is clearly and evidently guiding it, as it formerly guided the oppressed people of Israel during the travel through the desert to the land of promise. Above all he should blame himself, since he cannot shelter a sentiment other than an implacable hatred, the insatiable thirst of vengeance against the Filipino people and clergy. Was it not he who long ago serving himself with the Spanish authorities and bayonets, seized honest and indefensive Filipinos, priests or layman, and condemned them to thirst, hunger and all kinds of torture, jailed them and sent them to penitentiary, deportation or gallows? Is it not he who now convinces the American authorities and bayonets in order to jail Filipinos, destroy indefensive towns, and subject to perpetual yoke

a catholic people? And the one who does so is a Prelate of Christ Church, one of those called to participate in the sacred power received from the Father, of those who represent God; a minister of the religion of love and charity; a prince of the Church promising the mortals the greatest consolation that can be found in this valley of tears and afterwards the ineffable joy of an immortal life.

Fr. Bernardino Nozaleda knows very well that if the Revolution triumphs and the Philippine Independence is eventually recognized by the International Law, it would be impossible to restore his pristine authority, since an independent nation has a right to appoint one of his native sons to be the Supreme Ecclesiastical Chief within its territory; for this reason he has formed a common cause with the invaders and excommunicated me, in order that, if the people and clergy, allowing themselves to be deceived, would believe in the efficacy of this canonic penalty, could recover his primitive influence in the minds of the Filipinos and persuade them to continue the purposes of our enemies encouraged by the hope to recuperate in this way the dignities, parsonages, and land properties.

Fortunately, the people have opened their eyes, and alerted through bitter experiences, are aware of the afflictive situation toward which the deceit would convey; for this reason I am convinced that the Filipino clergy cannot help but look with contempt, as it looked at it disdainfully so extravagant excommunication. A man who, after defaming the Church with his bad example, uses coercive means prescribed by Canon Law, not to restore to the sheep-fold of Christ the astray souls, but for the attainment of his particular aims, dictated only by his pride and unproportionable ambition, rather than a man of Christ or prince of the Church, should be named apostate or renegade. The same canonical laws, the spirit of the church and the Holy Father who inspires himself therein will disprove of such inconsiderate penalty; on the contrary, they will direct the excommunication to the one who fulminated it arbitrarily by having misused sacred things.

On the other hand, what did I do to deserve a canonic penalty? As a Filipino and Catholic priest I have worked toward the harmony between the Revolution and the Catholic Church; I have toiled to avoid complete abandonment of the spiritual administration of revolutionary towns and to remedy the spiritual necessi-

ties of the Christians at the top of our limited resource; finally I have procured that the people and the clergy be in accord and go jointly in defending their respective rights, because it is thus proclaimed by the well being of humanity, the interest of the Church and the glory of God. The Philippine Government believing enough my good will and overlooking merits which I do not have, has recognized me Vicar General of War or Supreme Ecclesiastical Chief of the military men who, during the Revolution, are all the Filipinos, and, therefore, Supreme Chief of the Filipino priests who as such must be invested during the national struggle with the character of Chaplains of War.

Archbishop Nozaleda wants me not to discharge this ministry, since I have not been appointed by the Pope and the Philippine Government has no authority to appoint me. I must explain that the Philippine Government did not appoint me, but *recognized me only*, which is quite different. I exercise that ministry provisionally with the help of my colleagues, because as a priest, it is my duty not to abandon the interests of the Church. The Pope could no less than approve and bless me, since he cannot less applaud everything redundant in the welfare of the Church. And not only I have exercised provisionally, but I hurried up in convoking my companions to recognize me, else to propose for the recognition of the Government the one whom they consider more able to guide others in order that they may appoint persons as advisers for the provisional Chief in accordance with the spirit of the Constitution of the Church and a commission in charge of offering to the Holy See the adhesion and respects of the Philippine Church and of praying its blessings to this, and of requesting to supply it with its necessities. My conscience did not dictate me another more correct way to act and more adequate to canon laws and to the unforeseen necessities created by the Revolution.

I already know that Archbishop Nozaleda wishes the Filipino clergy not to address directly to the Holy See, but to obey him, which is impossible. The Filipino clergy cannot recognize as its chief the blood-shot enemy of its people without disagreeing with this. The Filipino clergy cannot be enemy of the Filipino people, because it has, like this, to recover denied rights stamped with the blood of Burgos, Gomez, Zamora and other Filipino clergymen; and, be-

sides, because it could not defeat the whole people and it would only attain the destruction of the Filipino Church, and every priest has the ineligible duty not to bring about the destruction but the conservation and aggrandizement of his church. On the other hand, Fr. Nozaleda is *de facto* unable to exercise jurisdiction in Filipino territory because he cannot go further than the reach of the American bayonets.

It may be said that the supremacy of Archbishop Nozaleda is necessary, because according to the canon laws, no priest can exercise his ministry without special authority from the bishop. But as it was already said, if Nozaleda is *de facto* unable to exercise jurisdiction in the Philippines, he is also *de jure*, because no right can exist without a fact as its grounds. Nozaleda might have his right *in potencia*, but not *in actu* in philosophical parlance. Besides this, canon laws as well as any human laws, are dictated for normal cases; in abnormal and unforeseen cases it is left to the discretion of those in charge of defending the threatened community to choose the easiest and speedy means, because upon the safety of the life of the community, the order and reign of laws can be restored; but if the life is extinguished, all is lost. I have done to the Church all that was my duty to do and could be done by my limited strength, when it was threatened by great dangers brought about by the Revolutoin; and this, in my opinion, deserves blessing and not censure, since I do not expect reward. I shall not incur in the folly of forming expediente and launching in my turn an excommunication against Nozaleda, though he deserves it, because this act redounds in the disrepute of the Church. I only expose the true facts before the wise and honest opinion, so that the Filipino people and the universal conscience may execrate and curse the one deserving it so.

Trustily I hope that the Roman Pontiff will approve my acts since if social conveniences advice sometimes an exception of the laws, I have acted, not for convenience, but for necessity. The events unforeseen for men, are not so for the Providence; the Philippine Revolution is clearly providential, and the necessities created by the Revolution, having been unforeseen by the Canon Laws, did authorize me to act as I could, and my conscience believed more just and reasonable; therefore, if such necessities were ordained by Providence, the Pope is duty bound to respect the Divine

Will and the consummated facts, as he lastly approved the republic institution of France and the regent family of Spain though his predecessors and the traditional policy of the Vatican had opposed to them. First in the life and safety of the Church, and then the appointment of the ecclesiastical authorities as provided by canon laws, when it is possible.

I have acted as Cardinal Gibbons, Archbishop of Baltimore, directs, in whose message delivered at the official inauguration of the Exposition of Chicago and published in the official Bulletin of the Archbishopric of Manila on May 15, 1895; the following is quoted:

"Do not fear the new. The solid principles will be kept well guarded. This is an epoch of novelties and the religious action to be in harmony with the epoch must have new directions. Let there be ground to everybody's action. The layman does not need to wait for the priest, nor the priest to wait for the bishop, nor the bishop to wait for the Pope in order to go on his own life. The timid go by flock; the valiant by single lines. When combined efforts are required, let us be prepared and ready; but there should be an ample sphere of action where the individual initiative can be unfolded producing a great benefit."

The same Cardinal continues afterward:

"These days are days of combat; it is not a century of trembling and fugitive virtue. Set to the work, priests and laymen! Search for the social ulcers and secure their remedy. Speak of legitimate rights, since it is necessary, but speak also of grievances and evident injuries. Fight in private with words and examples; fight so that the law may give satisfaction to the grievances and may atone for the harm done. Cast a glance of mercy into the interior of shops where the youth and childhood dry up; give healthful wind to the populous barrios where the poor lives; go after the boys loitering about the streets; visit the jails and disseminate moral and religious instruction; diminish in the trains and other services the work on Sundays, which make it impossible to million of men the practice of religion, oppose the dreadful vice of intemperance which daily damns bodies and soul of human victims and which at the present

hour, more than any social sin, attracts misfortune to the Church and misery to its children."

I should say the same to my brothers and compatriots, and would add these few words for my colleagues; pay a visit to the towns, the barrios and the farms; enter into the houses, huts and shops and preach holy war of independence mentioning ignored legitimate rights, grievances and harms done to honor, persons, and property, as well as miseries, humiliations and anguish which would bring about indifference, hesitation and swoon; inculcate into everybody the respect to individual rights and to laws, the love of country and virtue, and the constant exercise of justice and charity; animate the pusillanimous and the unconcerned reminding them that the worldly and eternal goods are conquered with works and sacrifices, instilling in them confidence and perseverance, and promising them comfort in their affliction, relief in their hardships and misfortunes, and complete satisfaction of their solitudes and aspirations.

All of this is with the purpose that, when our imprescriptible rights be recognized and our eager desires be fulfilled, we may exclaim with the above cited Cardinal: "The freedom enjoyed by the Church under the Constitution of the Republic has for us an inestimable value. Here there is no tyrant who enchains it, no concordant that limits its action or restrain its force. It is free as the eagle on top of the Alps, free to fly to highest regions and to put in action all its native energies. The law of the country protects it in its rights, and does not ask any sacrifice in exchange of those same rights, since those are of every citizen. . . . But we think thee, Oh God, not only for this earthly inheritance; we thank thee mostly for the precious benefit of constitutional liberty we possess, because this fertile soil would not be for us but an arid and esterile desert, should not be impregnated with the dew of liberty.

(Sgd.) GREGORIO AGLIPAY

The liberal religious men of America, mostly members of the Unitarian Church, in Boston in 1931, after learning of the pure and scientific doctrines of the Philippine Independent Church, invited Mons. Aglipay to make a visit to the United States offering to pay all expenses incident to the trip.

While there, Mons. Aglipay delivered many sermons and addresses, one of which was entitled "Our Idea of God". This was delivered in Tagalog and interpreted into English. After the discourse on this particular subject, the Americans remarked that they could clearly comprehend the meaning of his message from the expressions radiating from his face.

Mons. Gregorio Aglipay is a great religious leader that the Philippines has ever produced. Philippine history would be incomplete without this soldier-priest, founder of the Philippine Independent Church, patriot and nationalist, in the pages of our history in the glorious struggle for political and spiritual liberty.

* This paper is a reconstruction from the original work of Simcon Mandac, entitled, *Mons. Gregorio Aglipay and his Valiant Combatants*. The editor acknowledges the kindness of Mrs. Socorro Gerardo, daughter of the author for allowing me to publish this manuscript by her father, who was intimately associated with Aglipay during the Revolution and the founding of the Philippine Independent Church.

THE CHINESE GUERRILLAS

Celedonio A. Ancheta

Man does not live by bread alone but also with the spirit of God, love, sacrifice, devotion, duty, principle, and country. These virtues and idealism are exemplified by the four immortal Chinese guerrilla units in the Philippines that brought havoc and fear to the enemy and to the Japanese collaborators. All freedom fighters and lovers of democracy and liberty for that matter should give due recognition and respect to these four Chinese guerrilla units, VANGUARD, COWHM, US-CVP, and PEKEK for their patriotic and courageous stand against the Japanese invaders and for their sacrifices, with their families during the war years of occupation by the Japanese in the Philippines. These guerrilla units are four Chinese pillars of freedom and democracy in the Philippines.

VANGUARD

(THE PHILIPPINE CHINESE YOUTH WARTIME SPECIAL SERVICE CORPS)

The Philippine Chinese Youth Wartime Special Service Corps was transformed from the Chinese official national youth organization known as the *San Min Chu I Youth Corps* which had been under the direct leadership of the late Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, with headquarters in Chungking during the last world war with branches all over China and in important cities overseas. The Philippine branch of the Corps¹ was established in Manila in 1940 with Commissioner Lin Tso Mei as Secretary General. Immediately after the outbreak of the Pacific War, the members organized themselves in order to supply intelligence information to the USAFFE, to help maintain peace and order, to render first aid services and to rescue and aid all allied refugees. Upon the Japanese occupation of the Philippines, the Corps was transformed into an effective

¹ Cited by Gen. Douglas MacArthur.

guerrilla unit.

Commissioner Lin Tso Mei assumed command under the assumed name of Commander Pei San, assisted by Mr. Cheng Ho Fei, former editor-in-chief of the Kuomintang newspaper, *Kong Lipo*, Manila. This guerrilla unit was known as the VANGUARD because of the popular underground newspaper in Chinese, the "Chien Fong", literally translated as "VANGUARD". It was divided into the following divisions: Battalion Staff, Judge Advocate Service, Personnel and Organization Section, Propaganda Section, Intelligence Section, Treasury and Supply Section, Military Service Section, Ammunition Section, Medical Welfare and Social Service Section, Communication Section, Miscellaneous Section and a Special Activities Division.

In the summer of 1943, the VANGUARD joined their activities with USAFIP, NL with which it regularly exchanged intelligence informations. The VANGUARD from time to time furnished USAFIP, NL with certain radio parts and materials and papers for their underground needs. In July, 1944, the VANGUARD was furnished by Major Russell W. Volckmann C. O. of the USAFIP, NL with an identification letter certifying to its activities and acknowledging the co-operation it had been extending them. After the American forces landed in Leyte, it managed to contact and secure the recognition and co-operation of Captain Bernard L. Anderson of Manila through the office of Major Volckmann.

From the fall of Bataan in 1942, to the end of the Japanese occupation, the Corps was very active in apprehending collaborators and spies and had standing orders to capture and bring Japanese spies to its Headquarters for trial. The VANGUARD had several hundred members, mostly young men and women. Thirty-nine of them were sacrificed during the occupation and the liberation of the country. During the liberation of Manila, the members were very active in fighting side by side with the American forces, in helping the maintainance of peace and order in the burning city, rendering first aid treatment to people and soldiers injured, and in arresting spies and collaborators to be turned to the CIC.

After the surrender of the Japanese at the end of the war, the members organized the *Veteran Association of the Philippine Chinese Youth Wartime Special Service Corps*, which

was registered in the Philippine Veterans Legion, and continued rendering peacetime services to the Chinese community and to the country as a whole.

The following are the prominent members of this Veteran Association: Tom Gin, businessman, Joaquin Cotinting, of Peony Restaurant, Manila, Severino C. Li, principal of the UNO High School, Manila; Yu Sy To, businessman, Ang Bon Ping, businessman, Ang Tiong Tiong, newspaperman, Co Sin Seng, insurance underwriters and Go Chin Beng, businessman.

COWHM

(CHINESE OVERSEAS WARTIME HSUEHKAN MILITIA)

On January 2, 1942, the City of Manila fell into the hands of the Japanese Imperial Forces. The leader of the Chinese community were arrested and executed, the business firms were sealed, and their goods were all confiscated. The reign of terror made every Chinese shocked with horror. At that time, a few Chinese youths who had sought refuge in the hill areas had already formed themselves into anti-Japanese groups. But in Manila, under the blood and iron rule of the ruthless enemy, the CHINESE OVERSEAS WARTIME HSUEHKAN MILITIA, COWHM for short, was the most well-known anti-Japanese organization.

The COWHM was organized in March, 1942, by three former cadets of the 13th Military Training Center at Fukien, China. These cadets were Chua Go-kuan, Tan Liat-tek and Chua Yu. They met at a restaurant in Ongpin Street, Manila, and decided to contact their former classmates residing in the Islands to form an organization for the purpose of carrying out the anti-Japanese activities. In the 27th of May, they were able to recruit around twenty former classmates, and held a meeting secretly at Benavidez Street, Manila. The organization was originally named LOYAL SOUL FRATERNITY. Through Chua Go-kuan a constitution was drafted by Mr. Pao Shih-tien. Later the name was changed into the THE PHILIPPINE DEMOCRACY'S WAR-FRONT CHINESE HSUEHKAN MILITIA. In memory of the 13th Military Training Center, the arabic numerical figures 1 and 3 were joined together to form the alphabet "B" as a symbol of the organization. Furthermore, as all the members were the followers of Dr. Sun Yat-Sen, the father of

the Republic of China, the three horizontal lines were placed on both sides of the letter "B", thus symbolizing that the members of the organization were former classmates in the 13th Military Training Center, and also the "Three Principles of the People" (*San Min Chu I*). The most important aim of the organization was to devote itself to the task of resisting against the Japanese militarism, and joining the task of the reconstruction of the motherland.

The work in the initial period, however was centered in propaganda. On October 10th of the same year, *The Fuse Weekly* was published, disseminating the true news of the war. The weekly paper was heartily welcomed by the Chinese community. Faith, courage and confidence were fostered in the people for a final allied victory. On the military side, a special corps was organized with the former classmates in the 13th Military Training Center and some members of the *San Min Chu I Youth Corps* in Manila as the later joined the COWHM. Secret headquarters were set up at several places in the suburbs of Manila in La Loma, Pasay, Caloocan, and Malabon, Rizal. In these headquarters military training was imparted with secrecy to the members.

In April, 1943, The Chinese Puppet Association in Manila helped the enemy to prosecute Chinese nationals. Information reached the headquarters of the underground movement that the puppet Secretary-General Tan Tian-hong was the most notorious traitor. So the COWHM leaders had to take action and decided that Tan Tian-hong be liquidated. On the 16th of June, Tan was shot to death on Nueva Street, Manila. As the news of Tan's death spread out all over the City of Manila, the Chinese community was exhilarated. The death of Tan served as a warning to other Japanese puppet collaborators. So the execution of Tan not only marked the beginning of the extermination of other traitors, but it also spurred Chinese youths all over the country to spring up to join the anti-Japanese activities.

In September, the *Philippine Chinese Youth Wartime Special Service Corps* merged with COWHM. At this time, the membership was increased to more than 800. But in the middle of October, the said Corps was separated. The COWHM nevertheless continued to work wiping out the traitors and collaborators. In December, the Chief Commander was Yu Wee, then

followed by Chua Chong-li. In March 1944, Ong Su-tuan² took over from Chua as Chief Commander. In July 1944, Li Hai-jo assumed command as Chief Commander. Li also handled the editorial work of *The Fuse Weekly* the organization's paper. Chua Go-kuan, Cheng Chai-tuan, Tiu Siong-Bo, Tiu Kee-eng, and Tan Tek-bio were assigned as members of the Executive Committee of COWHM Headquarters. Chua Go-kuan was later-assigned as the Vice-Commander-in-Chief. At that period, COWHM forces were as follows:

- 1st Column, headed by Lee Kek-lin;
- 2nd Column, headed by Tiu Siong-bo
- 3rd Column, headed by Tan Ming-Sing
- 4th Column, headed by See Ching-pog
- 5th Column, headed by Co Heng-liong
- 6th Column, headed by Chua Siok-keng
- 7th Column, headed by Tan Tekbio
- 8th Column, headed by Go Suan-poc
- 9th Column, headed by Ang Hun-lu
- 10th Column, headed by Bo Tek-heng

The total strength was 1,008 officers and enlisted men.

Some of the prominent members of COWHM are Ong Se Hai (Chua Hai), Kung Hsien Sheh. Lt. Col. Li Hai Jo (Li Wo), who is an Executive Secretary of the General Association of Chinese Schools in the Philippines, and Capt. Marcelo Lee.

US-CVP

(THE U.S.-CHINESE VOLUNTEERS IN THE PHILIPPINES)

On December 8, 1941, the Philippine Constabulary provincial commander of the province of La Union, Major Maximo Nocete, acting upon verbal orders of Col. James A. Green of the United States Armed Forces of the Far East (USAFFE), called to his office Lee Pick Chai³ and instructed him to form a provisional company of able-bodied Chinese nationals as volunteers. Lee was designated company commander with the rank of captain. On December 19, 1941 Lee and his volunteers were duly inducted into the USAFFE by Major Nocete, and given the name

² Executed by the Japanese Imperial Army.

³ Known also as Mr. Vicente Lopez.

UNITED STATES-CHINESE VOLUNTEERS IN THE PHILIPPINES (US-CVP).

When La Union was occupied by the Japanese the big portion of the aforesaid Chinese volunteers took to the mountains and eventually were absorbed by the USAFIP, NL, a guerrilla organization under Col. Russell W. Volckmann, AUS.

Those who took to the mountains when La Union was occupied by the Japanese in 1942 was in fact the nucleus of the *U.S.-Chinese Volunteers in the Philippines* which took part in the liberation of Ipo Dam in Central Luzon and Sierra Madre.⁴

Lee and his men fought the enemy as guerrillas. One of the successful raids of Lee and his men was that on the evening of September 19, 1942 against the Japanese detachment in Aringay, La Union. The Japanese high command placed a price on the head of Lee, dead or alive. His volunteer unit increased in strength. Two regiments were formed with 6,249 officers and men. Lee got his promotion to a full colonel rank on January 1, 1943, and "General" in the Chinese guerrilla on August 22, 1944. He was honorably discharged on September 26, 1945.

The Kuomintang Headquarters guerrilla organization in the Philippines with the *Soul of the Great Hans* newspaper, and some other organizations were attached or affiliated to US-CVP.

Thereafter, the whole regiment underwent an extensive training under the U.S. Army. The US-CVP was prepared to invade the Japanese soil. But after the atomic bombs were dropped at Hiroshima and Nagasaki by the U.S. Air Force, the Japanese government announced its unconditional surrender to the Allied countries, and the plan to invade Japan was then cancelled.

On September 3rd in the same year, this group announced demobilization, and the members returned to civilian life and organized a veteran association called the "*US-Chinese Volunteers in the Philippines*," which is still existing up to the present time.

From the beginning of the Pacific War to the end, this

⁴ Refer to T I & E Div. AFP, Cp MURPHY, Q. C. June 1953.

group of volunteers suffered 63 dead and 62 wounded, bringing the total casualties to 125.

After the war, posthumous awards were given to those who sacrificed their lives for the altar of Freedom and for those who were wounded and disabled. They were honored and cited for their services by the governments of the Republic of China, the United States of America and also by the Republic of the Philippines.

The prominent members are Sy Yong Phao, President and General Manager of the Neltex Development Co. Inc., Las Piñas, Rizal, and commander of US-CVP in 1969 and Ramon Shih I Sheng, US-CVP commander in 1965.

PEKEK

(THE PHILIPPINE CHINESE PEKEK 399th CHAPTER)

In the early part of 1942, shortly after the Japanese had invaded the Philippines, the Philippine Chinese PEKEK⁵ 399th Chapter was organized by a large group of patriotic Chinese youths, led by Tan Pue Teck, Chua Chin Sheng, Yao Yee Sha, Ty Sy Giok, Ang Guan Cheong, Ting Qui Ngo, Ng Liem To, Tan Cheng Kim, and many others. This organization was composed of six units with more than thirty members each. Besides these, there was another unit in Manila, headed by Tan Cheng Kim.

It had an underground newspaper in Chinese, called SOUTIONG PO, printed secretly and circulated widely, encouraging and calling all Chinese youths in the Philippines to join the underground activities, fighting against the Japanese spies and collaborators. Many members of this organization were arrested, tortured and killed by the enemies. Among those killed were To Heng Giao, Tan Pue Teck, Chua Chin Sheng and Chan Eng Ching. More than forty were killed in the front line during the liberation.

Immediately after the landing of the American Forces, PEKEK representatives led by Lim Lam Bin and Lim Pang Gan, managed to contact the 161th Infantry, 25th Division, which recognized and permitted it to organize a military

⁵ PEKEK, means Press and Attack.

unit, to be sent to the front for active duty and to be armed and equipped by the U.S. Army. Members of the PEKEK were inducted in the USAFFE by the 161th Infantry. PEKEK 399th Chapter was the first Chinese guerrilla organization recognized by the U.S. Army. Lim Lam Bin and Lim Kee Bien commanded this particular unit. The headquarters of PEKEK was in Manila, with Tan Cheng Kim as Head of the office, who took charge of the enlistment of patriotic Chinese youths, to be sent to fight to the front. The unit successfully participated in the capture of Sta. Fe in Isabela. It was a major accomplishment of the unit. Some American reporters in the front line had taken pictures of the fighting there, and those pictures were shown in several theaters in Manila later.

The office of this unit in Manila published an English Weekly called "MANILA NEW DAY", the first English paper by the Chinese Community, with a circulation of more than 10,000 copies weekly. Tan Cheng Kim was the publisher, Sy Yinchow, the editor-in-chief, and Go Ching Guan, the Manager. This weekly, besides reported war news in all fronts all over the world, had also informed foreign readers with the activities and accomplishments of the different Chinese guerrilla units in the Philippines.

After the Japanese had surrendered and the war ended, the activities of the organization also ceased. In memory of the members of the unit who died heroically, PEKEK erected a memorial monument inside the Manila Chinese Cemetery, which stands gloriously together with three other monuments erected by the PHILIPPINE CHINESE YOUTH WAR TIME SPECIAL SERVICE CORPS., UNITED STATES-CHINESE VOLUNTEERS IN THE PHILIPPINES, and CHINESE OVERSEAS WAR-TIME HSUEHKAN MILITIA.

Some of the prominent members are Tan Cheng Kim (Ching Yan Siak), Cu Huy Hong, Co Yat Kut, Sy Suy, and Eleuterio Jao.

THE CHINESE CONSUL GENERAL AND HIS STAFF

This story would not be complete if we miss to mention the arrest and execution of the Consul General of the Republic of China to the Philippines during the war, Consul General

Young Kwong-son, and the members of his staff by the Japanese Imperial Forces on April 15 and 17, 1942, Manila. These public officials were dedicated servants of the Republic of China, and of the Free World. The roll of honors on the Altar of Freedom are the following Chinese martyrs:

1. Consul General Young Kwong-son
2. Consul K. Y. Mok
3. Consul Chu Shio Peng
5. Vice Consul Young Keng Siu
6. Vice Consul Shio Tong Min
7. Chancellor Lu Peng Chu
8. Wang Keung Wei

BOYCOTT COMMITTEE, CHINESE ANTI-JAPANESE ASSOCIATION

Also equally important to be recorded in our war history in the Philippines are the martyrs of the members of the *Boycott Committee Chinese Anti-Japanese Association*, who were executed by the Japanese Imperial Forces, also on April 15 and 17, 1942, Manila. These Chinese nationals were all loyal to the cause of freedom and to the dignity of the human soul. They gave their lives for their conviction and duty for their country. They fought for the cause of the resistance movement and for their motherland. Here are the names of the generous sons of China in the Philippines, the land they learned to love as their foster motherland.

1. Yu Yi Tung
2. Gan Wen Chu
3. So Chay An
4. Li Fu Siu
5. Sy Kiao Chu
6. Tsai Pai Kung
7. Huang Nein Ta
8. Li Lian Tiao
9. Chen Moh Ten
10. Go Kin Yueh

DOCUMENTS

A BRIEF HISTORY OF ANTI-JAPANESE ACTIVITIES OF THE COWHM*

World War II broke on December 8, 1941. On January 2nd of the following year, the Japanese army occupied the City of Manila. Without regard for international law, the invader arrested and later executed Dr. Kwangson Young, then Chinese Consul-General in Manila, together with eight other officials of the Chinese Consulate. Over a hundred well-known Chinese residents in the City were thrown to the detention cells. This brutal force of the Japanese struck terror into the people's heart, but it only intensified the hatred of the patriotic youths toward the enemy. The Chinese Overseas Wartime Hsuehkan Militia, or COWHM in short, was organized in March 1942. Its original name was *Loyal Youth Organization*. Later this name was changed to "Overseas Chinese Hsuehkan Militia in Democracy's Battleground of the Philippines." On September 18, 1942, its inauguration was announced. In June 1943, several notorious Chinese traitors and members of the Japanese puppet "Chinese Association in the Philippines", were liquidated. The Japanese, however, engaged on large scale massacre for revenge in order to suppress the people, but the members of the COWHM were encouraged to fight rather than intimidated. Its members increased in number day by day. Finally it changed its name again to "Chinese Overseas Wartime Hsuehkan Militia" and continued the work of fighting the enemy, eliminations of traitors, and giving protection to fellow countrymen. Its literary propaganda work, coupled with military activities, constantly struck at the Japanese with serious blows. In the Spring of the following year, the enemy suffered its first defeat in the Solomon Islands. In the wake of this enemy setback, Filipinos rose in groups to fight the Japanese. The COWHM established liaison with the Filipino and American guerrilla units on the various

* Prepared by COWHM.

areas of Luzon to intensify its anti-Japanese military activities. After the Allied troops landed in Leyte, the armed units of the COWHM joined Filipino and American guerrillas.

The construction of the airfield in the mountainous area northeast of Rizal Province paved the way for the liberation of the city of Manila and later its men together with the men of other units actually guided the 1st Cavalry Division, US Army to break through the Japanese lines and to enter the Philippine Capital. After the Liberation of Manila, the COWHM armed forces were attached to the 161st Infantry Regiment, 25th Division of the United States Army in pursuing the enemy which culminated in the liberation of Central and Northern Luzon. In September, 1945, Japanese General Yamashita surrendered. The COWHM armed forces then were demobilized. Colonel Victor L. Johnson, Jr., USA, then Commanding Officer of the 161st Regiment, cited the COWHM as follows: "That company (COWHM) participated in several important actions during that period in the area between Putlan and Santa Fe near Highway #5 at Balete Pass; that this company performed missions assigned by me and my battalion commanders in a brave, efficient and military manner incurring several casualties while so doing; that they contributed much to the ultimate success of the campaign and destroyed large numbers of Japanese in the conduct of their attacks." In recognition of the meritorious services rendered by the COWHM to the Allied Forces the Chinese Nationalist Government granted Citation No. Kuo-Fu-Kao-01558, issued by Generalissimo Chiang Kai Shek. The Chinese Executive Yuan granted Special Merit Certificates No. Chung-Chen-1855; and the Chinese Ministry of Interior issued Orders No. LI-2187 to eulogize one hundred more members of the COWHM who died in action. The headquarters of the 25th Division of U.S. Army issued General Orders of Citation Nos. 288, 290, 294, 303, awarded two silver stars, eight bronze medals, and twenty five purple hearts, and requested the U.S. Department of the Army to give due benefits to those members of the COWHM who fought with them and gave up their lives.

HEADQUARTERS
USAFIP, NORTH LUZON

July 15, 1944

Subject: Identification

To : Whom It May Concern

1. This letter will serve to identify Mr. Pei San (real name Lin Tso Mei) who claims to be the officially appointed commander of an official Chungking Organization known as "The Chinese Youth Wartime Special Service in the Philippines (Philippine Chinese Sam Min Chu I Youth Corps)". The purpose of this organization is solely for fighting the common enemy, Japan, according to Mr. Pei San.

2. While this headquarters is not in a position to vouch for the truth of Mr. Pei San's claims, his activities, the activities of his men, or the above mentioned organization, it can say that for over a year now it has been in contact with Mr. Pei San, through a Chinese who claims to be a member of said organization and who has been officially inducted into the intelligence section of this headquarters, and has exchanged intelligence information on the enemy with him. Mr. Pei San's help in assisting this Hq secure intelligence information of the enemy has been satisfactory and the information furnished by him has been accurate.

3. It is requested that whatever assistance and cooperation possible be given to Mr. Pei San.

(Sgd.) R. W. VOLCKMANN
Major, Infantry, US Army
Commanding

HEADQUARTERS
USAFIP, NORTH LUZON

27 August 44

Subject: Miscellaneous

To : Pei San

1. Many thanks for the 1,000 pcs of cigarette paper and carbon paper. All were received several days ago. Any future presents of the same nature plus writing paper (any kind) will be gratefully received.

2. Herewith find letter with indorsements regarding Chinese who were picked up by Lieut. Guillen. I am in hopes that the letter recently sent you will prevent similar future occurrences.

3. We have at last found a sure channel for sending out

communications. Your message will be forwarded to Chung-king and an answer forwarded to you when received.

4. We are urgently in need of the following radio parts listed below. If you can secure them and forward them we will certainly appreciate them:

- 2 vibro packs complete
- 6 616 tubes
- 2 Power transformers for 8 to 10 tubes
- 6 Filter condensers, 8 mfd, 600 volts.

5. Best regards and good luck.

FOR THE COMMANDING OFFICER:
(Sgd.) PARKER CALVERT
Major, Infantry, US Army
Executive Officer

2 Incls:

- Incl. 1. Radio News, August 26, 1944
- Incl. 2. Ltr, S-Chinese Guerrillas, HQ USAFIP, NL, Dated 7/15/44 w/1st & 2nd Incls.

HEADQUARTERS 25th INFANTRY DIVISION
Office of the Commanding General

APO # 25
25 May 1945

SUBJECT: Attachment Orders

TO : Commanding Officer, COWHM, 1st Company,
c/o Commanding Officer, 161st Infantry, APO #25

Pursuant to authority contained in letter, Headquarters Sixth Army, Subject: "Procurement, recognition, use, supply, and disposition of guerrilla units," dated May 1945, the COWHM (Chinese Overseas Wartime Hseuhkan Militia), 1st Company is placed under the control of the Commanding Officer, 101st Infantry.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL MULLANS.

(Sgd.) M. A. SWEETEN
Lt. Col., A.G.P.
Adjutant General

HEADQUARTERS 161ST INFANTRY
APO #25

29 May 1945

Major-General Chih Wang
Chinese Consul-General Tuan

Dear Sir:

The Chinese Pekek (Squadron 399) and COWHM units have been attached to this regiment since 31 March 1945 and 6 May 1945 respectively, and have served in the front line during the entire Baleté Pass — Santa Fe campaign.

Initially these troops were given a refresher course in basic tactics and use of weapons which subjects they absorbed so rapidly and with such zeal that within four days of the start of the course I considered them qualified for front line duty. They were first assigned security and patrolling missions along supply routes until their willingness and adeptness proved to me that they were capable of assault missions. For the last three weeks, the 1st Battalion 161st Infantry, to which they were attached, has used them consistently as assault troops and the results have been most gratifying. Their leaders are well schooled in infantry tactics and most cooperative. The troops themselves are brave, hardy, and as well disciplined as any troops I have seen anywhere. On one occasion, while under attack by a determined Jap infiltration group at night, the Commander of the COWHM platoon called Battalion Headquarters asking permission to reinforce Company B, 161st Infantry, some 300 yards away and also under attack, feeling that the situation on the B Company front was more critical than their own. On another occasion, a 20 man COWHM patrol on a reconnaissance mission engaged 50 Japs in a three hour fire fight, killed at least twelve and withdrew only after running out of ammunition. During an attack on a Jap fortified cave area by the Pekek Company (Squadron 399), one of my infantry company commanders assembled his company at an OP to use the attack as a demonstration of proper use of concealment and infantry tactic.

The Chinese troops attached to this regiment have to date killed 79 Japs, destroyed 5 machine guns, and themselves have had 5 killed and 19 wounded.

If the opportunity to have a battalion of these Chinese soldiers attached to my regiment for future campaigns ever presented itself, I would accept them with enthusiasm. All of the soldiers in this regiment who have fought side by side with them have utmost confidence in them and admiration for them.

Respectfully yours,

/s/ Victor L. Johnson, Jr.

/t/ VICTOR L. JOHNSON, JR.

Colonel, 161st Infantry

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES)

) S. S.

CITY OF MANILA)

A F F I D A V I T

I, Dominador Barilea, Filipino, of legal age, married, at present member of the Philippine Veterans Board, after having been duly sworn to in accordance with law, depose and say:

That I was the organizer and the Overall Commander of Barrion's Division organized purposely to counteract activities of the enemy during the Japanese occupation of the Philippines;

That sometimes about the middle part of October 1944 arrangement was made in order that the COWHM Unit known as the Chinese Overseas Wartime Hsuehkan Militia whose commanding officer was Colonel Li Hai Jo be attached to my own for the purpose of making a combined effort against the enemy;

That about 2/3 of this unit was performing guerrilla activities under my supervisory command, participating in all activities within the provinces of Bulacan, Rizal, Cavite and the City of Manila;

That this unit has also contributed considerable effort in the construction of the landing field for the US Air Forces in Novaliches, Rizal; That whatever accomplishment made by us during the construction of the aforesaid landing field may also be credited to the unselfish cooperation of the COWHM Unit;

That sometimes about the first day of February 1945 the COWHM Unit also took active part in leading the Cavalry Division, US Army recapture the City of Manila; That the

COWHM Unit also accompanied the American Liberation Forces in recapturing the University of Sto. Tomas where American Civilians were concentrated;

That this unit was attached to the 161st Inf, 25th Div, USA about the early part of May 1945 and participated in the Liberation of Nueva Ecija and Nueva Vizcaya;

That I further certify that Col. Li Hai Jo alias Li Wo also used the names "SUKUM" or "SOKUM" or "JOSE DY" during the period attached to my unit;

Further deponent sayeth not.

(Sgd.) DOMINADOR BARILEA
Affiant
ASN-O-42222

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 23rd day of January, 1954 in the City of Manila, Philippines. The affiant having exhibited to me his Residence Certificate Number A-0031404, issued at Manila on Jan. 14, 1953.

(Sgd.) ARTEMIO A. ALMENDRA
Notary Public
My commission expires on Dec. 31, 1954

Dock No. 174
Page No. 37
Book IV
Series of 1954



Mrs. Iluminada A. Ramos, in 1976; retired high school teacher, conferred the Diploma of Honor in recognition of her service for the cause of Filipino and allied fighting men during World War II, by the Lake County Federation of Women's Clubs, of California. She was born on November 29, 1903.



Miss Victoria Paguyo, high school teacher whose heroic work during the Japanese occupation helped alleviate the suffering of American prisoners of war and internees, awarded the Medal of Freedom by the U.S. Army, Col. Stuart C. MacDonald, Commanding Officer, Philippine Combat Headquarters, PHIL-RYCOM, presented the award.

Lake County Federation of Women's Clubs

State of California

KNOW YE THAT, *Numinada Ramos* OF MANILA,
UPON THE UNANIMOUS RECOMMENDATION OF THE COMMITTEE ON CITATIONS AND
AWARDS, AND IN PURSUANCE OF THE RESOLUTION OF THE OFFICERS AND THE
MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF THE LAKE COUNTY FEDERATION OF
WOMEN'S CLUBS, IS HEREBY CONFERRED THIS

Diploma of Honor

IN RECOGNITION OF HER SERVICE FOR THE CAUSE OF FILIPINO AND ALLIED FIGHT-
ING MEN DURING WORLD WAR II.



IN WITNESS WHEREOF, ARE HEREUNTO AFFIXED THE SIGNATURES..
OF WOMEN'S CLUB OFFICIALS AND LAKE COUNTY SUPERIOR JUDGE.

GIVEN AT SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA, THIS FIFTEENTH DAY OF
NOVEMBER, IN THE YEAR OF OUR LORD, ONE THOUSAND NINE HUN-
DRED FIFTY-TWO.

[Signature]
Judge, Lake County Superior Court

Mrs. John E. Nelson
Auditor, California Federation of Women's Clubs

Barbara Spurr
President, Lake County Federation of Women's Clubs

Mrs. Ramos' Diploma of Honor

JOSEFA LLANES ESCODA AND HER AGENTS

Celedonio A. Ancheta

It is a pity that up to this time of our history, our Filipino historians have not yet unearth many of our heroes and heroines' patriotic activities during the Japanese occupation of our country. Perhaps our historians should not be blamed for this seemingly neglect on our part. There are many causes for this apparent deficiency in Philippine historiography. But what ever they are, the primary cause is the lack of research funds available for our scholars who would wish to venture in the archives here and abroad looking for valuable source materials for the writing of our history.

This writer in his research work was lucky enough to discover valuable papers regarding the activities of five women agents in the underground movement during the Japanese occupation under the late Mrs. Josefa Llanes Escoda, then president of the National Federation of Women's Club of the Philippines.

The five unsung heroines are Misses Victoria R. Paguyo, Adelia Casas, Caridad Concepcion, Mercedes Evangelista and Mrs. Iluminada A. Ramos, a widow. Among the papers of Mrs. Ramos, I found a list of the activities of her group while they were in this dangerous voluntary work. Of course Mrs. Escoda, their chief must have trained them very carefully for this risky job, because it means death to all of them if they would be discovered by the Japanese as undercover agents. I quote Mrs. Ramos' record of activities:

Our Activities During the War Under the Late Mrs. Josefa Llanes Escoda

1. We were five members of the Federation under the care of Mrs. Escoda who worked in the underground movement: Misses Evangelista, Concepcion, Casas, Paguyo and myself.

2. We stayed with Mrs. Escoda in the office of the Fed-

eration in Manila until she assigned us to go to Bongabong a barrio of Nueva Ecija to serve the Filipino and American prisoners of war.

3. We were given badges approved by the Japanese imperial Army to be used by us wherever we travelled for the Filipino and American prisoners of war. We travelled from Manila to Bongabong or Gapan Boho, Nueva Ecija to serve the prisoners of war.

4. When we travelled to the prison camps we put our badges on our breast to be recognized by the Japanese that we were members of the Federation. We brought with us *bayons* filled with letters, money and gifts from wives, relatives and friends of the prisoners, but the *bayons* were covered with cigarettes, candies, and foods pretending that there were no secrets at the bottom of the *bayons*.

5. When we passed by the Japanese guards they stopped us but when they see that we were members of the Federation they permitted us to go on our way.

6. We were housed in a nice house in Bongabong with Mr. and Mrs. Escoda and their children. The Escodas stayed with us for three days in a week with Japanese soldiers as their bodyguards and then would go back to Manila.

7. We had commissary three times a week in the prison Camps. We did not sell the goods and foods we brought to the camp, but we were pretending to sell them as if we gave them the buying price. But before we entered the Camp a letter from Mrs. Escoda would be presented to the Japanese officer of the guard to permit us to have the commissary in the Camp. We offered cakes and foods first to the officers and his guards before we had our commissary.

8. Each of us of the Federation had a window and distributed the goods. It was done with care and caution because the Japanese officers were watching us until we were through with the pretended commissary.

9. Twice a month Mr. & Mrs. Escoda would come to the Camp with beautiful girls including their two children and held program like folk dancing, singing, dancing and eating parties for the Japanese officers only. These satisfied very much the

Japanese officers. In this way Mrs. Escoda gained their confidence. Sometimes we ate together and the Japanese cooked the food they served us in their own way of cooking.

10. These commissary business and singing and dancing parties were held many times every month. These goods for commissary were brought by Mrs. Escoda from Manila every week.

11. When the chance came to go home to Laoag, Ilocos Norte, I asked permission from Mrs. Escoda to leave the group. She nearly did not permit me to go home until I promised that I would come back after seeing my two young children under the care of my old parents.

12. Miss Paguyo was left alone. Our days were numbered and already very risky for all of us.

13. As I left for home I learned that Mr. Escoda and General Lim were caught by the Japanese when they were waiting for a submarine near the seashore somewhere that will bring them to Australia. They were immediately brought to Manila and imprisoned in Fort Santiago.

14. The Japanese looked for Mrs. Escoda in their home and was brought also to Fort Santiago. They also looked for the two Escoda children but they were already evacuated by relatives to the farthest and secluded place somewhere.

15. Miss Paguyo was afraid and so she hid herself somewhere. I did not know what happened to the other members of our group. I learned that Miss Casas and Miss Evangelista died already by natural death. May their souls rest in Peace.

16. Thanks to the Almighty, I was able to go home to my children and to my parents.

(Sgd.) MRS. ILUMINADA A. RAMOS

Mrs. Ramos is married for the second time to Mr. Juan Vallejos a retired municipal treasurer. She herself is a retired high school teacher. She has two children in the first marriage, Graducion (now Mrs. Acosta), and Napoleon Ramos. She has no child in the second marriage.

The United States Army honored Miss Paguyo with a gold Medal of Freedom, while the California Women's Club

awarded to Mrs. Ramos a Diploma of Honor. So far our government has not yet recognized them for the services they had rendered to their country. Mrs. Escoda together with her husband were executed by the Japanese Imperial Army. Miss Paguyo died May of last year (1975) by a jeep accident. I believe that Mrs. Ramos, Misses Paguyo, Evangelista, Casas and Concepcion deserve recognition from our country. Except for Mrs. Escoda, these heroines are unknown and unsung.

DOCUMENTS
LOUISVILLE GENERAL HOSPITAL
 323 E. Chestnut St.
 Louisville 2 Kentucky

April 2, 1947

Dear Miss Paguyo:

When we were in the Philippines from Japan to the U. S. I tried to contact you but the people from whom I asked did not know you. I was still trying to locate you when the boat pulled off.

Your letter certainly had a very interesting information. I am going to give you some account of those whom you know too in subsequent paragraphs.

I placed in a memorandum concerning your efforts and accomplishments, I will send you the report which was received about a month ago. It seems as if those who put the most effort in the war got the least out of it.

After leaving Bongabong we were sent to Cabanatuan, we stayed there about nine months. During this time Captain Joe Bulfamonte was sent to Corregidor. He was later killed with 250 others by the Japanese when the Americans invaded Leyte. About fourteen doctors went to Japan on the medical detail of February 1944, they fared all right except for a loss of weight.

Captain Hudgens, Lamire, Burr and DeBaker were either killed during the bombing of those prison ships or were drowned. Many of the corpmen whom you knew, but whose names escaped my memory now were killed.

I wrote to Harry Brown and Palermo the other day telling about the letter that you sent me. I know that they will be glad to learn that you are alive.

Remember that Robert Martinez (Robert Jones), well he was killed while participating in guerrilla activity. He was married to Dr. Madrid from Malolos, Bulacan. She has a child by him.

In regards to myself I was shipped to Japan with that group of 7000 Americans on those five prison ships. Only 1200 of us arrived. The rest were killed, drowned or starved to death. I weighed 50 kilos, about 110 pounds and with me beriberi, which probably amounted to 90 pounds of my total weight.

In the camp at Shrirahawa we were strafed by Americans and had 75 casualties. In the camp at Heito about a hundred prisoners were killed by frag bombs and 200 or more injured when the camp was hit directly.

At the time of liberation I weighed 131 pounds, about 20 pounds of it was water. I was in such condition that I could not carry on a normal practice so I decided to do something that was less strenuous and have taken eye, ear, nose and throat as a specialty.

Those books, if you were unable to find Dr. Julian keep them or give them to some Filipino doctors. Those letters you can tear up or send to me as you wish. I know you have taken great risk in keeping them in your possession. I am greatly indebted to you and I am not forgetting it. I know that I owe you some money, also since I have not seen you to know you personally.

I will write you more as soon as I can recollect names. I lost practically everything I have over there to pin any memory to. I have malaria attacks occasionally residual night blindness may be the result of Vitamins A and B deficiency.

Lastly, I owe you very much, my health, etc. for if it were not for your aid and those whom you were with, many of us would not be living.

Very sincerely yours,
(Sgd.) ALVIN CHARLES POMELEIT

Office Phone 8-0121

Residence Phones 7-26-33
8-54-69

Frank D. McCarthy, M. D.

Pat M. Cmeyla, M. D.

General Medicine

General Surgery

Suite 721 Badgerow Building

Sioux City, Iowa

9/13/46

Dear Misses Paguyo, Casas & Concepcion,

I am enclosing an affidavit which I hope will help you in establishing your identity with whomever you wish to contact. I am sure that no one knows better than those of us who were

in Camp # 3 what you people did during those dark days and I know there are many others, will never forget you and I am sure in my own mind that there are many men who owe their lives in part to the money and medicines you people smuggled in.

I have recently received a communication from the U.S. Armed Forces in the Western Pacific asking for names and addresses of individuals who may have rendered any unusual aid to prisoners during the time they were under the control of the Japanese forces. I shall certainly put your names at the head of the list.

I should like to ask you that if there are others that you know who should be included, would you please send me their names and addresses?

I remember Dr. & Mrs. Atienza from Camp O'Donnell and also Miss Evangelista who did much good work, but don't know their addresses and full names.

I am certain that many of those who came back home realized and appreciated what was done for them by those of you on the outside. A great many of them never did find out who was really responsible because of the necessary secrecy. Some few may have forgotten in the excitement of getting home. For those who never knew how or from whom their help came, May I offer you their thanks and May God bless you always.

Should a time ever come when I may be of any help to you, please do not hesitate to write me.

Sincerely yours,
(Sgd.) P. M. CMEYLA

STATE OF IOWA

:SS A F F I D A V I T

WOODBURY COUNTY

I, Pat M. Cmeyla, being first duly sworn on oath depose and say that I am a resident of Sioux City, Woodbury County, Iowa, and have been for twelve years last past with the exception of the years from August, 1941 to October, 1945 which were spent in the Philippine Islands and Japan in the service of the United States Army.

That during the months from February, 1943 to December, 1943 I was interned, along with a medical unit, in Camp #3 Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, as a prisoner of the Japanese for the purpose of providing medical care to interned Filipino soldiers and civilians.

That during our confinement in Camp #3 we were able to establish contact with Victoria R. Paguyo, Adelia Casas, Mercedes Evangelista, Caridad Concepcion and Mrs. Iluminada Ramos who were maintaining a small house at the edge of the prison inclosure.

That under grave risk of their lives these women smuggled money, medicine and food into our camp which had been collected and brought to their house by members of the National Federation of Women's Clubs under the leadership of Mr. and Mrs. Tony Escoda and the V.S.A.C.'s under Miss Trophy Ocampo.

That members of our unit in turn were able to smuggle said money, drugs and food to Camp #1, such articles greatly benefiting many American prisoners of war.

That these people successfully maintained their underground activities at constant risk of their lives and under great physical and mental strain and that their unselfish devotion and efforts did much to maintain morale among the interned American and Filipino soldiers alike.

That Victoria R. Paguyo, Adelia Casas, Caridad Concepcion, Mercedes Evangelista, Mrs. Iluminada Ramos, and Trophy Ocampo, among others, should be properly rewarded for their part in establishing successful link in an underground system which resulted in untold benefit to American and Filipino prisoner personnel.

FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NOT.

(Sgd.) PAT M. CMEYLA, MD

Subscribed and sworn to by the said Pat M. Cmeyla before me this 14th day of September, A. D. 1946.

(Sgd.) J. P. O'DONNELL
Notary Public

DAILY PACIFICAN

Army Newspaper
30 July 1948

In the Western Pacific
Page 5

P. I. TEACHER PRESENTED HIGH HONOR

Miss Victoria Paguyo, of Lacag, Ilocos Norte, Luzon, was awarded the Medal of Freedom for her meritorious work during the Japanese occupation, by Col. Stuart C. MacDonald, commanding officer, Camp O'Donnell, at Tarlac High School, Tarlac, where she is now a teacher, yesterday afternoon.

Miss Paguyo was extremely active in alleviating the plight of American prisoners of war and internees during their internment by the Japanese.

By smuggling food, medicine, clothing and personal necessities into the concentration camps. Miss Paguyo is credited with having kept many from starvation and possible death.

CITATION CONTENT

The citation for Miss Paguyo's award follows:

"Miss Victoria Paguyo, Filipino citizen, performed meritorious service during the Japanese occupation of the Philippines from 1942 to 1945. Upon hearing of the unfortunate condition of the prisoners of war, Miss Paguyo left the peace and comfort of her home in Laoag, Ilocos Norte, Luzon, for Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, Luzon, with the noble intention of doing her bit to alleviate the miseries of the Americans in the hands of the Japanese. She volunteered as a canteen operator and later became a trusted underground worker. At the risk of her life, she smuggled food, medicine, money and other personal necessities into the camp, which undoubtedly helped keep many from starvation and possible death."

THREE LECTURES

DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION: A TURNING POINT ON LAND REFORMS AND FOREIGN RELATIONS *

Ladies and Gentlemen:

I am happy to be with you today as one of the lecturers during this History Week on the eve of the third anniversary of the proclamation of Martial Law in the Philippines.

Proclamation No. 1081, dated September 21, 1972 proclaiming a State of Martial Law in the Philippines is one of the most significant events in the annals of Philippine history. A new freedom was born. It was the birth of the New Society. It was a turning point from the clutches of terrorism, apathy, and hopelessness in the Old Society to a life of peace and order in the New Society. The Filipino was liberated. This was a day to remember by all of us. To me September 21, 1972 was as significant as June 12, 1896. I consider this date as the second declaration of Philippine independence.

The Democratic Revolution has many turning points. Among these are a turning point in education, a turning point in industry, a turning point in government administration, a turning point in politics, on health, on social welfare, a turning point in community development, in agriculture, in infrastructures, such as roads, a turning point on agrarian reforms, on foreign relations, a turning point in our national attitudes, in our moral values, in our social life, and a turning point in our national philosophy as a people.

Ladies and Gentlemen, I would like to speak today on the topic, *Democratic Revolution: A Turning Point on Land Reforms and Foreign Relations*. What is land reform? Why is it so important to the Philippines?

* Paper read on September 19, 1975 at the Centro Escolar University Auditorium in Manila during the 1975 History Week Celebration of the National Historical Institute.

Consistent with the objectives spelled out in the Agrarian Reform Code — to make our farmers independent, self-reliant, and responsive citizens and to create a viable social and economic structure. Land reform is a program which includes community development, roads, schools, education, irrigation, health and sanitation, greater productivity, and all other activities encompassing all the well-springs of rural upliftment.

Perhaps the most comprehensive description of land reform is the following extract from a report submitted to the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. "Land reform is important not only because of its potential effect on incentive to production. It has a far larger significance. It can mean the difference between explosive tensions and stability, between apathy and hope, between serfdom and citizenship. A nation of farm owners and of tenants who have the opportunity to become farm owners has the basic elements of a stable society. The farmer who owns his land, who retains an equitable share of his production, who is able to combine in voluntary association with his neighbors to improve their common lot, knows the meaning of human dignity. He has a stake in his community. A nation of insecure tenants and rootless laborers who see little hope to better their lot, is unstable society, subject to sporadic violence and easily persuaded to follow false leadership."

A brief survey of the historical background of land reform in our country is in order. Attempts at solving the tenancy problems started as early as the Spanish regime when some sort of agrarian reforms were advocated by Spanish officials due to the agrarian revolts in the different regions of the Philippines. But nothing substantial were introduced by the government to solve the agrarian problems.

Rizal, himself, had definite ideas about land reform which he implemented in his 16-hectare land in Dapitan by allotting lands to his students for their agricultural education. The Americans made also an attempt in land reform when Governor William Howard Taft instituted a move to buy what were known as friar lands for subdivisions to smaller lots and resold them to needy farmers who were actual occupants with a minimum cost that they could afford.

During the Commonwealth period, President Manuel L. Quezon launched his Social Justice program for the common men and the underprivileged laborers and tenants. Quezon tried to promote the economic welfare of the downtrodden masses by distributing to them lands that they could call their very own. He believed that the greatness and stability of the country depended upon a prosperous class of tenant-farmers. "To this end he purchased big landed estates and had them parcelled out among landless peasants. To enable them to carry their produce to and from their lands, feeder roads were constructed connecting them to the great highways leading to various commercial centers."

What is social justice? The Court of Justice explained social justice as "neither communism nor despotism, neither atomism nor anarchy, but it is the humanization of the laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice is not social equality, because social inequality will always exist as long as social relations depend on personal or subjective proclivities. It is not legal equality, because equality is a relative term based on personal or natural incapacity or sex. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the component elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the inter-relations of the members of the community. . . . Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic life consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting the health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about the greatest good to the greatest number."

It was during the Commonwealth administration of President Quezon that the Philippine Legislature passes a law regulating share tenancy on riceland. This is in accordance to his Social Justice program.

On May 14, 1935 the people of the Philippines ratified the

constitution authorizing the State to regulate the relation between landowner and tenant and between labor and capital in agriculture. The constitution also provides the size of private agricultural land which individuals, corporations or associations may acquire and hold, and appropriates upon payment of just compensation, lands for subdivision and resale at cost to individuals.

During the administration of President Manuel A. Roxas, after liberation, the First Congress of the Philippines passes a law regulating rice share tenancy contracts otherwise known as the 70-30 share tenancy ratio, meaning 70 per cent for the tenant and 30 for the landowner. But this was only good on paper. It was never put into practice because of the connivance between tenant and landowner. The poor tenant would accept the traditional 50-50 arrangement for fear that if he will invoke the law he might be replaced as tenant by his landlord. "President Roxas could not carry out his program. There was no money in the treasury . . . the Huk rebellion posed a threat to the success of any social amelioration program. Whether the Huks would have laid down their arms and returned to peaceful pursuits if the Roxas program had been implemented, is not easy to determine."

The Huks demanded the scraping out of the Bell Trade Act. They were against the resumption of trade with Japan. They wanted the subdivision of large estates for distribution to the tenants, the release of all Huks prisoners, the industrialization of the country and the scraping of United States bases within the country.

Vice-President Elpidio Quirino succeeded to the presidency upon the death of Roxas. Quirino attempted to follow the footsteps of Roxas in his economic program. The PACSA for social amelioration was created and also the ACCFA to help farmers market their crops. He tried to immobilized the Huks and communist activities by granting amnesty to them but it did not work out to his satisfaction.

After the failure of the amnesty policy of President Quirino, the tenancy problem took a serious turn. Who were the Huks or Hukbalahap? Originally it was a guerrilla organization during the Japanese occupation but after liberation it turned

out to be Socialist-Communist inspired with the cloak of Philippine nationalism. The Communists tried to exploit it for their own purposes. This in effect brought about President Ramon Magsaysay's policy, of land for the landless which is said to be one of the projects that broke the Huk rebellion.

The principal feature of the Magsaysay administration was resettlement of ex-Huks and landless farmers in EDCOR and NARRA farms. The program also included the purchase of landed estates, their subdivision and distribution to deserving and landless tenants. President Magsaysay approved the Agricultural Tenancy Act regulating tenancy in general, fixing the rental on tenant land, and defining the rights and duties of both landowners and tenants on all classes of land. He also approved the Land Reform Act of 1955 establishing a machinery for the acquisition and redistribution of private agricultural lands.

The program, to a certain extent, solved a part of the problem. However, share-crop tenancy still existed with its inherent evils and inequities. This directly led to the enactment by Congress of the Agricultural Land Reform Code of 1963 during the administration of President Diosdado Macapagal, establishing a unified and coordinated machinery for undertaking extensive land reform. Macapagal failed to implement the provisions of the Code because of unsurmountable difficulties. There was no appropriation to carry out the provisions of the Code. There was no cooperation by members of Congress who would be affected by the land reform program.

One of the major platform of President Ferdinand E. Marcos' administration before it took over the reign of government in 1965 is to vigorously implement land reform. This was reaffirmed by him in his State of the Nation Address to Congress on January 24, 1966 wherein he emphatically pledged that he will implement the law. An extract of his message states "that our first concern is to strengthen the agricultural sector. Self-sufficiency in the production of food, especially rice, must be attained in the shortest possible time. We must also improve and diversify our production of export crops so that we can develop Philippine agriculture into reliable earner of foreign exchange. . . .

"This administration is prepared to find the means for the implementation of land reform. If necessary, we shall consider the sale of government properties not immediately needed to realize the funds of the proposed Land Bank. The Agricultural Credit Administration must be reoriented to permit a concentration of its resources on land reform cases. The Land Reform Code itself shall be subject to improvement to increase its feasibility."

The new Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines which was proclaimed by President Marcos on January 17, 1973 provides the constitutional basis of Land Reform. Article XIV, Section 8 states that all lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, wildlife, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State. This is based on the so-called Regalian Doctrine. Section 12 provides that the State shall formulate and implement an agrarian reform program aimed at emancipating the tenant from the bondage of the soil and achieving the goals enunciated in this constitution. While Section 13, states that the National Assembly may authorize, upon payment of just compensation, the expropriation of private lands to be subdivided into small lots and conveyed at cost to deserving citizens. The land to be expropriated are to be subdivided for resale. Land for the landless is essential to the peace, stability, and progress of the nation.

There are two significant Presidential Decrees that are consider the major turning points on Land Reform. They are Presidential Decree No. 2 and Presidential Decree No. 27. PD No. 2 which was barely signed by President Marcos in less than a week after the proclamation of Martial Law proclaims the whole country as land reform area. He stated that among the objectives of the Land Reform Code is to achieve dignified existence for the small farmers free from the pernicious institutional restraints and practices which have not only retarded the agricultural development of the country but have also produced widespread discontent and unrest among the farmers, one of the causes of the existing national emergency.

PD No. 27 promulgated the following month proclaims the emancipation of tenant from the bandage of the soil, transferring to them the ownership of the land they till and pro-

ving the instruments and mechanism thereof. This was aimed to abolish the institution of feudalism in the country which has spawned valid and legitimate grievances by tenant-farmers that gave rise to violent conflict and social tension.

President Marcos cited some of the main thrusts of the New Society during a meeting this month with the 1975 Ramon Magsaysay awardees. The New Society according to the President through its credit and monetary policies, has been rechannelling credit to the rural areas. Private banks have also been giving credit without collaterals to farmers. Banks have also been given incentives to spread out to the rural areas so as to better serve the small farmers. The problem of absentee landlordism has cropped up in the case of the corporate farming projects, in which big firms are engaged in rice farming for their employes by renting idle lands. He said that the owners of rented idle lands tended to move into the cities without helping till the land. To remedy the matter, the President said, a measure was being considered to reduce the rental if the land-owners did not help work the land. The balance between the actual rent and the reduced rent would go to a special fund to help the farmers.

Ladies and Gentlemen: Now on the other phase of the Democratic Revolution which I wish also to speak on is a turning point in our foreign relations. In the Old Society, Philippine foreign policy was as stiff and lifeless as a corpse. To the end of the Old Society, despite the fact that even our Asian neighbors as well as African nations were thinking for themselves, the country's foreign policy limped in crutches. In the Old Society, we found that our government clinged tenaciously to the "hard line" against communist countries. We are the only nation then in Asia who had not recognized the Soviet Union. America itself had opened diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union since 1933. But since we were helpless children we were not entitled to the same arrangement, or so our American tutors probably believed. The Philippines had not yet then declared its independence from American foreign policy and we were remarkably insensitive to the fact that most other nations in the world, especially the nationalistic Asian and African countries, viewed us then as miserable errand boys of the Americans.

But now in the New Society, our government took a bold step in our foreign relations. We opened our doors for trade and diplomatic relations to the socialist countries in both hemispheres. We are no longer like Capitan Tiago in the *Noli Me Tangere* of Dr. Jose Rizal, who was reputed to be the most lavish man in social entertainments. "It was known that his house, like his country, never closed its doors to anybody except to commerce or to every new or bold ideas."

Ladies and Gentlemen: We have to make friends with the countries of the world irrespective of their political ideologies provided that such friendships with them would not prejudice our national interest and national security. This does not mean that we must discard old friends, but instead we should strengthen our cordial relations with them. This is necessary to let the world realized that we are a people with honor and dignity who deserve respect by other peoples of the world.

It is very timely and relevant to quote here a portion of the speech of President Marcos at the AFP traditional testimonial review at Camp Aguinaldo, last week. "When we look at the world today, we see only too clearly a new theater of challenge and opportunity. We see that the future of national security lies no longer in alignment and in confrontation, but in regional solidarity, in independent pursuit of interests, in negotiations with other countries. The possibilities of peace notwithstanding, we also know that this is not the time to forget the dangers of aggression. But aggression, however real and imminent, must be met by policies rooted in global, regional, and national realities, not in mistaken fears or dubious dependence on the proffered protection by the mighty.

"In Southeast Asia, for the present, our best hope for peace continues to lie in a collective defense posture guaranteed by an equilibrium of powers among the powerful nations. Harmony is not possible should we desire uniformity of vision among the peoples of Asia; it can only be produced by the balancing of rights to self determination and by the exchange of goods and ideas among nations who may not have the same social and political systems."

Ladies and Gentlemen: In this connection, I wish to share with you my observations and impressions I had with our

countrymen with whom I had the privilege to have contact with in my recent visit to the United States this year.

The common questions that most of our countrymen in the United States had asked me were, How is the life in the Philippines under the regime of Martial Law? Are the people happy under the Marcos dictatorial rule? I told them that President Marcos is not a dictator like dictators in other countries where there is no rule of law but of men. But his administration is a constitutional authoritarian crisis government wherein the civilian government is supreme over the military. I explained to them that in the Philippines today we have a Democratic Revolution. The Barangay government in all the barrios in the Philippines is a good example where the people have the opportunity to decide for themselves what they want for their community. I told them that in the last referendum in February and previous referendums, the voting population unanimously indorsed the government under Martial Law and the continuation of the Marcos regime so as to continue the reforms that are in progress. Some of them were suspicious that the referendums we had were rigged. These are the Manglapus and Mijares followers whom we could count by the fingers. Thanks to the "Balikbayan" who were eyewitnesses of changes in the Philippines under the New Society that eroded the fortresses of Manglapus and others in the United States.

They asked me about the government land reform program. Is it fair they said, that the government should forcibly take away lands from landowners without just compensation? Is this not communism. I said that there is no forcible seizure of lands from the people, and it is not communism. It is the aim of the government that those who have big land holdings should share those landless farmers in order that there is dispersal of wealth for the common welfare of majority of the people. This would prevent concentration of wealth in the hands of a few families. I have to explain to them Presidential Decree No. 2 and Presidential Decree No. 27.

On foreign relations, many of them fear that opening our country for trade and diplomatic relations to Socialist countries would endanger our national security. They are of the opinion that we should not disengage our close association with

the United States for our political security and economic salvation. I emphatically said that the Marcos administration never thought of this or has any plan to disturb the present cordial diplomatic relations of the Philippines with the United States. The truth is that it is the desire of our government to strengthen our friendship with the United States on the basis of political equality.

The present administration, I said, is to develop in us self-reliance both in economic and military aspects. The trends of our defense posture under the Marcos administration is that being a free and sovereign nation we should prepare our country against any possible outside aggression without expecting the help of a mighty foreign power. Also to prepare our country to be able to police itself without inviting a friendly nation to help us. I cited as an example of what happened in South Vietnam recently.

My friends, I feel that at the advent of the third anniversary of the Democratic Revolution, our dreams and expectations for the realization of a glorious new way of life and a progressive Philippines is, I believe, within our reach and capability. What is needed is hard work and more hard work for all of us and cooperation among ourselves.

In Rizal's *Noli Me Tangere*, he said "Then, if there aren't enough, let all the villagers, the old men, the youths, and the boys work. Instead of the fifteen days of obligatory service, let them work three, four, five months for the state with the additional obligation that each one provide his own food and tools."

Thank you.

THE INFANTRY AND THE AIR FORCE IN PHILIPPINE DEFENSE CAMPAIGN *

Officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines:

I am happy to be with you today as one of your lecturers in your seminar/workshop on the general subject of Philippine Defense Campaign.

When we speak of Philippine Defense Campaign, one does not only think of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, but also of civilian establishments, both public and private. For example, civil defense units, home guards, public and private transportations and communications, hospitals, industries, labor and capital and others, of which without their cooperation the armed forces could not carry on and operate effectively to accomplish its military mission.

Also it is important to have the loyalty, cooperation and nationalism of the people with their sense of military obligation. National discipline and sacrifice by our people are necessary. We must not forget that when war comes, not only the men in uniform who will be involved but everybody, young and old irrespective of sex and status in life including innocent children. It is a total war.

So my friends, it is not only military tactics and strategy and logistics, or the use of sophisticated weapons, or tanks, airplanes or guided missiles that are important but also the cooperation and support of the civilian population. Also we must have a wise political direction of military planning, mobilization, and diplomatic leadership. All of these should be integrated and work hand-in-hand for our Philippine Defense Campaign.

Being a reserve officer in the Philippine army in the infantry, I wish to speak on the subject, *The Infantry and the Air Force in Philippine Defense Campaign*.

* Paper read on September 23, 1975 at the OTAG Training Center, Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo in Quezon City during a seminar at the Office of the Chief of Military History.

The infantry constitute the senior arm of the Philippine Army and in fact remains "Queen of the Battlefield." Everything is based on the infantry, and all other arms are geared to support it. It is never a case of the infantry supporting the tanks or protecting the artillery, but always the other way round.

In the standing forces the infantry divisions are either mechanized, motorized or lorry-borne, but all fight on their feet. The importance of the infantry, either in defense or in attack is that it is the main-stay of all military units in any operation. We need the infantry to garrison our strategic areas against possible enemy aggression and occupation. It should at all cost deny the enemy to gain a foothold or occupy our friendly territory. Or in case an enemy territory is evacuated due to relentless air strikes and artillery barrage, the infantry must come in immediately and garrison the place and deny the enemy to re-occupy it.

What is lamentable to think of regarding our Bataan campaigns in the last war is the lack of training and discipline of our men. Discipline in Philippine Army units left much to be desired according to United States army officers. Many went AWOL and deserted their units. Since the Philippine Army retained its national integrity after induction into the USAFFE, Philippine Army headquarters was responsible for discipline and punishment. "Many of the officers and non-commissioned officers were untrained and unqualified for their assignments. There were some first sergeants and company clerks who could neither read or write."

From the same report of a United States army officer it says "that training facilities and equipment were almost non-existent. Target ranges had been hurriedly improvised but many units went into battle without ever having fired their weapons. There was a serious shortage in almost all types of equipment. The clothing was old and much of it not fit for use. Shoes were rubber soled and quickly worn out. The uniform usually consisted of the blue fatigue suit, and when that wore out, anything that could be found. There were serious shortages in personal equipment, blankets, mosquito bars, and shelter halves. The supply of Enfield and Springfield 1903 rifles was adequate but that of the many other wea-

pons, entrenching tools, gas masks, and steel helmets was not. The trouble with the .30-caliber Enfield rifle used by American troops in World War I is that the stock was too long for the the small Philippine soldier and the weak extractor often broke and could not be replaced . . .

"Organic transportation was virtually nonexistent. Division headquarters and motor transport company could muster only one sedan, one command car, one bantam car, one 1 1/2-ton truck and one 1/2-ton truck."

Then a part of the report states "the enlisted men seemed to the division commander to be proficient in only two things: one, when an officer appeared, to yell attention in a loud voice, jump up and salute; the other, to demand 3 meals per day."

The concept of close ground support by aircraft probably originated in 1915 and 1916 in World War I amongst the more hare-brained and enthusiastic pilots, on both sides of the lines, who found themselves quite unable to resist the opportunity to swoop down unexpectedly upon enemy position or column, spray it with gunfire, and then zoom up and away, leaving chaos on the ground behind them. However the first official recognition of close ground support seems to have occurred until the spring of 1917.

The rivalry between the infantry and the airforce is very well illustrated in the Stilwell controversy with Chiang K'ai-shek. Subsequent to the Allied defeat in Burma, Gen. Joseph W. Stilwell, as Commander of the China-India-Burma Theater, attempted to carry out War Department orders to improve the combat efficiency of the Chinese Army together with later directives from General Marshall to "support China." Stilwell proposed to use most of the American Lend-Lease material to train an elite corps of Chinese soldiers to retake Northern Burma and to build a road connecting India and China. Stilwell's plan was opposed by Generalissimo Chiang K'ai-Shek and Gen. Claire L. Chennault, founder of the Flying Tigers. Chiang opposition was based on the politics of China and his desire to control all Lend-Lease supplies. Stilwell refused to relinquish control over American materials and even suggested that he be allowed to train and equip 30 to 60 Chinese divisions to fight Japan. Chiang's concern was maintenance of power, and his concept of strategy was defense in depth of conserve re-

sources and to avoid a major battle with the Japanese.

General Chennault the Commander of the Fourteenth Air Force in China, technically under Stilwell, believed the Japanese could be defeated quickly by air power. Instead of wasting materials outfitting Chinese soldiers for ground operations in Burma, Chennault advocated that cargo flown over the Himalayan Mountains (the Hump) be devoted to United States government supplies for the Fourteenth Air Force. Chennault claimed that if the Lend-Lease supplies were reserved exclusively for the Fourteenth Air Force, he could accomplish the defeat of Japan from air bases within six months. To Chennault as well as Chiang air power was the philosopher's magic stone, the Aladdin's lamp that could make wishes come true.

Despite the opposition of Chiang and Chennault, Stilwell's plan was adopted with the support of General Marshall and Secretary Stimson. From January to August 1944 Chinese soldiers trained and equipped, and commanded by Stilwell fought and defeated the Japanese armies in Northern Burma. Stilwell's victories were applauded by the American press and General Marshall continued to believe that Stilwell was one of his best field commanders.

General Chennault in his book *Way of a Fighter* (1949), denounced Stilwell as a man and for his strategy as China-India-Burma Theater Commander. He said, "Stilwell brought with him three things that served him ill during his difficult assignment in Asia: a strong prejudice against airpower coupled with a faint suspicion of any weapon more complicated than a rifle and bayonet; an imperialist attitude toward the Chinese, regarding them as inferiors incapable of managing their own affairs without foreign directions; and a complete disregard of the diplomatic facets of a top military post in a coalition war.

Gentlemen: Let us examine our participation in the Second World War. Let me preface our Philippine Defense Campaign in Bataan with the message of President Franklin D. Roosevelt to the Filipino people on August 13, 1943. He said, "The Filipino people fought and suffered and sacrificed for three years. They emerged from that struggle a free people, a nation fit to be respected as the equal of any on earth, not in size or wealth, but in the stout heart and national dignity.

which are the true measures of a people." The whole civilized world were then watching and listening every minute the heroic struggle of our people in Bataan and Corregidor. We fought in spite of overwhelming odds against our boys. They fought the enemy like the warriors of ancient Sparta against the Persians to protect their country from being invaded. Our boys believed that it is more honorable to fight and die with honor for their country than to surrender and live without any struggle but become slaves to the Japanese. Rifle for rifle, the Filipino had shown that he was a better soldier than the Japanese.

The thrilling story of a Filipino mess sergeant is in order in this lecture. Jose Calugas, Battery B, 88th Field Artillery, Philippine Scouts was awarded the coveted and highest honor, the Congressional Medal of Honor by the people of the United States, the first to be awarded to a Filipino. The action for which the award was made took place near Culis, Bataan on January 16, 1942. A battery gun position was bombed and shelled by the enemy until one gun was put out of commission and all of the canoneers were killed or wounded. Sergeant Calugas, a mess sergeant of another battery, voluntarily and without orders ran 1,000 yards across the shell-swept area to the gun position. There he organized a volunteer squad which placed the gun back in commission and fired effectively against the enemy, although the position remained under constant and heavy Japanese artillery fire.

In the Air Force, let me also cite a few of the heroes who conspicuously demonstrated their heroism. The greatest among the Filipino aces was the late Col. Jesus Villamor of the Philippine Army Air Corps who was decorated for "extraordinary heroism" on December 10, 1941. On this date the Japanese swang their first air blow at the Philippine Army Air Corps (PAAC) at high noon, when red-spotted carrier fighters roared down on Zablan field in Quezon City, where P-26s of the Sixth Pursuit Squadron under his command were based. In the face of heavy enemy fire from strong enemy forces, Colonel Villamor, then Captain, led his flight of three pursuit planes into action against attacking planes. By his conspicuous example of courage and leadership, and at great personal hazard beyond the call of duty, his flight enabled a rout of the attacking planes,

thereby preventing appreciable damage to his station. Again, on December 12, Villamor with his Filipino fighter pilots encountered the enemy in one of the most amazing dogfights of the last war. Six P-26s battled against 54 twin-engined bombers and 18 *Zeros* over Batangas airfield. The odds were twelve to one. Lt. Cesar Basa was killed when he took on seven fighters by himself. Lt. Antonio Mondigo was shot down while trying to aid Basa, but he managed to bail out to safety. Lt. Salvador Manlunas was killed on the ground when a bomb fragment hit him while directing anti-air-craft machinegun-fire. Col. Villamor and Lt. Joseph Gozar accounted two enemy planes shot down, one being destroyed by Villamor. Villamor for this action was awarded the Oak Leaf Cluster to be worn with the Distinguished Service Cross for another act of "extraordinary heroism." While Gozar was awarded also the Distinguished Service Cross by trying to ram enemy planes after his gun had jammed. By his display of courage and leadership, after a series of such maneuvers, he forced the Japanese planes to flee without further attacks against the airdrome. The other p-26 pilots, Lts. Godofredo Juliano, Geronimo Aclan, Basa and Mondigo were awarded the Silver Star.

There were two other fighter pilots of the Sixth Pursuit Squadron whom we can not help but mention here because of their dedication to duty and courageous leadership in combat. I am referring to Lt. Robert Joaquin Paulino, a topnotcher in the air corps flying school who died in Aglaloma, Bataan while leading an attack, and Lt. Alberto Aranzaso, who went out on a lone reconnaissance mission over the China sea and his P-26 ran into a Japanese cruiser maintaining the naval blockade. Anti-air-craft gunfire damaged his small fighter plane, but he managed to bring it back and forced-landed in Cavite. He drowned later while trying to escape from Corregidor with Capt. Damon Cause, an American officer. The two took a little boat from Corregidor to Cavite after the island fortress surrendered to the Japanese to escape capture. Captain Cause related the grueling experience of floating with icy-water of Manila Bay for almost 24 hours. A Jap *Zero* fighter spotted their little boat and shot it. Captain Cause said that "We had been in the water for almost 24 hours and I could feel a kind of aching numbness creeping up my legs." This was about 11:00 o'clock at night on May 7, 1942. Lt. Aranzaso, gave up the boat to

allow Captain Cause to have it for himself, because the two of them clinging to the damaged boat would make both of them perish. Captain Cause reported to the War Department the story of his escape and said this tribute to Lt. Aranzaso: "No cross will mark Lt. Aranzaso's watery grave, but I will always remember him. He was a gallant officer and a true gentleman." It was a tribute which could very well apply to every officer and men of the Philippine Army Air Corps.

Now going to the ten reserve infantry divisions that participated in the Philippine Defense Campaign. On September 1, 1941 General MacArthur issued orders calling into service ten infantry regiments — one from each of the reserve Philippine Army divisions. The 11th, 21st, 31st, 71st and 91st divisions were assigned for the North Luzon Force under the command of Major General J. M. Wainwright. The 41st and 51st divisions were for the Southern Luzon Force under the command of Brigadier General George M. Parker, Jr. While the 61st, 81st and 101st divisions were assigned for the Visayan-Mindanao Force under the command of Brigadier General William F. Sharp.

On the basis of the authorized strength of a Philippine Army reserve would be 75,000 men. To this figure must be added the strength of the 1st division and the Philippine Constabulary, plus non-divisional and provisional units formed after the start of the war. A rough estimate of the number of men in the Philippine Army would be approximated to be 120,000 men. Comparing the strength of a Japanese infantry division, it is twice the number of men to that of a Philippine infantry division.

The Philippine Coast Artillery Command, with headquarters in Manila under the command of Major General Geo. F. More, was assigned the Harbor Defense of Manila and Subic Bays. Its main mission was to protect the entrance of Manila Bay and to deny the use of Manila and Subic Bays to the enemy. The Philippine Army Air Corps was under the jurisdictional command of the Philippine Coast Artillery commander.

To each of the ten reserve Philippine infantry divisions were assigned more or less forty United States Army officers and about twenty American and Philippine Scouts non-commissioned officers who served as instructors. The position of the

instructor was an anomalous one. He had no command status. He had no authority but he was directly responsible for the success or failure of the regiment to which he was assigned.

To sum it up, the philosophy of the Philippine Defense Campaign, I would like to quote here an extract of a letter of General MacArthur to President Quezon: "The key of the defensive arch in the Philippines is the trained Citizen Army which will confront the enemy with the certainty of staggering costs in men and money. The object is to insure peace, a peace of self-reliance, a peace which upholds the Christian virtues and defies the threat of rapacious greed, a peace that will mean continued happiness and freedom of God-worshipping and democratic peoples."

General MacArthur said proudly the following tribute to the defenders of Bataan and Corregidor: "Six weeks of hard fighting have made veterans of the soldiers of the Philippine Army. Their training in the different school of actual combat and their battle experience have steadied them and developed their individual initiative and resourcefulness."

What are the flaws of the Philippine Defense Campaign? I will cite here only a few and I will leave the others for you to discover in your seminar/workshop. I have cited in this paper the anomalous situation of the United States army instructors assigned in the ten Philippine Reserve Infantry Divisions. They had no command status and yet they were responsible for the success or failure of their units. They were responsible but without authority. This situation was surely bound to be a dismal failure, and the consequence would be that of passing the buck to others of their mistakes of the operations.

I also mention somewhere in this paper that the Filipino soldier is only good first to yell attention in a loud voice at the approach of an officer and salute, and second, to demand 3 meals a day. Although this is a sort of derisive criticism to a Filipino soldier by an American officer, yet I would consider this as a manifestation of the Filipino discipline in the best military tradition of all times. The greatest general of the modern age, Napoleon Bonaparte said that the army walks on its stomach. To demand 3 meals a day is certainly not an extravagant. How can a man fight well with empty stomach? In a report submitted

by a commanding officer, he claimed that there were first sergeants and company clerks who could neither read nor write. This is a big lie. The truth, gentlemen, is that most if not all of our non-commissioned officers and company clerks were literate. Many of them were high school graduates and some were even college degree holders. I bear witness to this fact because I was a mobilization officer at the outbreak of the war and had access to the individual records of those inducted in the USAFFE.

Our Filipino Generals, like Generals Lim, Capinpin, Segundo, Francisco, and others could be compared favorably on all levels, of military training with the best of the commanding generals of the United States Army.

After the liberation, a Filipino officer remarked jokingly that his division was a "running away division" because his American commanding officer was a "running away general." It is very unfortunate to know that some of the so-called American instructors were assigned to command Philippine Army units during the Bataan campaign when the command should have been given to Filipino officers who had demonstrated leadership in the campaign. Another faulty practice during the campaign which would have been minimized to prevent confusion in the ranks were the shuffling of personnel and areas of operation of units while the battle is going on. This was similar to a bad practice of the Russian Army during the First World War. The result was poor internal communications and confusion which would be every bit as much drag on the defenders or the attackers.

In closing, I would like to state here what President Marcos said as our military policy of self-reliance. The three fronts must be pushed through for Philippine Defense Campaign. "First, expansion of the AFP's capacity, personnel and functions. Second, maintenance of public order and quelling of internal insurgency. And third, shouldering of the burden of defense by the Philippines alone."

The President reiterated the government's policy of never calling on any foreign troops to fight in our land for purposes of maintaining internal stability.

Thank you.

SIGNIFICANCE OF OCTOBER 20, 1944 *

Ladies and Gentlemen:

About thirty-nine years ago I lived here in your beautiful province as a Lieutenant in the Philippine Army. First as a commanding officer of the 6th Leyte Cadre at Malitbog and later of the 1st Leyte Cadre at Tacloban. Many of the boys who had fought the Japs during the Japanese invasion, and those who had joined the guerrillas during the occupation were my former cadre trainees. I would not be surprised if there are some of them present today in this 31st anniversary commemoration of the landing of the American forces in Leyte.

This is my first sentimental visit to Leyte after the war. I am very happy to be here today because I consider Leyte as my second home.

Ladies and Gentlemen: It is a common knowledge that the landing of the American forces in the Philippines at Leyte was on October 20, 1944. The fact is that landings were effected three days before this date. To be exact, it was on October 17 when the U.S. 6th Ranger Battalion went ashore on Suluan and Dinagat Islands. These islands guarded the eastern approaches to Leyte Gulf. Despite cyclonic storms and heavy seas these first landings mark the invasion of the Philippines. Homonhon Island was occupied the next day. All three islands were quickly cleared of small enemy garrisons and radio installations while mine sweepers and demolition teams co-operated to sweep the waters and the beaches of all obstacles potentially dangerous to the main operation.

The greatest armada of six hundred ships and 1,500 planes ever collected in the Pacific was gathered here in Leyte Gulf the morning of October 20. General MacArthur, in personal charge of the invasion, had brought this tremendous armada through the enemy lines without being sighted by a single Japanese ship, and two months ahead of his own schedule.

* Paper read on October 20, 1975 at the auditorium of the Leyte Normal College in Tacloban City during the 4th Regional Seminar of the Philippine Historical Association.

Before the landing the Air and Navy co-ordinated the bombardment of enemy positions and installations along the eastern coast of Leyte to "soften up" the Japanese. The main assault began at ten o'clock in the morning of Friday on October 20 on Red Beach at Palo. This was however preceeded by a landing of a regimental combat team of the 21st Infantry at both shores of Panaon Strait in southern Leyte an hour prior to the main assault. Then simultaneous landings were made along an 18-mile front between the two towns of Dulag and San Jose to the north. The naval and air bombardment were devastating in effect for the lands and skies shoke with it.

General MacArthur's stirring promise, "I shall return" was fulfilled shortly after the main landings. In a drenching rain he strode ashore together with President Sergio Osmeña and Brigadier General Carlos P. Romulo with their staff on the muddy beachhead near Palo, following close to the assault echelons, and heralded the coming hour of liberation. Speaking to millions of waiting Filipinos over a portable radio set, he declared:

"This is the Voice of Freedom, General MacArthur speaking. People of the Philippines: I have returned. By the grace of Almighty God our forces stand again on Philippine soil — soil consecrated in the blood of our two peoples. We have come, dedicated and committed to the task of destroying every vestige of enemy control over your daily lives, and of restoring, upon a foundation of indestructible strength, the liberties of your people.

"At my side is your President, Sergio Osmeña, worthy successor of that great patriot, Manuel L. Quezon, with members of his cabinet. The seat of your government is now therefore firmly re-established on Philippine soil.

"The hour of your redemption is here. Your patriots have demonstrated an answering and resolute devotion to the principles of freedom that challenges the best that is written on the pages of human history. I now call upon your supreme effort that the enemy may know from the temper of an aroused and outraged people within that he has a force there to contend with no less violent than is the force committed from without.

"Rally to me. Let the indomitable spirit of Bataan and Corregidor lead on. As the lines of battle roll forward to bring you within the zone of operations, rise and strike! For future generations of your sons and daughters, strike! In the name of your sacred dead, strike! Let no heart be faint. Let every arm be steeled. The guidance of Divine God points the way. Follow in His name the Holy Grail of righteous victory."

President Osmeña, in his speech, urged his countrymen to fight in the name of democracy. He spoke while the battle was raging. He said:

"My beloved people, by the Grace of God, and by the honor of America, I am again with you. Happy as I am to be back on Philippine soil, I am sad that our late and beloved President Quezon is not here to witness the realization of the great cause to which he dedicated his life — the independence of the Philippines. I know, however, that you feel as I do, that he is here with us in spirit, to unite our people and to encourage us toward the achievement of the vital undertaking which lies ahead. . . .

"But it must be realized that the liberation of the Philippines is a joint enterprise which can only be speedily and thoroughly accomplished with the wholehearted support of our people. You in your homes in the towns, in the barrios, in the mountains, whether or not you belong formally to the underground, must do your part in accordance with the directives which the leaders of the underground and the guerrillas will receive from General MacArthur. You must do your utmost, as did your sons and brothers on Bataan and Corregidor, in Cebu and throughout our beloved land. . . .

"I am confident, that our people, without exception, will rally to the banner of liberty and democracy and give to the army of liberation their determined and unqualified support. In this crucial hour I urge every Filipino to do his duty by actively participating in this struggle, the outcome of which will bring not only freedom and happiness to our people but also peace, law, and security to the entire world.

"Here is a new challenge to our sense of national responsibility. We shall not fail."

General Romulo, on his part said the following:

"People of the Philippines, after two years of silence you

are again hearing the Voice of Freedom. It was a voice that first cried to you in the anguish of war. It speaks to you again in exaltation. For this is liberation that bring us home....

"Andres Bonifacio, Antonio Luna, Gregorio del Pilar, and our other warrior heroes enjoin you to fight. Fight when the opportune moment comes. Fight when the order is given. Unsheathe your bolo and let it flash to the Japanese our outraged people's vengeance. Fight without quarter given or asked. The day of reckoning for the brutal aggressor is here. Fight him wherever you may find him. Fight him to death. Fight for our flag that he has insulted, for America, and for freedom."

A mighty effort of the Japanese Imperial fleet to force entrance to Leyte Gulf and desrupt the American invasion was smashed by the Seventh and Third U.S. Fleet on October 24-25. The Japanese Imperial fleet consisting of the Northern Force under Admiral Osawa, the Southern Force under Admiral Nishimura and the Central Force under Admiral Kurita, was severely battered, with 21 ships sunk and more than 10 others heavily damage. After this decisive naval battle at the gulf of Leyte, the Japanese Imperial fleet never dared to show its image again on Philippine waters to threaten and foil the American invasion.

General MacArthur expressed his deep appreciation to the Filipinos for their co-operation both before and during the operation. He said:

"We have our hold now and I shall not relax the grip until Bataan and Corregidor once more rise into life....

"As Commander-in-Chief, I publicly acknowledge and pay tribute to the heroes who have selflessly and defiantly subordinated all to the cause of human liberty."

General MacArthur, in a message on October 25, made public the dramatic and daring role played by Filipino and American guerrillas since the dark days of 1942.

The foremost Filipino guerrilla leader in Leyte was Governor Ruperto Kangleon. Before heading the Leyte Guerrilla, Kangleon who was a graduate of the old Philippine Constabulary Academy, fought the Japs invaders in Mindanao until

ordered to disband his Philippine army forces after the fall of Corregidor. He escaped from the Jap's prison after eight months of ill treatment in a concentration camp, and on his return to Leyte he quickly organized the various guerrilla units into a hard hitting mobile force.

Kangleon himself became such a menace to the Japs in Leyte, that a price of one million pesos was put on his head. "The Jap's money was almost worthless, so I wasn't very flattered," said the Governor.

And now, who is this General MacArthur? He was the most brilliant officer ever to graduate from West Point, decorated thirteen times for bravery under fire, the youngest general in the A.E.F. in World War I, youngest Chief of Staff in Army history, this was the man who was to become the architect of America's victory in the Pacific, the ruler of Imperial Japan, and the epic tactician of the Korean War of 1950.

MacArthur was off to the Philippines in 1903 as Second Lieutenant before the ink was dry on his West Point diploma. He was in the Army Corps of Engineers, then considered the elite corps of the service.

But it didn't take him long to get into action. He volunteered to go to the island of Samar to command the mop-up operation of a band of Filipinos called *pulajanes*. A native pointed out the direction of the *pulajanes* camp. MacArthur took out his .38 pistol and began advancing through the wild tropical forest. His father, General Arthur MacArthur, and Army captain at the time, whose career, like his son's was vitally concerned with the Philippines had warned him about this type of fighting guerrilla warfare; had told him that the Pilipinos were great masters of it.

Suddenly the stillness of the jungle was ripped open by the roar of a shotgun. MacArthur's orderly, walking at his side, fell to the ground dead. Then another shot from somewhere spun away his hat. "I guess I must have looked a little pale around the gills," he can still say, with a laugh.

During the next few days, following the landing a sustained series of heavy raids by 150-250 Japanese planes was directed against escort carrier forces and other surface units Headquarters of the Sixth Army, and General MacArthur's command post in

Tacloban did not escape attack. Direct hits were scored within a block of MacArthur's billet was struck on thanksgiving day. The General moved around unmindful of the near-death happening that day, as if nothing happened.

The honor of raising the first Filipino flag on Leyte soil on A-day was won by a Filipino corporal by the name Ponciano S. Dacones, a member of the U.S. Filipino regiment, who volunteered to bring the flag ashore and was later killed in action.

Neither the economic development nor the political rights of the Filipino people have been forgotten in the program to establish legitimate government in the Philippines.

President Osmeña sounded the clarion call of the national responsibility of the new Philippines when he declared in Tacloban the following:

"Ours is a constitutional government; ours is a community educated in the norms of a Christian civilization. Due respect for the law, rigid adherence to those principles established in civilized countries, complete obedience to the decisions of the courts — all these involve forms of character and high moral attributes that are the possession of enlightened countries like ours.

"On the threshold of occupying a sovereign place in the concert of free nations, we must live up to our responsibilities. We must prove our ability to maintain domestic peace and our capacity to mete out justice. Precisely when the eyes of the civilized world are focused on our country we cannot allow acts of personal revenge and misguided zeal to cast a reflection on our civilization and our ability to maintain an orderly government. Ours is a government by law; the splendor of its majesty must never be dimmed in our land."

The New York *Times* correspondent in a news story from Leyte made this observation as the work for reconstruction got under way:

"The basic of the whole effort has been a broad one aiming less to food, clothe and house destitute population — though that has been done where required — than to restore to the Filipinos the Government they established before the war, place it as rapidly as possible under their own control and remove them the earliest possible moment from the category of reci-

pient of relief given by the United States."

On November 8 the schools were reopened. In Tacloban alone 530 students registered the first day. Daytime fishing has been resumed in Leyte Gulf. Victory pesos have been issued in place of the worthless Japanese Micky-mouse money. Maximum prices have been established. In other words there was a speedy return to normalcy in the towns and barrios that were liberated.

Ladies and Gentlemen: To consider the significance of October 20, 1944 we have to look at it from different angles. To me this was not an invasion of revenge, but rather a war of righteous indignation. We are no conquering army. We are an army of free citizens determined unto death that democratic processes shall not pass. We are democracy at war, intent only upon lasting peace and justice.

The orderly return to civil government in the cities and towns of Leyte was a living example to the rest of the war-weary world that this war was one of true liberation.

Let me point another significance of which every educated Filipino should realize especially at this time of our national life where we are trying to search for our national identity as a people. Our national heritage as a stoic people, self-sacrificing in times of stresses, either personal or national, is vindicated. No people on earth had suffered more than the Filipinos. But no mob violence and vengeance was allowed to hold sway in the Philippines. A Filipino writer once said:

"Before us were the Japanese bayonets — behind us our Filipino traditions — and with us our unwavering loyalty to our country. The Japanese frightened us under duress we were compelled to do certain things, but what was with us and within us they could not take away."

The return of Douglas MacArthur meant not only victory and triumph of democracy but also the triumph of the dignity of the Filipino soul. Economic security is not enough. Only the spiritual securities can hold us within the circle of communal safety. The landings of the American forces on Suluan and Dinagat Islands on October 17 and on Red Beach, Palo on October 20, 1944 taught the world a lesson in cooperation and spiritual loyalties between the Philippines and the United States.


Let me close my lecture by saying that the foundation of the future was set here at Leyte upon which we can build a New Society, a New Nation and a New Filipino, if we are sufficiently wise, an edifice strong enough to hold the dreams of all men.

Thank you.


GLOSSARY

AC of S	Assistant Chief of Staff
Atry	Artillery
Atchd	Attached
AWOL	Absent without leave
Bn	Battalion
Btry	Battery
Co	Company
CO	Commanding Officer
CP	Command Post
DC of S	Deputy Chief of Staff
Div	Division
Engr	Engineer
FA	Field Artillery
G-2	Intelligence Division
G-3	Operation Division
GHQ	General Headquarters
Hwy	Highway
HPA	Headquarters Philippine Army
Hq	Headquarters
IJF	Imperial Japanese Forces
Inf	Infantry
KIA	Killed in Action
KP	Kilometer Post
LCM	Landing Craft, Mechanized
MIA	Missing in Action
MLR	Main Line of Resistance
NCO	Noncommissioned Officer
PA	Philippine Army
Plt	Platoon
POW	Prisoner of War
QM	Quartermaster
Regt	Regiment
RR	Railroad
SWPA	Southwest Pacific Area
TO	Table of Organization
USAFIP, NL	U.S. Army Forces in the Philippines, North Luzon
WIA	Wounded in Action
USAFFE	U.S. Army Forces in the Far East


MILITARY UNITS-IDENTIFICATION




Artillery




Cavalry, Horse



Engineer



Infantry



Medical Corps

SIZE SYMBOLS



Squad



Section




Platoon


I	Company
II	Battalion
III	Regiment
X	Brigade
XX	Division
XXX	Corps
XXXX	Army
XXXXX	Group of Armies




Area covered by USAFIP, NL.



Tangadan Operations 15th Infantry, USAFIP, NL




General Situation of 121st Infantry.




BATTLE FOR BESSANG PASS
(THE BREAK THROUGH)
June 14-15 1945




Battle for Bessang Pass, 3rd Phase.



Lepanto-Mankayan Operations USAFIP, NL



BAUKO - SABANGAN
OPERATIONS



General Situation of the 15th Infantry, USAFIP, NL (15 April 1945)

PRESIDENTS OF THE
PHILIPPINE HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION

1.	Gabriel F. Fabella, Sr., UP	1955
2.	Gabriel F. Fabella, Sr.	1956
3.	Gabriel F. Fabella, Sr.	1957
4.	Nicolas Zafra, UP	1958
5.	Gabriel F. Fabella, Sr.	1959
6.	Esteban A. de Ocampo, MLQ	1960
7.	Dalmacio Martin (on leave), D of E Ricardo A. Arcilla (Acting), UM	1961
8.	Nicolas Zafra	1962
9.	Esteban A. de Ocampo	1963
10.	Esteban A. de Ocampo (on leave) Federico S. Tuason (Acting), JRC	1964
11.	Gregorio F. Zaide, FEU	1965
12.	Gregorio F. Zaide	1966
13.	Celedonio A. Ancheta, UP	1967
14.	Sixto Y. Orosa, K of R	1968
15.	Esteban A. de Ocampo	1969
16.	Esteban A. de Ocampo	1970
17.	Gloria M. Santos, SMC	1971
18.	Gloria M. Santos	1972
19.	Celedonio O. Resurreccion, FEU	1973
20.	Celedonio O. Resurreccion	1974
21.	Diosdado G. Capino, AU	1975
22.	Diosdado G. Capino	1976

This issue is for the 1968 Historical Bulletin which was not ready in that year because of lack of materials available for publication.

Ambeth Ocampo



AMBETH R. OCAMPO

The objects and purposes of the Association are (a) to promote and propagate historical knowledge and studies; (b) to collect and preserve relics, manuscripts, documents and the like pertaining to the Philippines; and (c) to undertake any and other activities that will promote the objects and purposes of the Association. The regular membership fee in the Association is P20.00 a year which entitles a member to regular issues of the HISTORICAL BULLETIN free of charge. The life membership fee is P200.00.

Articles in the HISTORICAL BULLETIN do not represent the views of the PHA. Although the editors are responsible for their selection and acceptance, responsibility for the opinions expressed in the articles and for the accuracy of statements contained in them rests with their authors.

Articles for the HISTORICAL BULLETIN should be sent to the Editor-in-Chief, HISTORICAL BULLETIN, Philippine Historical Association, R-409, Guido-Ver Bldg., M. Jhocson cor. España, Manila.

The HISTORICAL BULLETIN is published quarterly in March, June, September and December.

Subscription and other business correspondence should be addressed to the Executive Director, PHA, to the same address above.